INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT

1. Recent World Bank Group (WBG) strategy documents, including the Forward Look, reiterated the importance of the WBG’s leadership role in dealing with global challenges and positioned the organization’s ability to work at the nexus of local and global issues such as climate change, gender, and pandemics as core part of its value proposition (World Bank 2013 and 2016). When the WBG shareholders committed to scale up WBG resources through the recent IBRD and IFC capital increase and the IDA18 replenishment in 2016, a core premise was to more strategically perform its global role, in better collaboration with public and private partners. This evaluation is about the WBG’s global role. It will assess how and when the WBG exercises convening power to spark collective action on global issues. Given the scale and interconnectedness of global challenges; increased complexity of the development ecosystem; and concerns over “mission creep”, the WBG’s role as a catalyst for collective action on behalf of the international community could become even more important. When and how should it lead, when should it support, and when should it withdraw?

2. At the heart of this evaluation is how the World Bank Group (WBG) exercises convening power to foster collective action by the international community around various global and regional issues critical to its mission. Convening power is defined as the ability to catalyze collective action by relevant actors to address global and regional development challenges. Exercising convening power is not an end-goal but rather a means to foster collective action to achieve desirable development outcomes. The WBG exercises its convening power in many different ways, in both official or unofficial capacities; convening power does not equate to formal leadership roles. Convening can be enabling, supporting, facilitating, or leading. For example, the WBG supports multilateral fora such as the G7 and the G20.

3. Convening power is often considered one of the three broad types of services the WBG offers to its member countries and clients (the other being financing and knowledge services). The WBG has substantial convening power. It has used its convening power to foster shared understanding of development issues, propagate international norms and standards, and set up financing mechanisms for various issues.

4. At the outset it is important to define the purpose of convening: mobilizing collective action to address issues that require collaboration across national or organizational boundaries. Collective action can be defined as actions to achieve a common objective, when the outcomes depend on interdependence of actors. In the literature, collective action is described as taking various forms including the development of institutions, resource mobilization, coordination, and information sharing (Poteete and Ostrom 2003). Attachment 1 elaborates on definitions of key concepts. In the WBG context, objectives may include changing attitudes of stakeholders, enhancing the acceptance of new approaches or policies, setting up a mechanism to produce a
global public good, securing financing for fragile countries, or facilitating private sector participation and finance.

5. Reflecting its multilateral mandate and global scope, the WBG has long been involved in catalyzing collective action. Collective actions were often required to pursue global public goods, for example, to address global, systemic risks. Financial stability and trade expansion were the first such issues the World Bank promoted, these being explicit parts of the Articles of Agreement. The Bank helped create the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in 1971, which has emerged as the backbone of the global public agricultural research infrastructure. The World Bank became heavily engaged in resolving the debt crisis in the mid- to late 1980s. The International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Sustainability Initiative, including its Environmental and Social Framework, gave rise to the “Equator Principles” which 92 financial institutions in 37 countries have adopted.¹

6. Starting in the mid-1990s, the WBG expanded its work on global issues, often starting initiatives in response to shareholder demand. Examples include biodiversity, forests, and global health initiatives. During this time, global issues have been of growing concern to an international community increasingly attuned to the crises that result from neglecting to address global public bads. At the same time, developing countries have seen increasingly abundant access to finance from sources other than the WBG, leading to a secular decline in the relative importance of WBG finance for national development. By engaging on global issues, the WBG has sought to remain relevant as a major global organization.

7. As the WBG has added initiatives, it expanded into new terrain. In recent decades, poverty alleviation, health, gender, environmental sustainability, climate change, data, and other issues have come to loom much larger than economic and financial issues. Demands from other MDBs, the United Nations, the G7 and G20 for WBG convening on a broad spectrum of development issues have surged in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals, including increasing demand for IFC’s leadership and convening role to scale up private sector finance for development. Given the opportunity cost of convening and multilateral engagement, this will require the WBG to be strategic in selecting which platforms and initiatives to engage with.

8. As the WBG pushes further on its global role, it confronts questions about its business models and accountability. The World Bank country-driven business model focuses on priorities identified by individual developing country governments, and country-based lending is a bedrock of its financial model. IFC’s financial model rests on project finance to firms. These operating models do not naturally direct the WB’s financial and analytical firepower to address global issues, and, as a result, WBG engagements on global public goods and global issues in general rely heavily on trust funds. Trust funds are not subject to the same accountability as are IBRD, IDA, and IFC, as their accountability flows more to trust fund donors than to the WBG’s Board.

9. Some internal and external voices call for the WBG to reorient itself to play a greater global role, though there is no consensus on this. The argument for a greater global role centers on the synergies between provision of global public goods and country-based support for fighting poverty and promoting shared prosperity: global risks imperil victory in the war on poverty.

