PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

GHANA

STATISTICAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(TF-97577)

June 28, 2016

IEG Human Development and Economic Management
Independent Evaluation Group
Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

*Currency Unit = Ghanaian cedi (Ȼ)*

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

- **ICR**: implementation completion report
- **IEG**: Independent Evaluation Group
- **IEGPS**: IEG Public Sector Evaluation
- **PPAR**: Project Performance Assessment Report
- **CAS**: country assistance strategy
- **CPI**: consumer price index
- **CPRP**: Community Population Registration Program
- **DFID**: UK Department for International Development
- **DSEH**: demographic, social, economic and housing characteristics
- **GSVP**: Ghana Statistics Development Plan
- **GSS**: Ghana Statistical Service
- **IDA**: International Development Association
- **MAPS**: Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics
- **MDA**: ministries, departments, and agencies
- **MDTF**: multi-donor trust fund
- **MMDA**: metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies
- **MOF**: Ministry of Finance
- **NACPUS**: National Advisory Committee of Producers and Users of Statistics
- **NSS**: national statistical system
- **PAD**: project appraisal document
- **PDMG**: Program Development and Management Group
- **PES**: post enumeration survey
- **SRF-CF**: Statistics for Results Catalytic Fund
- **TFSCB**: Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building

Fiscal Year

- **Government**: January 1 - December 31

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director-General, Independent Evaluation</td>
<td>Ms. Caroline Heider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Human Development and Economic Management</td>
<td>Mr. Nick York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager, Human Development and Corporate Evaluations</td>
<td>Ms. Marie Gaarder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Manager</td>
<td>Ms. Ann Elizabeth Flanagan</td>
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Contents

Principal Ratings ........................................................................................................ v
Key Staff Responsible ................................................................................................. v
Preface ........................................................................................................................ vii
Summary ...................................................................................................................... 1
1. Background and Context ....................................................................................... 5
2. Objectives, Design, and their Relevance ............................................................. 7
   Project Development Objectives ......................................................................... 7
   Project design .......................................................................................................... 7
   Relevance of Objectives ......................................................................................... 9
   Relevance of Design ............................................................................................... 9
3. Implementation ....................................................................................................... 10
   Implementation Experience ................................................................................... 11
   Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance .................................................................. 13
4. Achievement of the Objectives .......................................................................... 14
   Objective 1: To prepare GSS for institutional reforms ...................................... 14
   Objective 2: Timely analysis and dissemination of census data ......................... 15
5. Efficiency ............................................................................................................... 20
6. Outcomes ............................................................................................................. 21
7. Risk to Development Outcomes ........................................................................ 21
8. World Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 23
   World Bank Performance .................................................................................... 23
   Borrower’s performance ....................................................................................... 24
9. Monitoring and Evaluation System .................................................................... 26
10. Lessons ............................................................................................................... 26
References ............................................................................................................... 26
Appendix A. Basic Data Sheet .................................................................................. 31
Appendix B. List of Persons Met ............................................................................. 33
Appendix C. Borrower Comments .......................................................................... 34

This report was prepared by Ann Elizabeth Flanagan and Chad Leechor, who assessed the project in March 2016. The report was peer reviewed by Brian Ngo and panel reviewed by Soniya Carvalho. Yezena Yimer provided administrative support.
Boxes

Box 3.1. Why GSDP II Was in Limbo for Three Years ........................................ 13
Box 4.1. How Statistics Change People’s Lives ....................................................... 18
Box 7.1. A Baffling Case of the Statistics Bill ....................................................... 22
Box 8.1. The Restructuring of GSDP II (SRF-CF) .................................................... 25

Tables

Table 1.1. Comparison of Two Projects in Support of the Government’s GSDP .......... 6
Table 2.1. Summary Results Framework .................................................................. 7
Table 3.1. Budget estimates and actual outturns by components, in millions ........... 11
Table 5.1. Implementation Delays and Implications .................................................. 20
Table 7.1. Funds Received by GSS from the government and principal donors (2010-15) ................................................................................................................. 21
**Principal Ratings**

**GHANA: STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (MDTF)**  
*(TF-97577)*

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* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible World Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate Independent Evaluation Group product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

**Key Staff Responsible**

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<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Task Manager/Leader</th>
<th>Division Chief/ Sector Director</th>
<th>Country Director</th>
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<tr>
<td>Appraisal</td>
<td>John Y. Ngwafon</td>
<td>Richard G. Scobey</td>
<td>Ishac Diwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completion</td>
<td>John Y. Ngwafon</td>
<td>Grant James Cameron</td>
<td>Yusupha B. Crookes</td>
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About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the World Bank’s self-evaluation process and to verify that the World Bank’s work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20-25 percent of the World Bank’s lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or World Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview World Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEG peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible World Bank department. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both World Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers’ comments are attached to the document that is sent to the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations

IEG’s use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org).

**Outcome:** The extent to which the operation’s major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. **Relevance** includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project’s objectives are consistent with the country’s current development priorities and with current World Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project’s design is consistent with the stated objectives. **Efficacy** is the extent to which the project’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. **Efficiency** is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. **Possible ratings for Outcome:** Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Risk to Development Outcome:** The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). **Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:** High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

**World Bank Performance:** The extent to which services provided by the World Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. **Possible ratings for World Bank Performance:** Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance:** The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. **Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:** Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.
Preface

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the Ghana Statistical Development Project (GSDP), which was approved by the World Bank on December 31, 2010, and financed through a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF), including the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID) and the European Commission. The total project cost was estimated at US$7.37 million. The actual cost was US$5.9 million. The original closing date of the project was December 31, 2012, but it was extended by six months to June 30, 2013, to advance the implementation of project activities.

The report was prepared by Chad Leechor, consultant to the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). The findings are based on a field visit to Ghana from March 29, 2016 to April 6, 2016. The team met with the Ghana Statistical Service and all the participating agencies in the project. The team conducted interviews with a broad range of users of statistics, including the University of Ghana, the Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research, and development partners, including the International Monetary Fund, DFID and UNICEF.

IEG is grateful for the excellent cooperation of all of the stakeholders and the support of the World Bank country office in Accra.

Following standard IEG procedures, a copy of the draft report was sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and feedback. Their comments were taken into account and are enclosed in Appendix C.
**Summary**

Following the declaration of the Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics in November 2004, and with a growing global consensus on the need to build and broaden the statistical capacity of developing countries, the Government of Ghana began a process of analytical reviews and needs assessments. Late in 2008, with the support of the World Bank, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DIFD), and other external partners, the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) launched the Ghana Statistical Development Program (GSDP). It was an ambitious and far-reaching plan designed to align and dovetail the work program with the needs of the general public and the government, including the requirements for planning, policy making, and monitoring and evaluation.

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) focuses on the results of the World Bank’s Ghana Statistical Development Project (P118585), which was approved in December 2010 and closed in June 2013. It was the first in a series of two World Bank operations dedicated to supporting the government’s broader initiative with the same title—Ghana Statistical Development Program. The objective of this operation was “to prepare GSS for institutional reform and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data.” For the second operation, the objective was “to strengthen the National Statistical System in the production and dissemination of timely and robust statistics relevant for evidence-based policy making and other uses.” This PPAR also discusses, but does not review, the second operation.

Initially, the assistance from the World Bank was meant to be substantial and give a major boost to the government’s statistical development—similar to the second project in this series. During project preparation in 2009, however, it was decided that a smaller project that might be prepared quickly could give a head start to the corporate reform program and help finance the 2010 population and housing census. This smaller operation was expected to precede the main project by about 18 months. But there was a delay of almost one year in bringing the first project to the approval stage, while the main operation proceeded on schedule. As it turned out, the first project was approved only nine months ahead of the second.

As far as the first project is concerned, the objectives were well aligned with national priorities and assistance strategies of the World Bank—both at the time of appraisal and completion. However, the clarity of objectives suffered from the absence of rationale and direction of reforms. The project appraisal document (PAD) did not present the scope and extent of corporate actions to be undertaken to “prepare the GSS for institutional reforms.” Although additional information is available in the project components and results framework, the difference between the reform package of the project and that of

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2 The second operation which was approved in August 2011, also experienced a major delay. . . It did not become effective until April 2014.
the government’s corporate blueprint for GSS was not discussed. The relevance of objectives is rated Modest.

