

Appendix A

History of Conflicts and Violence

A.1 Mindanao, Philippines

Moros¹ live on the large island of Mindanao (mostly on the western side now) at the southern end of the Philippine chain and on several small islands between Mindanao and Indonesia and Malaysia to the west. Violent conflicts between the Muslim Moro population in Mindanao and the central authorities date back to when the Spanish took over Philippines after Magellan's arrival (16th Century) and started Christianity in the rest of the island chain. The conflict flared up with variations after the United States took over from Spain in 1898 and after independence in 1946. The military government of Marcos reignited the conflict in the 1970s with a program of settling large numbers of Christians in Mindanao. This and the attendant displacement of Moros from land prompted the formation of insurgent organizations.

Four overlapping categories of groups in Southern Philippines have been fighting with the government and with each other in recent decades: Moro separatists, Islamist militants, Communists (operating nationwide), and bandit and kidnapper gangs.² These labels reflect motivations, not clear organizational distinctions, but such categories can help discern what drives conflict and violence at different times and places, and what might reduce it. Within the context of this evaluation, focused on the Mindanao, there are two main drivers of conflict: ethnic/religious separatism and criminality. Some of the local disputes between Moros and Christians are over land titling, which also feeds into the wider political conflict. The conflicts in Mindanao are thus multidimensional. Figure A.1.1 shows the Heidelberg Conflict Indicators for various pairs of organizations and how they vary over time.

The MILF has been the largest among groups fighting with the government and with each other since the late 1990s.³ All occasional truce agreements have broken down within a year or two, with the exceptions of the 1990s peace deal with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which resulted in creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao⁴ (ARMM) and the current deal with MILF, in effect since 2012 and signed into formal agreement in 2014.


Box A.1.1. Mindanao Conflict Timeline

- 1970 – Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) founded
- 1972 – Pres. Marcos declared Martial Law to contain insurgencies
- 1984 – Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway from MNLF, founded
- 1990 – Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) established
- 2000 – War between the army and MILF under Pres. Estrada intensifies
- 2003 – Pres. Arroyo brokers peace talks with MILF
- 2008 – Supreme Court declares the peace talks unconstitutional; conflict intensifies
- 2011 – Pres. Aquino resumes secret negotiations with MILF in Narita, Japan
- 2012 – Negotiations for Bangsamoro Framework concluded
- 2014 – Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro signed
- 2015 – Mamasapano incident (January), over 60 dead (police, MILF and civilians)
- 2015 – The deadline (June) passes for adopting Bangsamoro Basic Law. No new deadline established (unofficially until after the 2016 presidential elections).

Source: BDA, World Bank

According to the 2014 agreement, an autonomous region will be set up, to be known as *Bangsamoro* Autonomous Region, before President Benigno Aquino steps down in 2016. When implemented, it will give the Muslim-dominated area greater political powers and control over its resources. Bangsamoro replaces the ARMM, with its own government. The next steps would be for Congress to pass the Bangsamoro Basic Law and to hold a referendum to decide which provinces would be part of the autonomous region under the new law. MILF is essentially a government-in-waiting and, notwithstanding the January 2015 shootings⁵ (the so-called Mamasapano incident) usually works with the government to maintain peace. The MILF has since the early 2000s clarified its ethic-religious identity, while disavowing any connection with international terrorist organizations and criminal activity. At times it has conducted joint operations with the military to suppress criminal gangs. Observers in 2015 were optimistic about implementation of the peace plan, but it is only just starting, and the more radical and violent groups (Abu Sayyaf, BIFF, NPA, others) have vowed to continue the fight.

Figure A.1.1. Heidelberg Conflict Intensity Ratings



Source:

Since the early 1990s, organized violence in Mindanao has claimed more than 160,000 lives and displaced 3.5 million people since 2000.⁶ The numbers of displaced peaked in 2008, when an estimated 600,000 people were forced from their homes, making the Philippines the country with the highest number of newly displaced that year.

Table A.1.1. Human Development Indicators in ARMM and all Philippines

INDICATOR	ARMM	PHILIPPINES NATIONAL AVERAGE
Percent below the national poverty line (2006)	61.9	32.9
Infant mortality (2006) per thousand	34	23
Percent households with safe water supply (2014)	58	85
Percent households with sanitary facility (2014)	85	94
Elementary school completion rate (2007-08)	40	71
Secondary school net enrollment (2008-09)	30	59
Secondary school completion rate (2007-08)	42	71

Source: World Bank

A.2 Aceh, Indonesia

Aceh is a province at the western tip of Sumatra, the western most major island of Indonesia. Population of Aceh is Sunni Muslim, like the rest of Indonesia, but follows a more conservative version of Islam,⁷ and takes pride in its distinctive culture. The conflict between Aceh and the central government dates back to 1970s, when local elites resisted the efforts of President Suharto to bring all of the country into a relatively homogeneous national culture. The main perceived threats to Acehese religion and culture were from the “neo-colonial” government in Jakarta and the rising number of Javanese migrants. Aceh is also a major producer and exporter of natural gas, but the central government was keeping most of the revenue.

Box A.2.1. Aceh Conflict Timeline


- 1976 – Free Aceh Movement (GAM) established
- 1989 – Aceh is declared a Military Operations Area, martial law imposed
- 2000 – Peace talks between the government and GAM
- 2002 – Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) signed
- 2003 – Military attacked CoHA offices leading to collapse of agreement
- 2004 – Pres. Yudhoyono elected in October, pledges to seek peace in Aceh.
- 2004 – 170,000 people are killed and 500,000 left homeless by tsunami (December)
- 2005 – Government of Indonesia and GAM signed Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding in August, giving Aceh greater autonomy
- 2005-12 – More than \$7.2 billion of aid pledged, including \$700 million MDTF
- 2012 – World Bank leaves Aceh with the closure of MDTF

Source: World Bank

The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) raised this issue in its proclamation in 1977 and took its first military action right after the start of liquid natural gas sales from the Aceh region. Intermittent conflicts, punctuated with short-lived ceasefire agreements, caused an estimated 15,000 deaths since 1977 and displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians. GAM almost always lost the battles, and government forces almost eliminated it in the late 1970s and again in the late 1990s. GAM survived partly because the military’s violent intrusions and corrupt presence increased local support for the insurgency. The fall of Suharto’s military government in 1998 allowed GAM to revive again, as the exit of the military from Aceh left a power vacuum, until the military came back again the next year. Temporary ceasefires alternated with military emergencies and vows to eliminate GAM once and for all.

In 1999 the new Jakarta government implemented a nationwide government decentralization, which created, empowered, and funded local governments — districts and sub-districts (Kecamatan). It deliberately by-passed and thus effectively dis-empowered the provincial level governments — the Aceh level — leaving them as administrative offices of the national government in Jakarta. It did not allow regional political parties. This ‘big-bang’ decentralization, as it became known, did not satisfy the autonomy demands of GAM.

Figure A.2.1 Heidelberg Conflict Intensity Rating



Source:

In late 2004 GAM and the Government of Indonesia made a peace deal again, which might or might not have survived in the normal course of events. The devastating impact on Aceh of the earthquake and tsunami in December 2004 created a whole new reality, attracting worldwide attention, and massive relief effort and funding. GAM and the national government, which had recently transitioned toward democracy and wanted international approval, both saw this as an opportunity to reach a peaceful settlement. They signed a peace agreement in August 2005 that allowed for some autonomy for the Aceh region, but did not go so far as independence. The Jakarta government enacted the Aceh Government Legislation, covering special rights agreed upon in 2002 and allowing the Acehnese to establish local political parties to represent their interests at national and local levels. Violent conflict between GAM and the government ceased quickly after the agreement. Although most reconstruction funding was not specifically linked to post-conflict assistance, the large number of well-funded post-tsunami projects provided opportunities for many entrepreneurial ex-combatants and insurgent leaders quickly to find gainful employment and contracts in the legal economy. GAM has become the political party for the Aceh region. Many, although not all, victims and ex-combatants from pre-2005 have received economic assistance.

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A unique feature of Aceh's experience is that just as the peace agreement was signed, the tsunami reconstruction effort brought in a tidal wave of funding for that reconstruction. Aceh's fiscal resources have increased dramatically since 1999: after decentralization and the Special Autonomy Status, the amount of funds managed directly by the Acehnese province and local governments increased several-fold. Nonetheless, Aceh remains one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia.

