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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT



BURKINA FASO, GHANA AND MALI
**West Africa Regional Transport and
Transit Facilitation Project**

Report No. 124817

APRIL 19, 2018

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali

**WEST AFRICA TRANSPORT AND TRANSIT FACILITATION PROJECT
(CR. 4438-BF, CR. 4439-GH, CR. 4435-ML)**

April 19, 2018

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Ghana Currency Unit = New Ghanaian Cedi (GH¢)

2008	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 1.08
2009	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 1.50
2010	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 1.44
2011	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 1.52
2012	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 1.93
2013	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 2.02
2014	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 3.00
2015	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 4.41
2016	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 3.90
2017	US\$ 1.00	GH¢ 4.42

Burkina Faso Currency Unit = West African CFA franc (CFAF)

2008	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 418.81
2009	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 466.50
2010	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 535.71
2011	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 458.29
2012	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 521.87
2013	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 499.52
2014	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 480.59
2015	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 584.98
2016	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 590.00
2017	US\$ 1.00	CFAF 578.27

Fiscal Year

Burkina Faso: *January 1 to December 31*

Ghana: *July 1 to June 30*

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
ALCO	Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Organization
ASYCUDA	Automated System for Customs Data
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERR	economic rate of return
ESIA	Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
ESMP	Environmental Safeguards Management Plan
FM	financial management
GHA	Ghana Highway Authority
GPHA	Ghana Ports and Harbors Authority
GRA	Ghana Revenue Authority
HIV	human immunodeficiency virus
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results report
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MOT	Ministry of Transport
MRH	Ministry of Roads and Highways (Ghana)
NPV	net present value
OTRAF	Organization of Road Carriers of Burkina Faso
ONASER	National Office of Road Safety
PDO	project development objectives
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCU	Project Coordination Unit
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report
RIAS	Regional Integration Assistance Strategy
RP-I	UEMOA Road Program I
STTV	Satellite Transit Truck Village
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (West African Economic and Monetary Union)

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This report was prepared by Kavita Mathur and Ebru Karamete, who assessed the project in December 2017. The report was peer reviewed by Baher El-Hifnawi and panel reviewed by Fernando Manibog. Richard Kraus and Jean-Jacques Alain Ildevert Ahouansou provided administrative support.

Principal Ratings

	ICR*	ICR Review*	PPAR
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome	Modest	Modest	Substantial
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory

* The Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) report is a self-evaluation by the responsible World Bank global practice. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEG product that seeks to independently validate the findings of the ICR.

Key Staff Responsible

Project	Task Manager/Leader	Practice Manager	Country Director
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IEG Mission: Improving World Bank Group development results through excellence in independent evaluation.

About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the World Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEG annually assesses 20–25 percent of the World Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or World Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEG staff examine project files and other documents, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate, and apply other evaluative methods as needed.

Each PPAR is subject to technical peer review, internal IEG Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank country management unit. The PPAR is also sent to the borrower for review. IEG incorporates both World Bank and borrower comments as appropriate, and the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the World Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEG Rating System for Public Sector Evaluations

IEG's use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEG evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEG website: <http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org>).

Outcome: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. *Relevance* includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current World Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, and Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. *Efficacy* is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Efficiency* is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension is not applied to development policy operations, which provide general budget support. *Possible ratings for Outcome:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Risk to Development Outcome: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). *Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome:* High, Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

World Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. *Possible ratings for World Bank Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. *Possible ratings for Borrower Performance:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Preface

This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group on the West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project.

The project was approved on June 19, 2008, for a cost of US\$197.2 million, with an IDA credit of US\$190 million. The project cost at completion was US\$180.87 million, with US\$173.5 million of the International Development Association (IDA) credit being used. The project was closed on June 30, 2015, with a delay of 15 months.

The objectives of the project were to: (i) improve access by Burkina Faso and Mali to the ports in Ghana and port operations, and (ii) facilitate the efficient movement of traffic along the Tema-Ouagadougou- Bamako road transport corridor ("the Corridor"). These were to be achieved through the rehabilitation of key sections of the corridor, construction of a Satellite Transit Truck Village (STTV) parking facility near the Port of Tema, strengthening of the capacity of customs and transport authorities of the project countries to manage transit traffic along the Corridor, interconnection of the customs systems of the three countries, and introduction of a cargo tracking system for monitoring transit traffic on the Burkina Faso and Mali section of the Corridor.

IEG selected this project for assessment because of the potential lessons from experience in fostering regional integration projects. It would also contribute to IEG's upcoming evaluation—Fostering Regional Integration. The project was in three countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali. IEG visited Burkina Faso and Ghana in December 2017. No mission was conducted in Mali owing to security concerns.

The assessment is based on a review of all relevant documentation, interviews with the World Bank staff at headquarters and in the country office, and discussions with officials of the government, the implementing agency, and other key stakeholders. The list of persons met during the mission is attached in appendix B. Their cooperation and assistance in preparing the report is gratefully acknowledged.

Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR was sent to the government officials and implementing agencies for their review and the comments received are attached in Appendix F.

Summary

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project implemented in three countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali. The project was approved on June 19, 2008, for a cost of US\$197.2 million, with an International Development Association (IDA) credit of US\$190 million. The project cost at completion was US\$180.87 million, with US\$173.5 million of the IDA credit being utilized. The project was closed on June 30, 2015, with a delay of fifteen months due to delays in release of counterpart funding from the Government of Ghana and suspension of works in Mali (for about 11 months) in the aftermath of the political crisis in March 2012.

Landlocked economies are disadvantaged by costly and unreliable transport and transit processes. For example, transport and transit costs for countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are up to 50 percent higher than for countries with direct sea access. Historically, the Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Bamako Corridor was the main sea access corridor for both Burkina Faso and Mali. However, because of the deteriorating security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, there was an urgent need to seek alternative access to ports for the landlocked countries of Burkina Faso and Mali.

The key sector issues identified at appraisal were: (i) poor road conditions—50 percent of the Tema–Ouagadougou portion of the corridor was in poor/fair condition, and about 60 percent of the Ouagadougou–Bamako portion was also in poor/fair condition; (ii) inefficient customs transit procedures and poor interconnectivity between the customs systems, and (iii) too many barriers along the corridor—there were about 49 checkpoints, of which 10 were fixed customs checkpoints, causing considerable loss of time, estimated at about eight hours per 1,000 km.

The fluidity of border crossings in West Africa is one of the key trade facilitation objectives of the two regional economic communities—Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA). The transport and transit facilitation approach was founded on the conventions, instruments, protocols, resolutions, decisions, and recommendations adopted by ECOWAS and UEMOA.

Project Performance and Ratings

The objectives of the project were to: (i) improve access by Burkina Faso and Mali to the ports in Ghana and port operations, and (ii) facilitate the efficient movement of traffic along the Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako road transport corridor ("the Corridor").

The **relevance of the project objectives** is rated *high*. The project objectives mirrored the concerns raised in the country strategies of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ghana. The current Country Partnership Strategy for Burkina Faso (FY13–16) highlighted the need for accelerating growth through creating value chains and improving access to transport and enhancing transport competitiveness to reduce costs and facilitate trade. The FY16–19 Country Partnership Framework for Mali identified connectivity as a critical constraint to lifting most Malians out of poverty and building the foundations for economic

transformation. The current Country Partnership Strategy for Ghana (FY13–18) focuses on improved competitiveness and job creation through, among others, more efficient delivery of infrastructure services. This strategy aims to improve competitiveness by reducing the cost of doing business, through the reduction of borders crossing time.

The project objectives were aligned with the strategic objective of the World Bank's Regional Integration Assistance Strategy (2001) for West Africa, which supported the creation of a West African open and unified economic space by building efficient, regionwide infrastructure services. The project objectives were also consistent with the first pillar of the 2008 Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa, which stressed the need for the development of regional infrastructure to improve cross-border interconnectivity. This pillar also emphasized that procedures across countries were essential to enable effective use of infrastructure systems, the harmonization of technical standards, and the development of common regulations.

The **relevance of project design** is rated *substantial*. The achievement of project outcomes are causally linked to the specific activities supported by the project, in a manner consistent with the results framework. The “hard infrastructure measures” (to improve the physical connectivity and levels of service, particularly at the port and on the road corridor) were well complemented by “soft facilitation measures” (to facilitate cross border transit). The design of the project as a regional intervention was necessary because the three participating countries needed to contribute together to achieving the objective of improving access of Mali and Burkina Faso to the port of Tema in Ghana, and to facilitating efficient movement of traffic along the corridor. The construction of the Satellite Transit Truck Village (STTV) would decongest the Port of Tema by moving container and bulk transit cargo directly off the ship to the STTV facility. The rehabilitation of the key road sections that were in poor condition would improve the condition of the corridor and would facilitate efficient movement of traffic along the corridor. Activities such as implementing interconnectivity of the national customs management systems and cargo tracking systems would further contribute to the efficient movement of transit traffic along the corridor by reducing the time spent at the border.

The project’s achievement of its **first objective of improving access by Burkina Faso and Mali to the ports in Ghana** and port operations is rated *substantial*. Major outcomes demonstrate the achievement of this objective:

- *First*, truck dwell time had decreased from 48 hours to 24 hours by project completion; further, this has been maintained at the same level until now, based on information provided to the IEG team. More specifically, the STTV site decongested the Tema Port by moving container and bulk transit cargo directly off the ship to the STTV facility, compared to the system at appraisal, when all cargo (transit and non-transit) had to undergo customs processing and loading on trucks at the main terminal. The STTV expedited the paperwork required for transit cargo by having a dedicated bonded area under the Customs’ jurisdiction. Thus, the combined effect of building the STTV and processing transit cargo in the STTV reduced the truck dwell time, that is, the time the transit trucks spent clearing customs and getting loaded at the port.

- *Second*, the IEG team found that customs officials of the Ghana Ports and Harbor Authority are currently available at the site for 24 hours to process documents. The Authority further confirmed that improved procedures at the port continue to contribute to the reduction of dwell time, through measures such as concurrent (instead of sequential) loading and processing of documentation—a finding that remains consistent with feedback from an earlier beneficiary survey conducted for preparing the Implementation Completion Report.
- *Third*, the Faladié Dry Port is currently serving most of the transit traffic coming from Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana to Mali.
- *Fourth*, the efficiency gains resulting from having implemented the capacity-building programs for the Customs Administration have also contributed (together with the functioning of the STTV facility) to avoidance of undue overstay in the yard and the reduction in truck dwell time.

The project's achievement of its **second objective of facilitating the efficient movement of traffic** along the corridor is also *substantial*. Significant outcomes demonstrate the substantial achievement of this objective:

- *First*, the average transit time (for containerized imports) from exiting at Tema port to reaching Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso was reduced from seven days in 2008 to about five and half days, as targeted; moreover, the average transit time (for containerized imports) from exiting at Tema port to reaching Bamako in Mali was reduced from 15 days in 2008 to about 12 days, also as targeted.
- *Second*, transit time variation from Tema port to Ouagadougou was reduced from three days to 2.4 days, and from Tema port to Bamako from six days to three days – both as targeted by project closure (more recent data is not available).