The causal chains underlying the project as presented in the PAD showed many deficiencies. First, the statement of objectives was unclear, providing no measurable targets or outcomes to be achieved. Second, the institutional reforms as defined by the project overlooked a crucial part of the government’s strategic blueprint—the redeployment and retrenchment of staff according to established rules.3 The agenda was thus fragmented and introduced uncertainties, including possible delays, in the funding of reforms. Third, the project team failed to revise and restructure the design of the project when circumstances changed with the one-year delay (from late 2009 to late 2010) in getting the first project to the approval stage. The project design should have been amended—to reduce the scope to cover only the census work or extend the duration to three or four years—to alleviate congestion of the institutional reform agenda and the 2010 census work, which by 2011 had become a matter of urgency. Fourth, adequate arrangements were not made to limit the loss of specialized and skilled staff. The results framework therefore offered little chance of achieving its goal. The relevance of design is rated Modest.

The first objective—to prepare GSS for institutional reforms—was partially achieved at the time the project closed—a significant shortcoming being that the statistics bill which was essential to preparing the GSS for institutional reforms was not presented to (let alone approved by) parliament. By April 2016, when this report was under preparation, all of the milestones set out in the PAD were met, but the statistics bill remained to be approved by the cabinet and parliament. The achievement of the first objective is rated Modest.

The second objective—to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data—was fully achieved at project completion. The final results of the census were released in May 2012, followed—within 10 months—by a series of 13 analytical papers including a national analytical report and 10 regional analytical reports, as well as a demographic, social, economic, and housing characteristics (DSEH) report. In addition, a variety of outputs not specifically targeted in the PAD, including the statistical compendium (manual of definitions, concepts, and methods), one-stop user service center and an international peer review process, were also delivered. The achievement of the second objective is rated Substantial.

Efficiency. Neither the PAD nor implementation completion report (ICR) presented an economic and financial analysis. There were no issues on the compliance with World Bank fiduciary and financial management policies. But a preponderance of evidence points to inefficient use of resources, as illustrated by a loss of four years in getting cabinet approval for the statistics bill and a delay of almost one year before the project was approved. Following approval, the project suffered multiple operational setbacks, among them the inability to secure technical advisors in a timely basis, a delay of more

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3 By design, the first project was meant to determine job qualifications and skill requirements and identify staff to be redeployed or retrenched. . . The second project was to implement the personnel action and pay for the expenses including severance packages or buy-outs. . . As it turned out, the second project was delayed by nearly three years.
than three years to complete the reforms of human resources, and the need to extend the closing date by six months for a two-year project. On balance, efficiency is rated **Modest**.

**Overall, the outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.**

**Risk to development outcomes.** Among the key risks to sustainability are: i) GSS’s funding uncertainty due to unpredictable budgetary allocations and ii) loss of qualified staff. Each of these risks could directly undermine Ghana’s statistical capacity and the results achieved. The project did not mitigate or provide safeguards for these threats. As such, the risk to development outcomes is rated **Significant**.

**World Bank performance**

(i) **Quality at entry.** The quality at entry was Unsatisfactory. The first objective was not adequately defined. Project planning was poor, with unmanageable bunching of the census work and institutional reforms. The results framework was weak, with a fragmented reform agenda that lacked crucial measures (redeployment and retrenchment of staff). The monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was notable mainly for its lack of contents. Quality at entry is rated **Unsatisfactory**.

(ii) **Quality of supervision.** Project supervision was mechanical, relying on routine administrative and financial data, rather than progress towards the results envisaged. Specialized areas were not adequately covered, including legal reforms and legislative processes. More importantly, the supervision team failed to secure the funding for the completion of corporate reforms which was embedded in GSDP II and left the reform agenda unfinished for another three years. The quality of project supervision is rated **Unsatisfactory**.

**Overall, World Bank performance is rated Unsatisfactory.**

**Borrower performance**

(i) **Government performance.** The government provided strong and consistent ownership of the project. It supported politically sensitive reforms and ensured an enabling environment for the GSS, including technical support as well as the personnel and office space of the project management unit. It could, however, have been more vigilant and more proactive in its deliberation of the statistics bill, which by all accounts involves no sensitive issues and yet has not been approved in nearly four years. Government performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

(ii) **Implementing agency performance.** Equally strong was the commitment of the GSS and its Board of Directors. Together, they gave the World Bank team extensive and reliable support. They also independently resolved many difficult implementation challenges, ranging from difficult measures in the workplace to poor design of the project and the absence of monitoring system. The Program Development and Management Group (PDMG) showed particularly strong performance in coordinating all activities efficiently and promptly tackling implementation issues as they arose. Monthly reviews were consistently carried out and progress reports issued as scheduled. Nonetheless, GSS could have made a difference on the statistics bill by
monitoring its status more closely and submitting periodic inquiries to the cabinet. Implementing agency performance is rated **Moderately Satisfactory**.

**Overall, borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.**

*Monitoring and evaluation system.* No functional M&E system was developed and used in this project—no outcomes and no tracking indicators. Project supervision relied on routine administrative data and final outputs of the activities supported. There was no way of obtaining interim results, other than asking individual task teams. If an activity made no progress, it would not trigger any alarms or activate any corrective actions. The quality of the M&E system is rated **Negligible.**

**Lessons.**

Among the lessons derived from this review are:

- To provide the public with relevant and reliable statistics, the national statistical office needs a responsive governing body to give strategic direction. Of particular importance is the presence of directors who represent the interest of data users—researchers, development partners, academicians, students and policy makers. Ghana once had such a mechanism; it was called the National Advisory Committee of Producers and Users of Statistics (NACPUS).

- In supporting corporate or institutional reform agendas, it is essential to ensure orderly, efficient, and effective implementation to minimize the impact on staff. It requires meticulous design, thorough consultations, adequate funding, and the supervision of specialists. By failing to include the funding for redeployment and retrenchment, the project held up the completion of corporate reforms for years.

- It helps to ensure that all the technical assistance services are in place before the project is presented to the Board. This was not the case with this project. After it became effective in February 2011, GSS was unable to get an expert to assist on the World Bank’s procurement simply because it did not know how to use the World Bank’s procurement system to hire that expert.

- Despite the large role that the World Bank has played in mobilizing international support for statistical development, the capacity of the World Bank team to deliver results in this area should not be taken for granted. Even though the World Bank team appeared to be well qualified and the task team seemed to possess the right skills mix, project results were modest.

- The check-list approach to monitoring and evaluation, as applied in this project, does not work. The results framework relied exclusively on administrative data (disbursements) and outputs (reports) of various activities to indicate the extent of progress made. No interim variables were chosen or developed to track progress.

Nick York  
Director  
Human Development and Economic Management  
Independent Evaluation Group
1. Background and Context

1.1 At the dawn of the 21st century, the global development community became acutely aware of the need to upgrade and significantly increase the supply of relevant statistics. Quality data was sought in the quest to improve policy making, enhance governance and monitor progress. The World Bank played a central role in raising the awareness, convening stakeholders and mobilizing resources to advance this agenda. In 1999, Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21) was founded in the context of the United Nation’s Conference on Development to develop a culture of evidence-based policy making. Soon thereafter, the Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building (TFSCB) was established as a World Bank-administered, multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) to provide grants to developing countries to improve their capacity to compile and use statistics. In 2004, the Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics (MAPS) emerged from the Second Round Table for Managing for Development Results as a global plan to improve development statistics based on an informal partnership involving developing countries, donors, and statistical agencies worldwide.

1.2 This key initiative was not lost on Ghana. In fact, within the government, and especially at the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) where external support had been actively sought, it resonated profoundly. To seize the moment, the government of Ghana requested the assistance of the World Bank, as well as many external partners notably UK DFID, for both technical advice and funding to develop a far reaching program of statistical capacity building to modernize the role of GSS. With the consent of partners, extensive consultations and needs assessments were carried out.

1.3 The results were not surprising: major shortcomings were found across the board, including structural (legal and organizational), managerial and professional (skills), and financial deficiencies. Of particular concern was the weak capacity of staff at the GSS, inconsistencies in official statistics, use of different concepts and definitions by data producers and delays in the release of statistical data. The assessments recommended the development of a strategic framework, including a legislative foundation, to address the weaknesses. The challenges of the GSS were to be addressed first to make it more efficient in coordinating the National Statistical System.