A.3 Northern Uganda

Northern Uganda has a protracted history of armed conflict and recurrent violence between rebel groups and the government – the most recent civil conflict in this part of the country started after Museveni came to power in 1986. For the purpose of this analysis the main conflict of interest during the 2000–2014 time period is the conflict with the LRA.⁸ This conflict has been well documented and researched, a brief overview and analysis of the drivers and consequences is provided here.⁹

The LRA is a cult-like organization currently led by Joseph Kony. Conflict with this group in Uganda began as a pro-Northern Uganda movement led by the Acholi people following the civil war that led to Museveni's rise to power in 1986. In the late 1980s the LRA turned on the same population whose interests it purported to advocate and the Acholi population became the target of LRA attacks, at times in retaliation for actions taken by the Ugandan army. The LRA is notorious for brutal tactics including maiming, torturing, raping the Acholi population and abducting children and forcing them to serve as child soldiers, porters, or in the case of some young women, war wives. This conflict has affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans in the Northern region – estimates include 20,000 casualties and 1.6 million IDPs.

The conflict was most intense in during the 2002 – 2004, and during this time the government began moving civilians into camps in conflict affection regions order to provide better security. The count of IDPs reached its peak in 2006. There have been no major outbreaks of violence in Uganda since peace talks started in 2006 and the LRA was pushed out of Northern Uganda. After 2008, IDPs were gradually transferred out of camps, this was mostly completed by 2011. After the LRA was pushed out of Uganda they moved between the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan.


From pre-colonial times the Northern Acholi people were characterized by a warrior tradition, which resulted in the British government heavily recruiting among the population to serve as army, police, and prison guards. Historical analysis suggests that Acholi were exploited by their colonizers for uniformed services and unskilled labor, while central Ugandans were the beneficiaries of commercial and educational activities (Gersony 1997, ACCS 2013, Kustenbauder 2010). Post-independence there were a series of violent conflicts between highly militarized political factions that loosely aligned with regional and ethnic groups in a struggle for national power. During this time period all sides committed atrocities in a tit for tat cycle. A legacy of this violence is the residual feelings of distrust on the part of the Acholi toward the ruling President and his National Resistance Movement Party (comprised mostly of people from the Banyankole tribe).¹⁰ These negative sentiments contributed to

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initial Acholi support for the LRA in the late 1980s before it eroded after the Acholi population became the target of the LRA.

Figure A.3.1 IDPs and Returned IDPs: Uganda 2006—2011



Source: UNHCR Population Statistics Database—earliest year of data is 2006

Some have described perceptions in Uganda of a “marginalized north – prosperous south divide” (Gersony, 1997). Historically, this has been attributed at least in part to the legacy of colonization described above. The status of the North was worsened by over 20 years of conflict and as a result, the Northern region currently lags across most income and non-income indicators. As of 2009/2010 the Northern region comprised 20 percent of the population, but contributed 38 percent of the share of the population of Uganda living under the national poverty line (UBOS, 2009),¹¹ this did not change substantially from data collected in 2005/2006. Additionally, there are poverty concentrations in the conflict-affected sub-region of mid-northern Uganda.¹² In 2009/2010 this sub-region comprised 9.8 percent of the population but contributed 16.1 percent to the portion of the national population living under the poverty line (UBOS, 2009). It is difficult to gauge how poverty has changed in the conflict-affected regions as data from these areas was not included in the national household survey in 1999/2000 and 2002/2003.

LRA numbers are reported to be dwindling, though as previously mentioned the organization has been active outside of Uganda – in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, and Southern Sudan, where Joseph Kony is rumored to be residing. In early 2015 a LRA commander, Dominic Ongwen, surrendered to US troops in the Central African Republic and is awaiting trial at the International Criminal Court. As of 2012 the numbers of the LRA were reported to have reduced to between 200 and 700 followers, but the organization was still considered a threat.¹³ There is still no official peace agreement and there remains an International Criminal Court warrant for the arrest of Joseph Kony.

A.4 Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka was embroiled in violent conflict between the Sinhalese-dominated central government and militant Tamil forces (the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE) fighting for a separate state since 1984. Isolated incidences gave way to a civil war between the government and the LTTE in 1983 and continued through 2009. Despite attempts to solve the conflict through negotiations, it proved intractable. In 2009, the conflict ended with a decisive victory of the government.

The consequences of the conflict remain apparent today. There are approximately 73,700 (non-resettled) IDPs¹⁴ spread throughout a country whose land and infrastructure remain heavily damaged. The Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces, which saw the heaviest fighting, face considerable challenges rebuilding. The conflict had a substantially negative impact on Sri Lanka's economic and social development and incurred a tremendous human cost, resulting in 40,000 civilian deaths.¹⁵

Conflict Drivers. The tension between the Sinhalese and Tamils finds its roots in Sri Lanka's colonial past and the years immediately following independence. There was a perception that the British government often "favored" the Tamil minority, breeding resentment in the majority population. This was reinforced by policies that, according to Sinhalese nationalists, disproportionately increased the power of Tamils in society. After independence Sinhalese nationalists became frustrated that independence did not immediately translate into more power and status, leading to the promulgation of increasingly discriminatory policies. These dynamics can be seen through the evolution of education and language policies, which differentiated Sinhalese and Tamil interests.

Land: The Northern and Eastern Provinces, which are Tamil-majority territories, is a sparsely populated dry zone. After independence, the government decided to settle poor Sinhalese farmers from densely populated wet zones into this region, viewing the process as the "reclamation and recreation in the present of the glorious Sinhalese Buddhist past," and a vital component of rebuilding Sri Lanka. These irrigation settlements were directly sponsored and monitored by the state, leading Tamils to further associate the government with Sinhalese interests and feel increasingly marginalized. Consequently, the idea of a "traditional Tamil homeland" became powerful in the Tamil political lexicon. A separate and independent state soon became the objective of the LTTE and Tamil separatists.

Political Authority: Tamil political leaders were pushing for greater political autonomy in the Northern and Eastern Provinces through a federalist structure.

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Though numerous pacts had been written to define a framework for devolution, they were never implemented. Disillusionment with the democratic process and nonviolent politics fueled the militarization and radicalization of Tamil politics in the early 1970s. This frustration culminated in the Vaddukoddai resolution of May 1976, calling for the Northern and Eastern Provinces to secede and form Tamil Eelam. The LTTE was also founded at this time, sharing the platform of the resolution. Isolated incidences gave way to a civil war between the government and the LTTE in 1983 and continued through 2009.

Post-Conflict. The government's focus on defense and large-sale infrastructure since the end of the conflict has at different times inflamed the historic tensions surrounding land and political authority. Without a sustainable political settlement to the conflict, many of the social aspects that often accompany peace- and state-building efforts were neglected in favor of growth-generating investments in infrastructure.

A.5 Colombia

The literature tends to identify four major drivers of conflict and violence in Colombia:

Political Polarization, originating in a period known as *La Violencia*, (1940-1950s) when an extreme level of political polarization led to violent confrontation between the Liberal and Conservative parties. An agreement reached in the 1960s entailed a power-sharing strategy that excluded other political groups, which evolved into two distinct armed groups, the FARC and the ELN (National Liberation Army). In response, the authorities allowed the emergence of paramilitary groups to confront those two. Conflict and tensions remained latent but intensified sharply at the end of the 1990s.

Rural conflict, inequality and lack of property rights. Historically the level of conflict and violence has been particularly high in rural areas. Unclear land property rights and very high inequality in land distribution worsened over time. Drug traffickers and paramilitaries snatched significant areas of rural land in the 1980s and 1990s to launder their profits and contributed to the displacement of farmers. Some 70 percent of displaced farmers did not hold a formal title.

Limited state presence. Colombia has been historically characterized by a high institutional capacity at the national level, but low levels of accountability in state institutions and social cohesion at subnational levels. The vacuum of power has been eventually filled by non-state actors. It has also generated incentives for drug producers to move into those areas.

Illegal Drug Markets. The increasing demand for cocaine during the 1980s increased its output and Colombia became the largest cocaine exporter in the world. The increase in drug production and trafficking encouraged organized crime and violence that started to peak at the end of the 1990s. The long-term sustainability of guerilla activity is closely associated with their increasing involvement in the drug industry. It created a mutually reinforcing dynamics between guerrilla, paramilitary groups, and drug cartels.