These positive outcomes were mainly to the effect of the project's satisfactory completion of road rehabilitation works in conjunction with other donors, which significantly improved road conditions in the corridor, and thereby contributed to efficient movement of traffic. Some shortcomings remain to be addressed: the interconnection of customs systems between the three countries was only partially achieved, and the single cargo tracking system was not deployed on the entire corridor but only on the Ghana section, which is about 43 percent. Regarding outputs that were not achieved, five rest stops were constructed but none of them are operational.

The **project efficiency** is rated *modest*. Although, the ex-post economic rate of return for the corridor improvement component was 13 percent, efficiency of the project is rated modest owing to implementation delays for road works in Ghana and Burkina Faso, non-operational rest stops, and the non-implementation of (i) a single cargo tracking system and (ii) the interconnection of customs in the three countries.

The **project's outcome** is rated *moderately satisfactory*, based on the high relevance of objectives and the substantial relevance of design, the substantial achievement of its development objectives of improving transit access and facilitating transport along the Mali-Burkina Faso-Ghana transport corridor, and the project's modest efficiency.

The **risks to development outcome** are rated *substantial*. With the planned expansion of Tema Port, the limited STTV capacity will cause congestion at the port, leading to delays in customs clearance and loading of the transit cargo. Although all three countries have individually set up a second-generation road fund financed mainly through fuel levy, resources have increased but are still insufficient to fully cover maintenance cost. Therefore, the risk of failing to mobilize adequate financial resources for maintenance is substantial. The inadequate enforcement of axle load controls is still a problem and causes faster deterioration of the rehabilitated roads. Competition from other ports in the region may place the Tema Port at a relative disadvantage. The increased number of security checkpoints on the corridor will increase travel time on the corridor.

The **World Bank's performance** is rated *moderately satisfactory*. The World Bank's experience from similar transport, trade, and transit facilitation projects in Africa and other regions was reflected in the project design. The team conducted a thorough review of the actual construction costs of similar projects in the three participating countries, resulting in actual costs being close to the estimated costs at appraisal.

A design shortcoming stemmed from this complex project, which involved three countries, each with their own independent agencies. The project implementation units of each country were directly in control of the road rehabilitation activities, which could be executed within a shorter implementation span. However, the transit facilitation component required substantial coordination among the three countries (including language as a major barrier), hence a longer implementation time frame than that for road rehabilitation was required. The project design did not reflect this difference in implementation schedules. The implementation of the facilitation component proved to be challenging. Despite the World Bank's efforts to facilitate intensive consultations between the Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali customs administrations throughout the implementation period, the three countries could not come to an agreement and decided to adopt different systems.

The World Bank team closely supervised the project and the aide-mémoires did not identify any financial management or procurement irregularities. The implementation of civil works was delayed in the three countries. There were no cost overruns. The supervision of safeguards was satisfactory.

The **Borrower's performance** is rated *moderately satisfactory*. The governments showed strong commitment to the project during preparation and up to effectiveness. However, the countries could not reach the necessary agreements on transit facilitation. The differences in implementing agencies' modalities in the three countries impacted the project results. Although the Project Coordination Units in Burkina Faso and Mali were familiar with the World Bank's fiduciary and procurement guidelines, there were delays in the execution of civil works. In Ghana, the arrangement to use line ministry staff in Ghana was deficient and led to delays in implementation because no priority was given to the World Bank-funded project activities. Moreover, there was weak project ownership and lack of urgency or incentives to deliver works faster because Ghana, being a coastal country, was not dependent on the corridor.

Lessons

- **A regional approach to implement road rehabilitation works along strategic corridors can enhance the benefits particularly for the landlocked countries by linking them to gateway ports.** Project experience shows that carrying out road rehabilitation works simultaneously in all the participating countries rather than separate single operations, helps to address the needs for the entire corridor in a timely and coordinated manner.
- **It is important to have strong upstream analytical work and technical assistance for regional trade facilitation reforms so that countries can agree early on the technical details of institutional reforms.** The project's experience shows that waiting until project implementation to sort out the technical details is risky, and this initiative largely failed. During the preparation stage and early years of project implementation, the World Bank and UEMOA facilitated coordination and collaboration between countries to discuss customs interconnection issues and cargo tracking systems. However, despite numerous meetings, no agreement was reached regarding which cargo tracking system technology should be adopted: Ghana continued using its separate tracking system; Mali piloted its in-house cargo tracking system; and Burkina Faso opted for a different system from Ghana and Mali. Similarly, the interconnection of the customs systems experienced problems in agreement regarding the configuration and format of data to be exchanged.
- **When the projects involve Regional Economic Communities (REC), it is important to assess and cover RECs' funding needs for project coordination and implementation so that they can carry out this function effectively.** Regional institutions perform important roles, such as: bringing countries together, obtaining their political commitment, helping them take collective decisions, playing an advocacy role and performing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) functions at the regional level. The project experience showed that the funding of the implementation arrangements for the West African Monetary Union (UEMOA) was not sufficient. The World Bank could have done a better assessment of UEMOA's funding needs, coordinate with other donors to cover the gap and better utilize the influencing and coordinating power of this institution.
- **The World Bank's current single-country business model makes it challenging to implement regional projects.** While regional integration projects benefit from the IDA window and provide additional financial resources for clients to implement regional projects, the project's experience shows that the implementation is based on the World Bank's single-country model. Challenges included, for example, a single task team leader coordinating with separate country management units and separate teams on procurement, fiduciary, and safeguards for each country, which is more demanding than implementing a single country operation. Using a single team for procurement, safeguards, and fiduciary aspects would have been more efficient.

José Carbajo Martínez
 Director, Financial, Private Sector, and
 Sustainable Development

1. Background and Context

Regional Context

1.1 Landlocked economies are disadvantaged by costly and unreliable transport and transit processes. For example, transport and transit costs for countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are up to 50 percent higher than for countries with direct access to the sea¹. These high costs translate into increased prices of consumer goods and loss of external competitiveness. Therefore, an efficient transit system is critical in reducing the cost and time for a landlocked country to trade with the countries outside the region. At the same time, a transit country also gains from transit facilitation by recovering transit fees from transit service provision and functioning as a logistic and trading hub. In addition, transit facilitation may support regional economic integration and competitiveness through increased intra-regional trade.

1.2 The fluidity of border crossings in West Africa is one of the key facilitation objectives of the two regional economic communities—Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)² and the West African Monetary Union (*Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine* [UEMOA])³. The transport and transit facilitation approach was founded on the successive adoption of conventions, instruments, protocols, resolutions, decisions and recommendations by ECOWAS and UEMOA. In 2001, UEMOA adopted a road transport and infrastructure strategy that stressed the importance of regional road infrastructure, and transport and transit facilitation. In December 2002, ECOWAS presented to its Council of Ministers an action plan for strengthening the community decisions on free movement of goods and persons.⁴ With the adoption of the Community Action Plan for Road Infrastructure and Transport (*Programme d'Actions Communautaire des Infrastructures et du Transport Routier* [PACITR]), integrated infrastructure and facilitation measures were developed to ensure that the major designated regional road transport corridors met adequate infrastructure and service standards.

1.3 Historically, the Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Bamako Corridor was the main sea access corridor for both Burkina Faso and Mali. However, because of the deteriorating security situation in Côte d'Ivoire there was an urgent need to seek alternative access to ports for the landlocked countries—Burkina Faso and Mali. The regional transit pattern shifted to Tema port in Ghana, which experienced an increase in transit traffic to and from Burkina Faso and Mali by about 500 percent between 2001 and 2005.⁵ Therefore, the first phase of the PACITR, known as Road Program I (RP-I), focused on the corridor linking Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali. This was the result of meetings organized by UEMOA and ECOWAS in Burkina Faso in 2002 and a subsequent workshop in Ghana in 2003.⁶ This program highlighted the need for rehabilitating the highly deteriorated sections of the road corridors linking landlocked countries with West African ports.

Role of the World Bank

1.4 The World Bank was engaged in the dialogue of the program right from the beginning and was an important partner by supporting other donors in preparing and

designing the program.⁷ However, the World Bank was not the lead financier of the program. The European Union (EU) was the first to commit €80 million, followed by the African Development Bank with (UA 68 million equivalent⁸). The value World Bank's perceived value added at appraisal was that it could effectively facilitate the program by supporting institutional reforms.

1.5 The World Bank was strongly committed to regional integration, and had developed its Regional Integration and Assistance Strategy (RIAS) for West Africa in 2001. It enhanced its support to regional integration by launching a regional envelope under the International Development Association (IDA)13 replenishment in 2003. The regional envelope aimed at providing additional resources to each country's IDA allocation.⁹ The intention was to give a strong incentive for countries to work together to find regional solutions.

1.6 The World Bank's intervention complemented other technical and financial partners and bilateral donors' parallel investments in other sections of the Corridor. The World Bank financed part of the program under the IDA14 regional envelope. The total cost of the project was US\$197.2 million, with IDA contributing US\$190 million (two-thirds was from the regional IDA envelope and one-third from the national IDA allocations) and the governments of Ghana and Mali contributing US\$5 million and US\$2.2 million in counterpart funding, respectively. There was no contribution from the government of Burkina Faso.

Key sector issues

1.7 **Poor road condition.** Because of inadequate maintenance, roads on the Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako Corridor-were extremely damaged and in urgent need of rehabilitation. At project appraisal, 50 percent of the Tema–Ouagadougou portion of the corridor was in poor/fair condition and about 60 percent of the Ouagadougou–Bamako portion was also in poor/fair condition.

1.8 **Inefficient customs transit procedures and poor interconnectivity between the customs systems.** Inefficient customs operations were one of the key barriers to the efficient movement of transit goods along the Corridor. The inefficiency is the effect of a variety of factors such as: (i) inadequate interconnection of the existing customs management systems across countries; (ii) inadequate transit traffic monitoring and enforcement capabilities by customs administrations, owing to poor internal communications, inadequate mobile surveillance teams, and lack of a cargo tracking system; (iii) lack of a regional transit guarantee system;¹⁰ and (iv) an ineffective truck sealing system to reduce the diversion of transit goods.¹¹ To monitor and control the movement of transit goods along the Corridor, customs administrations have relied on customs escorts for transit trucks.

1.9 **Too many barriers along the corridor.** Excessive and fluctuating numbers of checkpoints (both fixed customs checkpoints and security checkpoints) are a major obstacle for transit traffic throughout West Africa. The number of checkpoints along the Corridor remains a source of delays and costs for transit traffic. There were about 49 checkpoints along the Corridor, of which 10 were fixed customs checkpoints.¹² A 2003 UEMOA survey of illegal practices on selected interstate roads (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, and Togo) estimated that the amount of illegal payments per trip collected at roadblocks was about

CFAF60,000 (US\$143¹³) on average, or CFAF32,000 (US\$76) for the Ghana-Burkina Faso section of the Corridor alone.¹⁴ The loss of time caused by the checkpoints was considerable, and was estimated at about eight hours per 1,000 km.

2. Objectives, Design, and their Relevance

Project Development Objective

2.1 The project development objective, as stated in the Financing Agreements¹⁵ of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali, was to: (i) to improve access by Burkina Faso and Mali to the ports in Ghana and port operations; and (ii) to facilitate the efficient movement of traffic along the Tema–Ouagadougou–Bamako road transport corridor ("the Corridor").