1.4 In November 2008, with the help of development partners, GSS launched the Ghana Statistical Development Program (GSDP), which included a Corporate Plan to serve as the blueprint for institutional reforms of the GSS. The GSDP is a system-wide approach intended to revamp the entire national statistical system (NSS), including the GSS and ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) responsible for data collection and dissemination. The vision of GSDP has been to align activities of the NSS with the requirements of the government in planning, decision-making, and monitoring and evaluation. GSDP also envisages making statistics more relevant, reliable, and easily accessible to the public, including the private sector, social networks, cultural communities, civil societies, researchers, students, and development partners. The cost of the program was estimated to be $157 million, including major surveys, such as the 2010 population and housing census, to be implemented over five years.
1.5 This PPAR focuses on the results of the Ghana Statistical Development Project (P118585) of the World Bank, which was approved in December 2010 and closed in June 2013. It was the first in a series of two World Bank operations dedicated to supporting the government’s broader initiative with the same title – Ghana Statistical Development Program. The objective of this operation was “to prepare GSS for institutional reform and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data.” For the second operation, the objective was “to strengthen the National Statistical System in the production and dissemination of timely and robust statistics relevant for evidence-based policy making and other uses.” This PPAR also discusses, but does not review, the second operation (Table 1.1).

### Table 1.1. Comparison of Two Projects in Support of the Government’s GSDP

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<th>GSDP II (SRF-CF)</th>
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<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td>To prepare GSS for institutional reform and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data⁴</td>
<td>To strengthen the National Statistical System in the production and dissemination of timely and robust statistics relevant for evidence-based policy making and other uses⁵</td>
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<td>Actual</td>
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<td>TF Contribution</td>
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<td>August 25, 2011</td>
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**Notes:**
2. World Bank, 2014, Financing Agreement, Credit Number 5010, February 27.

**Sources:** The World Bank and IEG staff estimates

1.6 Initially, the assistance from the World Bank was meant to be substantial and give a major boost to the government’s statistical development program – something like the second in this series. During project preparation in 2009, however, it was decided that a smaller project that might be prepared quickly could give a head start to the corporate reform program and help finance the 2010 population and housing census. This smaller operation was expected to precede the main project by about 18 months. But there was a delay of almost a year before the first project was approved while the second proceeded as scheduled. Ultimately, the first project was approved only 9 months ahead of the second.

2. Objectives, Design, and their Relevance

Project Development Objectives

2.1 According to Schedule 1 of the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund Grant Agreement of February 7, 2011, the objective of the (Ghana Statistical Development) Project is to prepare GSS for institutional reforms and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data. The statement of objectives given in the PAD is identical. The overall objective of the government’s larger program is “to modernize and streamline the Ghana National Statistical System to ensure that it is sufficiently resourced in terms of human resources, essential tools and infrastructure to produce and disseminate reliable and timely statistics in a cost effective manner, in accordance with international standards and in response to user needs” (World Bank, 2011, Project Appraisal Document for the Ghana Statistical Development Project, p. 9).

Project design

The Results Framework

2.2 The summary results framework as presented on page 29, of the PAD is presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. Summary Results Framework

<table>
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<th>Development objective</th>
<th>To prepare GSS for institutional reform and to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data.</th>
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<td>Baseline</td>
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<td>1. Institutional reform being implemented and on track</td>
<td>• Statistics law drafted.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Financial management</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• System in place.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Functional review of the NSS completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Restructuring strategy agreed.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Comprehensive training program developed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Provisional results of the census being available</td>
<td>• Performance management system fully operational.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>--</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Release of provisional results</td>
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2.3 In addition, the PAD also stipulated that, as an intermediate result, the Statistics Law would be approved by the cabinet and the parliament by the end of 2012 (Appendix 3, p. 31).
Components

2.4 The project had five components – legal and institutional reform; GSS capacity building; improving the quality and dissemination of statistical products; supporting the 2010 Census post enumeration; and project management. Components 1, 2 and 3 support the first objective – to prepare GSS for institutional reforms. Component 4 supports the second objective – to ensure timely and extensive analysis and dissemination of census data. Component 5 covers project management activities.

Component 1: Legal and institutional reform (Appraisal, US$0.38 million)

(i) Amendments of the existing legal and regulatory instruments governing GSS; and
(ii) Reorganization of the institutional structure of GSS and reform of its human resource management framework through:
   a. Development of job specifications for managers and staff;
   b. Introduction of a management information system; and
   c. Preparation of a redeployment and retrenchment plan after the 2010 Population and Housing Census.

Component 2: GSS capacity building (Appraisal, US$1.36 million)

(i) Preparation of a needs assessment, developing and implementing a training program for GSS management and staff;
(ii) Upgrading of information technology equipment to improve communication and internet connection between the GSS and other entities, and
(iii) Enhancement of Ghana’s geographical information system by assessing its practices and policies and implementing needed reforms and providing the hardware and software for the geographical information system.

Component 3: Improving the quality and dissemination of statistical products (Appraisal, US$ 0.90 million)

(i) To improve the production and dissemination of statistical products across the Ghana Statistical Service, including among others, reviewing the quality and scope of statistical products and services, aligning them with international best practices; making quality products publicly available and supporting the preparation of a manual on statistical standards and methods on selected areas.

Component 4: Supporting the 2010 Census post enumeration activities (Appraisal, US$2.58 million)

(i) To carry out activities on the 2010 Census, including census data analysis; production and dissemination of reports and improving the capacity of the GSS to analyze census data and
(ii) To conduct the 2010 Census post enumeration survey including printing of survey and other forms; data collection and data capturing, editing, validation and reconciliation.

Component 5: Project Management (Appraisal, US$1.00 million)
Relevance of Objectives

2.5 The objectives of the project were well aligned with national priorities and assistance strategies of the World Bank – both at the time of appraisal and completion. At appraisal (September 2009), the Second Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), which was in effect from 2006 through 2009, specifically mentioned timely and reliable statistics as being essential for good governance and economic management. At the time of closing in 2013, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (2010 - 2013), listed improvements in national statistics as a pre-requisite for evidence based policy making, which in turn contributes to transparent and accountable governance. Similarly, the World Bank’s Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (2007 - 2010), which dovetailed the government’s GPRS II, pledged its support for the national statistical system. The objective of this project directly supported the goal of evidence-based decision making and the objective of good governance of the Joint Assistance Strategy. The Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report (CASPR) of the World Bank, which was effective from March 2010 through July 2013, when the project closed, noted specifically that “a program of support for the Ghana Statistics Development Plan is planned to advance a results based approach to public policy formulation in Ghana.”

2.6 However, the objective as stated in the project documents does not clarify the rationale or direction of the institutional reform being supported. No indications are given that the support provided under the project would pave the way towards a national statistical system capable of producing relevant, reliable, and timely statistics, as envisaged by the government. Nor did the PAD present the scope and extent of corporate actions to be undertaken to “prepare the GSS for institutional reforms”. While additional information is available in the project components and results framework, the difference between the reform package of the project and that of the government’s corporate blueprint for GSS was not discussed.

2.7 By comparison, the statement of objectives given in the government’s broader statistical development program is perfectly clear. It shows why the reforms are being sought as well as the quality of statistics to be delivered. Since the statement of objectives serves as the basis on which the achievements of the project are to be measured, the inadequate clarity diminishes its relevance. The relevance of objectives is rated Modest.

Relevance of Design

2.8 In principle, the design of the project should have been clear and straightforward. But, as it is designed and presented in the PAD, many complex issues arise. Among them:

- First, the objectives are not clearly stated, with inadequate specificity and large areas of ambiguity. For example, “to prepare for institutional reforms” is a vague goal that could be met by a variety of actions, including one brief meeting to discuss a concept note. In addition, no specific targets or types or direction of reforms are given – a reshuffling of existing staff and managers would qualify under the stated objective.
Second, the institutional reform package supported by the project is fragmented, incomplete and difficult to implement. It deviates from the blueprint of the government’s GSS Corporate Plan in a critical way. The government’s blueprint calls for a reclassification of jobs, skill requirements and redeployment of staff, including retrenchment, retraining and buyouts (severance payments) in a comprehensive and coherent package. The project removes the redeployment and retrenchment actions from the reform package and leaves this key element of the program to be implemented under a future operation. This fragmentation of personnel actions subjects the reforms to uncertainties, including delays in the arrival of a future operation – a risk that actually materialized in this case.