Recent developments and outlook. To confront the sharp escalation of violence, in 2002 the newly elected President Uribe started to reinforce the army to confront several illegal armed groups. It resulted in a gradual reduction in the incidence of armed clashes and related deaths. In 2010 President Santos introduced initiatives to institutionalize the process of restitution and reconciliation. The 2011 Victims Reparation and Land Restitution Law introduced a legal process to formally identify


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the victims of the conflict and the restitution of patrimony lost due to the violence. Peace negotiations with the FARC started by the end of 2012.


Although the level of violence has been visibly reduced, it still has significant impact on the lives of people. In 2013 about 157,000 new families were displaced, and thousands of displaced households are still not able to repossess their land due to ongoing violence. According to UNHCR, the cumulative number of IDPs¹⁶ reached about 5 million people by 2015, the highest of any country in the world. Figures A.4 and A.5 show the trend in both the number of deaths resulting from the armed encounters and the number of displaced persons – which are correlated, not unexpectedly.

Figure A.5.1 Deaths from the Armed Conflict, 1990-2010



Source: Data from RUV, figure IEG

Figure A.5.2 IDPs, 1990-2014




Source: Data from RUV, figure IEG

A.6 Honduras

During the last decade, countries in the Central America's Northern Triangle – El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras – experienced some of the world's highest crime and homicide rates. Drug trafficking through the Central American drug corridor expanded sharply and became a major driver of crime and violence. Drug trafficking increased the incentives for corruption in the criminal justice system and tarnished the image of state institutions. The resulting lack of trust in institutions encouraged citizens to take the law into their own hands. The increase in crime and violence has been particularly sharp in Honduras during the late 2000s, when the homicide rate rose exponentially and surpassed by a large margin the homicide rate of the neighboring countries (see Figure A.6.1).

Figure A.6.1 Homicide Rate per 100,000 Population



Source: UN Global Study on Homicide

In 2011 the Bank issued a major diagnostic report on crime and violence in Central America, summarizing lessons and identifying priorities for the future.¹⁷ The study responded to the sharp increase in violence during the 2000s, when the homicide rates doubled in all three countries. It examined major trends in the indicators of violence, its economic costs, provided analysis of the main drivers, and made recommendations for possible strategies across several fronts. It recognized the interaction among the many drivers and the need to combine several of these strategies. This evaluation takes the 2011 study as a point of departure to examine the assistance of the Bank to Honduras, as it was issued in parallel with and provided the analytical basis for the 2012 CPS. The 2012 CPS also introduced for the first time an explicit thematic pillar/objective focusing on citizen security.

Box A.6.1. Main Drivers of Crime and Violence in Central America

Drug trafficking is the most important single factor behind the rising violence in the region. About 90 percent of cocaine flowing to the United States comes through Central America, with its value about 5 percent of the region's GDP.

Youth violence and gangs. By 2011 they were 900 gangs in Central America, with estimated 70,000 members, accounting for about 15 percent of homicides.

Availability of firearms as a result of past civil wars. There are about 4.5 million small arms in the region—most of them illegal.

Weak criminal justice institutions. In Honduras 65 thousand criminal complaints were filed, 49 thousand were investigated, but only one thousand ended up in a conviction. This weak performance limits the efficacy of punishment and prevention. Underreporting is a major issue due to the lack of trust in the institutions.

Source: World Bank 2011

A.7 Nigeria, Delta Region

Niger Delta is located in Nigeria's South-South geopolitical zone and contains 15 percent of the country's population (estimated 170 million in 2013). Oil was discovered in the Delta in commercial quantities in 1956. Nearly two dozen international oil companies operate in joint ventures with the Nigeria National Petroleum Company, producing around 2.3 million barrels of crude oil per day, making Nigeria the largest oil producer in Africa and the eleventh largest producer in the world. Oil accounts for 90 percent of export earnings, 75 percent of consolidated government revenue and 25 percent of GDP. The centrality of oil has made securing access to and control over an increasing proportion of oil revenue the main locus of political struggle in the Niger Delta. Violent conflict raged in the Delta from the 1990s through 2009.

Box A.7.1. Niger Delta Conflict Timeline

- 1990 — Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) issues the Ogoni Bill of Rights. An unrelated protest brings the first major military action against civilians.
- 1995 — Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP leader, is executed along with eight others.
- 1997-2003 — Three successive waves of violent ethnic clashes occur in the Warri area
- 2004 — Conflict ignites between the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force and Nigerian government troops.
- 2005 — Multiple resistance and armed groups join together under the umbrella Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).
- 2009 — Sharp decrease in oil production falls as a result of continued heavy fighting between militias and the government. Government offers amnesty buy-out to over 20,000 ex-combatants. The Disarmament, Demobilization, Reorientation and Reintegration program put in place (to continue until the end of 2015).

Source: World Bank

One of the main causes of the violent conflict in the Niger Delta is *distribution of revenues* from oil resources. The claimants to resources are Nigeria's federal government and those of the states in its South-South geopolitical zone — Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers.¹⁸ Per capita total federal transfers (including not related to oil) to Delta states are two-and-a-half times the national average. This, however, had little impact on the availability and quality of public goods in the Delta, including security, education, health, infrastructure, etc. This situation has raised questions about the *lack of transparency and accountability* in the use of public funds, adding to the overall sense of disaffection among the population of Delta states.

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There is also the sentiment that the Delta population is not receiving an adequate share of the natural resource wealth, while bearing the costs of producing it. Little has been done to address the toxic *environmental legacy of oil exploration* borne by host communities. Up to 546 million gallons of oil have poured into the ecosystems of the Niger Delta over 50 years of production – nearly the equivalent of an Exxon Valdez spill every year (Nossiter 2010). Soil, forests and waterways have been ravaged and traditional livelihoods such as agriculture and fishing threatened by oil spills and gas flares.¹⁹ In line with findings elsewhere, environmental degradation has had a stronger deleterious impact on the poor than the rich.²⁰

This set of issues has eluded peaceful resolution. The Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) was formed to contest environmental degradation in the Ogoniland community of the Niger Delta. Although MOSOP espoused nonviolence, conflict broke out between ethnic groups, the government and communities and between oil companies and communities. The government resorted to force to crush protests. A trial led to the hanging of the MOSOP leaders in 1995. The army, navy and paramilitary force continued to be regularly deployed even after the restoration of a civilian government in 1999.

Militant groups, sometimes in collusion with poorly-paid security personnel, engaged in oil theft (known as “bunkering” in Nigeria), which is estimated at between 70,000 and 300,000 barrels a day, or around 10 percent of Nigeria’s oil production. The proceeds from bunkering and other criminal activities, such as kidnapping, were used to finance the insurgency, which was targeted toward government and the oil companies. Engaging in criminal activities was attractive for the massive numbers of unemployed youth, who have seen little return to education and training. Two-thirds of the population is under 30, and youth male unemployment in the Delta states is above the national average of 20.9 percent.²¹ Groups organized into protection rackets were paid off by oil companies to discourage attacks on oil pipelines.

By 2005 violent community conflicts in Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta state typically numbered between 120 and 150 per year, and over 50 armed groups with an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 armed youths were operating in the oil producing region (UNDP 2007). Hostage-taking and attacks on oil facilities became increasingly common with the formation of the umbrella militant group called the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Escalating unrest led to very significant losses in oil production beginning in late 2005 and until amnesty was offered to combatants in mid-2009.

Since 2009, a negotiated settlement involving amnesty and a Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration program has been in place. Militants who handed in their weapons were pardoned and paid around \$400 a month until they found legitimate work.²² Furthermore, oil companies pay local groups to protect pipelines and oil wells. A fragile peace, punctuated by very occasional outbreaks of violence, currently reigns.

Historically, the reaction of the government to the periodic crises of the Delta has been a combination of use of force, buying off militants through the redistribution of revenue, promise of jobs for ex-combatants, and the creation of new development institutions. Little has been done differently since the amnesty in 2009 to tackle the multiple underlying drivers of conflict in the Delta, including (i) improving transparency in revenue flows; (ii) tackling the problem of youth unemployment; (iii) addressing the toxic environmental legacy of oil exploration; and (iv) reducing criminal activities such as oil theft and kidnapping. Should the regular payments to ex-combatants as part of the amnesty program come to an end in 2015 (as they are currently planned to), these problems can reignite the conflict in the Delta.