Components and Costs

2.2 The project's components were as follows:

Component One - Corridor road infrastructure improvement (appraisal cost estimate US\$162.70 million; actual cost US\$151.39 million. This component aimed at rehabilitating the key sections of the Corridor. Specific activities included:

- a. Rehabilitation of 54 km of roads in Burkina Faso, 103 km in Ghana, and 154 km in Mali.
- b. Construction of two rest stops in each country.
- c. Implementation of social and environmental mitigation measures (including Environmental Impact Assessments and Environmental Mitigation Plans in the three countries and an Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plan for Burkina Faso.
- d. Implementation of corridor-specific human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) action plans for mitigating the propagation of HIV/AIDS among high-risk groups such as truck drivers.
- e. Implementation of corridor-specific road safety action plans.

Component Two - Corridor transport and transit facilitation measures (appraisal cost estimate US\$28.70 million; actual cost US\$21.93 million). This component aimed at strengthening the capacity of customs and transport authorities of the project countries to manage transit traffic along the Corridor. The activities included:

- a. Construction of a Satellite Truck Transit Village (STTV) adjacent to Tema port, for transit trucks.
- b. Rehabilitation of the multidimensional platform at the dry port of Faladié (Bamako).
- c. Upgrading of customs-related Information and Communications Technology (ICT) (including extension of the Automated System for Customs data (ASYCUDA ++)) systems in Burkina Faso and Mali, and connection between the ASYCUDA system of Burkina Faso and the customs management system of Ghana).
- d. Introducing a cargo tracking system for monitoring transit traffic on the Burkina Faso and Mali sections of the Corridor.

- e. Capacity building, technical assistance, and training to the customs and transport authorities of the countries.

Component Three - Project Management (appraisal cost estimate US\$3.10 million; actual cost US\$4.59 million). This component financed activities associated with project implementation activities in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali.

The components by each country are listed in Annex B.

Relevance of Objectives

2.3 At appraisal and at present, the project development objectives were highly relevant to the strategies of Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali for developing their respective transport sectors, and to the World Bank's infrastructure sector strategies for these three countries.

2.4 The Country Assistance Strategy for Burkina Faso (FY06–09) aimed at increasing the reliability and reducing the costs of transport through upgrading and maintenance of the priority road network under the strategic objective of “increased regional integration.” The current Country Partnership Strategy for Burkina Faso (FY13–16) highlighted the need for accelerating growth through creating value chains and improving access to transport as well as enhancing transport competitiveness to reduce costs and facilitate trade.

2.5 The Country Assistance Strategy for Mali (FY08–11) supported linking Mali to the regional road network and integrating Mali with the regional and global markets. The FY16–19 Country Partnership Framework identified connectivity as critical to lifting most Malians out of poverty and building the foundations for economic transformation. The World Bank's support in the Country Partnership Framework aimed at improving infrastructure and connectivity.

2.6 The Country Assistance Strategy for Ghana (FY08–11) supported the creation of a stronger infrastructure asset base to achieve Ghana's development strategy. In the transport sector, the World Bank would support the essential regional integration roads projects where Ghana had strong potential. The project was aligned with the second pillar of the current Country Partnership Strategy for Ghana (FY13–18) which focuses on improved competitiveness and job creation through, among others, more efficient delivery of infrastructure services. The Country Partnership Strategy calls for processes and systems to monitor and provide implementation support for all major public infrastructure projects with roads and energy sectors in the lead. The Country Partnership Strategy also aims to improve competitiveness by reducing the cost of doing business, through the reduction of borders crossing time.

2.7 The project objectives were aligned with the strategic objective of the World Bank's RIAS (2001), which supported the creation of efficient infrastructure services and a unified economic space across West Africa. The World Bank would focus on smooth movement of goods across borders through elimination of all but essential official roadblocks. The project objectives were consistent with the first pillar of the 2008 RIAS for Sub-Saharan Africa. It stressed the development of regional infrastructure to improve cross-border interconnectivity,

and emphasized that the harmonization of technical standards and the development of common regulations, procedures across countries were essential to enabling the effective use of infrastructure systems.

2.8 The project objectives continue to be relevant to the government strategies of the three countries. The project is consistent with Burkina Faso Transport Sector Development Strategy (2011–25), the objective is to “modernize, strengthen, preserve and maintain the national and inter-State network.” The project is aligned with Ghana’s Shared Growth Development Agenda, 2014–17, which aimed at establishing Ghana as a transportation hub for the West African Sub-Region. This would be achieved through increasing infrastructure spending to modernize the existing main corridors linking major regional centers of the country with the capital and with neighboring countries. The project objectives are aligned with third pillar of Mali’s most recent transport strategy,¹⁶ to open the economy inside and outside by construction of road infrastructure. The strategy goes on to state that the government of Mali will continue its efforts to facilitate international transit and reduce road harassment, at the national level through dialogue with all the relevant stakeholders, and at the regional level through consultation with neighboring countries and regional organizations.

2.9 The relevance of objectives is rated **high**.

Relevance of Design

2.10 The project design logic—clear and realistic objectives supported by causally linked project activities—was in general sound. The project design was comprehensive and can therefore be expected to fully deliver the outcomes. The “hard infrastructure measures” (to improve the physical connectivity and levels of service, particularly at the port and on the road corridor) were well complemented by “soft facilitation measures” (to facilitate cross-border transit between the three countries). The design of the project as a regional intervention was necessary because the three participating countries needed to contribute together to achieving the objective to improve access of Mali and Burkina Faso to the port of Tema in Ghana and to facilitate efficient movement of traffic along the corridor.

2.11 The construction of the STTV near Tema Port would contribute to the first objective of “improving access of Burkina Faso and Mali to Tema Port.” The STTV site would reduce congestion at the Port of Tema by moving container/bulk transit cargo directly off the ship to the STTV facility; at project appraisal all cargo (transit as well as non-transit cargo) had to undergo customs processing and loading on trucks at the main terminal. The STTV would expedite the paperwork required for transit cargo by having a dedicated bonded area under Customs jurisdiction for transit cargo. Thus, the combined effect of building the STTV and processing transit cargo there would reduce the truck dwell time, that is, the time the transit trucks spent clearing customs and getting loaded at the port.

2.12 The World Bank project was rehabilitating about 356 km of road, which is about 19 percent of the Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako Corridor,¹⁷ which were in poor condition and critically important for the region’s transit traffic.¹⁸ The World Bank’s contribution was complementary to works done by other donors and the client countries themselves, who were

rehabilitating remaining parts of the Corridor. Thus, the rehabilitation of these key sections would improve the condition of the Corridor and would contribute to the achievement of the second objective, “facilitating efficient movement of traffic along the Corridor.” The project activities such as construction of rest stops, development and implementation of road safety action plans, and HIV/AIDs awareness campaigns would contribute to the improved driving environment for the truckers and further facilitate efficient movement of traffic along the Corridor.

2.13 Activities related to transit facilitation, such as implementing interconnectivity of the national customs management systems¹⁹ and cargo tracking systems, and capacity building of the customs and transport authorities for monitoring transit traffic, can be expected to facilitate the efficient movement of transit traffic along the corridor by reducing the number of customs checkpoints and the time spent at the border.

2.14 The relevance of design is rated **substantial**.

3. Monitoring and Evaluation

3.1 **Design.** The measurement of the project’s performance was based on two outcome indicators: the average transit time and the variance in transit time for containerized imports from exit at the Tema port to final distribution centers in Ouagadougou and Bamako. The project included five intermediate outcome indicators: percentage of the corridor roads in good condition, number of fixed customs checkpoints (excluding those at borders) in the Ghanaian and Malian sections of the corridor, border crossing time, truck tracking system operating over the entire length of the corridor, and truck dwell time at the STTV in Tema.

3.2 The baseline data were drawn from the 2006/2007 West Africa Trade Hub-funded survey. The data on indicators would be collected by national agencies while UEMOA would be responsible for monitoring at the regional level because it was responsible for the overall RP-I Program.

3.3 The project outcome indicators were measurable, but more indicators were needed to better assess project outcomes. For example, in addition to “transit time” outcome indicator, the project would have benefitted from a “transport logistics costs” indicator along the corridor, from gateway to destination. The existing indicators were “time-based” indicators, which need to be complemented by “cost-based” indicators to strengthen the evidence on the project objective “efficient movement of traffic.” Also, regarding intermediate indicators, no indicator was designed to monitor road safety on the corridor.

3.4 The targets for the indicators were too modest. The harmonization of customs systems is partially responsible for reduction in border clearance time; however, the targets were set at a modest level (during implementation, customs collaboration did not happen, but the targets were met).

3.5 The project did not establish a sustainable M&E system to track, monitor, and report on transit and trade facilitation along the entire corridor.

3.6 **Implementation.** During implementation, at the national level the monitoring of the indicators was designated to the following agencies: (i) customs and Ghana Ports and Harbors Authority for the port and border transit data; (ii) the three countries' roads and highway authorities for traffic data, road surveys for road conditions; (iii) the police patrol for accident and fatalities data; and (iv) the three countries' Ministry of Transport. There were some delays in data collection at the national level. At project closing a survey was carried out with the main beneficiaries of the corridor improvement, including the road users, freight forwarders' associations, and importers and exporters.

3.7 **Utilization.** The country agencies still collect routine data on road condition and accidents; however, there is no system to track project indicator data on the corridor such as average transit time, and variation in transit time. The PPAR mission had to rely on a study conducted by USAID and Borderless Alliance and interviews with stakeholders to update these indicators.

3.8 Although “enabling the collection of regular and reliable statistics on inter-state road transit of goods” was an element of ECOWAS and UEMOA's regional program, the project did not develop a sustainable M&E system to continue collecting and monitoring project indicators for the entire corridor after project closed. At the regional level, UEMOA's Observatory on Abnormal Practices collected data only on the number of checkpoints, and payments made at the border (legal and illegal).

3.9 The project's M&E is rated **modest**.

4. Implementation

4.1 **Implementation delays:** There were delays in the kick-off of the civil works in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali. The rehabilitation of the Ouagadougou-Sakoinsé road section in Burkina Faso was completed by mid-2013 with a one-year delay caused by late mobilization of the contractor on site.

4.2 In Ghana, implementation of project activities was hampered by delays in the following: (a) the mobilization of the contractor on the Buipe-Tamale road rehabilitation works; (b) the selection of consultant services to design and supervise the construction of two rest stops and to design the STTV near the Port of Tema; (c) the finalization of the land acquisition process to build the two rest stops; and (d) the design of the interface for the customs management systems.

4.3 Project implementation was adversely affected by the 2014 sociopolitical uprising in Burkina Faso and the military coup in Mali.

4.4 **Upgrading of existing transit yard instead of construction of STTV near the Port of Tema:** The initial project site was changed from the Kpone location to the Ashaiman interchange because of health and environmental concerns; the original site was adjacent to a landfill.²⁰ A feasibility study was conducted for the Ashaiman site and tender documents (goods and works) were completed. However, civil works for construction of the STTV could not commence due to cost overruns: the lowest evaluated tender was US\$11 million

while the available IDA funding was US\$5 million. The government of Ghana could not raise additional funding. Given resource limitations, the World Bank proposed to pave and upgrade the terminal surface of the old transit yard at the Tema Port as an alternate to the initial proposal.

