The Food Crisis and its Effects

1. International food prices increased dramatically in the period 2005-2008, starting with a moderate upward trend until early 2007, and then accelerating more rapidly to a peak in mid-2008. Prices for food cereals more than doubled during this time; those for rice doubled in the space of just a few months. And key agricultural inputs (particularly fertilizer) and fuel prices quadrupled in early 2008. Food prices receded after June 2008 (although not to the pre-2005 levels), but surged again between June 2010 and June 2011 (Figure 1).1

2. The food price escalation of 2007-08 was unexpected, coming as it did after a long period of low and fairly stable global food prices. Many governments were unprepared for the economic and political implications of the sharp price increases, and the issue became an important concern for many developing country governments that faced domestic turmoil. Similarly, stakeholders in international development began to focus on the food crisis after 2007 because of its immediate adverse impact on the poor and its longer-term negative implications for human and economic development.

Figure 1. Food Price and Cereal Price Index (FAO)

3. While there is still some debate about the most critical causes of the surge in food prices, it is generally agreed that it was the combined result of several factors: higher fertilizer and fuel prices.

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1 Price spikes in 2010 were affected by big climate events in temperate exporters, and belief was already widespread that markets had become more vulnerable, so those spikes were more predictable.
(key agricultural inputs), higher demand for maize and diversion of agricultural land for feedstock crops driven by bio-fuel production, reduction of grain stocks in a number of OECD countries and China, adverse weather conditions in some countries, re-emergence of grain diseases such as wheat rust in major producing countries, and stagnation in investments to increase grain productivity in developing countries (See Table 1). Once food prices increased significantly, further pressure on international prices arose from export bans and similar trade-curtailing policies by several major producers aiming to maintain lower domestic food prices.

**Table 1. Factors in the Global Food Crisis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time horizon</th>
<th>Demand-side factors</th>
<th>Supply-side factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long run</td>
<td>Increasing population</td>
<td>Limited availability of agricultural land and water for irrigation; insufficient investments in rural institutions and infrastructure, agricultural research, extension and water and soil management; poor policies in some developing countries; Organization for Economic Co operation and Development subsidies; climate change; inadequate systems to ensure food safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium run</td>
<td>Biofuel demand</td>
<td>Rising energy prices and resulting increases in prices of fertilizers, pesticides, and transportation; subsidies for biofuel production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short run, cyclical</td>
<td>Financial speculation that may exacerbate the price effects of food shortages.</td>
<td>Adverse weather in major exporting countries, crop diseases, exchange rate volatility, price controls and changes in export and import policies, speculative hoarding, untargeted subsidies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Financial crisis and resulting credit tightening and increased borrowing costs for food exports and imports (OECD 2009).</td>
<td>Food security concerns prompting major buyers in the world market( for example, countries in the Middle East and North Africa) to lease land for agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diversion of land from wheat and other crops to production of biofuel feedstock; increase in farmland process (Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009); low global grain stocks; tighter credit availability for crop production because of the financial crisis (OECD 2009).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Growth and Productivity in Agriculture and Agribusiness, IEG2011*

4. The food price crisis was particularly hard on the poor and the near-poor because they spend large portions of their budgets on food. The increased food expenditure due to price increases forces them to cut other expenditures, such as health, education, and clothing, and to purchase less food and shift to lower-quality food. Even smallholder farm households suffer because they often are net purchasers of food due to the small volume of their production.
5. The immediate deprivation and deepening of poverty during the period of higher prices is accompanied by effects that are manifested over a much longer horizon. Inadequate nutrition of children and pregnant and lactating women, for example, leads to adverse impacts on human development, and reduced schooling due to increased child labor and reduced school attendance has long-term implications for human capital. At the national level, these negative long-term outcomes are aggravated by the diversion of public funds to finance more expensive food imports and short-term safety nets. This is often done at the expense investment in physical and human development infrastructure, which implies reduced future growth (See Box 1).

Box 1. What is Food Security?
People are considered food secure when they have all-time “access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life” (Definition adopted by the 1996 World Food Summit). Food security analysts look at the combination of the following three main elements:

**Food availability**: Food must be available in sufficient quantities and on a consistent basis. It considers stock and production in a given area and the capacity to bring in food from elsewhere, through trade or aid.

**Food access**: People must be able to regularly acquire adequate quantities of food, through purchase, home production, barter, gifts, borrowing or food aid.

**Food utilization**: Consumed food must have a positive nutritional impact on people.

*Source: World Food Program website*
http://www.wfp.org/food-security

6. The concern about these negative short- and long-term development outcomes galvanized the international community and dominated the agenda of several high-level meetings in 2008 and after (Table 2). In addition to the long-established, Rome-based, Committee on Food Security, a United Nations High Level Task Force was established in April 2008 to coordinate responses to the food crisis. This task force, of which the Bank has been a member, guided actual UN response. Bilateral and international donors pledged substantial amounts of resources to fund a variety of interventions to mitigate the impact of the crisis in the short term and to increase agricultural production in the medium and longer term to avert future crises. A time profile of the evolution of the crisis and the international reaction is depicted in Figure 2.

Table 2. International Meetings on Food Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>United Nations High Level Task Force on Global Food Security established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>G-8 Summit in L’Aquila; developed country leaders committed $20 billion for sustainable agriculture development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>G-20 meeting in Pittsburgh; G-20 reaffirmed call for a food security trust fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>World Food Summit; world leaders approved the food security principles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. The World Bank Group responded to the global food crisis with a variety of short-term and medium-term interventions (some of which are shown in Figure 2). IEG will review and evaluate

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2 The Committee on Food Security (established 1974) is a United Nations’ forum for reviewing and following up on policies concerning world food security. In 2011, an additional organization was created with contributions of some bilateral agencies (the Food Security Cluster) to improve food security responses in humanitarian crises situations.
the Bank Group’s response to the Food Price Crisis of 2007-08, focusing on developments from mid-2008 to the present, and to assess the progress the Bank Group has made in helping vulnerable countries build resilience to future food price shocks. This real-time evaluation will draw lessons aimed at enhancing the impact of continued actions by the WBG and others, as well as insights to be applied when encountering similar food crises in the future.