¹ See http://equator-principles.com
Global, systemic risks such as the rapid spread across borders of disease, financial instability, and forcibly displaced people have become a defining characteristic of an interconnected world. Systemic risks threaten to wipe out gains in poverty reduction (Goldin and Kutarna 2016). A high-level expert panel convened by the Center for Global Development recommended a new mandate for the World Bank to promote global public goods with associated far-reaching changes to its governance and financing models (Birdsall and Morris, 2016). Similarly, a study of the World Bank’s role in the global environmental commons (climate change, oceans, forests, and biodiversity) advocated a “Copernican” shift in multilaterals’ approach to global public goods (Evans and Davies. 2015). The study also identified some institutional barriers that impede the World Bank’s effective global role, including its governance model, overreliance on special-purpose funding for regional and global initiatives, and bureaucratic processes geared more toward large, loan-financed operations that impede flexibility and innovation, and therefore limit impact. However, not all stakeholders endorse a growing global role, certainly not if it comes at the expense of country focus.

10. In a fast-evolving external environment, the WBG needs to consider its role in relation to other actors: when to lead, when to support, and when to withdraw from issues. The development eco-system has become crowded with large number of actors, issues, and voices vying for funding and attention. Yet few international organizations rival the WBG’s breadth of coverage and depth of financial, technical and knowledge capabilities. More than others, actions by the WBG shape the organizational ecosystem of the entire development sector, for example by supporting the creation of new global and regional programs and funds, or by advancing innovative approaches and instruments

WORLD BANK GROUP’S STRATEGY AND PORTFOLIO RELEVANT TO THE EVALUATION

11. Strategy documents relevant to this evaluation variously discuss the WBG’s global role, its convening power, its contributions to global and regional public goods, and working in partnership.

12. WBG strategic documents (2007, 2013, 2016) show continued commitment to provision of global public goods and an evolving approach to managing global engagements. Meeting the Challenges of Global Development (World Bank 2007) proposed a framework to manage its engagement in global public goods, also with the purpose of strengthening the voice of developing countries. The 2007 framework identified six categories of global public goods relevant to the World Bank: communicable diseases; development data, research and knowledge sharing; environmental commons; international financial architecture; trade and economic integration; and peace and security. The background paper to the Forward Look (World Bank Group 2016) references many initiatives on topics ranging from climate change, fragile countries, crisis response, financial architecture, anti-corruption, global trade, and knowledge for development, repeatedly emphasizing financial innovations and financial support as key WBG contributions:

“The WBG’s framework for global public goods [proposed in 2007] remains relevant, but the world has become even more interconnected and more vulnerable to fast-spreading country or regional crises, requiring a broader agenda. The WBG has responded to shareholder demand, playing an important role in climate finance and Ebola response, creating new market instruments, and recently launching the Pandemic and MENA Facilities. The Forward
Look presents new approaches for strengthening the WBG’s leadership role and impact. These approaches are consistent with longstanding guiding principles for its engagement in global public goods, focusing on building partnerships and mobilization, and on coordinating action at the global, regional, national, and local levels, as well as across the public and the private sectors. “(World Bank Group 2016: 18).

13. Internal reforms have in part aimed to strengthen and bring greater coherence to global engagements. The creation of the Global Themes Vice-Presidential Unit in July 2017 sought to impose a coherent managerial structure to four Global Themes Groups (climate change, gender, FCV, and Infrastructure, Guarantees, and Public-Private Partnerships). These groups are tasked with providing internal and external strategic directions on corporate priority themes, reflecting the WBG’s need to impose coherent management on its involvements in global issues. Furthermore, the Global Practices, set up in 2014, aim to link country engagements across Regions, connecting with global knowledge as needed. The Global Practices have dedicated budgets for global engagements and some have units oriented to global engagements. Ongoing trust fund reforms also seek to improve alignment, selectivity, and management of the World Bank’s financial involvement on these issues.

14. The WBG’s involvement in global issues is sizeable. The so-called global engagement budgets of the World Bank Global Practices and Global Themes were USD77.7 million in fiscal year 2017. The Bank is engaged in 22 Financial Intermediary Funds, providing trusteeship on behalf of the international community for a combined cumulative total of USD 89.7 billion. The bulk of these resources finance global partnership programs in health (49 percent) and environment and climate change (34 percent). In addition, the WBG holds USD10.5 billion in Bank and IFC trust funds, some of which have a global scope. Furthermore, the Annual and Spring meetings are important fora where the WBG brings together global leaders, policymakers, and civil society for discussion and knowledge exchange on global challenges. The WBG participates in G7, G20, United Nations (UN) and many other high-level meetings where collective action is routinely discussed and new initiatives originate. Among other things, the WBG contributes with knowledge, including through the World Development Reports and the Global Monitoring Reports, and with data and indicators, including Doing Business and World Development Indicators. Another part of the WBG’s global role are its efforts to help the international community anticipate and respond to systemic shocks such as pandemics, financial crises, debt crisis (including through the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative), and climate change.