It should be noted that these personnel actions cannot be unilaterally decided and imposed top-down by GSS management. It needs to be a two-way street in which individual staff is consulted to determine the preference, needs and circumstances. Some staff might volunteer to be redeployed with no incentives offered, while others would not transfer at any cost or would rather receive retraining in order to remain with GSS. The reform package fails to take this crucial consultation process into account. It envisages a reorganization to be imposed with no voice of the staff, since GSS is unable to make any offers to retain the staff or give them incentives to be redeployed or retrenched. If implemented as envisaged, the partial reforms target staff for separation without immediate benefit of retraining, compensation or new posting in a different organization.

Third, the project design does not address significant changes that affect the causal chains and sequencing of events. Due to external events, the approval of the project was delayed by about one year, from December 2009 to December 2010. The loss of time created an urgency for the completion and release of the 2010 census. It would have been prudent to restructure the project, possibly by focusing exclusively on the census work and removing the institutional reforms component. Alternatively, the duration could be extended from two to four years to accommodate the workload arising from the 2010 census. But no such amendments were made prior to approval. The design remained unchanged and contributed to foreseeable bottlenecks and delays, which materialized as the project was being implemented.

Fourth, adequate arrangements were not made to limit the loss of specialized and skilled staff.

As such, the weak design offers little assurance of the likelihood for success. The relevance of design is rated Modest.

### 3. Implementation

At appraisal, the total cost of the project was estimated to be US$7.37 million which would be financed by a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF), including GBP 3 million from the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (UK DFID) and EUR 1.9 million from the European Commission. Of the total funds available, US$ 6.2 million was to cover the estimated project cost at appraisal and the balance of about US$ 1 million was to mitigate exchange rate fluctuations.
Table 3.1. Budget estimates and actual outturns by components, in millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Estimates</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal &amp; institutional reforms</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality &amp; Timely Dissemination of Data</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Post–census enumeration survey</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project management</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.22</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.23</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ICRR and PAD

Note: The figures presented in the ICRR differ from the US$ 5.9 million total disbursement reported in operations portal.

3.2 During implementation, many reallocations of project funds took place. Some planned activities were dropped, including the installation of an accounting package and administrative management information system. They were dropped because the government was committed to install common financial information and administrative information systems across the public sector. The Financial Management (FM) consultant which was expected to build the capacity of the GSS Finance Unit was not hired. An FM assessment by the World Bank soon after effectiveness indicated there was no need for such a consultant. Some activities were added including additional work to engage stakeholders, prepare integration guidelines under the Institutional Reform Component and support the re-basing of the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

3.3 The original closing date of the project was December 31, 2012. At the request of the government, the closing date was extended by six months to June 30, 2013, in order to advance in the implementation of project activities. The PDO and the performance indicators remained unchanged.

**Implementation Experience**

3.4 The operating environment for the GSDP was full of challenges, both foreseeable and unexpected. In addition, the implementation was further hampered by weak quality at entry. Among the key factors affecting implementation are:

3.5 **Poor planning.** An oversight committed at the outset hamstrung this project throughout its life. In the planning stage, both the World Bank and the government failed to recognize that the census enumeration work would be in full swing at the time that a comprehensive, and difficult, reorganization campaign would be launched and conducted. Each of these exercises would entail a workload that fully occupied the entire staff and management.

3.6 **Poor design.** The bunching of large and unrelated workloads was further exacerbated by weak technical design with funding gaps and issues related to the sequencing of events. As discussed above, the results framework did not lead to the main results and the wrong funding instrument was used. No assistance was provided to help the implementing agency procure technical assistance to learn about World Bank procurement. As discussed below (Section on M&E System), no meaningful monitoring
devices were developed and employed to track progress, other than the deliverables of each activity.

3.7 **Lack of working experience with the World Bank.** Unlike many MDAs in Ghana, GSS was never exposed to the administrative and fiduciary requirements of the World Bank. This proved to be a distinct disadvantage – at least in the initial stage. It relied heavily on the experience and expertise of the World Bank staff in drawing up an adequate design and operational blueprint – a reliance that in hindsight turned out to be misplaced. The loss of the GSS head of the procurement unit during the first year of implementation also compounded the problem.

3.8 **Civil service constraints.** While GSS is in principle an autonomous agency that reports directly to the Office of the President, in practice it relies on the Ministry of Finance and other MDAs for technical support. In addition, it is part of the public service that depends on the budgetary allocations of the government and is subject to the compensation, recruitment and job placement restrictions of the public sector. Each of these rules has an implication for the implementation of this project. For example, budgetary allocations proved to be unpredictable making it difficult to sustain a medium term work program, as required by the project. The staff with requisite expertise and training is often recruited by private firms with more attractive job offers. Furthermore, replacing lost staff has not been possible in recent years as a hiring freeze has been imposed across the public service.

3.9 **National election of December 2012.** The follow-on project – GSDP II or SRF-CF – was held up for three years. The reasons were: i) it was an IDA credit which requires parliamentary approval; ii) it contained funding for staff retrenchment, which was politically sensitive; iii) the incumbent administration did not wish to engage in a public debate of such a delicate issue in an election year. As a result, the project was shelved until after the election in December 2012. (For further details, see Box 3.1 below.) Thereafter, a new Minister of Finance was appointed. He requested additional time to study the project before giving clearance to the cabinet. Finally, the project was approved by parliament in 2014. The delay in the follow-on project was detrimental to the project under review (GSDP I or MDTF). As discussed above, a critical element of institutional reforms under this project was left unfunded in anticipation of the follow-on project.
Box 3.1. Why GSDP II Was in Limbo for Three Years

The second Ghana Statistical Development Project (GSDP II or SRF-CF Project) was approved on August 25, 2011, but it did not become effective until April 28, 2014, two years and eight months later. The delay in its approval is relevant to the evaluation of the first project.

A substantive reason for the delay that the project involved redeployment and retrenchment of staff at GSS. Part of the project funds were earmarked to pay for severance benefits (buyouts) of affected staff. In addition, some of the staff was expected to be transferred to other municipalities, ministries, departments and agencies. These are politically sensitive issues, which could trigger protracted debates in parliament when the project was presented for approval.6

Officials familiar with the project, however, explained that much of the delay could have been prevented. A crucial error was made when the task team and the implementing agency were not able to ensure timely cabinet approval of the project agreement within the calendar year 2011 or within 4 months of project approval by the World Bank Board (August 2011). If the project had been presented to parliament before the election year of 2012, it would not have received the extra scrutiny that it would be subjected to in an election year. It could have been quickly approved.

In the event, the cabinet did not get to review the project until the 2012 when political campaigns had begun. Following the death of incumbent President (John Atta Mills), the ruling party postponed the presentation of the project to parliament until after the election (December, 2012). More delays followed the appointment of a new Minister of Finance in 2013 who requested additional time to review the project and did not present it to parliament until February, 2014. Thereafter, the credit agreement was quickly endorsed and the project became effective in April.

Source: Interviews with staff of GSS and the Ministry of Finance

Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

a. Safeguard Compliance

3.10 Activities supported by the project involved only institutional reforms and capacity building. According to the project appraisal document, no safeguard policies were triggered. The project was rated Category C.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

3.11 The initial assessment of financial management and procurement capacity at GSS indicated major weaknesses. To mitigate these risks, a Project Implementation Manual and a Manual of Procedures were prepared and cleared by the World Bank prior to project effectiveness. Training was provided by procurement staff in the first year of the project, but the hiring of a procurement advisor to assist GSS staff, which was planned, was deemed unnecessary by a procurement specialist on the task team.

6 The project was financed by $30 million of IDA credit and $10 million of grants from the Statistics for Results Facility Catalytic Fund. . . The IDA credit portion of the project made it necessary to seek parliamentary approval.
3.12 According to the task team, the project and the borrower complied fully with the World Bank’s fiduciary policies. Internal management control was carried out by GSS. External audits were conducted each year by a firm approved by the government Auditor General. Regular joint supervision missions were carried out by the World Bank’s Project team, the government and the Donors contributing to the MDTF. Overall, fiduciary compliance was deemed adequate.

4. Achievement of the Objectives

4.1 As indicated above, the objectives of the project were narrow compared to the objectives of the government’s underlying program that the project was supporting. Many results were achieved that had not been explicitly stated as parts of the objectives.