Figure 2. Timeline of Food Crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food Price Crisis</th>
<th>Global Economic Crisis</th>
<th>Food Prices Spike Again</th>
<th>Horn of AFR Drought</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>Q4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>Q3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

World Bank Group Response

OVERVIEW

8. The Framework Document for food crisis response stated that the Bank Group was well positioned to play a distinctive role in the global response. It cited the Bank Group’s multisectoral expertise, together with its presence in many of the most vulnerable countries, as it a comparative advantage in providing integrated solutions to address the adverse effects of rising food prices. Under the Framework, it was envisaged that the WBG could rapidly provide significant funds to countries at risk and provide access to innovative financial instruments to mitigate a portion of the food price risk. The Framework Document pointed out that the WBG could undertake policy analysis that draw on country, regional, and global experience, and that it had the capacity to design and deliver targeted social protection programs to mitigate the negative impact of higher food prices on the poor and vulnerable. It was also envisaged that the Bank Group would support policy, programmatic, and investment operations to enhance a food production supply response in the short and medium term. Finally, it was expected that through the International Finance Corporation, the Bank Group could support private sector activities and investments that alleviate the food crisis.³

9. The WBG established a number of special programs to implement its crisis response activities. These included:

- **Global Food Crisis Response Program**: The GFRP was launched in May 2008 with initial funding headroom of $1.2 billion for three years. The short-term program was subsequently scaled up to $2 billion and extended through June 2012. The program’s activities are a mix of stand-alone technical assistance, development policy, and investment operations under four components. As of December 10, 2011, the total Bank-funded Board approved GFRP projects amounted 1,239 million.

- **Global Food Initiative (GFI)**: IFC initiated this short-term food crisis response program in mid-2008 to support the agribusiness value chain in IDA and IDA/IBRD (blend) countries. The GFI has two components: investment lending and advisory services. It aims to provide liquidity throughout the value chain: trade finance, working capital, and wholesaling finance. The GFI also aims to support supply-side responses through global agri-commodity players by investing in modern food retailers and strengthening the links between local suppliers and food retailers. IFC provided $600 million in investment lending and $300 million in advisory services.

- **Global Agricultural and Food Security Program**: The GAFSP, launched in April 2010, is a grant-based partnership (sponsored by several donors) that provides a multilateral mechanism to support a variety of agricultural development and food security-enhancing activities by governments and national and regional organizations. It was created as a $20 billion financing mechanism to manage the G-20’s increased support to agriculture and food security. The program is being implemented as a Financial Intermediary Fund for which the World Bank serves as trustee. The Bank also hosts a small coordination unit that supports the GAFSP Steering Committee. The GAFSP operates through two windows: the public sector window and the private sector window. Seven donors have pledged $972 million to GFSAP as a whole by October 2011, with $897 million of this earmarked for the public sector window, and $75 million earmarked for the private sector window. The GAFSP private sector window complements the public sector window and is administered by the IFC.

- **Agricultural Price Risk Management**: This IFC-led program was announced in June 2011 and aims to provide up to an initial $4 billion in protection from volatile food prices to farmers, food producers, and consumers in developing countries. This product, the first of its kind, is expected to improve access to hedging instruments to shield consumers and producers of agriculture commodities from price volatility. It will also protect buyers from price rises in food-related commodities such as wheat, sugar, cocoa, milk, live cattle, corn, soybeans, and rice.

- **Horn of Africa program**: Introduced in July 2011 as a $500 million package, this program is designed to assist drought victims. It was scaled up to $1.9 billion in September 2011. The program has both short-term and long-term components. While not a direct response to the food price crisis, it targets the same countries that were affected by the food price crisis and has similar food security, social protection, and agricultural development objectives.
• **Research, policy analysis, and advice:** The Bank used its analytical capacity to produce a number of reports analyzing the food crisis (causes and implications) at global, regional, and national levels. It also provided international stakeholders and national governments with advice on short-term mitigation and longer-term policy and strategies to avert future problems. Through its support to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), the Bank helped to initiate new CGIAR-wide programs to address issues of food security and agricultural development.

10. In addition to the above activities that are directly and specifically addressing the food price crisis of 2008, the Bank Group also geared up lending in agriculture and social protection sectors in response to the crisis. The volume of agricultural lending (other than through GFRP) has increased from an average of $3.0 billion per year in the FY06-08 period to $4.3 billion in the FY09-11 period. Social protection lending (other than through GFRP) in the same period increased from an average of $400 million per year in FY06-08 to $3.3 billion in FY09-11. In FY10, IFC provided nearly $2 billion in financing across the agricultural supply chain, including financing for projects to improve storage and distribution of agricultural produce, expand rural and agricultural trade finance, and expand food processing.

11. As will be clarified in a subsequent section, the GFRP/GFI will be a major focus of the evaluation, and a more detailed background on its rationale and activities is required, as described below. The evaluation will also review regular WBG programs in agriculture and social safety nets to assess progress in helping vulnerable countries build resilience to respond to future food price shocks, including for the three years in the run-up to the crisis, given their relevance in affecting country capacity and readiness to respond to food price shocks.

**SHORT-TERM RESPONSE**

**Global Food Crisis Response Program (IDA/IBRD)**

12. The GFRP was the World Bank’s main short-term vehicle for responding to the food price crisis of 2008. The program was designed as an umbrella for rapid Bank support to address aspects of the crisis. It had three objectives: (i) reduce the negative impact of high and volatile food prices on the lives of the poor in a timely manner, (ii) support governments in the design of sustainable policies that mitigate the adverse impacts of high and more volatile food prices on poverty, and (iii) support broad-based growth in productivity and market participation in agriculture to ensure an adequate supply response as part of a sustained improvement in food supply.

13. The program was intended to finance a mix of technical assistance, development policy, and investment lending under four components that were to be implemented simultaneously, with payoff to be gained progressively over the short and medium term. The four components were: (i) food price policy and market stabilization, (ii) social protection actions to ensure food access and minimize the nutritional impact of the crisis on the poor and vulnerable, (iii) enhancing domestic food production and marketing response, and (iv) implementation support, communications, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

14. The various interventions to be financed under the GFRP were to be underpinned by the Bank’s existing and emerging AAA and country knowledge. While specific operations would be
defined within particular sectoral or sub-sectoral areas, it was envisaged that within a country, all supported GFRP activities would conform to a support program that was integrated at the national level and would be compatible with overall country programs. As in crisis-affected programs there were likely to be crisis-mitigating activities of many other donors and development partners, the GFRP anticipated a need to establish partnerships and coordination mechanisms all levels: global, regional, and national. Within a country, it was envisaged that a financing framework would be designed that would define the roles of all partners, recognizing in particular the responsibilities and comparative advantage of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and the World Food Program (WFP).