15. With the growth in the number and spread of convening efforts, does the WBG have sufficient strategic thrust? Does it have clear mandates, priorities, and principles? Which convening efforts are effective, and why? These are some of the questions this proposed evaluation will need to confront as it examines the WBGs convening power, the first ever IEG report to do so in a holistic fashion.

**Existing Evaluative Evidence**

16. Previous IEG evaluations provide critical insights. Generally, the WBG’s influence is hard to systematically assess because such “soft” outcomes are hard to detect and convening comes
intertwined with finance, knowledge and policy dialogue. Nevertheless, the evidence is abundant that the Bank has substantial convening power in many different areas.

17. Increased corporate attention to global public goods in the late 1990s prompted more attention from IEG to how effectively the WBG supports global public goods. IEG’s 2008 Annual Development Effectiveness review found that the Bank had been a strong convener on global trade and avian flu but less effective at advocating and convening for environmental commons. This is because the local, national and global benefits—actual or perceived—diverge significantly and this make the Bank’s country model less effective for fostering global public goods.

18. IEG also produced a wealth of evidence on the evolution and effectiveness of WBGs’ support to global and regional partnership programs—in environment, disaster risk management, communicable diseases, and data—through a series of global program reviews (2004-2015) as well as corporate evaluations and learning products. These evaluations provide ample evidence on the critical roles that the WBG often played in establishing such mechanisms—by globally (co-) convening other partners, establishing supporting financing mechanisms, and providing implementation support and technical expertise at country level. Relatedly, the forestry evaluation (2013) noted the key role of the WBG in convening global, national and local forestry partnerships and using them to foster consensus around forest conservation and broader development issues.

19. Some global partnership programs have shortcomings in governance, strategic focus, and results monitoring. Recipient governments criticize global funds and programs that impose ill-suited requirements and parallel reporting yet fail to build country capacity (IEG 2011b, 2014). Some of these programs, despite being located inside the Bank, have connected little to country programs, questioning to some extent the effectiveness of the Bank in working at the nexus of global and country issues.

20. The Trust Funds evaluation (2011) shed light on how non-core donor funding shapes Bank priorities and provides support for an issue-focused business model in parallel with the Bank’s country-focused model. Trust fund resources, for example, helped to expand the scope of Bank activities in two areas that would not have occurred (or occurred on the same scale) without grant financing. These are (a) engagement in post-conflict and post-disaster situations; and (b) support for the provision of global and regional public goods, typically through participation in global and regional partnerships. The drawbacks in increased reliance on trust funds, however, are their low predictability and poor strategic alignment in some cases. The evaluation also raised fundamental questions about financial intermediary funds (FIFs), pointing out that the Bank’s participation in FIFs gives it voice and responsibility on large and complex global issues but also that each FIF has been set up in an ad hoc fashion, with a political motivation, and customized to context. IEG recommended a review of FIFs given their large risks and opportunities.

21. On pandemics, the World Bank has proven itself crucial during outbreaks but lacking in continuity. The Bank’s convening power was critical in establishing and implementing the Global Program on Avian Influenza Control and Human Pandemic Preparedness and Response. With little or no technical expertise in the field, the Bank played a key role in getting specialized UN...
agencies to work together--through financing, coordination at the country and global levels, and project supervision--and in spurring governments into action. However, lack of clear ownership inside the Bank hampered the effectiveness of the response; efforts were not sustained once the initial pandemic subsided (IEG, 2014).

22. Recent IEG thematic and sector evaluations demonstrate the WBG’s substantial convening power and its diverse contributions to collective action in various sectors. The Clean Air and Pollution evaluation (2017) found that the WBG exercises its convening role globally in advancing the clean agenda, mainly by acting as knowledge broker, but also through partnerships and standard setting. However, the Bank needs to go further to integrate pollution control in client countries’ development agenda and strategies. The Urban Transport evaluation (2017) found that the Bank’s influence has been significantly wider globally and in case study countries compared to the resources it deployed in urban transport. This was attributed to its technical excellence and knowledge sharing; convening and mobilizing power and policy influence; and international operational expertise, including environmental and social practices. According to the Water Supply and Sanitation evaluation (2017) the Bank has revamped its global contributions in the sector by co-convening global knowledge and data initiatives. At country level, however, the World Bank’s convening role has been limited in comparison with its substantial lending and knowledge roles.