Objective 1: To prepare GSS for institutional reforms

Inputs

The project supported this objective through:

- Technical assistance and advice on the development of a new legal and regulatory framework governing the roles and responsibilities of the National Statistical System, including GSS at the center. The new legal framework was to redefine the mandates of individual agencies in the National Statistical System, their reporting structures and methods of collaboration across agency boundaries. It was envisaged that the new law would be approved by parliament by the time the project closed.

- Technical assistance and advice on reforms of institutional structure and human resource management framework, including the information system. With the support, GSS was to develop new job specifications for staff, staff performance management system and preparation of redeployment and retrenchment plan, including a review of the terms and conditions of service.

Outputs

With the support of the project, the following outputs were reported:

- The Statistics Bill 2013 was prepared and completed. Before the project closed, the Bill was presented to the cabinet but the expected parliamentary approval was not achieved. Three years later, in May 2016, the Bill remained under cabinet review. Reasons for the delay are discussed in Box 5.1: A Baffling Case of Statistics Bill.

- A strategy for restructuring the GSS was prepared and approved by the GSS Board.

- A new organogram was approved by GSS Board and by the Public Service Commission.
A plan for reposting of staff was completed, but no funding was available under the project for implementation.

**Updates by the PPAR**

4.2 All of the milestones set out in the PAD were met by April 2016, with the notable exception of the Statistics Bill, which remained to be approved by the cabinet and parliament. These achievements are not directly attributable to the project.

- Financial management system in place (2014). It was implemented as part of the public sector’s Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS). The launch of GIFMIS was widely covered by the media.
- Functional review of the NSS which was a milestone not met as the project closed in June 2013 and was taken up under the GSDP II (SRF-CF). According to PDMG staff, it was completed (2015) with implementation to take place by 2018 when GSDP II is expected to close.
- Restructuring strategy agreed (2012), as discussed in the ICR and confirmed by GSS;
- Comprehensive training program developed (2012), as thoroughly documented by the government in the Grantee’s Implementation Completion Report (Section 3.2, page 29 of the World Bank’s 2013 ICR);
- Performance management system fully operational (2015), although it is the system used by all MDAs and differs from that originally envisaged.

4.3 Thus, the first objective was partially achieved, with a major shortcoming in the failure to get parliamentary approval for the Statistics Bill. The achievement of this objective is rated Modest.

**Objective 2: Timely analysis and dissemination of census data**

**Inputs**

The project supported the following activities:

- Post census enumeration activities, including:
  - Analysis of census data, report writing and dissemination of the preliminary and final results;
  - Production and distribution of analytical and thematic reports beyond census data including national and regional reports;

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7 See for example, URL: http://www.ghananewsagency.org/features/gifmis-tackles-public-sector-financial-challenges—76631
- Specialized training workshops geared towards improving the capacity for GSS staff to analyze census data;

- Post-census enumeration survey. This survey was to be conducted immediately after the census to reconcile and validate the results. Among the activities are:
  - Training of field staff for the survey;
  - Printing survey manuals and questionnaires;
  - Data collection at the district and regional levels;
  - Data matching and editing;
  - Reconciliation and quality control.

**Outputs**

With the support of the project, the following outputs were reported:

- Provisional results of the 2010 census were released in February 2011 and the final results in May 2012, well within the time frame of the original project. These publications are available on the internet and in hard copies at the GSS and local book stores in Ghana. Census data, in Ghana as in other countries, are some of the most important and widely used information. Business users include banks assessing potential demands for loans and entrepreneurs evaluating locations for a new business. Policy-makers need population data for revenue sharing and allocation of public expenditures. Researchers have diverse applications for census data, ranging from the needs for medical services to internet use by different age groups and income categories.

- Post Enumeration Survey (PES) Report, completed in-house by GSS staff with editorial assistance of an external consultant. The PES report was published (and posted on the web) in June 2013 at the closing of the project, along with GSS’s National Analytical Report. The PES is a method for evaluating the results of the 2010 census. As census results are used for more policy and planning purposes, it is essential to review the quality and limitations of the data and to understand the inaccuracies that may occur. While no data is currently available on the users of this specific report, users of the PES are generally those who use census data (see below). However, the PES is of greater value to those who depend on population characteristics for their businesses and careers. Politicians, for example, need reliable ethnic and socio-economic data of households in particular electoral districts. Demographers need refined distinctions of age and education attainment of residents in particular Regions.

- One of the limitations of current census data is a large gap in the geographical coverage of remote communities. (See Box 4.1 below.) Many small villages, especially those of the Northern Region, do not currently appear in any official

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records. To narrow this gap, the Births and Deaths Registry has launched the Community Population Registration Program (CPRP) to register the residents of these undocumented villages.

✓ A series of analytical results were produced and disseminated, including:

- National and Regional Analytical Reports\textsuperscript{12};
- Demographic, Social, Economic and Housing Characteristics (DSEH)\textsuperscript{13}.

4.4 These analytical reports enhance and broaden the usefulness of the basis census data by providing maps (at national, regional and district levels) and disaggregation of the data, for example, by age, income and housing groups. More sophisticated policy makers and researchers, especially international users, benefit from the availability of these statistics.

✓ Rebasing of the consumer price index (CPI) in July 2013\textsuperscript{14}. The new base year is 2012, replacing the 2002 base year. Price statistics are the most fundamental economic data, used by the central bank for making monetary policy, by the government for reviewing the standards of living and by international bodies such as the UN to compare real income and purchasing power parity. Rebasering the price index means changing the weights attached to the constituent components. Since a more recent year is a better reflection of the consumers’ current purchases, a new and more recent base year is more relevant to both consumers and policymakers.

✓ According to GSS, the following training activities were carried out:

- 50 GSS and MDA staff trained on the use of STATA at the University of Cape Coast between July and August, 2012;
- 40 staff on Integrated Management Information System in December 2012;
- 10 staff trained on archiving and documentation.

4.5 Thus the achievement of the second objective is rated Substantial.


\textsuperscript{13} For a copy of the DSEH report, click here URL: http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/publications/2010_PHC_demographic_social_economic_housing_characteristics.pdf

Box 4.1. How Statistics Change People’s Lives

Many communities in rural Ghana are far removed from public services and infrastructure. Few residents are literate or have access to official records, such as a home address or marriage certificate. Most children are born without legal identity. To the rest of the world, they simply do not exist. With the help of the Ghana Statistical Development Project (GSDP) and the staff of Births and Deaths Registry (BDR), however, some of these communities are now more visible.

One such community is Gizaa in Kumbungu District of the Northern Region. Residents of Gizaa participated in an outreach drive called the Community Population Registration Program (CPRP), which was made possible by the use of Mobile Registration Vans (MRVs) financed by the GSDP. A BDR team visited Gizaa and met with the village chief, elders and representatives of the local authority to explain the concept and benefits of a nationwide Community Population Register. (It is a system of data collection in which residents’ names, gender, date of birth, education, marital and health status are recorded and regularly updated.) Volunteers with requisite levels of literacy were selected and trained to complete registration forms and maintain the Register. At specified intervals, the volunteers would submit the completed forms to the nearest registration office within the District. The BDR duty officials would then issue actual birth certificates for the families.

Today, Gizaa is on the map. With the proof of residency and birth certificates in the community, the Kumbungu District Assembly was able to provide assistance with electricity and basic water harvesting schemes including bore holes. With the arrival of power supply and water, family members are freed of daily time-consuming chores. More economic opportunities have become available. Girls have a chance to attend school — once schools and teachers arrive in the community, that is.

Source: Births and Deaths Registry; IEG

Results Not Specifically Stated in the Objectives

4.6 Many key results fundamental to the achievements of the government’s statistical development objectives are listed here. The project contributed directly to these achievements. Nonetheless, they are not mentioned or indirectly covered in the statement of objectives of the project. (An assessment of the relevance of objectives is made in Section 2 above.)

Outputs

Among the more significant outputs are:

✓ An Action Plan that resulted from the Peer Review with statisticians participating from counterpart agencies in Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, as well as the African Development Bank.15 (Source: GSS and AfDB.)

URL: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#search/peer+review/153cc734f758da25?projector=1
Completion of the Compendium of Statistical Standards, Variables and Concepts covering 23 subject areas, exceeding the target of 10 originally envisaged. (Source: GSS. See link at the footnote below.)

A User Satisfaction Survey (2012) was carried out and published – a key result that shows outcomes in terms of data quality. (Source: GSS with the URL for the document given in the footnote below.)