15. The severity of the crisis in some of the poorest countries necessitated speedy processing of supported activities. Recognizing that the Bank’s standard project preparation, approval, and effectiveness procedures would not be compatible with need for fast support, the Board of Executive Directors agreed that GFRP-supported operations would be processed under a special accelerated protocol. GFRP investment lending operations would follow the practice applied to horizontal Adaptable Program Loans (APLs): after Board approval of the first two investment operations, approval would be delegated to Bank management. Management approval would be “in principle,” and project documents would be circulated to the Board for information, with approval becoming effective five working days thereafter. However, if at least three Executive Directors were to request so, projects would be presented for Board discussion. A similar procedure was enacted for Development Policy Operations (DPOs). The Board was to be informed by management every six months on the status of GFRP implementation.

16. Under the accelerated preparation and processing of GFRP operations, particular attention was intended to be given to the M&E for each activity. As is standard in Bank-supported operations, specific objectives, targets, benchmarks, and key performance indicators were to be defined during preparation. Reporting obligations were more stringent, however, requiring the implementing agencies to issue a midterm progress report for country-level operations a year and a half after launch, and a final evaluation report upon completion, to provide detailed information on the accumulated outcomes of the project as well as the main lessons learned, to benefit similar operations elsewhere.

17. The risks entailed in GFRP operations naturally depended on the particulars of each country and operation. However, at the GFRP design stage it was recognized that the circumstances of the most critically affected countries and the agencies expected to implement activities implied significant overall risk of falling short of achieving the full desired benefits. The Framework Document for the program highlights the high risks of (i) declining national and international political commitment to fund efforts to address the food crisis; (ii) limited staff numbers, skills, and capacity to provide services in health, education, and other facilities in rural and peri-urban areas; and (iii) poor procurement performance and compromised integrity leading to delays, cost overruns, and low quality. Significant risks were also perceived in the low capacity of implementing agencies and local institutions, ineffective administrative and control systems, inadequate transparency and public participation, poor coordination between regional and country programs, low commitment of provincial and regional authorities, and political interference diverting assistance to less vulnerable groups. All of these risks could lead to failure to control or avert a generalized food crisis. Various counter-measures to mitigate these risks were envisaged and specified in the Framework Document.
18. The program was launched at the end of May 2008, with initial funding headroom of $1.2 billion and an authorized duration of three years. On April 16, 2009, the Board increased the funding ceiling to $2 billion, but shortened the duration to two years. The duration was subsequently extended to June 2012, due to a resurgence of high food prices in the second half of 2010. By December 10, 2011, the GFRP had committed $1,239 million in 55 operations in 35 countries. The bulk of the funds (87 percent) were committed in FY09, the year in which about two-thirds of GFRP operations were processed. It is noteworthy, however, that 12 of the 55 GFRP operations (although small in volume of funding) were approved already within the first year of GFRP’s activities. Over half of the GFRP operations (58 percent) were supporting crisis-affected countries in the Africa region, while other regions had 4-5 operations each. Given the emphasis of GFRP on poorer countries, the bulk of the funding was provided on concessional terms (67 percent IDA and 16 percent grants; see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Regional Distribution of GFRP Operations and Commitments

19. The vast majority of the operations (76 percent) were classified as investment loans and the rest were DPLs (Figure 4). Almost half of the projects focused on agricultural supply response, a third supported government policies and institutional actions to address the food crisis, and a fifth provided support to social protection programs. Most of the funding was provided through new loans. Additional and supplemental finance options were also employed for expeditious response to the crisis. By the end of calendar 2011, almost half of the GFRP projects had closed, although only fifteen had Implementation Completion Report (ICR).

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4 In addition, under the Externally-Funded GFRP trust funds, there were approved operations totaling $271 million.
The emphasis of the GFRP has shifted over time. Initially the program’s funding was divided almost equally between its three main substantive components (food policy, social protection, and food production), with much attention to emergency budget support to allow for immediate reductions in food tariffs and taxes (to dampen the rise in domestic food prices) without cutting the budgets of social programs. Further support to safety nets was another focus, given the immediate hardships endured by the poor due to the higher food prices and the global economic recession that followed. With the stabilization and reduction in international food prices after the 2008 peak, the share of support to enhance agricultural supply response gradually increased, providing some cushion against the difficulties that could be encountered with resurgence in international food prices. By October 2011, GFRP support to agricultural supply response amounted to 44 percent of the commitments.

**Global Food Initiative (IFC)**

IFC initiated this short-term food crisis response program to provide liquidity throughout the agribusiness value chain: trade finance, working capital, and wholesaling finance. The GFI also provided support to supply-side responses through global agri-commodity players by investing in modern food retailers and strengthening the links between local suppliers and food retailers. The initiative consisted of investment lending and advisory services. Investment lending had three elements: trade finance; debt, seed money, and first loss; and equity. To increase global and local food supply, IFC provided $300 million in trade finance to financial institutions, micro-lenders, growers, and traders in 2008. It devoted $200 million under the debt, seed money, and first loss program. Equity investments in the range of $100 million were made in 2008 along the entire value chain. Advisory services were provided throughout the agribusiness supply chain to address effects of climate change, improve local farmer productivity, and increase local food supply. The amount of advisory services to short-term food crisis response was $300 million.

**Medium-Term Response**

As pointed out earlier, the World Bank has scaled up its regular lending program in agriculture and social safety nets, thereby possibly helping to build up resilience to food crises in vulnerable countries and increasing global food production capacity. The Bank’s agriculture
program consists primarily of project lending and, to a much smaller extent, AAA—economic and sector work (ESW) and technical assistance (TA). In the decade before the crisis, IBRD/IDA commitments for agriculture ranged from a high of $3.8 billion in FY1999 to a low of $1.8 billion in FY00—an annual average of $2.6 billion over the period.\(^5\) During the immediate pre-crisis years FY06-08, annual commitments ranged from $2.9 billion (FY06) to $2.6 billion (FY08). Agriculture received almost 12 percent of total Bank lending during FY06-08. Commitments peaked at $5.3 billion in FY09 and declined in the subsequent two years, to $4.1 billion (FY10) and back to $3.6 billion in FY11, amounting to about 9 percent of total lending in these post-crisis years. Expenditures on AAA for FY00-11 totaled $46 million for ESW and $45 million for TA, amounting to $91 million or 9 percent of AAA Bank-wide. Comparing only the immediate and post-crisis years, the number of AAA reports increased from 102 to 142.