4.5 Environmental and Social Safeguards: The project was classified as a Category B (partial assessment) under the World Bank's environmental and social safeguards framework because the road sections to be rehabilitated did not traverse any environmentally sensitive areas. The following two safeguard policies were triggered: environmental assessment (OP 4.01), and involuntary resettlement (OP 4.12). Involuntary Resettlement was triggered only for minor land acquisition or loss of income because of road rehabilitation or the construction of the rest stops. At the appraisal stage, Environmental and Social Impact Assessments were conducted and Environmental and Social Management Frameworks and Resettlement Action Plans were prepared and publicly disclosed, by the participating countries, as required. The only shortcoming was the delay resulting from slow land acquisition in Ghana for the construction of rest stops.

4.6 During implementation, the compensation in all countries was financed by counterpart funding. The project's supervision documents indicated that all compensation payments were made, albeit with delays in Burkina Faso and Ghana caused by government budget limitations. However, no information was obtained on how many people were compensated in Burkina Faso and Ghana. In Mali, seven households were resettled and compensation was timely. Supervision reports rated safeguards compliance as satisfactory throughout the implementation period.

4.7 Fiduciary Compliance: The project did not experience any major fiduciary issues. Financial management performance ranged from satisfactory to moderately satisfactory throughout project implementation. According to the supervision reports, the financial management was first downgraded from satisfactory to moderately satisfactory in September 2010 because of the delayed submission of audited project accounts by Ghana. After the timely submission of all relevant financial audit reports by Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali, the financial management performance was upgraded to satisfactory in September 2011. However, it was again downgraded to moderately satisfactory from October 2013 until project closure because of minor delays in the submission of the audit reports by Ghana and Mali. Financial audits were completed per agreed timetables set by the World Bank and were deemed satisfactory in the supervision reports. Audit reports were unqualified.

4.8 Procurement: The supervision reports rated procurement management satisfactory. There were no major issues reported in procurement per se; however, procurement capacity and resources remained as concerns. The stakeholders interviewed by IEG in both Ghana and Burkina Faso mentioned that some bidders were able to meet technical qualifications early during the procurement cycle but demonstrated operational deficiencies during implementation. Another issue raised was that during the procurement process the implementing agency did not have the resources to conduct thorough due diligence of contractors' technical specifications.

5. Achievement of the Objectives

5.1 For assessing project efficacy, the indicator dwell time, that is, the time the transit trucks spent clearing customs and getting loaded at the port at the STTV, will be used as a measure of achievement of the first objective, “improve access by Burkina Faso and Mali to the ports in Ghana and port operations.” For the second objective, “facilitate the efficient movement of traffic along the project corridor,” project outcome indicators—average transit time and variations in transit time—will be used. Average transit time is defined as the time it takes for the cargo to travel from the STTV facility to Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso or Bamako in Mali.

5.2 There is some overlap between the two sub-objectives: improving access to the ports and port operations and increasing the efficiency of movements along the entire corridor. The first sub-objective seems to be encompassed within the second objective. For the efficacy of the project, the PPAR is assessing the achievement of the sub-objectives separately. The project has substantially achieved its development objectives of improving transit access and facilitating transport along the Mali–Burkina Faso–Ghana transport corridor. Although there are shortfalls and remaining challenges, the project’s outputs and intermediate outcomes directly support the overall achievement of improved access and efficient traffic movement—which are the final outcomes. The results under each of the project’s two project development objectives are discussed immediately below.

Objective 1. Improve access by Burkina Faso and Mali to the ports in Ghana and port operations—rated *substantial*.

Outputs

5.3 The main outputs relevant to this objective include:

- a) Construction at Tema Port of the STTV was completed. The STTV is a bonded area under the customs’ jurisdiction that is mainly used for imports by Mali and Burkina Faso (see Appendix Tables D1 and D2). The project financed the construction of pavement at the STTV site and lighting, while the EU funded an axle load bridge. Although the STTV was partially operational at the time of project closing, the IEG team observed during its site visit that the facility is fully operational and is being maintained by the Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority in accordance with the maintenance procedures for all normal port facilities.
- b) The rehabilitation, equipping, and modernization of the Faladié Dry Port—a multifunctional platform in Bamako—was completed. Moreover, the private sector operator (Bollere-SDV), who was selected under a five-year leasehold, started operating the facility in February 2015. The IEG team was informed that the dry port remains in operation.
- c) Capacity development was also carried out through capacity-building programs for the Customs Administration, including at the port, through training and the upgrading of ICT equipment. The project trained the customs staff at the port to

achieve proficiency in Ghana Community Network (GCNet) and Ghana Customs Management system (GCMS) systems (see paragraph 5.5 for details).

Outcomes

5.4 Major outcomes demonstrate the achievement of this objective:

- *First*, truck dwell time had decreased from 48 hours to 24 hours by project completion; further, this has been maintained at the same level until now, based on information provided to the IEG team. More specifically, the STTV site decongested the Tema Port by moving container/bulk transit cargo directly off the ship to the STTV facility, compared to the system at appraisal when all cargo (transit and non-transit) had to undergo customs processing and loading on trucks at the main terminal. The STTV expedited the paperwork required for transit cargo by having a dedicated bonded area under the Customs' jurisdiction. Thus, the combined effect of building the STTV and processing transit cargo in the STTV reduced the truck dwell time.
- *Second*, the IEG team found that customs officials of the Ghana Ports and Harbor Authority are currently available at the site for 24 hours to process documents. The Authority further confirmed that improved procedures at the port continue to contribute to the reduction of dwell time, through measures such as concurrent (instead of sequential) loading and processing of documentation—a finding that remains in line with feedback from an earlier beneficiary survey conducted for Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) report.
- *Third*, the Faladié Dry Port is currently serving most of the transit traffic coming from Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire to Mali.
- *Fourth*, the efficiency gains resulting from having implemented the capacity-building programs for the Customs Administration have also contributed (together with the functioning of the STTV facility) to avoidance of undue overstay in the yard and the reduction in truck dwell time.

5.5 However, although project development objectives have been substantially achieved on balance, some issues remain to be addressed. Field interviewees reiterated to the IEG team the issue of the STTV's location and capacity. The Ghana Institute of Freight Forwarders' representatives raised to the IEG team their concerns (already voiced during ICR preparation) that the STTV site is sometimes slow to reach because it takes up to two hours to cross a three-mile section that traverses an urban area, whereas a bypass for express access between the port and the northern fringe of Tema could have solved the problem. The Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority also mentioned that the site was not optimal for future needs of the port (see risk to development section for details). Also, although the Faladié facility is fully functional, indicators need to be developed to measure (against baselines) the actual usage and operational performance of this dry port.

Objective 2. To facilitate the efficient movement of traffic along the corridor - rated *substantial*.

Outputs

5.6 The main outputs that were fully achieved and relevant to this objective include the following:

- a) Rehabilitation of badly deteriorated roads was implemented as targeted. In total, 356 kilometers in key sections of the corridor were rehabilitated, including 103 km of the Buipe-Tamale road in Ghana; 54 km of the Ouagadougou–Sakoinsé road in Burkina Faso; and two roads in Mali: 154 km of the Bamako-Bougouni road and 45 km of the Sikasso-Heremakono road. The World Bank’s financing covered 19 percent of the entire corridor.
- b) Substantial improvements were made in the corridor’s road conditions; rehabilitation works were financed by the World Bank, other development partners, and the government. In Ghana, the extent of corridor in good condition improved from 56 percent (baseline) in 2008 to 76 percent in 2016 (see Appendix Table D3). In Burkina Faso, 81 percent of the corridor was in good condition in 2017 compared to 50 percent at appraisal. In Mali, the roads in good condition on the Heremako–Bamako section of the corridor increased from 40 percent baseline to 85.4 percent at project closure. The IEG mission conducted two site visits on the corridor: (a) 6 km stretch of the 54 km road rehabilitated by the World Bank (from Ouagadougou city center toward Mali); and (b) 25 km on the road rehabilitated by the African Development Bank (from Ouagadougou toward Ghana). The roads visited appeared to be good condition. The representative of the Organization of the Road Carriers of Burkina Faso indicated that the condition of the road has improved in the past four years.
- c) Road safety action plans covering the three countries were developed and implemented under the project. Signage and line markings were provided along the entire road corridor. Speed bumps were constructed on the Ouagadougou–Sakoinsé section of the corridor in Burkina Faso. Local road safety committees were put in place and road safety awareness campaigns were conducted in Mali and Burkina Faso.
- d) Capacity development was carried out through a broad range of activities. In Ghana, about 200 junior and senior customs staff were trained during 2009–14. The types of training courses offered included border management, proficiency in GCNet/GCMS system, and satellite tracking for transit consignments. In addition, vehicles were procured for customs officers to enable them to patrol the corridor. In Burkina Faso, 1,213 staff were trained. The project also delivered the following capacity-strengthening activities: (i) procurement of mobile weighbridges in Burkina Faso; (ii) procurement of computers, furniture, and equipment in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali for customs and transport authorities; (iii) procurement of vehicles and motorcycles to better patrol the corridor for customs and transport

authorities in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali; (iv) training for customs and transport authorities in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali; (v) procurement of mobile speed cameras, radar speed guns, and other safety equipment to improve road safety on the Malian and Burkinabe sections of the corridor; (vi) construction of two emergency outposts and procurement of vehicles to improve the response of civil defense units along the Malian section of the corridor; and (vii) financing of study tours and advocacy work to facilitate the safe movement of goods along the corridor.

5.7 Some outputs did not materialize. Regarding outputs that were not achieved, five rest stops were constructed but none of them are operational. Rest stops along the corridor were intended to mitigate the problem of limited parking spaces and to enable safe driving. In Burkina Faso, two rest stops at Sabou and Pâ were constructed, but they are non-operational and unlikely to become so, given their isolated locations away from towns. In Ghana, two rest stops were under construction (about 70 percent completed) at project closure, and the Ministry of Roads and Highways was planning to finish the construction using its own resources. However, the IEG mission found that these rest stops have not been completed. In Mali, the one rest stop constructed was also not operational. The project also supported HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns to mitigate the negative social impacts of transit traffic. In Burkina Faso, a campaign was implemented through advertisements on television, fliers, and distribution of free condoms. However, it was discontinued after project closure because of lack of funding. In Ghana, some HIV/AIDS sensitization activities were carried out.