Resource and Data Center – a new one-stop service center was established for users of statistics to get technical support from GSS; (Source GSS)

Improvements in the Geographic Information System (GIS) – an outcome that helped improve the quality of the 2010 Census Atlas and has been used by international researchers. (Source GSS and Center for Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Services)

95 percent of GSS staff of 481, including Regional Offices, received training in managerial and technical areas. (Source: GSS)

Outcomes

4.7 Although no specific and observable outcomes were stipulated in the PAD, a few indications of positive outcomes resulting from the production of data are available:

- Enhanced GIS data has been widely used and cited by international researchers, including for example, BiomedCentral, a British publisher has supported research on the application of GIS to control the spread of ulcer in Ghana;
- The peer review mechanism on GSS data has been studied and published by the African Development Bank. (See footnote 3)
- A survey conducted by GSS shows that more than 4,000 organizations and individuals have made use of data and publications released by GSS including the Statistical Compendium.

4.8 In addition, it would be reasonable to expect some improvement in the capacity among staff at GSS and the quality of data delivered as a result of the project. A follow-up User Satisfaction Survey is scheduled to be conducted this year (2016). The result of this survey, together with the 2012 baseline, would give indications of an important outcome.

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18 URL: http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/DataRequest.html

19 URL: http://cersgis.org/remote_sensing.html


21 URL: https://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2013/06/15/survey-shows-4000-groups-use-statistics-by-gss/
5. Efficiency

5.1 Neither the PAD nor the ICR offers traditional cost-benefit analysis or rate of return calculations. With good reasons, these project documents argue that the results of the project are primarily public goods that enhance social welfare and contribute to the quality of governance by generating more reliable evidence. There is also little or no scope for revenue generation or cost recovery associated with the outputs or outcomes of this operation.

5.2 However, the project experienced protracted delays and loss of opportunities, as summarized in Table 5.1. Among them:

- Four years of lost time in advancing the Statistics Bill to parliament;
- Considerable delays (more than three years) in completing the institutional reforms due to the lack of funding for staff redeployment at GSS;
- Delays in getting started, including getting procurement advisors at GSS;
- A last-minute restructuring of the project budget and procurement plan was needed prior to project approval due to a mis-procurement at GSS (not involving Bank resources). This revision delayed the effectiveness of the project by almost one year;
- The closing date was extended by six months (or 25% of project's life) as implementation took longer than expected;
- A large number of activities were dropped (including an advisor on financial management and an audit of the electrical system) and others unplanned activities were added, resulting in significant reallocations of project expenditures.

5.3 Nonetheless, there were no reported issues of fiduciary compliance or irregularities in financial management during implementation. On balance, efficiency is rated Modest.

Table 5.1. Implementation Delays and Implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Implication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delay in the approval of GSDP I</td>
<td>From December 2009 to December 2010</td>
<td>Congestion of corporate reform agenda and 2010 census work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay in making GSDP II effective</td>
<td>From Aug 2011 to Feb 2014 (two and a half years)</td>
<td>Personnel actions at GSS were on hold with many employees awaiting severance payments. The delay also made it necessary to restructure GSDP II. See Box 8.1 for further discussion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay in parliamentary approval of the Statistics Bill</td>
<td>From December 2012 to May 2016.</td>
<td>No legal foundation for the National Statistical System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of closing date</td>
<td>From December 2012 to June 2013</td>
<td>Outputs and outcomes were delivered later than planned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Outcomes

6.1 The objectives of the project were aligned with the priorities of both the country and the World Bank. However, the relevance of these objectives was modest due to inadequate clarity on the outcomes and targets envisaged. The design of the project was also modestly relevant due to gaps in the causal chains that jeopardized the achievements of objectives. The first objective of preparing GSS for institutional reform was only partially achieved. The main shortcoming at the time of the PPAR (April 2016) was the status of the Statistics Bill which remained to be approved by parliament. The second objective of timely analysis and dissemination of the 2010 census was achieved before the project closed. Efficiency was Modest due to significant delays in most of the activities. Overall, the outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.

7. Risk to Development Outcomes

7.1 Among the key risks to sustainability are: i) funding uncertainty; ii) loss of qualified staff at GSS; iii) staff reassignments and shifts of priorities among participating MDAs. Each of these risks could directly undermine Ghana’s statistical capacity and the results achieved.

Table 7.1. Funds Received by GSS from the government and principal donors (2010-15)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Agency</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>46,884</td>
<td>7,785</td>
<td>10,788</td>
<td>8,462</td>
<td>7,449</td>
<td>7,502</td>
<td>88,868</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>414</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>477</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
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<td>48,144</td>
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</table>

Source: Ghana Statistical Service (GSS)

7.2 Funding uncertainty. The statistical program depends on funding from the government as well as a large number of donors, including the World Bank, the UK DFID and UNICEF. (See Table 7.1). Government allocations represent the largest source of revenue, although the amount of funding has been variable from year to year and inadequate to cover GSS’s work program. On average, funding from the government
accounts for less than 60 percent of the requirements, with more funding available during the election year (2012) and tapering off thereafter. Heavy reliance on donor funding has become the norm. But donor’s contributions have been even more uncertain than that of the government. No provisions have been made under this project or the follow-on operation (SRF-CF) to limit the variability of funding for the statistical program. GSS activities remain subject to delays and interruptions, depending on the availability of money.

7.3 **Loss of competent staff.** Retention of well trained and skilled personnel has proved a difficult task at GSS. Better compensations and job qualities are often available in the private sector. “Poaching”, as GSS representatives put it, has often occurred to the best and brightest of the organization. Furthermore, under the IMF’s current Extended Credit Facility, a freeze on new hiring is now in effect. Once a statistician has left the Service, it is difficult and time consuming to find a replacement.

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**Box 7.1. A Baffling Case of the Statistics Bill**

The first Ghana Statistical Development Project (also known as GSDP I or MDTF), which was approved in December, 2010, was scheduled to close in December 2012. One of the key outcome envisaged was parliamentary approval and enactment of the Statistics Bill, along with the necessary regulatory instruments, which would govern the national statistical system and define the roles and responsibilities of the participating ministries, departments and agencies. This outcome was to be achieved before the project closed in December 2012. However, by April, 2016, nearly four years after the expected delivery, the Statistics Bill remains in limbo – not having been presented to parliament or even approved by cabinet.

Without the law, the national statistical system (NSS) remains fragmented and governed by the inadequate decrees that predated Ghana’s return to democracy. The close collaboration across agency boundaries that has occurred under the SRF project (GSDP II) is unlikely to be sustained beyond the life of the project. The new skills and capacity would soon be dissipated under civil service reassignments and recruitments by private businesses. Of particular concern, however, is the loss of the National Advisory Council on Producers and Users of Statistics (NACPUS), which would be established under the new law to give strategic direction to the NSS and help ensure the production of relevant and reliable statistics.

The delay is also surprising because there are no substantive or politically sensitive issues involved. According to GSS (the implementing agency), an issue that has come up was the title of the chief executive officer of the NSS. The draft Statistics Bill used the title of “Statistician General”, which may have required the legal underpinning from a constitutional amendment being reviewed by a constitutional commission. Thus, a legal sub-committee of the cabinet recommended the revising the title to “Government Statistician”—a change to which the governing body of the GSS had no objection.

Years have passed and little progress has been made. It would appear that more proactive efforts—and vigilance – perhaps through monitoring and dialogue, would have produced the result much earlier.

*Source:* Interviews with staff of GSS and Ministry of Finance

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7.4 **MDA staff rotations and priority changes.** Statistical staff at sector ministries are subject to transfers and reassignments under civil service priorities. The requirements of the statistical program, including skills and experience of staff, may or may not correspond to those of the parent ministries. Continuity of the work program is always a
risk among MDAs. IEG has learned during the April 2016 mission that even staff trained under the GSDP II operation or otherwise familiar with the program has largely been redeployed, leaving a large capacity gap for the scheduled activities. A restructuring of the operation has now become necessary and is in fact scheduled for June 2016.

7.5 Overall, the risk to development outcomes is Significant. It is not considered High because, while budgetary allocations tend to be inadequate, they have not been cut drastically.

8. World Bank and Borrower Performance

World Bank Performance

Quality at entry

8.1 The project was well chosen and of considerable strategic relevance both to the World Bank and to the GOG. However, there was large scope for improvements in the quality of design, implementation arrangements, design of the M&E system and the sequencing of project supported activities.