**Figure 5. Trends in Standard WB Agriculture Commitments (US$ billions)**

23. The regions that benefitted the most in the post-crisis years were Africa (rising from 24 to 28 percent) and Latin America and the Caribbean (rising from 14 to 19 percent of the total), a region of urbanized economies. South Asia’s share, though still substantial, declined from 32 to 26 percent. Europe and Central Asia’s share shrank from 11 to 3 percent. In FY11, Bank lending for agricultural development (in nominal U.S. dollar terms) has returned to its pre-crisis levels, but agriculture is a smaller percentage of total. At this point, it is not clear whether the commitment to increase significantly and sustainably Bank support to agriculture—made in the Agriculture Action Plan 2010-12—will be realized, as there was a declining trend from the peak lending in FY09. IEG’s review of the WBG’s agricultural operations in the period 1998-2008 highlighted insufficient focus on agricultural growth and productivity in the design of operations, and the composition of operations in the FY09-11 period will be reviewed to assess whether the growth and productivity

\(^5\) All the agriculture sector lending figures are calculated in a manner consistent with data provided in the World Bank Agricultural Action Plan, FY10-12.
orientation in the recent agricultural lending program has changed, in particular whether a significant shift to enhance food production has taken place.⁶

24. The World Bank provides support for countries to develop and implement social safety nets (SSNs) through a range of channels, including lending and AAA (ESW, non-lending TA, global knowledge sharing, and research and evaluation). During FY00-10, the Bank lent $11.5 billion to support SSNs through 244 loans to 83 countries. Since the onset of the global economic and food crisis, the number of SSN programs increased 113 percent (from 55 in FY06-08 to 117 in FY09-11⁷), while SSN commitments increased 655 percent (from $1.2 billion in FY06-08 to $9 billion in FY09-11). It is important to note that Bank lending for FY09-11 includes support to address the financial crisis, which generally went to middle-income countries (MICs) as opposed to the Bank support to the food crisis, which generally went to low-income countries (LICs). The Bank allocated $60.5 million to SSN analytic studies and non-lending TA over FY00–10. A total of 210 ESW activities and 87 non-lending TA activities related to SSNs were identified over the decade. Non-lending TA spiked after the onset of the food and global economic crisis.

25. IEG’s evaluation of SSNs found that Bank lending, analytical, and capacity-building support for SSNs was more concentrated in MICs than in LICs throughout the decade (FY2000-10) and that SSNs are important in LICs to protect against systemic shocks and to help alleviate extreme poverty and food insecurity. As Bank support for SSNs in response to the food crisis focused mainly on LICs and fragile countries, the IEG evaluation of the food crisis will look at how effectively the Bank has engaged in LICs in response to the crisis and provide insights on the implementation challenges of SSNs in such country contexts.

Figure 6. Trends in Standard WBG SSN Commitments (US$ billions)

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⁷ In order to make the number of operations and commitments calculations, IEG considered the pre-crisis period FY06-FY08 and the crisis period FY09-FY11.
Objectives

26. The purpose of this evaluation is to review and evaluate the immediate responses of the WBG to the global food crisis of 2007-08, as well as to assess progress in building up resilience to future crises through the Bank’s regular lending program and AAA activities. Building up resilience, is conceptually closely related to food security. It corresponds to the “availability” and, in part, to the “access” aspects of food security, as defined in Box 1, in the sense that increased agricultural productive capacity improves the availability of food, while improved safety net infrastructure enables governments to expand vulnerable households’ access to food in times of crisis through cash and in-kind transfers.

27. Food prices are expected to continue to be volatile due to a higher frequency of extreme climate events, very limited progress on increasing grain productivity, continued pressures on prices related to biofuel production, and population growth accompanied by rapid urbanization. Many developing countries, particularly the poorest among them, may again face challenges to food security and development brought about by price volatility. The donor community, as well as the World Bank Group may well be called upon again to provide advice and assistance. The lessons to be drawn from this evaluation will help member countries, bilateral aid agencies, and multilateral organizations in the design and coordination of future assistance activities in response to food crisis as well as in formulating strategies and activities to build greater resilience to such crisis.

28. In addition, because the evaluation report will be delivered in early FY13 while a considerable share of food crisis response operations are still ongoing, it will provide a real-time assessment that may enable improvements in other ongoing response activities in agriculture and social safety net sectors and the effort to enhance the capacity to withstand future crises. The evaluation builds upon, and follows, a 2008 IEG report examining lessons of Bank Group interventions during a past crisis episode—the World Bank Group’s Response to the Global Economic Crisis Phase I, and an ongoing evaluation—the World Bank Group’s Response to the Global Economic Crisis Phase II. In addition, the evaluation will make use of the data bases and analytical work of two recently completed IEG evaluations of WBG operations in the two sectors that were the focus of most of the WBG’s crisis response activities, namely, agriculture and social protection—Growth and Productivity in Agriculture and Agribusiness 1998-2008, and Social Safety Nets, An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 2000-2010. The period covered in these two completed studies overlaps in part the period on which the present evaluation intends to focus, and they derive many relevant insights.

Analytical Framework

29. The analytical framework of this evaluation is illustrated in the results chain in Figure 7. For identifying the inputs and assessing the outputs and outcomes of WBG support, corresponding evaluation questions, elaborated in the approach paper, will be asked. The focus is on assessing the achievement of outcomes at the country level and for the WBG’s crisis response and resilience enhancement for the group of vulnerable countries. It is envisaged that this results chain and the analytical framework will be used for evaluating activities in the agriculture and social safety net sectors.

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8 A real-time evaluation is carried out while a program is in full implementation and feeds back findings to the program for immediate use. See Unicef. 2003. Desk Review of Real Time Evaluation Experiences.
30. **Inputs:** Inputs to the results chain are the special crisis response initiatives and programs launched to mitigate the short-term adverse impacts of the spike in food prices (e.g., the GFRP/GFI) and the standard WBG instruments in agriculture and social safety net sectors that include IDA/IBRD loans, credits, trust funds, and AAA activities, and IFC advisory services and investment activities, which were oriented towards improving vulnerable countries’ capacity to withstand and manage future crises.

31. **Outputs:** Outputs in the results chain are broadly divided into two categories, namely, policies and programs to tackle price volatility and its short-term social and economic impacts, and policies and programs to enhance resilience to future crises in the longer term. The shorter term measures include policies to stabilize and reduce domestic food prices (e.g., tariff and tax reductions, targeted price subsidies), introduction and expansion of social safety nets (e.g., cash and food transfers, school feeding programs), support to the farm sector to induce short and medium-term supply response (e.g., input subsidies, seed distribution), technical and policy advice, and coordination with other donor assistance programs. Speed of preparation and implementation will be considered as process indicators for the timeliness of response. Longer term measures include expansion of agricultural production capacity, enhancing productivity growth, developing risk management tools, and also further building up the organizational infrastructure and operational capacity of safety net programs.