A.8 Pakistan: Balochistan, FATA, and KP provinces

Along Pakistan's western border with Afghanistan, localized conflicts have threatened both national and regional stability in recent years. Government engagement with militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and Balochistan provinces can be traced to a complex web of issues that originate in Pakistan's independence and complex relationship with Afghanistan.²³

FATA, KP, and Balochistan are both geographically and politically removed from the central government. Existing on the periphery has negatively influenced the state/citizen relationship; people in these regions report feeling disenfranchised by the government, and seek to empower themselves by redefining their relationship with Islamabad. As the central government has struggled to set the parameters for a federalist state, they are also increasingly concerned with the instability posed by war in neighboring Afghanistan. Due to the flow of Afghan fighters into Pakistan, and the spill-over of the coalition fighting, a historically tense situation in FATA, KP, and Balochistan has become militarized.

The conflicts in FATA, KP, and Balochistan are distinct, but they are both the result of a failure of governance where the center has distanced itself from the realities of the population and this has undermined the state's legitimacy. The lack of visible progress on a range of socioeconomic issues, coupled with a limited number of institutions to meaningfully engage with the government, has disillusioned the population. Militant groups have capitalized on this anger enjoying varying levels of public support.

The conflict has resulted in considerable economic and human cost. The *Post Crisis Needs Assessment* (2011) notes that the conflict in KP/FATA alone has caused 2.3 million IDPs; damage in physical and social infrastructure; decreased tourism; and has negatively affected economic activity. These results not only constitute a humanitarian crisis, but also undermine the Pakistani state's ability to govern an area with important security implications for the country and the broader region. Armed conflict is considered as one of the key reasons for drop in foreign direct investment from \$5.3 billion in 2008 to \$744 million in 2012. The annual cost of conflict in Pakistan is estimated at no less than 2 percent of GDP.

Weak state presence is frequently cited as a key driver of this conflict and a source of resentment in the population. Exploiting the population's cynicism and alienation, militant groups have (sometimes successfully) presented themselves as a viable alternative to the state and a source of social and economic stability, particularly


through the provision of access to justice and limited civil services. FATA, KP, and Balochistan are among the poorest provinces in Pakistan with some of the lowest social indicator scores. FATA is consistently ranking last in the country for key human development indicators, with KP not far behind. The government's inability (and perceived disinterest) to comprehensively address these problems has frustrated residents in the region, which has few opportunities for economic improvement. A lack of formal educational opportunities, the result of forced school closures and a disorganized national educational system, has further constrained employment opportunities. Poverty, the lack of jobs in the formal economy, and the absence of courts has increased participation in criminal activity such as drug and arms trafficking and has incentivized men to join militant outfits.

In Balochistan, one of the sources of tension has long been the *sharing of resource benefits*, contributing to Balochs feeling alienated from the central government and the democratic process. Balochs have long seen the relationship between the province and the central government to be exploitative. Balochistan is the largest producer of natural gas in Pakistan, and has been paid a fixed royalty for its natural gas "exports" to other provinces, which has depreciated in real terms over the years. Consequently, Balochistan is no longer remunerated for the full value of its exports. The limited profits that are received go directly to plant and distribution network owners, who frequently live outside of Balochistan – in essence, the income generated in Balochistan is rarely returned to the community. The province remains dependent on the center for transfers, which have shrunk in recent years as a result of declining energy prices, contributing to the deterioration of the local economy. The government has not meaningfully engaged with Balochs on how to address these concerns. Instead, the military has cracked down on militant groups while political leaders refuse to engage with nationalist groups, who they claim are undermining the central government's authority.

Appendix B

A Snapshot of Fragility, Conflict, and Violence beyond the Harmonized List

The below figure illustrates the extent to which FCV pose challenges to countries beyond the Harmonized List. The criteria underpinning the list is expanded by lifting the low-income countries cut-off and including additional markers of conflict and violence.¹ The resulting data shows that while fragility is often associated with LICs, which only account for half of the countries where fragility, conflict, and high levels of violence affect development outcomes. A substantial number of countries with FCV do not currently have access to IDA resources. Overall, FCV to various extents impact the development outcomes of almost 2 billion people, one-quarter of which are living in extreme poverty. Of the 2 billion people, the vast majority are living in Low-MICs (38 percent) and Upper-MICs (37 percent) countries, and only 25 percent in low-income countries. (Source: FCV CCSA)



Appendix C

Reference Tables

Table C.1. List of World Bank Lending Projects

Country	Proj ID	Project name	Agreement type	Fiscal year	Closing FY	Project status	Sector board	IBRD commit amt	IDA commit amt	Grant
Colombia	P006891	CO ANTIOQUIA EDUCATION	IBRD	1998	2007	Closed	Education	40.0	-	
Colombia	P046031	CO MAGDALENA MEDIO	IBRD	1998	2001	Closed	Social Development	5.0	-	
Colombia	P046112	CO PASTO EDUCATION	IBRD	1998	2004	Closed	Education	7.2	-	
Colombia	P053243	CO PEASANT ENTERPRISE ZONES (LIL)	IBRD	1998	2004	Closed	Agriculture and Rural Development	5.0	-	
Colombia	P050576	CO YOUTH DEVELOPMENT	IBRD	1999	2003	Closed	Social Protection	5.0	-	
Colombia	P050578	CO RURAL EDUCATION APL I	IBRD	2000	2007	Closed	Education	20.0	-	
Colombia	P057692	CO 2nd Magdalena Medio Project (LIL)	IBRD	2002	2004	Closed	Social Development	5.0	-	
Colombia	P089443	CO Social Safety Net Project	IBRD	2006	2009	Closed	Social Protection	86.4	-	
Colombia	P104507	CO Social Safety Add'l Financing	IBRD	2007	1900	Closed	Social Protection	104.8	-	
Colombia	P052608	CO Antioquia Secondary Education Projec	IBRD	2008	2014	Closed	Education	20.0	-	
Colombia	P082908	CO (APL2) Rural Education APL II	IBRD	2008	2016	Active	Education	40.0	-	
Colombia	P101277	CO (AF)Peace and Development II	IBRD	2010		Closed	Social Development	7.8	-	
Total								346.2	-	-
Honduras	P082242	HN Nutrition and Social Protection	IBRD	2006	2013	Closed	Social Protection	-	20.0	
Honduras	P088319	HN (CRL) Barrio-Ciudad Project	IDA	2006	1900	Closed	Urban Development	-	15.0	

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Country	Proj ID	Project name	Agreement type	Fiscal year	Closing FY	Project status	Sector board	IBRD commit amt	IDA commit amt	Grant
Honduras	P124157	HN Employment Generation in Poor Urban N	RETF	2011	2015	Closed	Urban Development	-	-	2.5
Honduras	P130819	HN Safer Municipalities	IDA	2013	2019	Active	Social Development	-	15.0	
Total								-	50.0	2.5
Indonesia	P079156	ID KECAMATAN DEV. 3	IDA	2003	2010	Closed	Social Development	204.3	45.5	
Indonesia	P095883	ID Reconstruction of Aceh Land Admin Pro	RETF	2005	2009	Closed	Agriculture and Rural Development	-	-	25.0
Indonesia	P092019	ID Kecamatan Development Project 3B	IDA	2005	2010	Closed	Social Development	80.0	80.0	
Indonesia	P100218	ID-Aceh-Infra. Reconstr Enabling Program	RETF	2006	2012	Closed	Urban Development	-	-	42.0
Indonesia	P097605	ID SPADA in Aceh and Nias	RETF	2007	2012	Closed	Social Development	-	-	25.0
Indonesia	P101785	ID-Aceh Infra. Reconst. Facility (IRFF)	RETF	2007	2013	Closed	Urban Development	-	-	100.0
Indonesia	P109024	Aceh Economic Dev Financing Facility	RETF	2009	2013	Closed	Financial and Private Sector Development (I)	-	-	50.0
Indonesia	P118977	Nias Rural Access and Capacity Building	RETF	2010		Closed	Social Development	-	-	10.0
Indonesia	P118813	ID-JSDF Sustaining Women's Leadership	RETF	2010		Closed	Social Development	-	-	1.9
Indonesia	P110635	Nias Livelihoods & Econ. Dev. Program	RETF	2011	2013	Closed	Urban Development	-	-	8.2
Total								284.3	125.5	262.1
Jordan	P132097	5M: Displaced People in Jordan / Lebanon	RETF	2013	2015	Closed	Social Development	-	-	2.4
Jordan	P145865	Mitigating Impact of Syrian Displacement	IBRD	2014	2015	Closed	Social Protection	150.0	-	
Jordan	P147689	JO-Emergency Services&Social Resilience	RETF	2014	2017	Active	Urban Development	-	-	50.0
Total								150.0	-	52.4