8.2 The results framework was not fully worked out, with major gaps in the causal chains. The institutional reform agenda was fragmented, with critical actions left outside the scope of the project. The activities in components 2 and 3, which accounted for a third of project resources, did not support any stated objectives the project.

8.3 Implementation arrangements were not adequate to ensure the results. In particular, the funding for key components of institutional reforms, including retrenchment buy-outs (severance packages), was not provided under the project, leading to a hiatus in implementation from 2012 to early 2014.

8.4 No meaningful M&E system was developed for the purpose of tracking results. No monitoring of outcomes or outputs took place. The task team relied primarily on inputs used through routine administrative reports. Outputs were noted as a task was finished. There was no way of detecting when a task was left unfinished.

8.5 The sequencing of major events was also problematic. The reorganization of GSS staff and structure was to take place during the time when the GSS workload was at its maximum, with the production and dissemination of the 2010 census in full swing. The severe bunching was disruptive to the regular census enumeration activities.

8.6 Overall, the goals of the project were laudable, but they were difficult to achieve with the design and preparation that took place. The quality at entry is rated Unsatisfactory.

Quality of Supervision

8.7 Project supervision was mechanical, consisting mainly of reviews of administrative and financial reports, rather than an examination of results and progress
made toward desired outcomes. This shortcoming is reflected in the M&E system which shows no tracking indicators or outcomes to be achieved. The frequency of supervision visits was also low, with three missions conducted over the 29 months of project life, averaging 9 months per visit. The normal frequency for the Africa Region is 6 months. No comprehensive mid-term review was carried out, contrary to the intent as stated in the project appraisal document (PAD). Specialized areas, including personnel management and legislative process, were not adequately covered. For example, while three different legal counsels served as members of the task team, nobody covered the draft Statistics Bill and the necessary legislative procedures needed for presentation to the parliament.

8.8 A significant oversight occurred in the second half of 2011 when the supervision team failed to secure the funding needed to complete the corporate reform agenda. As discussed above, the funding for staff redeployment and retrenchment was attached to the follow-on project – GSDP II or SRF-CF, which was approved on August 25, 2011, when corporate reforms were being actively implemented. The supervision team could have provided rapid implementation support to expedite the effectiveness of GSDP II and release the necessary funding for the key personnel actions. No such prompt interventions were made, however. Soon the political campaigns of 2012 were in full swing and it became exceedingly difficult to win parliamentary approval. (See further discussion in Box 3.1.) Meanwhile, the corporate reform agenda was left unfinished for nearly three years. The quality of supervision is rated Unsatisfactory.

8.9 Overall, Bank Performance is rated Unsatisfactory

Borrower’s performance

Government performance

8.10 The Government of Ghana, as represented mainly by the Ministry of Finance, showed strong and consistent support for the project. Following the request for Bank assistance, the government participated fully in the design and implementation of the project. It approved the reorganization of the GSS and the institutional reforms which included politically sensitive measures, such as staff redeployment and retrenchment. As a contribution to project financing, the government paid for the staff, office space and facilities of the project management unit (Program Development and Management Group – PDMG). In addition to the Ministry of Finance, the Comptroller and Accountant General also assisted the implementing agency by promptly reviewing and approving the withdrawal applications submitted. The Public Procurement Agency and the Ministerial Tender Board also provided technical assistance to GSS during project implementation. The government, however, could have been more vigilant and more proactive in its deliberation of the Statistics Bill, which by all accounts involves no sensitive issues and yet has not been approved in nearly four years. Government performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.
Box 8.1. The Restructuring of GSDP II (SRF-CF)

As soon as the project became effective (in April 2014 – about three years late), the first task confronting the project team was to restructure or re-build the project.

Significant changes made the original design obsolete. First, many stakeholders left the project, including staff of participating MDAs, under civil service reassignments, job change or retirement. Second, many of the capacity building programs envisaged at appraisal were no longer considered appropriate by the new stakeholders. Third, new statistical agencies were created at municipal and regional authorities which helped absorb some of the GSS employees who were previously earmarked for retrenchment. The program of buy-outs became much smaller than originally estimated.

Upon effectiveness, new team leaders arrived both on the World Bank project team and at many of the participating MDAs, although the project management unit remained largely intact. It was agreed that while project objectives would remain the same the activities would be substantially revised, with many of the training programs to be replaced by data producing and learning by doing activities. Funding for severance packages was reduced and reallocated to data production and dissemination. In addition, the closing date of the project which was originally set for August 2016 was extended to June 2018.

A project paper indicating the rationale and restructuring measures went to the World Bank Board on March 22, 2016. An implementation support mission to launch the restructuring is scheduled for late May and early June 2016.

Source: IEG and project task team.

Implementing agency performance

8.11 Equally strong was the commitment of GSS, especially the Board of Directors, which paid close attention to the project. The GSS played an active role from the design stage by supporting the World Bank team in the consultations with local stakeholders and the needs assessments of the MDAs. A key contribution of the GSS was to establish the PDMG and staff it with a cadre of qualified and dedicated professionals. The Program Development and Management Group (PDMG) in turn contributed to the preparation of the PAD and the Project Implementation Manual. During project implementation, the PDMG served as the project secretariat, coordinating the activities of all the participants, both in the government and from the World Bank.

8.12 The PDMG discharged its responsibilities with distinction. It facilitated all activities and ensured compliance with project covenants and broader World Bank policies. It introduced monthly meetings, chaired by the agency head (government statistician), to review progress and address implementation issues. The progress reports, including procurement and financial management representations, were produced monthly within one week following month end. The standards of delivery far exceeded the expectations set out in the PAD, which called for quarterly reports to be produced six weeks after end of quarter. In addition, the PDMG provided support for the World Bank’s supervision with services before the arrival, during the visit and after the missions.

8.13 Senior management of GSS, including the government statistician and two deputies, provided the staff with adequate oversight and support. They held monthly reviews of the progress made and met with all supervision missions from the World
Bank. They attended to the development of institutional reforms strategy and the Statistics Bill. They oversaw the implementation of staffing reforms, including a difficult period of staff redeployment and buy-outs, and the introduction of a new approach to personnel management. They also sought the approval of the Public Service Commission for the new institutional structure and scheme of service at GSS. Nonetheless, GSS could have made a difference on the Statistics Bill by monitoring its status more closely and submitting periodic inquiries to the cabinet. The performance of the Implementing Agency is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

8.14 Overall, borrower performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory.

9. Monitoring and Evaluation System

9.1 Quality of design. No functional M&E system was developed for this project. Observable outcomes, such as user satisfaction or an increase in relevant statistics from an established baseline, made no appearance in the results framework. Instead, all the results were stated in terms of outputs to be delivered by project supported activities. In fact, the M&E system shows little more than a check list of what was delivered under the project.

9.2 Data collection was event driven, such as completion of a task or report, with no periodic monitoring of specific variables to indicate progress made. Administrative data and financial management reports, which primarily indicate inputs, were used by the supervision missions to measure implementation. No distinction was made between final and intermediate outcome indicators – all indicators presented in the PAD are called “intermediate indictors”. In the case of the Statistics Law – the cornerstone of this operation – no interim results were stipulated or tracked. The only indication of progress was to be the proclamation of the law. Thus, no monitoring took place and the lack of progress (including the Statistics Bill) went unnoticed for four years.

9.3 Implementation. Since there were no indicators to track, no data was to be collected other than routine administrative and financial reports. No meaningful implementation of the M&E system took place.

9.4 Utilization. Only routine administrative data and financial reports were utilized.

9.5 Overall, the quality of the M&E system is rated Negligible.

10. Lessons

10.1 Among the lessons derived from this review are:

- To provide the public with relevant and reliable statistics, the national statistical office needs a responsive governing body to give strategic direction. Of particular importance is the presence of directors who represent the interest of data users – researchers, development partners, academicians, students and policy makers. Ghana once had such a guiding hand; it was called the National Advisory Council for Producers and Users of Statistics (NACPUS). With the help of this project and
its successor, an active Board is now at work at GSS. Gradually, capacity at GSS is being built. In addition, a governing body like NACPUS is expected to be established, once the Statistics Bill, which has been dormant for four years, is approved by parliament.