32. **Intermediate Outcomes:** Short and medium-term crisis response measures translate into intermediate outcomes such as the mitigation of domestic price spikes, channeling of significant assistance to vulnerable groups, and increasing domestic supply of staple food products through improving access to inputs. The key indicators for assessing intermediate outcomes are domestic food price index (relative to pre-intervention and international price trends), food crop output volume, and the number of social safety net program beneficiaries as percent of targeted vulnerable population. The evaluation will also look at capacity to identify poor and vulnerable households and capacity to deliver benefits to vulnerable groups as success indicators.

33. **Indicative longer-term outcomes.** Longer-term resilience enhancement is reflected in expanded food production capacity, increased strategic food reserves, and improved capacity of social safety nets. The key indicators for assessing longer-term resilience enhancement are food crop yields, volume of food crop production, volume of strategic grain reserves, number of social safety net beneficiaries as percent of vulnerable population. In terms of improved capacity of social safety nets, the extent to which institutions in place have ability to scale up their operations in response to future crises, and availability of contingency funds and donor coordination arrangements are important factors. These resilience indicators correspond to the “availability” and, in part, to the “access” aspects of the concept of food security, as defined in Box 1, in the sense that increased agricultural productive capacity improves the availability of food, while improved safety net infrastructure enables governments to expand vulnerable households’ access to food in times of crisis through cash and in-kind transfers.

34. Ultimately both the short-term crisis response, and the longer term enhancement of resilience, contribute to poverty alleviation and economic growth (important elements in enhancing food security at the national level), but the time frame of this evaluation does not allow conclusions on the extent of achievement of these objectives, as most of the WBG-supported interventions are either recently completed or still on-going. Consequently, this evaluation will focus on analyzing the inputs, outputs, and intermediate outcomes of the above results chain, while the long-term impacts on poverty alleviation and economic growth, they will not be assessed in this evaluation.
**Figure 7. Results Chain for the Evaluation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
<th>Intermediate Outcomes</th>
<th>Indicative Long term Outcomes</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Bank Group instruments:</td>
<td>Coherent policies and programs to tackle price volatility and its short-term social and economic impacts:</td>
<td>Short and medium term food security enhancing measures:</td>
<td>Greater resilience to future food price crisis:</td>
<td>Poverty alleviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Special crisis response programs (GFRP, GFI, GAFSP)</td>
<td>• Rapid assessments completed and vulnerable countries identified</td>
<td>• Reduction in price spikes and volatility</td>
<td>• Expanding food production capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IDA/IBRD loans, credits, trust funds, AAAs, ESWs, TAs</td>
<td>• Food price policy changes: tax and tariff reductions, and price subsidy reform</td>
<td>• Protection of the most vulnerable groups with targeted assistance from food price shocks.</td>
<td>• Increasing strategic food reserves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• IFC Advisory service, Investments</td>
<td>• Introduction or enhancement of social safety net programs</td>
<td>• Increasing aggregate food supply through improving access to inputs</td>
<td>• Ensuring vulnerable households’ food security through well-established SSNs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Enhance short-term agriculture supply response</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Enhance donor coordination</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• TA /Policy analysis assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Indicators:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coherent Policies and programs to enhance longer-term resilience:</td>
<td>• Domestic food price index</td>
<td>• Food crop yields</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Build up and expand social safety nets programs</td>
<td>• Food crop output index</td>
<td>• Volume of food crop production</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Expand investments in agricultural production and productivity growth</td>
<td>• Number of social protection program beneficiaries as percent of targeted vulnerable population</td>
<td>• Volume of strategic grain reserves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop risk management tools</td>
<td>• Capacity to identify poor and vulnerable households</td>
<td>• Number of social protection program beneficiaries as percent of targeted vulnerable population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Process Indicators:</strong></td>
<td>• Capacity to deliver benefits/services</td>
<td>• Institutions in place to scale up response in future crisis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Speed of response (month)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Contingency fund in and donor coordination in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Speed of disbursement (month)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Areas of the results chain on which the evaluation will focus on
Scope

35. **Two-pronged approach.** The evaluation will carry out two complementary analyses. The first will evaluate the WBG’s immediate response to the 2007-08 food crisis, with particular attention the GFRP and GFI. The second will evaluate the WBG’s medium-term efforts to help build vulnerable countries’ resilience to food price shocks in the future by looking at the nature and focus of the regular WBG agricultural and SSN portfolios approved since the food crisis, including IFC’s risk management initiative. The agriculture and social protection sectors are the two areas to which most of the crisis response and resilience enhancement efforts have been directed, and therefore the evaluation will focus specifically on activities in these sectors. Hence, the evaluation will cover the programs specific to the global food crisis and will also cover the broader portfolio influenced by the crisis to assess to what extent there has been shift in the focus of WBG portfolio towards helping countries building resilience to food price volatility and shocks.

36. As detailed earlier, the World Bank Group undertook a number of initiatives over the FY08-11 period to deal with the crisis both directly and indirectly. The most immediate and extensive response has been through the GFRP and GFI, which have the most significant and substantial documentation and data to enable a meaningful evaluation, and through the much smaller Rapid Social Response program. It is likely that in responding to future similar crises, the WBG will consider similar vehicles for fast assistance. For this reason, in assessing the short-term response of the WBG to the crisis, the main focus of the evaluation will be on the design, implementation, and early outcomes of the GFRP and GFI. In addition, within a country case study context, other Bank Group-supported activities that address the immediate crisis, or enhance the longer-term capacity to handle future crises, will be covered in the evaluation. As explained in paragraph 34 above, the whole lending program in the agriculture and SSN sectors will be examined in this evaluation to identify trends and shifts in the aggregate and within sub-groups of countries (e.g., vulnerable countries) for three years in the run-up to the food crisis and in the post-crisis period.

37. The evaluation will examine the approach the Bank Group used to identify the countries that are heavily affected by the crisis. The evaluation will look at three dimensions of vulnerability: (i) vulnerability caused by rising food prices and countries’ net food export/import status; (ii) government’s ability to respond to high prices in terms of fiscal space, foreign exchange reserves, and social safety nets; and (iii) the actual impact of the crisis on poverty. It will also assess the compatibility between the implied prioritization according to extent of vulnerability and the actual allocation of program activities and funding. In considering the resources made available to crisis-affected countries through the GRFP and GFI, consideration must be given to countries’ specific demand for WBG crisis assistance, and to other funds and assistance provided by the WBG and by other development partners. But this requires also an examination of the effectiveness of arrangements for coordination at all levels, both before and during the implementation of country assistance programs.