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Country	Proj ID	Project name	Agreement type	Fiscal year	Closing FY	Project status	Sector board	IBRD commit amt	IDA commit amt	Grant
Kyrgyz Republic	P098949	VIP 2	IDA	2007	2015	Closed	Social Development	-	15.0	
Kyrgyz Republic	P123044	EMERGENCY RECOVERY	IDA	2011	2014	Closed	Economic Policy	-	70.0	
Kyrgyz Republic	P125425	Economic Recovery Support Operation	IDA	2012	2012	Closed	Economic Policy	-	30.0	
Kyrgyz Republic	P126034	DPO1	IDA	2014	2015	Closed	Economic Policy	-	25.0	
Total								-	140.0	-
Lebanon	P149242	Emergency Nat'l Poverty Targeting Proj	RETF	2014	1900	Active	Social Protection	-	-	8.2
Total								-	-	8.2
Nigeria	P121455	NG-State Employment and Expenditure	IDA	2012	2018	Active	Public Sector Governance	-	200.0	
Total								-	200.0	-
Pakistan	P105075	PK: PPAF III	IDA	2009	2016	Active	Agriculture and Rural Development	-	250.0	
Pakistan	P103160	PK: Social Safety Net	IDA	2009	2016	Active	Social Protection	-	60.0	
Pakistan	P121394	PK: KP and FATA Emerg Recovery Project	IDA	2011	2015	Closed	Social Protection	-	250.0	
Pakistan	P125584	PK: KP Emergency Roads Recovery Project	RETF	2012	2015	Closed	Transport	-	-	8.0
Pakistan	P124268	PK: KP/FATA Economic Revitalization	RETF	2012	2016	Active	Financial and Private Sector Development (I)	-	-	20.0
Pakistan	P126426	PK: Revitalizing Health Services in KP	RETF	2012		Active	Health, Nutrition and Population	-	-	16.0
Pakistan	P128096	PK: Promoting Girls Ed in Balochistan	RETF	2013	2015	Closed	Education	-	-	10.0
Pakistan	P126833	PK: FATA Rural Livelihoods & Infra	RETF	2013	2016	Active	Agriculture and Rural Development	-	-	12.0
Pakistan	P130835	KP Southern Area Development Project	RETF	2013		Active	Agriculture and Rural Development	-	-	18.0

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Country	Proj ID	Project name	Agreement type	Fiscal year	Closing FY	Project status	Sector board	IBRD commit amt	IDA commit amt	Grant
							Total	-	560.0	84.0
Philippines	P051386	SZOPAD SOCIAL FUND	IBRD	1998	2003	Closed	Social Protection	10.0	-	
Philippines	P058842	MINDANAO RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT	IBRD	2000	2005	Closed	Agriculture and Rural Development	27.5	-	
Philippines	P073488	PH—ARMM Social Fund	IBRD	2003	2014	Closed	Agriculture and Rural Development	33.6	-	
Philippines	P095173	PH Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstr & Dev	RETF	2006	2016	Active	Social Development	-	-	50.0
Philippines	P084967	PH Mindanao Rural Dev. Project—Phase 2	IBRD	2007	2015	Closed	Agriculture and Rural Development	83.8	-	
Philippines	P127741	PH National CDD Program	IBRD	2014	2020	Active	Social Development	479.0	-	
							Total	633.9	-	50.0
Sri Lanka	P086747	LK: Community Livelihoods in Conflict Ar	IDA	2004	2015	Closed	Agriculture and Rural Development	-	64.7	
Sri Lanka	P083932	LK: NE Housing Reconstruction Program	IDA	2005	2012	Closed	Urban Development	-	75.0	
Sri Lanka	P084580	LK: Education Sector Development Project	IDA	2006	2011	Closed	Education	-	60.0	
Sri Lanka	P100390	LK: Puttalam Housing Project	IDA	2007	2012	Closed	Urban Development	-	32.0	
Sri Lanka	P113036	LK: N&E Local Services Improvement	IDA	2010	2017	Active	Urban Development	-	50.0	
							Total	-	281.7	-
Uganda	P002952	UG-N Uganda Soc Action Fund (FY03)	IDA	2003	2009	Closed	Social Protection	-	100.0	
Uganda	P109216	UG-Emergency Demob & Reinteg. (FY08)	RETF	2009	2011	Closed	Social Development	-	-	8.3
Uganda	P111633	UG-SEC N Uganda SAF (NUSAF2) (FY09)	IDA	2009	2016	Active	Social Protection	-	100.0	
							Total	-	200.0	8.3

Table C.2 List of ESW

Country	Project ID	Project Name
Colombia	P094842	Peace Programmatic III: Reparation and Reintegration Program, 2009
Colombia		Adjusting the Labor Supply to Mitigate Violent Shocks: Evidence from Rural Colombia, 2011
Colombia	P095711	Peace Programmatic I: Demobilization of Ex-Combats, 2008
Colombia		Peace Programmatic II: Reparation for Victims of the Armed Conflict in Colombia, 2007
Colombia		The Economic Foundation of Peace, 2003
Honduras		Crime and Violence in Central America, a Development Challenge, 2011
Indonesia		Spending for development : making the most of Indonesia's new opportunities, Public Expenditure Review, 2007
Indonesia	P121876	Support for Developing Gender Engagement in Indonesia
Indonesia		Justice for the Poor
Indonesia		Conflict and Dispute Resolution in Indonesia: Information from the 2006 Governance and Decentralization Survey, 2010
Indonesia		Justice for the Poor
Indonesia		Support for Developing Gender Engagement in Indonesia, 2013
Indonesia		Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis: Spending for Reconstruction and Poverty Reduction, 2007
Indonesia		Conflict and dispute resolution in Indonesia: information from the 2006 governance and decentralization survey
Indonesia		GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: enhancing peace through community-level development programming GAM reintegration needs assessment: enhancing peace through community-level development programming
Indonesia		Multi-stakeholder review of post-conflict programming in Aceh: identifying the foundations for sustainable peace and development in Aceh
Indonesia		Preliminary Damage and Loss Assessment (2005)
Indonesia		Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh (MSR) 2010
Jordan		Economic and Social Impact Assessment
Jordan		Country Gender Assessment: Economic Participation, Agency and Access to Justice in Jordan, 2013

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Country	Project ID	Project Name
Jordan		The Economic Advancement of Women in Jordan: A Country Gender Assessment, 2005
Jordan		Country Gender Assessment: Economic Participation, Agency and Access to Justice in Jordan
Jordan	P109392	Jordan: Measuring the Impact of National Policies and Strategies on Gender Equality
Kyrgyzstan	P146775	Kyrgyz Republic Conflict Filter
Lebanon		Economic and Social Impact Assessment
Lebanon		Gender-based differences among entrepreneurs, and workers in Lebanon, 2009
Nigeria		Economic Report, 2013, Issue 1
Nigeria		State Level Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review: A Synthesis Report, 2011
Pakistan		Country Gender Assessment: Bridging the Gender Gap, Opportunities and Challenges, 2005
Pakistan		Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Expenditure Review, 2013
Pakistan	P120179	MDTF for Crisis Affected Areas of NWFP/FATA/Balochistan
Pakistan		Pakistan Country Gender Assessment: Bridging the Gender Gap, Opportunities and Challenges
Philippines		AARM Human Development Sector Study
Philippines		Addressing Gender in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations in the Philippines
Philippines		Bangsamoro Development Plan, 2015
Philippines		Philippines Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in ARMM, 2003
Philippines		Human development for peace and prosperity in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
Philippines		Joint Needs Assessment for Conflict-Affected Areas of Mindanao, 2005
Philippines		Violent Conflicts and Displacement in Central Mindanao: Challenges for recovery and development, 2011
Philippines		Facility for Advisory Support for Transition Capacities (FASTRAC)
Philippines		Gender and Peace-Building Experience in the Philippines
Philippines		Public Expenditure Review. Strengthening Public Finance for More Inclusive Growth, 2011
Sri Lanka		Strengthening Social Inclusion (Part 1), 2006
Uganda		Government's Poverty Eradication Action Plan