Intermediate Outcomes

5.8 Some intermediate outcome targets were partially implemented and laid the groundwork for achieving the project development objective. These include:

- a) The interconnection of customs systems between the three countries was only partially achieved. For Burkina Faso and Mali, Technical Assistance support was provided to facilitate the interconnection of their respective customs systems, which were also upgraded. The three countries also completed the activities to interconnect their customs systems. However, the mutual exchange of real-time data had not commenced at project closure and was still not operational at the time of IEG's visit. The IEG mission was informed that UEMOA has imposed interconnection deadlines, but no timeline was set between Ghana and Burkina Faso or between Burkina Faso and Mali. For Ghana, it was reported that poor progress toward customs harmonization was owing to: (i) incompatibility of the systems, (ii) lack of agreement about which country systems to use; and (iii) the perception that the project corridor is a lower-priority trade route for Ghana than for other countries, and (iv) lack of political commitment. In contrast, the customs interconnection between Burkina Faso and Togo is far advanced and scheduled for March 2018, because both country share similar systems (Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) funding). The interconnection of customs between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire is being supported by the World Bank's Transport Sector Modernization and Corridor Trade Facilitation Project (which was approved in December 2017).

- b) Customs-related information and communication technology were updated and the capacity of customs administration was strengthened through training. As a positive result, the border crossing time at the Ghana–Burkina Faso border was reduced from five hours in 2008 to approximately one and a half hours at project closing. At project closure, the border crossing time at the Burkina Faso–Mali border did not decrease as targeted; instead, it increased marginally from four hours in 2008 to a little more than four and half hours. However, the current data shows a decrease in 2017 to about two hours, exceeding the target of three hours.²¹

5.9 Some intermediate outcomes were not achieved. For example, the single format for cargo tracking was intended to facilitate the movement of transit goods from the Tema port and thus further reduce transit times. However, it was not implemented. Numerous meetings were organized and facilitated by the World Bank, but the countries did not reach any agreement. Finally, at the time of project closing, the three countries had opted for different systems. At the time of the IEG mission, a harmonized cargo tracking system was still not operational. Only the Ghanaian section (825 km) was operational, or about 43 percent of the corridor’s 1,900 km length. The border crossing time between Ghana and Burkina Faso showed an increase to three hours in 2017, based on the most recent data provided to IEG. It was also reported by various parties that because of the lack of harmonized cargo tracking systems, at the Burkina Faso side of the border the crossing time may take longer, sometimes even up to a day, because the truckers need to wait for the customs escort to accompany the truck. Finally, the reduction in customs checkpoints was not achieved. In Mali, the number of fixed customs checkpoints increased from four at project start-up to six at project closure (compared to the target of just one). In Ghana, the number of fixed customs checkpoints in Ghana was reduced from six at the baseline to five at project closure (against the target of only two). Burkina Faso has just one fixed check point at the border to check documents (at appraisal and at closure). In addition, although the number of security checkpoints was not within the project’s scope, the IEG mission was informed that such checkpoints (legal and illegal) have increased, which has implications for increased costs of transit traffic.

Outcomes

5.10 On balance, taking both positive results and shortcomings into account, there were significant outcomes that demonstrate the substantial achievement of this objective.

- *First*, the average transit time (for containerized imports) from exiting at Tema port to reaching Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso was reduced from seven days in 2008 to about five and half days at project closure, as targeted. The IEG mission found that transit time from Tema to Ouagadougou has increased to more than seven days (there is no available data for travel times between Tema port and Bamako), because two bridges in the Ghana part of the corridor are being rehabilitated and the traffic is being diverted through a longer route. IEG was informed that the works will be completed by March 2018 and transit times will revert to the earlier levels. The average transit time (for containerized imports) from exiting at Tema port to reaching Bamako in Mali was reduced from 15 days in 2008 to about 12 days at project closure, also as targeted.

- *Second*, transit time variation from Tema port to Ouagadougou was reduced from three days to 2.4 days, and from Tema port to Bamako from six days to three —both as targeted by project closure (more recent data are not available). These positive outcomes were mainly owing to the project’s satisfactory completion of road rehabilitation works in conjunction with other donors, which significantly improved road conditions in the corridor, and thereby contributed to efficient movement of traffic.

5.11 Nonetheless, in addition to pursuing the single-format cargo tracking and the reduction in customs checkpoints, two specific issues also remain to be addressed. One concerns the cargo tracking system in Ghana, where the truckers’ representatives have raised concerns that there is no unit in charge of monitoring the system; hence, during emergencies such as a truck breakdown or an accident, customs offices do not respond quickly to transfer the cargo to another truck. They also mentioned the high cost of renting the tracking equipment (US\$50 per truck).²² The IEG mission was informed by the Ghana Institute of Freight Forwarders that Customs has imposed the new rule that a truck transiting the country must leave the country within a maximum of seven days (it was two weeks earlier). Beyond seven days, the truck must pay a fine of Cedi 1,000 per day. Although trucks frequently break down, customs do not accept breakdown as an excuse and will still charge the fine.

6. Efficiency

6.1 An economic analysis was conducted for the road rehabilitation activities at appraisal and at closure, using the Highway Design Model (HDM-4). The benefits associated with road rehabilitation activities were: (i) reduction in transit time; (ii) reduction in transport unpredictability; and (iii) reduction in non-logistics costs, such as inventory and storage costs. The average ex post economic rate of return (ERR) was 13 percent, substantially lower than the ex-ante estimate of 22 percent (See Table 1 for ERRs for individual countries). Although none of the civil works funded under the project suffered from major cost overruns during implementation, and traffic volumes along the corridor had grown faster than originally forecasted,²³ thus increasing the absolute benefits of the project with regard to time savings, the ex-post ERR was lower because of increases in maintenance costs. The traffic increase was mainly in heavy goods vehicles (trucks), which cause roads to deteriorate more quickly.²⁴

6.2

Table 1: Economic Internal Rate of Return, by Country

	Road Sections	Ex ante ERR (%)	Ex post ERR (%)
Ghana	<i>Buipe–Tamale (103km)</i>	14.7	13.4
Burkina Faso	<i>Ouagadougou–Sakoinsé</i>	18.5	14.0
	<i>Bingo–Ouagadougou</i>	19.7	10.0
Mali	<i>Bamako–Bougouni (154 km)</i>	31.0	14.0
	<i>Sikasso–Heremakono (45 km)</i>	30.0	14.0
Average		22.0	13.0

Source: Implementation Completion and Results report.

6.3 The project implementation experienced delays and the project closing date was extended by 15 months. These delays result in benefits forgone as a result of late start and completion of project activities. The implementation of civil works in Mali experienced delays due to: (i) insecurity and political unrest during January 2012 to August 2013; (ii) design revision of the Faladié (Bamako) dry port; and (iii) design revisions for the Sikasso–Heremakono road. In Burkina Faso, the rehabilitation of the Ouagadougou–Sakoinsé road section was completed by mid-2013 with a one-year delay due to late mobilization of the contractor. In Ghana, works for the rehabilitation of the Buipe–Tamale road section were completed with substantial delays due to procurement issues. In Ghana, the construction of the two rest stops incurred delays in land acquisition, and design studies took longer than expected.

6.4 Although the ex post ERR for the corridor improvement component was 13 percent, efficiency of the project is rated **modest** because of implementation delays for road works in Ghana and Burkina Faso, non-operational rest-stops, non-implementation of a single cargo tracking system and interconnection of customs in the three countries.

7. Ratings

Outcome

7.1 The project's outcome is **moderately satisfactory**, based on the high relevance of objectives, the substantial relevance of design, and the substantial achievement of its development objectives of improving transit access and facilitating transport along the Mali-Burkina Faso–Ghana transport corridor, and the project's modest efficiency.

7.2 The relevance of objectives is rated high because the project was fully aligned with the priority support areas identified under the Country Assistance/Partnership Strategies for Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali, and the Regional Integration Strategy for Africa, and governments' sector goals and strategies. The relevance of project design is substantial. The achievement of project outcomes is causally linked to the specific activities supported by the project, in a manner consistent with the results framework. The achievement of the project objective of improving access by Burkina Faso and Mali to the ports in Ghana and port operations was substantial. The objective of facilitating the efficient movement of traffic along the Tema–Ouagadougou–Bamako road transport corridor is also rated substantial, although there were some shortcomings such as non-implementation of a single cargo tracking system and interconnection of customs in the three countries. Although the ex post ERR for the corridor improvement component was 13 percent, efficiency of the project is rated modest because of implementation delays for road works in Ghana and Burkina Faso, non-operational rest-stops, non-implementation of a single cargo tracking system and interconnection of customs in the three countries.

Risk to Development Outcome

7.3 The risks to development outcome are substantial. With the planned expansion of Tema Port, the limited STTV capacity will cause congestion at the port, leading to delays in customs clearance and loading of the transit cargo. Although all three countries have set up a second-generation road fund financed mainly through a fuel levy, the increased resources are still insufficient to fully cover maintenance cost. Therefore, the risk of failing to mobilize adequate financial resources for maintenance is substantial. The inadequate enforcement of axle load controls is still a problem and causes faster deterioration of the rehabilitated roads. Competition from other ports in the region may place the Tema Port at a relative disadvantage. The increased number of security checkpoints on the corridor will increase travel time on the corridor. These risks are discussed in detail below.

Financial Risk

7.4 **Inadequate mobilization of financial resources for maintenance:** At the time of project appraisal, only Ghana, among the three countries concerned, had set up a second-generation road fund. Burkina Faso had a first-generation road fund. Mali had set up a road authority whose resources came largely from budgetary provision. By project closure, the three countries had set up a second-generation road fund financed mainly through a fuel levy. Resources have increased but are still insufficient to fully cover maintenance costs.

7.5 In Ghana, there is a maintenance funding gap of about 40 percent. There is no budgetary allocation for maintenance funding. The road fund is mandated to finance funding for maintenance through its revenue from the fuel levy, tolls, and vehicle license fees. The revenue is not enough and in the past few years, the road fund has been used for construction rather than maintenance.

7.6 In Burkina Faso, the government established a second-generation road fund and is preparing a strategy for optimizing road maintenance and creating a road databank for more transparent road maintenance programming. The recent political and economic turmoil in the

country has reduced the allocation for road maintenance, and continued maintenance of roads was raised as a major concern. The Special Fund for Roads²⁵ receives only about 70 percent of the funds required to adequately maintain the classified road network. In 2018, the estimated maintenance need is CFAF38.3 billion and the budget allocation is CFAF22.9 billion. The total budget required for the routine maintenance of the corridor is CFAF400 million, which is much higher than the budget allocation of CFAF170 million.

7.7 Although all three countries have set up a second-generation road fund financed mainly through a fuel levy, resources have increased but are still insufficient to fully cover maintenance costs. Therefore, the risk of failing to mobilize adequate financial resources for maintenance is substantial.

Institutional Risk

7.8 **Axle load control is still an issue for both Burkina Faso and Ghana:** Some progress has been made in controlling axle loads, but it is not enough. In principle, UEMOA member states have adopted Regulation No. 14 on axle load and gross weight control on the harmonization of standards and procedures for vehicle size, tonnage, and axle load control of heavy transport vehicles. However, there are no systematic sanctions for noncompliance with the rules in the three countries, either through discharging the extra load or payment of fines. Axle load standards in Francophone and Anglophone countries are different. The weight limitation is lower in Ghana, at 11.5 tons per single axle or 51 tons for six-axle truck, compared to 13 tons per single axle or 60 tons per six-axle truck in Burkina Faso. By April 1, 2018, the whole subregion will follow 51 tons for six-axle truck.