38. The evaluation will also assess the appropriateness and relevance of the various instruments (lending, grants, AAA) the World Bank Group has used to assist those countries most severely affected by the food price crisis. Since support to countries’ agricultural and food sectors, and to the social protection systems, form the bulk of the crisis-related activities, the evaluation will consider the extent to which the Bank Group was prepared for activities within these areas in terms of staffing and skill mix, background knowledge, and relevant AAA activities on global and country
vulnerability issues. The relevance of policy advice given on issues of food policy and agricultural supply response will be assessed as well as the appropriateness of operation design and the quality of the support given to implementation of short-term crisis response activities (for example, supervision resources, monitoring and evaluation arrangements). Similarly, for activities aiming for longer-term resilience enhancement (mostly through regular Bank operations), the relevance of the design and its likely effectiveness in building capacity to withstand future crises will be examined.

39. The evaluation will look at WBG policy advice related to trade and subsidy at three levels. First, it will look at the WBG’s role in advocating measures that need to be adopted by developed and developing countries on their trade and subsidy regimes for agricultural products. This will involve reviewing major reports and assessing the quality and consistency of their policy recommendations. Second, it will evaluate GFRP related development policy operations with trade and subsidy-related policy measures (such as tariff and tax reductions, input subsidies, production and processing subsidies and non-price measures) and assess their rationale, efficacy, and the short and long-term effects. Finally, it will look at cooperation with relevant international institutions, including the G-20, FAO, and WTO on food trade and subsidy issues in the time leading up to the food crisis and response period.

40. The evaluation will also look at how and how well the Bank Group partnered with donors and other institutions in responding to the crisis. In so doing it will examine Group activities at both the global and country levels, drawing inter alia on the findings of country case studies. The focus of this assessment will be on the broad range of institutions that have been cooperating on global food crisis response since April 2008, as discussed earlier in this paper, including the UN High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis, Rome-based Committee on Food Security, FAO, IFAD, WFP, the IMF, regional development banks, private sector organizations, and the OECD.

Evaluation Questions

41. This evaluation will seek to answer three overarching questions: How did the World Bank Group respond to the global food crisis? How effectively did the World Bank Group help countries confront the short-term effects of the food crisis? To what extent did the World Bank Group engagement during and after the crisis help countries to enhance their resilience to future food price shocks?

42. The analysis needed to answer these questions will require examination of many aspects of the World Bank Group response, starting with the adequacy of Bank human resource capacity and procedural arrangements, and entailing detailed review of the range of activities within specific country contexts as well as an overview of WBG-wide crisis response programs, such as the GFRP/GFI and Rapid Social Response, and the regular post-crisis lending in the agricultural and social protection sectors. Following are subsidiary questions for each of the major evaluation questions; Appendix 1 contains the evaluation design matrix.

- How did the WBG respond to the global food crisis?
  - Did the WBG have in place—or was it in a position quickly mobilize—the requisite knowledge base, staffing, budget resources, and financial resources to respond quickly to needs of vulnerable countries?
Was the WBG resource allocation in line with the needs of vulnerable countries? What instruments did the WBG use to respond to the crisis and how well suited were they to provide immediate support?

How effectively was WBG support coordinated between the Bank and IFC and with the support of other donors, including the UN High Level Task Force on the Food Crisis, and what role did the WBG play in coordinating the response?

What was the balance between short responses and interventions geared toward medium-term and longer-term objectives of building resilience and supporting medium-term supply response? Did the WBG ensure consistency between short-term and longer term development objectives?

- **How effectively did the WBG help countries confront the short-term effects of the food crisis?**

  - How relevant and timely was the WBG response to short-term needs?
  - To what extent were the overall and the country-specific objectives clear and focused?
  - What factors affected relevance, speed, and effectiveness of the WBG response to short-term effects of the crisis? And did the WBG appropriately handle the tensions between speed and quality?
  - Was there sufficient assessment of the constraints to effective implementation imposed by inadequate infrastructure and human resources within crisis-affected countries?
  - To what extent were short-term objectives achieved, including protecting the poor and vulnerable from price shocks? What early results have the interventions achieved?
  - To what extent were objectives of helping ensure short- and medium-term supply response achieved?
  - Were the monitoring and evaluation systems adequate?

- **To what extent did the WBG engagement during and after the crisis help countries to enhance their resilience to future food price shocks?**

  - How sustainable are the emergency-induced organizational and administrative structures and programs supported by the GFRP/GFI and other WBG assistance?
  - Has food production capacity been expanded? Are countries allocating more resources to agricultural development?
  - Are the organizational infrastructure and capacity for protecting and assisting vulnerable groups being enhanced?
  - Are efficient arrangements to protect countries against price volatility being established?
  - What lessons can be learned for crisis management in general and food crisis management in particular?
Methods

43. The proposed evaluation is a real-time evaluation as it will be conducted while implementation of many operations is ongoing or has very recently been completed and for which completion reports are not yet finalized. As is normally the case, the proposed evaluation will use a mixed methods approach. It will combine literature and document review, semi-structured and in-depth interviews, surveys, program and project analyses, background papers, and country case studies. It will also examine performance against stated WBG objectives (at the program, country, and operation level), using IEG’s normal evaluation criteria.

- **Review of the GFRP Lending Portfolio:** The portfolio consists of 55 operations in 35 countries. Business Warehouse data will be complemented with the addition of variables based on in-depth review of program and project documents to determine the type of support provided in response to the food crisis and the results achieved. (Support might include, for example, short-term immediate support such as school feeding programs or providing farmers with agricultural inputs or longer-term capacity building such as developing surveys to measure household welfare or measures to increase farmers’ productivity)

- **Review of IFC’s Food Crisis Response:** The evaluation will investigate the objectives of IFC’s financial investments in GFI, based on a modified version of its standard evaluation methodology, adapted to capture dimensions important to the food crisis, such as relevance, speed of response, systemic impacts, outputs and preliminary outcomes, and IFC’s role and contribution. As part of the short-term food crisis response, IFC offered advisory services under the GFI program and mobilized $300 million for advisory services activities. The evaluation will review the scope and effectiveness of the food crisis advisory services using established IEG criteria, modified to reflect the food crisis response backdrop, focusing at the present stage on outputs and preliminary outcomes, as opposed to final outcomes or impact.