- In supporting corporate or institutional reform agenda, it is essential to ensure orderly, efficient and effective implementation to minimize the impact on staff. It requires meticulous design, thorough consultations, adequate funding and the supervision of specialists. In particular, by failing to include the funding for redeployment and retrenchment, the project held up the completion of corporate reforms for years.

- It helps to ensure that all the technical assistance services are in place before the project is presented to the Board. This was not the case with this project. After it became effective in February, 2011, GSS was unable to get an expert to advise on the World Bank’s procurement simply because it did not know how to use the World Bank’s procurement to hire that expert. To address this issue, the World Bank has offered the use of Project Preparation Facility (PPF), which can be drawn on before the project becomes effective. But the World Bank Unit of the Ministry of Finance in Ghana noted that the PPF is seldom, if ever, used in the country. The reason, according to Ghanaian officials familiar with the PPF, getting approval for the PPF is as complex and time consuming as getting the underlying project through the Board.

- Despite the large role that the World Bank has played in mobilizing international support for statistical development, the capacity of the World Bank team to deliver results in this area should not be taken for granted. Under this statistical capacity development project, much was made of the limitations of counterpart agencies in Ghana, based on multiple needs assessments sponsored by the World Bank. Even though the World Bank team appeared to be well qualified and to possess the right skill mix, project results were modest. As discussed throughout this report, the quality of project design, preparation, implementation and supervision all fell short of the norms for Bank operations.

- The check-list approach to monitoring and evaluation, as applied in this project, does not work. The results framework relied exclusively on administrative data (disbursements) and outputs (reports) of various activities to indicate the extent of progress made. No interim variables were chosen or developed to track progress.
References


Ghana Statistical Service, various years. URL: www.statsghana.gov.gh


Appendix A. Basic Data Sheet

GHANA: STATISTICS DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (MDTF) (TF-97577)

Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million)

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Date of final disbursement: August, 2013

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Other Project Data

Borrower/Executing Agency:

## Follow-on Operations

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## Appendix B. List of Persons Met

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<tr>
<td>Mr. Theo Braimah Awanzam</td>
<td>Economist</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Emmanuel Aaron Adjetey</td>
<td>Chief Economic Officer</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Sarah Fafa Kpodo</td>
<td>Principal State Attorney</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Reginald N. O. Odai</td>
<td>Head, Research and Statistics Unit</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Divine Y. Aydzoe</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>SRIMPR, Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Willian Kartey</td>
<td>Direct, Human Resources</td>
<td>Ministry of Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Baah Wadieh</td>
<td>Deputy Government Statistician</td>
<td>Ghana Statistical Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Philomena Nyarko</td>
<td>Government Statistician</td>
<td>Ghana Statistical Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Sylvester Gyamfi</td>
<td>Director of Coordination and Program Management</td>
<td>Ghana Statistical Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Francis Nyarko Larbi</td>
<td>Head of Program Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
<td>Ghana Statistical Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Theo Braimah Awanzam</td>
<td>Economist</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Natalia Koliadina</td>
<td>Resident Representative</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Kingsley Asare Addo</td>
<td>Principal Assistant Registrar</td>
<td>Registry of Births and Deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms. Lynne Henderson</td>
<td>Senior Results &amp; Evaluation Advisor/ Ag. Deputy Head</td>
<td>Department for International Development (DFID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Clemens Gros</td>
<td>Monitoring &amp; Evaluation Specialist</td>
<td>United Nation’s Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Augustin K. Fosu</td>
<td>Professor (Economics)</td>
<td>Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Prosper Nkudefe-Adjotor</td>
<td>Research Department</td>
<td>Bank of Ghana</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix C. Borrower Comments

22 June, 2016

Marie Gaarder
Manager
Human Development and Corporate Evaluations
Independent Evaluation Group
The World Bank

Dear Marie,

Re: Republic of Ghana-Statistical Development Programme (TF-97577)
Draft Project Performance Assessment Report

I have read through the draft Project Performance Assessment Report of the Statistical Development Programme (TF-97577) and wish to comment on the following:

The Statistics Bill
I appreciate the issues and concerns raised in the assessment report on the Statistics Bill. Actually, work on the Statistics Bill as was noted in the assessment report was done by GSS in collaboration with stakeholders due to the technical nature of the Bill and the procedures involved. In May, 2013 the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) submitted the Bill to the Honourable Minister for Finance as was required, for onward submission to Cabinet for approval for it to be laid in Parliament for consideration and subsequently passed.

The Honourable Minister for Finance and his Legal Team held a meeting with the GSS Board, the Government Statistician and Management on the Statistics Bill in August, 2013. Inputs from the meeting were used to revise the Bill before it was submitted to Cabinet Secretariat at the Flagstaff House in October, 2013.

In January, 2014 Cabinet referred the Bill to the Joint Committee on Finance and Economy and Governance, Legal and Security for study and feedback to Cabinet.

The Statistics Bill was subsequently handed over in January 2014 to the Attorney-General and Minister for Justice to be redrafted. The GSS team responsible for the Statistics Bill and the Legal Department of the Ministry of Finance collaborated with the Attorney-General’s Department to redraft the Bill from April 2014 to May 2015.

The Attorney-General and Minister for Justice in May 2015 requested GSS to re-submit the Statistics Bill, 2015 (redrafted) through the Sector Minister (Ministry of Finance) to Cabinet for
approval to lay the Bill in Parliament. The GSS in June, 2015 re-submitted the Statistics Bill. The GSS, since the re-submission has been following up to ensure that the Bill goes to Parliament.

The collaborative nature of the work on the Statistics Bill with the stakeholders as is required by law and laid down procedures is such that the GSS in most cases had little or no control over the activities involved despite its preparedness to expedite action to ensure that the Bill is passed. Given the background information on the Statistics Bill and the role of the GSS, it is clear that the GSS has little or no control over the circumstances surrounding the work of the Statistics Bill. In this regard, the rating of the outcome of the Statistics Bill as “Moderately Unsatisfactory” has to be re-considered.

**MMDAs**

I wish to draw attention on the use of the acronym “MMDAs” in paragraph two, page two of the assessment report. The acronym stands for “Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies” and not “municipalities, ministries, departments and agencies” as was stated in the said paragraph and page.

I wish to express my appreciation for the opportunity to comment on the assessment report. It shows how transparent the exercise is.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Isaac Odoom

Head, Planning and Budgeting and a member of the GSS Team on the Statistics Bill.
Ms. Marie Gaarder  
Manager  
Human Development and Corporate Evaluations  
Independent Evaluation Group  
The World Bank  
1818 H Street N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20433  
U.S.A.

Dear Ms. Gaarder,

Re: Republic of GHANA – Statistical Development Program (TF:97577)  
Draft Project Performance Assessment Report

I acknowledge with gratitude receipt of your letter dated June 7, 2016 and the draft Project Performance Assessment Report.

In response to your request, I wish to comment on the draft report as follows:

Page ii – Abbreviations and Acronyms – MMDA is defined as Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies  
- NACFUS – change Committee to Council and for to of to read National Advisory Committee of Producers and Users of Statistics

Page x – Paragraph 2, line 4 – change papers to reports  
- Paragraph 3, line 7 – change manual of definitions, and methods to manual of definitions, concepts and methods.

Page xi – Under Borrower performance, bullet (i) line 2, insert an between ensured and environment. In line 3, insert as between well and the personnel.
APPENDIX C

Page xii – Under Lessons, bullet 1, line 5 - Change Council to Committee and for to of to read National Advisory Committee of Producers and Users of Statistics (NACPUS). Also specify the number of years in the last line of bullet 2.

Page 1 – Paragraph 1.1, line 5 – insert meetings after stakeholders
- Paragraph 1.3, line 3 – insert and before financial
- Paragraph 4, line 5 – delete the word multiples before ministries

Page 4 – Under Component 3 (i), line 4 – delete increasing the and insert making

Page 9 – Paragraph 3.8, line 2 – change cabinet to Office of the President, and insert it before relies. Please note that the GSS does not rely on other MDAs for technical support. If such was found during the Assessment, kindly cite examples.

Page 11 – Under Objective 1, Inputs, bullet 1, line 1 – Insert a before new and change instruments to framework in line 2. Also delete the before parliament in the last line of the same bullet.

Page 15 – Paragraph 1, line 3 – insert of before Mobile.

Page 22 – Box 8.1, line 1 – Kindly clarify the word damaging as used here.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Dr. Philomena Nyarko
(Government Statistician)