7.9 Ghana is monitoring axle loads on the corridor and has invested in mobile axle-weight facilities to weigh trucks that may take diversion routes to avoid permanent weight bridges. The trucks are checked randomly and those that are not in compliance with Ghana's axle load regulation are fined and made to shed the load. The IEG mission was informed by Ghana Harbour and Port Authority that at the Tema Port, all departing vehicles are required to pass through the axle load scales.

7.10 In Burkina Faso, the National Office for Road Safety (Office National de la Sécurité Routière [ONASER]) enforces road safety laws, and has the mandate to enforce axle load regulations. Weighing stations were established or renovated with support from EU.

7.11 Overloading is still a problem, but with the gradual introduction of axle load controls and improved monitoring, the road infrastructure funded under the project will be less affected by premature degradation caused by overloading. IEG was informed that after April 1, 2018 extreme overloading (more than 20 percent of allowed weight) will not be tolerated as by then all UEMOA member countries will enforce zero tolerance for extreme overloading. However, normal overloading will continue (up to 20 percent over allowed weight). Though Ghana is not part of UEMOA, it is following the ECOWAS Supplementary Act that has similar content as Regulation 14. Ghana and UEMOA member states agreed on a "road map" for the implementation of axle weight controls for trucks.²⁶

7.12 **Although the number of customs checkpoints has been reduced there has been an increase in security check points.** The security checkpoints have significantly increased between Burkina Faso and Ghana, and the likelihood of these going down is very low. The increase in security checkpoints will increase travel time on the corridor.

Economic Risk

7.13 **Uncertain competitiveness of Tema Port vis-à-vis other ports in the region.**


Although access for Burkina Faso to Tema port was improved, Tema Port is not the key port for imports and exports to Burkina Faso and Mali. Currently the main ports for imports to Burkina Faso in the order of importance are: Lome in Togo, Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire, and Tema in Ghana. For exports, Abidjan is the main port, followed by Lome, Cotonou and Tema. (Figure 1 and Appendix Tables D1 and D2).

7.14 The choice of ports may also be affected by the dwell time at these regional ports. In 2016 the cargo dwell time at the Tema port was 15 days, compared to 14 days at Cotonou Port (Benin), 11 days at Abidjan port (Côte d'Ivoire) and nine days at Lome port (Togo)²⁷.

Technical Risk

7.15 **Limitations of STTV capacity:** There are concerns about the capacity and size of the facility. The original site selected was four times larger than what was eventually built. Currently, the Tema Port is being expanded, and limited STTV capacity will cause congestion at the port, leading to delays in customs clearance and loading of the transit cargo.

Figure 1. Evolution of Burkina Faso Transit Traffic from the Key Ports, 2007-16.



Source: Statistical Bulletin 2016, 2017. Direction de l'Observatoire des Transports Internationaux et de la Prospective Conseil Burkinabè des Chargeurs (CBC).

7.16 Taking all these factors into account, the overall risk to development outcome is rated **substantial**.

World Bank Performance

Quality at Entry

7.17 World Bank experience from similar transport, trade and transit facilitation projects in Africa and other regions was reflected in the project design. These regional projects were the East Africa Trade and Transport Facilitation Project, Trade and Transport Facilitation Project in Southeast Europe, and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community Transit and Transport Facilitation Project. The lessons taken in account were: (i) simplify project objectives, design and components; and (ii) anchor the project objectives to those of the regional program.

7.18 The project design was also based on the following findings of the IEG evaluation of the multi-country operations,²⁸ namely: (i) programs/projects that address issues where countries' interests are symmetric have generally been more successful than those that do not; and (ii) the objectives should match national and regional capacities to effectively deal with the complex implementation coordination challenges. The interests of the transit and landlocked countries broadly coincided because all three countries shared the same interest in improving transport infrastructure along the corridor. Harmonizing of customs was also agreed upon by the three countries at the design stage.

7.19 The objective statement is not clearly formulated: there is some overlap between the two sub-objectives: improving access to the ports and port operations, and increasing the efficiency of movement along the entire corridor. The first sub-objective seems to be encompassed within the second objective. In addition, road safety should have been included in the project development objective, thereby necessitating the need for indicators and sufficient monitoring during project implementation.

7.20 This complex project involved three countries, each with its own independent agencies. The project implementation units of each country were directly in control of the road rehabilitation activities, which could be executed within a shorter implementation time frame. However, the transit facilitation component required substantial coordination among the three countries (with language as a major barrier); hence a longer implementation time frame than that for road rehabilitation was required. The project design did not reflect this difference in implementation schedules.

7.21 The project was designed to be managed separately by each country. However, it was really a regional project that needed to be managed by a regional institution because the activities required a substantial amount of coordination and concertation among the participating countries that a supranational institution is best placed to handle. UEMOA was expected to play this role but was not effective. UEOMA should have been supported through sufficient project funds to be an effective regional coordinating body for the project. This would have contributed to achieving transit facilitation–related activities.

7.22 The project had few shortcomings. The project did not have sufficient citizen engagement procedures for the rest stops. The IEG mission was informed in Burkina Faso that stakeholders, particularly truckers and villagers, were not consulted regarding the exact location of the rest stops to be built. As a result, the rest stops are not being used by the stakeholders. In addition, engineering (technical specifications needed to be revised during implementation. The project did not establish a sustainable M&E system to track, monitor, and report on transit and trade facilitation along the entire corridor-

7.23 The World Bank's quality at entry is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

Quality of Supervision

7.24 Regular supervision missions were carried out and 17 Implementation Status and Results reports were filed during the period 2008–15 (approximately every six months). Supervision missions could not visit Mali and Burkina Faso during the period of political crisis and security threats (Mali—insecurity and political instability events during January 2012 to August 2013, Burkina Faso—2014 sociopolitical uprising).

7.25 The World Bank closely supervised the project, and no financial management and procurement irregularities were reported in the supervision documents. As discussed in the implementation section, civil works were delayed in the three countries. When Ghana and Burkina Faso experienced problems with contractors, the World Bank advised the use of contractual remedial measures and to apply the contractual delays penalty clause. This proved effective in expediting the works and curbing the delays. There were no cost overruns. The supervision of safeguards was rated satisfactory in the supervision documents.

7.26 The implementation of the facilitation component proved to be very challenging. Despite the World Bank's efforts to facilitate intensive consultations between Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Mali customs administrations throughout the implementation period, the three countries could not come to an agreement.

7.27 Ghana Port Authority representatives expressed concerns to IEG about not being able to obtain additional financing from the project for a larger site located at a better location for the STTV construction. As discussed in the implementation section, because of resource constraints, the World Bank proposed to pave and upgrade the terminal surface of the old transit yard at the Tema Port as an alternative to the initial proposal.

7.28 The quality of supervision is rated **satisfactory**.

7.29 Because the quality at entry is rated moderately satisfactory and the quality of supervision is rated satisfactory, the overall World Bank performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

Borrower Performance

Government performance.

7.30 The three participating countries were committed to project activities at the beginning. However, they did not reach necessary agreements on transit facilitation. The IEG mission was informed that during implementation, the focus was more toward the improvement of the road corridor rather than transit facilitation.

7.31 Regarding counterpart funding, the actual contribution from the government of Mali was US\$6.33 million, which is almost three times its appraisal commitment of US\$2.2 million. On the other hand, the actual contribution from the government of Ghana was US\$1.0 million, or substantially less than its appraisal commitment of US\$5.0 million, which caused delays in implementing project activities. There was no planned or actual funding from the government of Burkina Faso.

7.32 The government performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

Implementing agencies performance

7.33 At the national level, the implementation of the project involved several implementing agencies in the three different countries. Both Burkina Faso and Mali used the existing transport sector Project Coordinating Unit, while in Ghana it was implemented by three agencies (Ghana Highway Authority, Customs Excise Prevention Services, and Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority within the line ministry, the Ministry of Transportation. After the Paris Declaration,²⁹ Ghana was used as a pilot country to mainstream project implementation and to reduce reliance on parallel project implementation units.

7.34 The differences in implementing agencies' modalities in the three countries affected the project results. Although the Project Coordination Unit in Burkina Faso and Mali were familiar with the World Bank's fiduciary and procurement guidelines, there were delays in the execution of civil works. Winning contractors in Mali and Ghana turned out to be small organizations and faced major difficulties in mobilizing equipment and qualified personnel to the sites, which resulted in implementation delays and technical difficulties in submitting statements of expenditures on time. Despite the unrest in Mali that delayed project activities, Mali was successful in implementing the activities in the latter years of the project. In Ghana, the arrangements for using line ministry staff were deficient and led to delays in implementation because no priority was given to the World Bank-funded project activities. Moreover, there was weak project ownership and lack of urgency or incentives to deliver works faster because Ghana, being a coastal country, was not dependent on the corridor.

7.35 At the regional level, overall coordination of the project was carried out by the UEMOA through its Department of Community Territorial Development, Infrastructure, Transport, and Telecommunications and a joint technical committee made up of the implementing agencies in each of the three countries. The role of UEMOA was mainly to facilitate sub regional integration, particularly through the full implementation of Regulation

14 (axle load control) and harmonization of customs across member countries and monitoring the community standards on number of border check points.

7.36 Throughout the implementation of the project, UEMOA tried its best to coordinate and advocate to the involved national governments for the implementation of the facilitation activities along the RP-I corridor. More specifically, it initially convened all key stakeholders on a regular basis (customs, chambers of commerce, transport ministries, facilitation committees, multilateral development banks, etc.). It provided some technical assistance to monitor roadblocks along the corridor. However, as time progressed and key staff changed, UEMOA had less and less funding to provide adequate support to the RP-I program, especially after African Development Bank funding ended for UEMOA-supported activities under the RP-I program.

7.37 The implementing agencies performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

7.38 Because both the government and the implementing agencies performance is rated moderately satisfactory, the overall, the borrower performance is rated **moderately satisfactory**.

8. Lessons

8.1 **A regional approach to implement road rehabilitation works along strategic corridors can enhance the benefits particularly for the landlocked countries by linking them to gateway ports.** Project experience shows that carrying out road rehabilitation works simultaneously in all the participating countries rather than separate single operations, helps to address the needs for the entire corridor in a timely and coordinated manner.

8.2 **It is important to have strong upstream analytical work and technical assistance for regional trade facilitation reforms so that countries can agree early on the technical details of institutional reforms.** The project's experience shows that waiting until project implementation to sort out the technical details is risky, and this initiative largely failed. During the preparation stage and early years of project implementation, the World Bank and UEMOA facilitated coordination and collaboration between countries to discuss customs interconnection issues and cargo tracking systems. However, despite numerous meetings, no agreement was reached regarding which cargo tracking system technology should be adopted: Ghana continued using its separate tracking system; Mali piloted its in-house cargo tracking system; and Burkina Faso opted for a different system from Ghana and Mali. Similarly, the interconnection of the customs systems experienced problems in agreement regarding the configuration and format of data to be exchanged.