- **Review of the Agriculture and Social Safety Nets Lending Portfolio:** The review of the World Bank’s agriculture and SSN lending portfolio will be one of the main instruments to provide comprehensive insights on the WBG’s medium and longer-term food crisis response as it will go beyond the GFRP operations. The portfolio review will examine trends in Bank engagement over time and throughout the regions. The portfolio review will look at the extent to which the focus of WBG lending in agriculture and social safety nets has shifted toward building resilience in the aftermath of the crisis. This review will build on the databases and analyses prepared by two previous IEG evaluations: IEG evaluation of SSNs and IEG evaluation of Growth and Productivity in Agriculture and Agribusiness. Both portfolios will be updated by adding FY11 operations. A similar portfolio analysis will be carried out for IFC’s medium- and longer-term crisis response.

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9 The set of agricultural-oriented operations covered in evaluation includes all operations under the Agricultural and Rural Sector Board and other Sector Boards that have agricultural components or rural infrastructure (agricultural extension and research, crops, irrigation and drainage, animal production, general agriculture and fishery, public administration-agriculture, agro-industry, agro-industry marketing and trade, rural land administration, rural infrastructure such as rural roads and rural energy). Similarly, SSN will include all projects approved by the Social Protection Sector Board with theme code 54 (social safety nets) as well as all projects approved by other Sector Boards assigned theme code 56 (other social protection and risk management).
- **Review of Agriculture and Social Safety Nets Analytical and Advisory Services**: The review will include AAA classified in Business Warehouse as food crisis response as well as relevant agriculture and SSNs reports. The latter will include AAA completed by the Bank between FY07 and FY11. The comprehensive AAA review will contribute to the analysis of the WBG program in responding to the food price shocks.

- **Country Case Studies (Field and Desk-Based Country Cases)**: Country case studies will be used to assess the extent to which the WBG and GFRP/GFI response was relevant and effective, the coordinated efforts of the donor community effectively addressed the short- and longer-term objectives, vulnerable countries were able to set up systems to address future food price shocks, and the constraints were removed to more effective response. The proposed selection of countries to study includes those most severely affected by the crisis, and those that received most GFRP and GFI funding. A total of 20 case studies will be undertaken. Field work will be carried out for 8 case studies (see Table 3a). The case studies will also review the broader WBG SSN and agriculture operations and AAA. Sample selection is purposive based on two criteria:

  o **Operation size**: The GFRP/GFI involved both large (between $10 million and $275 million) and small operations (less than $7 million). Most importantly, the evaluation will review the top 5 GFRP borrowers (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Philippines, Bangladesh, Nepal), which account for 60 percent of the funds committed.

  o **Regional and sector balance**: Another 15 countries were selected to achieve a combination of regional and sector balance. Selection is proportional to the regional distribution of the GFRP/GFI countries (see Table 3b). At least two countries are selected from each region other than Africa. Ten countries are selected from Africa, covering the 10 largest operations in the region.

### Table 3.a. List of Country Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFR</th>
<th>ECA</th>
<th>EAP</th>
<th>LCR</th>
<th>MNA</th>
<th>SAR</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Kyrg.Republic</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Djibouti 1/</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Guinea</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
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<td>Rwanda</td>
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</table>

**Note**: Field based country case studies are in bold.
1/ A field-based PPAR is in advanced stage of completion.

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10 Two Project Performance Assessment Reports (PPAR) have been completed on GFRP operations in Ethiopia and another two are in advance stages for GFRP operations in Burundi and Djibouti.
Table 3.b. Regional Breakdown of Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>AFR</th>
<th>ECA</th>
<th>EAP</th>
<th>LCR</th>
<th>MNA</th>
<th>SAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of case studies</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of GFRP countries</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Stakeholder perspective**: The evaluation will take into account the perspectives of key stakeholders and beneficiaries, as well as WBG staff. This will involve meetings and interviews of key stakeholders, including other donors, research institutions, and think tanks. The evaluation team will conduct interviews and focus group discussions with key stakeholders in field-based country case studies. For those country studies that are not field-based, the evaluation team will interview key stakeholders using teleconferences and videoconferences.

- **Working papers**: The evaluation will commission studies that will provide additional evaluative evidence on specific thematic issues to help answer the question *How did the World Bank Group respond to the food crisis?* The topic will be the WBG role in donor coordination in the global food crisis response. Given that donor coordination was one of the key challenges the WBG encountered in responding to the food crisis, this analysis will examine donor coordination issues at the global, program (GFRP/GFI), and country levels. IEG will conduct interviews with key officers within the Bank and within partner agencies. Another topic will be a vulnerability analysis. This study will provide a brief assessment of the macroeconomic vulnerabilities of developing countries to food price rises (poverty, net food importer or exporter position, balance of payments, and fiscal dimension). The third topic will be the design of IFC’s agricultural price risk management system. The analysis will aim to shed light on the relevance of the design of the program, which was introduced in June 2011 to protect farmers, food producers, and consumers in developing countries from volatile food prices.

**Limitations**

44. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the design and implementation of interventions supported by the WBG have been timely and effective. It will look at only outputs, intermediate outcomes, and indicative long-term outcomes. The reason for this limitation is that the evaluation will be done while some of the activities are not yet completed or have only been recently completed. In particular, the short-term response programs (GFRP/GFI) and the broader agriculture and social safety nets operations are ongoing or have not yet been subject to implementation completion reporting.

**Evaluation Team**

45. The evaluation team will be led by Ismail Arslan (Task Team Leader, IEGCC) and will consist of Jennie Litvack, Hijalte Sederlof, and Ursula Martinez (social safety nets), Ade Freeman (IFC private sector response), Gershon Feder, Isabelle Tsakok, and Melvin Vaz (price policy, market stabilization, and agriculture), Joanne Salop (coordination with UN agencies and international financial institutions), Xubei Luo and Saubhik Deb (food vulnerability indicators). Alan Gelb, Peter Timmer, and Johan Swinnen will be the peer reviewers for the evaluation. The work will be
conducted under the direction and guidance of Monika Huppi, Manager (IEGPS), and Emmanuel Jimenez, Director (IEGPS). Due to her recent association with the World Food Program, the Director-General of Evaluation, Caroline Heider, has recused herself from this evaluation. Daniela Gressani, Deputy to Director-General and Senior Adviser will oversee this evaluation.

46. A group of external advisors will be identified to advise the evaluation team during the evaluation process. This panel will consist of three to four internationally recognized food crisis experts and practitioners who will comment on the ongoing analysis and early drafts of the various intermediate outputs. The Panel will review and provide written comments on the final report.