Country	Project ID	Project Name
Uganda		Public Expenditure Review for Northern Uganda, 2007
Uganda		Uganda Post-Conflict Land Policy and Administration Options: The Case of Northern Uganda, 2009
Uganda		From Periphery to Center: A Strategic Country Gender Assessment/ SCGA, 2004
Uganda		Post-conflict land policy and administration options: case of Northern Uganda
Uganda	P101771	Northern Uganda Public Expenditure Review, 2007
Uganda		Repatriation, Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reintegration of Reporters in Uganda
Global		World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development

Table C.3 List of IFC Investments

Country	Project ID	Status	Business Category	Approved. Inv (\$ million)
Colombia	27961	Active	Infrastructure and Natural Resources	19
Colombia	32481	Active	Infrastructure and Natural Resources	25
Colombia	28479	Active	Infrastructure and Natural Resources	34
Honduras	26394	Active	Financial Institutions Group	20
Honduras	27250	Active	Manufacturing, Agribusiness & Services	30
Indonesia	26428	Completed	Financial Institutions Group	45
Nigeria	24802	Completed	Infrastructure and Natural Resources	75
Nigeria	25335	Active	Manufacturing, Agribusiness & Services	10
Nigeria	34450	Active	Infrastructure and Natural Resources	75
Pakistan	24013	Active	Financial Institutions Group	5
Pakistan	28010	Active	Infrastructure and Natural Resources	35
Pakistan	26229	Active	Infrastructure and Natural Resources	50
Sri Lanka	30613	Active	Financial Institutions Group	65
Sri Lanka	28672	Active	Financial Institutions Group	3
Sri Lanka	30421	Active	Financial Institutions Group	11

APPENDIX C
REFERENCE TABLES

Country	Project ID	Status	Business Category	Approved. Inv (\$ million)
Sri Lanka	31456	Active	Financial Institutions Group	75
Sri Lanka	31894	Active	Manufacturing, Agribusiness & Services	25
Sri Lanka	32392	Active	Financial Institutions Group	34
Sri Lanka	33889	Active	Financial Institutions Group	7
Sri Lanka	34286	Active	Financial Institutions Group	20

Table C.4 IFC Advisory Services

Country	Project ID	Project Name	Status	Business Category	Approved. Inv (US, 000)
Indonesia	545704	Aceh Investment Law	closed	IC	
Indonesia	550627	Aceh World Hotel Link	closed	SBA	
Indonesia	552925	Aceh & Nias Mariculture Producer Livelihood Program (seaweed)	closed	SBA	
Indonesia	552987	Aceh & Nias Shrimp Producer Livelihoods Program	closed	SBA	
Indonesia	559345	Aceh Public-Private Dialogue	closed	IC	
Indonesia	560386	ECOM	closed	SBA	600,000
Kyrgyz Republic	561496	Kyrgyzstan Business Enabling Environment—inspections, permits, tax administration	closed	IC	3,637,790
Lebanon	553345	(MFI roundtable)	closed		
Lebanon	553488	Technical Assistance to Rebuild the Financial Sector in Lebanon	closed		114,000
Pakistan	598467	Pakistan and Afghanistan CG Project	Active	SBA	625,000
Philippines	561416	Chiquita Unifrutti	closed	SBA	1,169,000
Philippines	507694	GEF Philippines Sustainable Energy Financing Program	Active	A2F	5,700,000
Sri Lanka	586787	Sri Lanka Union Bank Access to Finance	Active	A2F	201,784
Sri Lanka	596707	SME Banking SL	Active	A2F	846,785
Sri Lanka	597447	Post-Conflict Integration	Active	SBA	3,181,350
Sri Lanka	599638	Sanasa Development Bank Limited	Active	A2F	555,000

Table C.5 MIGA Guarantees

Country	Project ID	Project Name	Year
Honduras	7617	Energía Eólica de Honduras S.A	2014
Honduras	11853	Autopistas del Atlantico S.A. en C.V.	2015
Honduras	12720	SunEdison PV Solar Power	2015
Indonesia	8113	PT Weda Bay Nickel (Indonesia)	2011
Indonesia	8521	PT Natrindo Telepon Seluler	2011
Indonesia	11862	Rajamandala Hydropower Project	2015
Jordan	10391	Jordan Bromine Company Limited	2012
Jordan	12716	Adenium Jordan-1	2015
Jordan	12664	Jordan Solar One	2015
Lebanon	11576	Butech Utility Services S.A.L. in Lebanon	2014
Pakistan	10762	Bulleh Shah Packaging (Private) Limited in Pakistan	2013
Pakistan	6115	Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited	2012
Pakistan	10003	Star Hydro Power Ltd.	2012
Uganda	9368	Icam Chocolate Uganda Limited	2011

Appendix D

Portfolio

Portfolio selection. This evaluation identified the Bank Group portfolio for review using five broad areas of intervention: (i) provision of services (infrastructure, education, health, etc.); (ii) jobs and private sector development; (iii) social inclusion and capacity building; (iv) security and justice; and (v) the convening power of the Bank Group. In reviewing each country case, the evaluation assessed the relevance and efficacy of programs in each of these five areas when addressing a particular form of fragility or violence. The evaluation team then identified the portfolio to review through a “mapping exercise,” where Bank Group financial, analytical, and advisory instruments were classified according to (i) a particular FCV situation they were deployed in; and (ii) the five areas of intervention. This type of mapping was conducted for each country and then consolidated into an overall portfolio reviewed in this report. Identifying the portfolio for this evaluation was complicated by the fact that most of the FCV situations in these countries were confined to certain parts of their territory, whereas Bank Group interventions and initiatives were often parts of broader national programs. Bank Group instruments selected for this report include: projects that provided financing to address the needs of populations affected by conflict and violence in specific regions; nationwide projects with wider objectives and containing important components or elements relevant to conflict and violence issues; analytical work addressing specific issues of relevance to conflict and violence (diagnostics, political economy analyses, needs assessments, etc.) or with potentially catalytic effect over time. Full list of projects (loans and grants) and AAA is available in Appendix Table D.1.

Portfolio performance. The evaluation compared performance, as well as some other features of over 56 selected projects spanning 11 countries with the rest of the Bank portfolio in these countries. The evaluation’s focus on localized conflicts is reflected in the makeup of the portfolio: many of the projects were regional in scope (77 percent) and were conflict-specific – meaning the project explicitly addressed a driver or consequence of fragility in its design (67 percent). The content of the projects reflects World Bank thinking on how best to operate in a conflict environment. The CDD model was widely considered an appropriate tactic to establish presence in conflict areas, increase community involvement in programming, encourage community ownership of projects, and foster social cohesion, and 60 percent of projects embraced this approach. Almost 80 percent of all projects had capacity-building components. Close to 40 percent of projects underwent a level 1-2 restructuring. In terms of sectoral spread, the SURR GP was the leading originator (20 percent), followed by Education, Social Protection, and Labor, and Governance GPs (12–13 percent).

APPENDIX D

PORTFOLIO

Despite efforts to account for fragility in project design and implementation, they were rarely captured in results. Only 32 percent of programs recorded fragility-specific outcomes; 26 percent had M&E systems specifically designed to track issues of FCV. FCV-specific indicators varied widely within the selected sample and depended strongly on particular country and situation context, and included such metrics as the level of social cohesion within communities (Philippines, Uganda), reintegration of ex-combatants (Indonesia), public services in affected communities (Jordan), impact on the well-being of internally displaced population (Colombia), incidence of violent crime (Honduras), and others.

In terms of performance, in most cases, 8 out of 10 countries (the evaluation covers 11 countries, but performance information is collected for 10, excluding Nigeria, where there was only one recently launched relevant project in Niger Delta, SEEFOR) the FCV portfolio either outperformed or was on par with the rest of the portfolio in the same country (see Figure D.1). This positive difference in performance becomes even more pronounced if the countries are grouped by drivers of conflict and violence (Figure D.2). This finding is consistent with the similar conclusion of the 2014 IEG evaluation of FCS countries, where portfolio performance in low-income FCS was higher than in low-income non-FCS. The perceived risks to outcomes of Bank interventions in conflict-affected regions of MICs seem to be exaggerated, whereas the development achievements in these regions are very important as they are also related to peace, post-conflict rehabilitation, and strengthening resilience. This could also be an indicator of increased strategic focus within the Bank to FCV situations in MICs and interventions to address them. It is also notable that both cases where the FCV portfolio was less successful (albeit not significantly) were IDA countries (Uganda and Honduras).