8.3 **When the projects involve Regional Economic Communities (REC), it is important to assess and cover RECs' funding needs for project coordination and implementation so that they can carry out this function effectively.** Regional institutions perform important roles, such as: bringing countries together, obtaining their political commitment, helping them take collective decisions, playing an advocacy role and performing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) functions at the regional level. The project experience showed that the funding of the implementation arrangements for the West African

Monetary Union (UEMOA) was not sufficient. The World Bank could have done a better assessment of UEMOA's funding needs, coordinate with other donors to cover the gap and better utilize the influencing and coordinating power of this institution.

8.4 The World Bank's current single-country business model makes it challenging to implement regional projects. While regional integration projects benefit from the IDA window and provide additional financial resources for clients to implement regional projects, the project's experience shows that the implementation is based on the World Bank's single-country model. Challenges included, for example, a single task team leader coordinating with separate country management units and separate teams on procurement, fiduciary, and safeguards for each country, which is more demanding than implementing a single country operation. Using a single team for procurement, safeguards, and fiduciary aspects would have been more efficient.

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¹ Project Completion Report for the West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project. June 2015. Ghana Ministry of Roads and Highways.

² ECOWAS is a regional institution of 15 countries in West Africa, including in addition to the three project countries, Benin, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo). Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS in 2000 to join the Arab Maghreb Union.

³ All countries in West Africa (except Mauritania) are members of ECOWAS; Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire are also members of the West Africa Economic and Monetary Union (Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine) (UEMOA)/.

⁴ West Africa Road Transport, Project Concept Note. World Bank.

⁵ Project Completion Report for the West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project. June 2015. Ghana Ministry of Roads and Highways.

⁶ ECOWAS adopted in January 2003 a decision on the establishment of a regional road transport and transit facilitation program in support of intra-community trade and cross-border movements

⁷ The other partners were the European Union, African Development Bank, France, the US Agency for International Development, and New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

⁸ The African Development Bank uses the “Unit of Account” or “UA,” which is equivalent to the International Monetary Fund’ Special Drawing Right (SDR) as its reporting currency.

⁹ Individual country allocations could leverage twice the amount from the IDA14 envelope (one-third from country allocations and the two-thirds from IDA window).

¹⁰ A transit guarantee system is a mechanism to guarantee the transit country that either: (i) the goods will indeed leave the country without being put illegally on the market, or (ii) that the corresponding taxes and excises will be paid if ever evidence of the goods leaving the country cannot be produced.

¹¹ A sealing system for transport containers to ensure that trucks could undertake transit journeys without discharging cargo inside the country without needing to be monitored by customs officers throughout the journeys.

¹² Project Appraisal Document, West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project.

¹³ Exchange rate used is US\$1 to CFAF420.

¹⁴ Project Appraisal Document, West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project.

¹⁵ The project development objectives are stated in the same way for all three project implementing countries.

¹⁶ National Transport Infrastructure and Opening up Policy 2015-19 (Politique Nationale des Transports des Infrastructures de Transport et du Desenclement).

¹⁷ The total length of Tema-Ouagadougou-Bamako Corridor is about 1,900 km.

¹⁸ Project Appraisal Document para 28 and Annex 4.

¹⁹ The EU project was responsible for the harmonization and simplification of regulations, procedures, and documents.

²⁰ There were delays in decommissioning of the landfill.

²¹ UEMOA, 2017, Report of the Observatory on Abnormal Practices.

²² Before the introduction of the cargo tracking device, a customs escort had to accompany the transit truck in the Ghanaian corridor. No estimate was provided on the cost of the customs escort.

²³ In 2014, the traffic volumes were higher than the 2008 forecasts for the same year, by 39 percent on the Ouagadougou-Sakoinsé section and by 17 percent on the Bingo-Ouagadougou section.

²⁴ Implementation Completion and Results. West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project.

²⁵ Fonds Spécial Routier du Burkina, FSR-B, formerly the Road Fund - Fonds d'Entretien Routier du Burkina FER-B, was created with the possibility of receiving funds directly from fuel levy and road tolls.

²⁶ A two-stage axle weight control was introduced: (i) from July 1, 2010 with generous axle weight allowances and (ii) fully from January 1, 2011. For petrochemical tankers, the implementation was to take place more gradually, with fines for infractions increasing in three stages until 2012.

²⁷ Implementation Completion and Results for Abidjan Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation Program.

²⁸ *Development Potential of Regional Programs: An Evaluation of World Bank Support of Multi-Country Operations*. 2006.

²⁹ The Paris Declaration was the outcome of the 2005 Paris High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. In the Declaration 60 partner countries, 30 donor countries, and 30 development agencies, including the World Bank, committed to specific actions to further country ownership, harmonization, alignment, managing for development results, and mutual accountability for the use of aid.

Appendix A. Basic Data Sheet

WEST AFRICA TRANSPORT AND TRANSIT FACILITATION PROJECT

Key Project Data (US\$ million)

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs	197.2	180.9	91.7
Loan amount	190.0	173.5	92.4
Cancellation			

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements

	<i>FY09</i>	<i>FY10</i>	<i>FY11</i>	<i>FY12</i>	<i>FY13</i>	<i>FY14</i>	<i>FY15</i>	<i>FY16</i>
Appraisal estimate (US\$M)	7.9	30.9	75.0	135.0	180.0	190.0	190.0	190.0
Actual (US\$M)	11.0	29.6	40.6	75.0	117.2	157.4	170.7	173.5
Actual as % of appraisal	138	96	54	56	65	83	90	91
Date of final disbursement								12/1/2015

Project Dates

	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Concept Review	12/15/2003	01/08/2004
Appraisal	12/03/2007	12/06/2007
Board approval	12/14/2004	06/19/2008
Effectiveness	10/02/2008	10/02/2008
Closing date	03/31/2014	06/30/2015

Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (World Bank budget only)	
	<i>Staff Weeks (number)</i>	<i>US\$ Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)</i>
Lending		
FY03	10.31	82.10
FY04	18.64	134.46
FY05	16.23	138.34
FY06	35.34	214.96
FY07	50.14	327.64
FY08	50.67	326.15
Total Lending	181.33	1,223.65
Supervision/ICR		
FY09	57.06	188.60
FY10	65.24	230.80
FY11	42.48	184.10
FY12	42.23	172.60
FY13	56.35	324.20
FY14	36.30	186.70
FY15	27.30	193.30
FY16	1.50	10.10
Total Supervision/ICR	328.46	1,490.40
Total Lending and Supervision	509.79	2,714.05

Task Team Members

<i>Name</i>	<i>Title (at time of appraisal and closure, respectively)</i>	<i>Unit</i>
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Appendix B. Project Components by Country

Burkina Faso (appraisal cost US\$70 million; actual cost US\$70 million).

The project scope consisted of the following activities:

- a. rehabilitation and strengthening of the Ouagadougou-Sakoinsé (54 km) section of the Corridor;
- b. construction of up to two rest stops;
- c. design and implementation of a road safety action plan for the Burkinabé section of the Corridor;
- d. extension of the existing Automated System for Customs Data ++ (ASYCUDA ++) customs management system to the Ghanaian and Malian borders;
- e. interconnection of the Burkinabé ASYCUDA ++ system with the Malian ASYCUDA ++ and Ghanaian Customs Management System (GCMS);
- f. training and procurement of equipment to strengthen the capacity of customs and transport authorities to better monitor and secure transit traffic along the Corridor;
- g. extension of the cargo tracking system to the Burkinabé section of the Corridor; and
- h. implementation of an HIV/AIDS action plan for the Burkinabé portion of the Corridor.

Ghana (appraisal cost US\$85 million, actual cost US\$74.75 million).

The project scope consisted of the following activities:

- a. rehabilitation and strengthening of the Buipe-Tamale (103 km) section of the Corridor;
- b. design and construction of a Satellite Transit Truck Village near the Port of Tema;
- c. design and construction of two intervening transit checkpoints/rest stop areas and up to two rest stop areas on the Ghanaian section of the Corridor;
- d. design and implementation of a road safety action plan for the Ghanaian section of the Corridor;
- e. capacity strengthening of customs authorities to better monitor and secure transit traffic along the Corridor;
- f. interconnection of the GCMS with the customs systems of Burkina Faso (ASYCUDA ++) and Mali (ASYCUDA ++); and
- g. implementation of an HIV/AIDS action plan for the Ghanaian portion of the Corridor.

Mali (appraisal cost US\$42.2 million, actual cost US\$36.12 million).

The project scope consisted of the following activities:

- a. rehabilitation of the Bamako-Bougouni (154 km) section of the Corridor;

- b. rehabilitation and strengthening of the Sikasso-Heremakono (45 km) section of the Corridor;
- c. modernization of the multifunctional platform at Faladié (Bamako);
- d. construction of up to two rest stops on the Corridor;
- e. capacity strengthening of customs and transport authorities to better monitor and secure transit traffic along the Corridor;
- f. implementation of an HIV/AIDS action plan for the Malian portion of the Corridor; and
- g. design and implementation of a road safety improvement action plan on the Malian portion of the Corridor.

Appendix C. Regional Legal Framework for Transit Transport Cooperation

1. Supplementary Act /SA.1/07/13 Relating to the establishment and Implementation of the Joint Border Posts Concept within Member States of the Economic Community of West African States was approved and signed in June 2013.
2. ECOWAS Supplementary Act/SP.1/02/12 Relating to the Harmonization of Standards and Procedures for the Control of Dimensions, Weight and Axle Load of Goods Vehicle Within Members States of the Economic Community of West African States.
3. Harmonization of norms, standards, vehicle size, axle load & JBP legal Framework Studies (Nigeria in ECOWAS and Cameroon in ECCAS)
4. Harmonized Axle Load Legal framework
5. ECOWAS Protocol A/P.1/5/79 of 29th May 1979 as amended relating to Free Movement of persons, residence and establishment
6. ECOWAS Convention No A/P2/5/82 of 29 May 1982 regulating inter-State Road Transportation between ECOWAS Member States
7. Convention A/P5/5/82 of May 29th, 1982 for mutual administrative assistance on customs matters
8. Resolution C/RES/.4/5/90 of May 27th, 1990 on the reduction of the number of road check points in ECOWAS Member States
9. Convention A/P.1/7/92 of 29 July 1992 relating to mutual assistance in criminal matters;
10. Decision C/DEC.13/01/03 - Establishes a Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Program in Support of Inter-Community Trade and Cross-Border Movements (JBPs, Observatories, ISRT Awareness)
11. RESOLUTION No.2 relating to the implementation of the Joint Border Posts Program of ECOWAS and UEMOA member states

Appendix D. Tables

Table D1. Evolution of Import Shipping Traffic from 2007 to 2016 (tonnes)

Transit ports	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Cotonou (Benin)	14,844	3,541	632	8,183	8,847	8,611	3,616	3,869	13,437	38,529
Lome (Togo)	538,621	288,496	210,388	687,308	722,314	524,116	672,301	789,678	551,665	944,877
Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)	147,373	189,764	349,651	320,292	508,718	518,648	563,506	603,612	768,497	667,728
Tema (Ghana)	290,965	329,680	259,410	343,187	454,036	357,977	407,540	464,503	593,196	708,774
Takoradi (Ghana)	21,874	18,434	25,946	27,928	30,051	-	16,250	16,605	50,938	62,257
Total	1,013,677	829,915	846,028	1,386,897	1,723,966	1,409,351	1,662,241	1,878,267	1,977,733	2,422,166