47. The evaluation team will interact closely with other IEG teams working on tasks relevant to the proposed evaluation (sector studies and evaluations, country assistance evaluations, and project assessment reports) to avoid duplication of effort and maximize synergies.

Schedule

48. The time line for the task is outlined in Table 4. A proposed chapter outline is in Appendix 2 and references are in Appendix 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Global Food Crisis Response Evaluation—Timetable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approach Paper One Stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach Paper Submission to CODE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Stop Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Submission to Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report Submission to CODE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49. Dissemination of the report is expected to target internal and external audiences, particularly (in the case of external audiences) other UN agencies, international financial institutions, multilateral development banks, and the Evaluation Cooperation Group.
## Appendix 1: Evaluation Design Matrix – Global Food Crisis Response

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Questions</th>
<th>Information Sources</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. How did the World Bank Group respond to the global food crisis?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Did the WBG have in place—or was in a position to quickly mobilize—the requisite knowledge base, staffing, budget resources, and financial resources to respond quickly to needs of vulnerable countries?</td>
<td>Program documents; CP Strategies; International development literature; Bank Group documents; Bank Group team</td>
<td>Document review; Literature review; desk review; interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What were the most affected countries from the global food crisis? What instruments did the WBG use to respond to the crisis? Was the WBG resource allocation in line with the needs of vulnerable countries?</td>
<td>International development literature; Bank Group documents; program and project documents, ISRs, ICRs, PPARs, XPSRs, task team leaders and public officials</td>
<td>Portfolio review; desk reviews; background papers; stakeholder interviews and country case studies</td>
<td>Limited information available on the vulnerability analysis. Preliminary assessment will need to be compared to DEC/PREM and regional analyses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How effectively was WBG support coordinated between the Bank and IFC and with the support of other donors, including the UN High Level Task Force on the Food Crisis, and what role did the WBG play in coordinating the response?</td>
<td>Framework Document for GFRP/GFI; Progress Reports; UN and other partners’ reports; Bank Group Documents</td>
<td>Stakeholder interviews; country case studies and desk reviews.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What was the balance between short-term responses and interventions geared towards medium and longer term objectives of building resilience and supporting medium term food supply response? Did the WBG ensure consistency between short-term and longer term development objectives?</td>
<td>Program and project documents, ISRs, ICRs, PPARs, XPSRs, task team leaders and public officials</td>
<td>Portfolio review and country case studies.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>II. How effectively did the WBG help countries confront the short term effects of the food crisis?</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Questions</td>
<td>Information Sources</td>
<td>Data Collection Methods</td>
<td>Limitations</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>How relevant and timely was the WBG response to short term needs?</td>
<td>Bank Group reports; Rapid impact assessments; program and project documents; task team leaders; public officials</td>
<td>Country case studies; desk reviews; working papers and stakeholder interviews.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent were the overall and country-specific programs’ objectives were clear and focused?</td>
<td>Bank Group Program and project documents, ISRs, ICRs, PPARs, and XPSRs</td>
<td>Portfolio review and country case studies</td>
<td>Limited coverage of some program documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What factors affected relevance, speed and effectiveness of the WBG response to short term effects of the crisis? Was the WBG appropriately handling any tensions between speed and quality?</td>
<td>Bank Group reports; Rapid impact assessments; program and project documents; task team leaders; public officials.</td>
<td>Country case studies; desk reviews; working papers and stakeholder interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was there sufficient assessment of the constraints to effective implementation imposed by inadequate infrastructure and human resources within crisis-affected countries?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent were short objectives achieved, including protecting the poor and vulnerable from price shocks? What early results intervention achieved?</td>
<td>Bank Group Program and project documents, ISRs, ICRs, PPARs, and XPSRs</td>
<td>Portfolio review and country case studies</td>
<td>Limited information available on results as many of the operations are still ongoing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent objectives of helping ensure short and medium term supply response achieved?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Were the monitoring and evaluation systems adequate? Adequacy of supervision resources? Assessment of implementation problems and follow-up actions?</td>
<td>Bank Group Program and project documents, ISRs, ICRs, PPARs, and XPSRs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. To what extent did the World Bank Group’s engagement during and after the crisis help countries to enhance their resilience build resilience to future food price shocks?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Questions</th>
<th>Information Sources</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
<th>Limitations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How sustainable are the emergency-induced organizational and administrative structures, and programs supported by the GFRP/GFI, and other regular WBG assistance?</td>
<td>International development literature, Bank Group documents, program and project documents and task team leaders</td>
<td>Literature review; desk review; interviews and country case studies</td>
<td>Assessment will be constrained by documentation and availability of data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has food production capacity been expanded? Are countries allocating more resources to agricultural development?</td>
<td>International development literature, Bank Group documents, program and project documents and task team leaders</td>
<td>Literature review; desk review; interviews; stakeholder survey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are organizational structure and capacity for protecting and assisting vulnerable groups being enhanced?</td>
<td>Bank Group Program and project documents; ISR; ICRs; PPARs; XPSRs and country case studies</td>
<td>Document review; interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are efficient arrangements to protect countries against price volatility established?</td>
<td>Bank Group Program and project documents; ISR; ICRs; PPARs; XPSRs; country case studies; public officials; partners; and donors</td>
<td>Document review; interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What lessons can be learned for crisis management in general and food crisis management in particular?</td>
<td>Bank Group Program and project documents; ISR; ICRs; PPARs; XPSRs; country case studies; public officials; partners; and donors</td>
<td>Document review; interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Appendix 2: Report Outline

A Real-Time IEG Evaluation of the World Bank’s Response to the Global Food Crisis

Chapter 1. Introduction, Background, Methodology
- Background on the crisis
- Evaluation Scope
- Methodology and Evaluative Questions

Chapter 2. The Overall World Bank Group’s Response to the Global Food Crisis
- Vulnerability Analysis of Countries
- Allocation of Bank Support
- Appropriateness of Bank Instruments in the Food Crisis
- Coordination with Other IFIs

Chapter 3. World Bank Group Support to Food Price Policy, Market Stabilization and Domestic Food Production in the Food Crisis
- Analytic and Advisory Activities
- Lending Portfolio (short term response and regular program)
- Effectiveness and Sustainability of Programs

Chapter 4. Bank Support to Social Safety Net in the Food Crisis
- Analytic and Advisory Activities
- Lending Portfolio (short term response and regular program)
- Effectiveness and Sustainability of Programs

Chapter 5. Summary of findings and lessons
Appendix 3: References