IFC: For 11 case study countries, the report identified 36 IFC projects relevant to FCV situations in non-FCS countries: 20 investment projects and 16 advisory service projects. Many of these IFC projects are still under implementation and their development outcomes have not been rated by either IFC or IEG. Only 10 projects (7 advisories and 3 investments) have been completed and rated by IEG for development outcomes and effectiveness. Six out of the 10 are advisory service projects in Aceh, Indonesia. Although the sample size is small, analysis of the advisory service portfolio in Indonesia indicates that IFC can be equally effective in more difficult circumstances of FCV. From 2008 to 2015, IEG assigned development effectiveness ratings to 13 projects in Indonesia. The success rate of IFC advisory service projects in Aceh is 50 percent, compared to 57 percent for the rest of advisory service projects in Indonesia.

Figure D.1. Average Performance Index by Country



Notes: IEG/OPCS rating scale: Highly Satisfactory—6; Satisfactory—5; Moderately Satisfactory—4; Moderately Unsatisfactory—3; Unsatisfactory—2; Highly Unsatisfactory—1

Figure D.2. Average Performance by Groups of Countries (typology of conflict drivers)



Notes: IEG/OPCS rating scale: Highly Satisfactory—6; Satisfactory—5; Moderately Satisfactory—4; Moderately Unsatisfactory—3; Unsatisfactory—2; Highly Unsatisfactory—1

APPENDIX D
PORTFOLIO

Table D.1. Sample Portfolio Mapping Matrix

<i>Drivers of Violence/Conflict</i> <i>Bank Group response</i> <i>(by sectors)</i>	Subnational level violence: ethnic/religious tensions, secessionist movements	Organized crime, gangs, and drug trafficking	Systemic failure of governance and erosion of state legitimacy	Overwhelming external pressures
Provision of public services	SZOPAD Social Fund— Philippines Mindanao Rural Development Project I	Rural Education—Colombia Peace and Development Project I— Colombia	Pakistan: Social Safety Net Project	Emergency National Poverty Targeting Program—Lebanon Emergency Services and Social Resilience—Jordan
Jobs and private sector development	Aceh & Nias Shrimp Producer Livelihoods Program Northern Uganda Social Action Fund	Ficohsa—Honduras Second Magdalena Medio Regional Development Project—Colombia	Tameer Microfinance Bank (24013)— Pakistan State Employment and Expenditure for Results Project—Nigeria	Middle East Micro Credit Company and FINCA—Jordan
Social cohesion, local empowerment and capacity building	Multi-Donor Facility for Mindanao Reconstruction and Development Northern Uganda Social Action Fund	Peace and Development Project 1st Phase APL—Colombia Honduras Safer Municipalities	Second Poverty Alleviation Fund Project Pakistan State Employment and Expenditure for Results Project—Nigeria	Emergency Services and Social Resilience —Jordan
Bank Group convening role	Multi Donor Facility—PH Mindanao Reconstruction & Development MDF Aceh—Nias Rural Access and Capacity Building Project	MDTF to support Colombia Peace and Post-Conflict Agenda	Pakistan Post-Crisis Needs Assessment	Lebanon Economic and Social Impact Assessment Emergency Services and Social Resilience —Jordan
Security and justice	Northern Uganda: Land Policy and the Return to Peace Encouraging More Resilient Communities in Conflict-affected Areas of the Philippines	Protection of land and Patrimony for IDPs—Colombia Crime and Violence in Central America: A Development Challenge	Niger Delta Conflict Analysis and Management Program	

Appendix E

People Met

COLOMBIA

GOVERNMENT

Maria Angelica Bueno
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National Department of Planning
Former Director of FAMILIAS
Director of the Protection of Land and
Patrimony Project
Director of Centro Nacional de
Consultoria
National Department of Planning
Coordinator of Impact Evaluations, Peace
and Development Projects
Presidential Agency for International
Cooperation
Presidential Agency for International
Cooperation
Director, Land Restitution Agency
Secretary of Social Development of
Cundinamarca

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Karin Therese Andersson
Valerie Jordan

UNDP
European Union

NGOs AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Leonel Narvaez
Paula Monroy
Francisco de Roux

Fundacion para la Reconciliacion
Fundacion para la Reconciliacion
Colombian Catholic Church

APPENDIX E PEOPLE MET

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Zulalzmi	Deputy Country Director, GIZ

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Endnotes and References

Chapter 1

¹ Global Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace 2015)

² Source: FCV CCSA. Also see Appendix C.

³ While the 2013 Strategy acknowledges the effects of FCV on the development goals of LICs, it is silent on FCV in MICs.

⁴ “World Bank Group Assistance to Low-Income Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: An Independent Evaluation” (IEG 2014).

Chapter 2

¹ The current set-up, when the Nairobi hub hosts mainly technical operational staff, with the management team re-located back to the HQ, presents a much more viable and useful model, as uniformly confirmed by IEG interviews.

² Fragility Assessments: A Guidance Note. FCV CCSA and GPSURR, World Bank, 2015

³ AARM Human Development Sector Study, The World Bank

⁴ “The Search for Durable Solutions: Armed Conflict and Forced Displacement in Mindanao, Philippines” (2010); and “Violent Conflicts and Displacement in Central Mindanao: Challenges for recovery and development” (2011). World Bank and WFP

⁵ “How Poor Are Refugees? A Welfare Assessment of Syrians Living in Jordan and Lebanon,” World Bank and UNHCR, 2015.

⁶ Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) program.

⁷ Böge, V., Fitzpatrick, C., Jaspers, W., Paes, W.-C. 2006. Who’s Minding the Store? The Business of Private, Public and Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict. Bonn: BICC. Brief 32

⁸ Porter Peschka, Mary. 2011. THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN FRAGILE AND CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES. Background paper for the WDR 2011

⁹ See CAO investigation of the IFC’s investment with Dinant in Honduras.

¹⁰ Sanasa Development Bank Ltd. (SDBL) has been able to increase its SME clientele by 7,160.

¹¹ Nearly half of MIGA’s guarantees in FY14 were for FCS countries, which represented a significant increase from 24 per cent in FY11 (MIGA Annual Report, 2015)

¹² WB (2014). Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Fragile and Conflict Situations

Chapter 3

¹ For example, the late 19th century famines in the Sertao in Brazil and in West Bengal under the British Raj, or the more recent famines in Bangladesh and Ethiopia. The contrasting history of peasant revolts in China, arising in a number of cases from famine, show how such grievances can translate into revolution (and dynastic overthrow, in China’s case) if led with purpose and inspired by a resonant ‘narrative.’

² CPS 2015: “The [Bank Group] recognizes the window of opportunity afforded by recent progress with the peace process and will support social and economic development in conflict-affected regions. The [Bank Group] will scale up efforts to increase trust within communities and between citizens and the state in conflict areas and develop and implement a ‘Peace Dividend’ program for Mindanao/Bangsamoro.”

³ By most accounts, as related to IEG, this was coincidental.

⁴ World Bank, 2006a

⁵ The EU, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, World Bank, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Canada, Asian Development Bank, USA, Belgium, Finland, New Zealand and Ireland

⁶ GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: Enhancing Peace through Community-level Development Programming, World Bank 2006.

⁷ Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) is a joint World Bank / IFC facility to assist countries to attract foreign direct investment (FDI).

⁸ Gender and Livelihoods among IIDs in Mindanao, Philippines, July 2013, The Brookings Institution

⁹ <http://www.insideindonesia.org/women-and-the-war-in-aceh>, October 2000.

¹⁰ ADB Sri Lanka Country Gender Assessment, An Update, 2015, pp.32.

¹¹ Delivering Assistance to Conflict-Affected Communities—The BRA-KDP Program in Aceh, The World Bank, pp.56.

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Chapter 4

¹ "Crime and Violence in Central America : A Development Challenge", World Bank, 2011

² The program shared some characteristics with the CDD model. It was developed for a territory or region which may be significantly broader than a community, but sharing important commonalities as far as the conflict is concerned. In contrast with CDD, the funding did not flow directly to the community but to the Consortiums in charge of implementation, often designated as the partner organizations (PO).

³ The Magdalena Medio series were accompanied by a parallel EU program, the so-called Laboratorios de Paz

⁴ “Iron fist” approach of the first half of the 2000s hardened penalties, allowed for the detention of juvenile criminals in high security prisons, and lowered the age of legal responsibility to 14 years.