Source: Statistical Bulletin 2016, 2017. Direction de l'Observatoire des Transports Internationaux et de la Prospective Conseil Burkinabè des Chargeurs (CBC)

Table D2. Evolution of Export Shipping Traffic from 2007 to 2016 (tonnes)

Transit ports	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Cotonou (Benin)	7773	785		8416	17808	25787	37500	60000	55000	33260
Lome (Togo)	191666	70749	27225	44742	173223	57864	99518	73919	91015	106303
Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)	46051	86256	192998	211190	81721	53589	113095	201541	235362	228376
Tema (Ghana)	71014	22235	16925	17059	17195	12206	10340	6643	3081	1824
Total	316504	180025	237148	281407	289947	149446	260453	342103	384458	369763

APPENDIX D

Annex Table D3. Condition of Trunk Roads in Ghana (All Paved Roads)

	All Paved Roads							Central Corridor*
	Good		Fair		Poor		Total	Good
Year	Length (km)	(%)	Length (km)	(%)	Length (km)	(%)	Length (km)	(%)
2008	3995	72	1302	23	288	5	5585	56
2009	3802	64	1860	31	309	5	5971	
2010	3191	43	3013	41	1220	16	7424	29
2011	3478	49	2062	29	1609	23	7149	55
2012	4386	60	2401	33	535	7	7322	67
2013	4278	60	2043	29	759	11	7080	56
2014	5093	63	2773	34	257	3	8123	65
2015	4806	62	2735	35	201	3	7742	71
2016	5741	66	2797	32	134	2	8672	76

*Central corridor includes the project corridor.

Source: Road Condition Report, Year 2016. Ghana Highway Authority. Ministry of Roads and Highways. June 2017.

Appendix Table D4. Average Number of Checkpoints by Corridor

Corridor/Country	Distance traveled (km)	Police	Customs	Military with jurisdiction in civil law enforcement	Waters and Forests	Plant Disease	Other (town hall, union, taxes)	Total
Abidjan-Bamako	1174	6	5	6	0	2	2	21
Côte d'Ivoire	710	3	2	3	0	1	1	10
Mali	464	3	3	3	0	1	1	11
Abidjan-Ouagadougou	1263	5	6	7	1	1	2	22
Burkina Faso	517	3	3	4	1	0	1	12
Côte d'Ivoire	746	2	3	3	0	1	1	10
Bamako-Dakar via Diboli	1382	7	5	10	0	1	3	26
Mali	700	3	3	5	0	1	3	15
Senegal	682	4	2	5	0	0	0	11
Bamako-Dakar via Moussala	1225	6	5	6	1	2	0	20
Mali	420	2	3	3	1	1	0	10
Senegal	805	4	2	3	0	1	0	10
Bamako-Ouaga via Hérémakono	934	9	8	7	0	0	2	14
Burkina Faso	502	6	4	3	0	0	0	6
Mali	432	3	4	4	0	0	2	8
Bamako-Ouaga via Koury	1035	8	7	9	0	0	0	16
Burkina Faso	488	4	4	5		0	0	6
Mali	547	4	3	4		0	0	10
Cotonou-Niamey	950	1	5	2	0	0	2	10
Benin	710	0	2	1	0	0	1	4
Niger	240	1	3	1	0	0	1	6
Tema-Ouagadougou	1057	7	8	3	0	0	0	18
Ghana	881	4	5	0			0	9
Burkina Faso	176	3	3	3	0	0	0	9
Lome-Ouagadougou	920	4	13	4	2	2	2	27
Burkina Faso	274	2	4	3	2	1	1	13
Togo	746	2	3	1	0	1	1	11
Dakar-Bissau	1052	19	7	0		2	2	38
Senegal	923	13	2	0		1	1	25
Guinea Bissau	129	6	5	0		1	1	13

Source: Report de L'Observatoire des Pratiques Anormales (period April to June 2017. Economic and Monetary Union West Africa. July 2017.

Appendix Table D5. Control Time at Checkpoints.

Corridor / Country	Control time (in minutes)	Control time per 100 km (in minutes)
Abidjan-Bamako	150	12
Ivory Coast	100	14
Mali	50	9
Abidjan-Ouagadougou	130	10
Burkina Faso	60	11
Ivory Coast	70	8
Bamako-Dakar via Diboli	299	21
Mali	150	22
Senegal	149	22
Bamako-Dakar via Moussala	251	21
Mali	94	22
Senegal	157	19
Bamako-Ouaga via Hérémakono	95	10
Burkina Faso	40	8
Mali	55	13
Bamako-Ouagadougou via Koury	120	12
Burkina Faso	45	9
Mali	75	14
Cotonou-Niamey	170	18
Benin	110	15
Niger	60	25
Tema-Ouagadougou	162	15
Ghana	120	14
Burkina Faso	42	24
Lome-Ouagadougou	102	11
Burkina Faso	42	15
Togo	60	8
Dakar-Bissau	390	37
Senegal	180	20
Guinea Bissau	210	163

Source: Report de L'Observatoire des Pratiques Anormales (period April to June 2017. Economic and Monetary Union West Africa. July 2017.

Appendix E. List of Persons Met

Burkina Faso

Direction Générale du Commerce

Mr. Souleymane Ouedraogo, *Direction des échanges commerciaux (Director of Trade Flows)*

Mrs. Lougui, *Trade Cooperation Directorate in Charge of Trade Negotiations*

Directorate General of Land and Maritime Transport (DGTMM)

Mr. Mahamoudou Zampaligre, *Director of Studies and of Legislation*

National Office of Road Safety (ONASER)

Mr. Mamoudou Quattara, *General Director*

Burkina Shippers Concil (Conseil Burkinabé Des Chargeurs (CBC))

Mr. Erve Ilboudo, *General Manager*

Madame Bodou, *Director of Traffic and Freight*

Mr. Zakaria Belem, *Director of International Transport Observatory*

Mr. Thierry Hien, *Freight and Commercial Information Section Chief*

General Directorate of Road Infrastructure (DGIR)

Daila Kolou, *Road Works Section Chief*

Moumouni Ilbado, *Road Works Director*

Vincent de Paul Kountaar Dabire, *General Director*

General Directorate of Customs (DGD)

Micheline Ilboudo, *Deputy General Director*

Mr. Nounjolou, *Section Inspector*

Directorate General for Cooperation (DGCOOP)

Mrs. Mariam Ouedraogo, *Directorate of Financial Program Monitoring*

Mrs. Sama / Dabire Diane, *Directorate of Financial Program Monitoring*

APPENDIX E

Mr. Salam Kafando

Burkina Shippers' Council in Tema (Ghana)

Mr. Rakissiwindè Bationo *Representative of Burkina Shippers' Council in Tema (Ghana)*

Mr. Savadogo Bvukari, *Port and Shipping Department*

Mr. David Kyelem, *Head of Road Traffic and Facilitation Department*

Mr. Poda Martin, *Agent*

African Development Bank

Mr. Barnabas Yougbare, *Infrastructure Specialist*

The World Bank

Cheick Fantamady Kante, *Country Manager*

Aguiratou Savadogo-Tinto, *Senior Transport Specialist*

Fabio Galli, *Project Task Team Leader (Retired)*

Mr. Maiga Seydou, *Consultant*

Ghana**Ministry of Finance**

Mr. Souda Ahmed Seinou, *Principal Economics Officer Head*

Ministry of Roads and Highways

Mr. Edmund Offei-Annor, *Director, Policy & Planning*

Mr. Kwasi Agyeman-Boakye, *Senior Engineer*

Ms. Josephine Manu, *Chief Legal Officer*

Mr. Owusu Brandford, *National Service Personnel*

Mr. Frank Gmachin, *Assistant Development Planning Officer*

Alfrettina A. Chirawura, *APO*

Ms. Josephine Baddoo, *Principal Planning Officer*

Ghana Highway Authority

M. A.B. Kassim Nuhu, *Deputy Chief Executive*

Mr. Victor Annan, *Chief Engineer*

Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority

Mr. Komla W. Ofori, *Project Engineer*

Mr. Stephen Ampiaiw, *Port Civil Engineer*

Ministry of Trade and Industry

Mr. Patrick A. Poku, *Director*

Mr. Seidu Adam, *Commercial Officer*

Customs

Mr. Mike Dah, *Customs Officer*

Ghana Immigration Service

Mr. Peter Claver Nantuo, *Assistant Commissioner*

Mr. Peter Nantuo, *Lawyer*

Ministry of Trade and Industry

Mr. Patrick A. Poku, *Director/ Trade Facilitation and Export Trade Development*

Ghana Road Transport Coordination Council

Mr. Ibrahim Alhassan, *HTDC*

Mr. Abdul Wasiu Osman, *Accra*

APPENDIX E**Ghana Standards Authority**

Michael Jeffery, *Freight and Logistic Officer*

Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Julius Bradford Lamptey, *Head of Research and Advocacy*

Ghana National Bureau – ECOWAS

Mr. Patrick Agyekum, *General Secretary*

Sheik Lines & Co. Limited

Mr. Eddy Kwesi Akrong, *CEO*

Ghana Institute of Freight Forwarders

Mr. Kwabena Ofosu- Appiah, *President*

Eddy Kwesi Krong, *Ex. Secretary*

John Kwame Adu Jack, *Council Member*

State Insurance Corporation

Mr. Anthony Osei Ntiamoah, *Head, Inter-State Road Transit (ISRT)*

Borderless Alliance

Afua K. Eshun, *Advocacy Program Advisor*

African Development Bank

Ms. Sheila Enyonam Akyea, *Senior Transport (Infrastructure) Engineer*

The World Bank

Henry Kerali, *Country Director*

John Kobina Richardson, *Senior Transport Specialist*

Fabio Galli, *Project Task Team Leader (Retired)*

Appendix F. Borrower Comments

From: Kwasi Agyeman-Boakye <kwasi.agyeman.boakye@gmail.com>

Senior Engineer, Policy and Planning, Ministry of Roads and Highways

Date: 16 April 2018 at 11:37

Subject: Re: Fw: West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project (P079749) -- IEG Project Performance Assessment Report (Draft)

To: kodwo addison <gkaddison@hotmail.com>

Cc: "sahmed@mofep.gov.gh" <sahmed@mofep.gov.gh>, "Victor Annan (" <annan.victor@gmail.com>, baba <abknuhu@yahoo.co.uk>, "s.akyea@afdb.org" <s.akyea@afdb.org>, Gifty <danicajsk@gmail.com>, annor <eddyoannor@gmail.com>

Dear John,

Please note the following comments for consideration in the document:

1. It is observed that the list of people met was not exhaustive. I have attached the full list of people met for all the meetings. Notably the list of people met at the NFC meetings should be considered.

2. Also on page 35, Appendix Table D3, the table is labeled as "Condition of National Roads in Ghana". The label should read " Condition of Trunk Roads in Ghana" as the information in the table only reflect trunk road information.

Regards,

Kwasi Agyeman-Boakye,

Senior Engineer, Policy and Planning, Ministry of Roads and Highways