⁵ For the case of Magdalena Medio LILs and the Peace and Development series, an impact evaluation prepared by the Government found a positive effect on food security and consumption among population affected by the conflict. Impact regarding exposure to violence was not measured. Guarín, Sergio, et al., “Evaluación de Impacto de los Programas Paz y Desarrollo y Laboratorios de Paz: Línea de Base e Impactos Preliminares”, National Planning Department, Colombia, 2008. Attanasio, Orazio, et al., Evaluación de impacto de los programas de Paz y Desarrollo y Laboratorios de Paz, INFORME FINAL, National Planning Department, Colombia, 2011.

⁶ Government of Colombia 2008: Programa de Familias en Acción: Impacto en Capital Humano y Evaluación Beneficio Costo del Programa, Evaluación de Políticas Públicas series, Numero. 6.

⁷ Social Protection project to support the expansion of BONO (\$40 million) approved in 2010, was followed- up by two additional financing projects approved in 2013 and 2015, totaling \$37 million.

⁸ The highest death rate in Colombia was experienced in 2002, about 40 deaths per 100.000 inhabitants.

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Chapter 5

¹ FADAMA is a series of nationwide CDD projects launched in 1992, including three phases (1992-99; 2003-09; and 2008-17)

² The SEEFOR project was approved by the Bank’s Board in 2012 and became active in 2013.

³ The MDTF is supported by 11 donors (Australia, Denmark, EU, Finland, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Turkey, UK and USA) collectively contributing \$159 million.

⁴ Balochistan Education Support, 2006-14, \$24 million; Promoting Girls’ Education in Balochistan, 2012-15, \$10 million

⁵ Poverty Alleviation Fund Projects (PPAF II 2004-11, \$570 million; and PPAF III 2009-16, \$250 million); NWFP Community Infrastructure Project II (CIP, 2004-09, \$37 million); KP Southern Area Development Project (SADP, 2013-15, \$18 million)

⁶KP Emergency Roads Recovery Project (2011-15, \$26 million); FATA Emergency Recovery Project (2012-15, \$16 million); Revitalizing Health Services in KP (2012-15, \$10 million); FATA Rural Livelihoods (2012-15, \$12 million); Economic Revitalization of KP and FATA (2011-15, \$20 million).

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Chapter 6

¹ Forbes Statistica

² For example, 1 million refugees would translate into 12/1000 ration in Germany

³ UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service.

⁴ REACH January 2015.

⁵ There are 2 million registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan, of which 370 thousand still live in camps. The war in Iraq in 2003 has displaced some 800,000 Iraqi immigrants into Jordan. In Lebanon, UNRWA reports 450,000 Palestinian refugees, 50 per cent of which live in camps.

⁶ Syrians are viewed as more "liberal" by the conservative Jordanian communities of the north.

⁷ NRC, The shelter situation of refugees from Syria in neighboring countries. June 2014.

⁸ See "Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Nationals in the Bekaa and Akkar", Charles Harb and Rim Saab, American University of Beirut, 2014.

⁹ Lebanon 2011-14 CPS Progress Report

¹⁰ The Bank initially led the task force for municipal livelihood which was later taken over by USAID.

¹¹ A joint initiative of the Bank Group, IsDB and the UN was announced during the October 2015 WB-IMF annual meetings. The proposed financing initiative consists of two mechanisms to support countries impacted by conflict and

economic slowdown, as well as those affected by large numbers of refugees and IDPs: (i) guarantees from donor countries to issue special bonds to finance economic recovery and reconstruction projects; and (ii) grants from donor countries to provide concessional finance to middle income countries of the region hosting the bulk of refugees. Source: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/10/new-joint-initiative-to-mobilize-additional-support-for-refugees-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa>

¹² Regional office covering Mashreq (Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) is located in Beirut, Lebanon. There is no formal Bank office in Jordan, and a few project staff are hosted by IFC representation.

¹³ According to UNHCR, even after the end of the conflict voluntary repatriation of refugees can take up to 17 years.

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Appendix A

¹ The Moro people is a population of indigenous Muslims in the Philippines. The term “Moro” originated from a term used to refer to the Muslims of Andalusia in southern Spain (known as the “Moors”) during the Reconquista and applied to the native Muslims within the conquered Philippine islands by the Spanish invaders.

² The main violent insurgent organizations in recent years include: (i) Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a breakaway from MNLF, placing more emphasis on Islam for its identity); (ii) Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); (iii) New Peoples' Army (NPA), the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines; (iv) Abu Sayyaf, extremist MNLF breakaway group; (v) Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a breakaway from MILF.

³ Those include: (i) Moro Islamic Liberation Front; (ii) Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); (iii) New Peoples' Army (NPA), the military wing of the Communist Party; (iv) Abu Sayyaf, extremist MNLF breakaway group; (v) Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a breakaway from MILF.

⁴ In 1989 the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) a region of about 4 million people was created, following a constitutional mandate to provide for an autonomous area in Muslim Mindanao. A plebiscite in 14 provinces and 11 cities resulted in only four provinces choosing to join the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which was officially inaugurated in November 1990.

⁵ In late January 2015, a breakaway group from MILF, along with some MILF regulars, attacked Philippine police, who had arrested two suspected terrorists. 44 police died in the attack, along with 18 of the MILF and 4 apparent civilians.

⁶ Source IDMC (Internal displacement monitoring center), www.internal-displacement.org

⁷ Aceh is the only province in Indonesia that applies Islamic sharia law.

⁸ Other ongoing conflicts include between the government and the Allied Democratic Forces—National Army for the Liberation of Uganda, and cattle rustling along the border with Kenya.

⁹ For an analysis of incentives and the history, politics, and religious factors relating to the conflict see Kustenbauder 2010 and Gersony 1997.

¹⁰ For example, there are also feelings of distrust or apathy towards the Acholi, possibly fueled by an incident in 1983 when Acholi soldiers brutalized civilians and killed 300,000 civilians and military forces under the command of Milton Obote (Kustenbauder, 2010).

¹¹ Poverty estimates for Uganda relayed in this report were calculated using a method that established a threshold based on the cost of meeting caloric needs, given the food basket for the poorest half of the population and some allowance for non-food needs.

¹² Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum, Pader, Apac, Oyam, Lira, Amolatar and Dokolo

¹³ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/24/joseph-kony-african-union-brigade?newsfeed=true>

¹⁴ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: Sri Lanka. Over 430,000 IDPs have been resettled by the government

¹⁵ International Crisis Group “Sri Lanka’s North: The Denial of Minority Rights”

¹⁶ Colombia defines IDPs as those individuals forced to migrate within the national territory, leaving their usual locality of residency or economic activity when their lives, physical integrity, personal safety or freedom have been harmed or directly threatened by the armed conflict. Data on IDPs is available from the *Registro Único de Población Desplazada* (RUPD) and the *Registro Único de Víctimas* (RUV)

¹⁷ “Crime and Violence in Central America : A Development Challenge”, World Bank, 2011

¹⁸ Three other states—Ando, Imo and Ondo— produce oil in marginal quantities. Although geographically close to the Niger Delta, they do not belong to the South-South zone.

¹⁹ A United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) report on oil and gas pollution in Ogoniland in the Niger Delta published in 2011 calculated that a complete cleanup of the small Ogoni region alone would cost \$1 billion and take 30 years.

²⁰ A survey of rural households in the Niger Delta showed that the poorer half of the sample derives 60 percent of its income from environmental resources such as water and fuelwood. [Source: World Bank (2003)].

²¹ Akwa Ibom 21.7 percent, Bayelsa 42.9 percent, Cross River 21.6 percent, Delta 35.9 percent, Edo 37.7 percent, and Rivers 38.9 percent

²² Those who led the insurgency have reportedly received multimillion dollar payouts.

²³ This section draws from the following sources: [Pakistan’s undeclared war; FATA— A Most Dangerous Place; PAKISTAN: Post-Conflict Needs Assessment](#) (PCNA FATA/KP); [International Crisis Group: Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan](#)

Appendix C

¹ Lifting the low-income countries cut off allows including IBRD/Blend countries with a CPIA rating below 3.2. As additional conflict markers, we include countries with more than 25 battle-related or terrorism-related deaths. As violence marker, we include countries with levels of intentional homicides well above the WHO level of ‘epidemic of homicides’ (i.e. 25 per 100,000 population, rather than 10 per 100,000 population). Battle-Deaths and intentional homicides are also part of the suggested Post-2015 framework of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In addition, we include countries with UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and Border missions.