23. There were noteworthy uses of WBG convening power on development data and global health. IEG’s Data for Development Evaluation (2017) found that Bank’s global reach, financial, analytical and convening power have enabled the World Bank to make a significant contribution to generating and sharing global data. The Bank has a strong reputation on data and via its open data initiative provides an important global public good. WBG Support to Health Services Evaluation (2017) concluded that the WBG often successfully catalyzed collective action and leveraged resources to tackle global public health challenges by establishing and co-convening global partnership programs and platforms. There are, however, negative unintended consequences: the proliferation of global health programs and vertical funds have fragmented the aid ecosystem in health and diluted the WBG’s strategic focus.

24. Finally, an external academic panel assessed the Bank’s research, concluding that the World Bank is losing some of its relevance as a leader in global policy debates (Besley and others, 2015). The panel cited gender and climate change as areas where “the Bank is no longer considered a major force in research and debates.” The panel saw the Bank’s leadership and credibility as dependent upon the quality of its data and research and advocated to “reinstate the World Bank at the center of such debates and to enhance its voice in an authoritative way guided by analysis and evidence.” The panel suggested a more coherent and less fragmented approach to policy, research, and data work.

**CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING CONVENING POWER**

25. Convening to foster collective action is a dynamic process that takes place in a complex context. A “systems map” (Figure 1), derived from the literature review, visualizes the factors, drivers, actors, capacities and processes that are the key in fostering collective action.

26. The assets and capacities that enable WBG’s convening power comprise structural; social and normative factors; and intellectual factors. Material and structural factors include financial
assets; fiduciary and implementation capacity; and capacity for financial innovation; organizational structure; and how the organization is embedded within the larger organizational ecosystem of the development sector. Institutional factors, such as policy autonomy, governance, delegation and control exercised by member states also play a role. Strategy documents emphasize the WBG’s ability to work at the intersection of global and local issues as a key comparative advantage. With its global mandate and country presence, it is presumably well placed to ensure that global commitments and priorities translate into action on the ground (although evaluations suggest a mixed track record, IEG, 2015). This ability is greatly enhanced by its analytical and research capacity; solid fiduciary track record; and capacity to channel finance for a variety of purposes, including to countries in crisis situations.

27. Social capital, which encompasses social networks that the organization is a part of, the trust, reputation and credibility of the WBG, as well as authority and legitimacy, are critical preconditions for successful collective action. Trust is especially important whenever actors don’t agree on goals or may renege on prior commitments. Intellectual factors—the human capital—include the professional and technical expertise of the WBG staff. Other global or state actors often approach the WBG for knowledge, data, and advisory services, or IFC for its ability to serve as a medium between private investors and the public policy domain. Interpersonal trust and networks also can play important role in successful convening.

28. Drivers of WBG convening are both external demands and internal factors. The mandate and the set of pressing development challenges set the broad stage upon which member countries, the private sector, civil society, and foundations lobby the WBG to advance agendas on which they see an urgent need for collective action. Demand for WBG convening often stems from its
social capital, centrality in the network of peer organizations, and financial and implementation capacity. A few examples can be offered. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, a joint IFC and World Bank program, was requested by the G20 in 2009. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative was launched in 2002 after civil society advocacy. Many initiatives in health, as well as the Living Standards Measurement Study-Integrated Surveys on Agriculture, came to exist thanks to demand and funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The Equator Principles reportedly came about in response to commercial banks wanting IFC’s help to address risks affecting their project finance business. World Bank engagement on the debt crisis in the 1980s was in response to the US Treasury (that engagement created tension with the IMF related to the respective mandates of the two institutions, illustrating how convening cannot be studied in isolation from organizational relationships and power issues) (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb, 1997). Internal drivers—such as organizational incentives to remain relevant in the changing organizational ecosystem, senior management’s proactivity, or motivated staff responding to perceived gaps in knowledge and leadership — also can be powerful drivers to convene. The Doing Business project, for example, was initiated in response to technical analysis by staff which had identified data gaps and an opportunity to enhance the evidence base for policy discussions on private sector development.

29. Figure 2 articulates a granular logic model for the WBG supply side: the processes and outputs that constitute the WBG internal capabilities to exercise convening power. Internally, this would mean a clear understanding of why the issue is a priority; what the institution can contribute to; and how. These understandings translate into establishing principles for engagement; improving capabilities for advocacy and influence (data, knowledge, collaborative leadership skills); priming internal policies and frameworks; mobilizing resources; setting up partnerships; and working with client countries at the nexus of country and global issues. In other words, the logic model depicts how and to what extent the WBG’s financial resources, its knowledge base, social capital and staff competencies enable the organization to engage and play different convening roles.

30. The WBG’s role as a convener can be manifold and evolve over time in response to drivers and pursued challenges. Based on the review of the academic literature and lessons from other organizations, Figure 2 also depicts some of the convening roles the WBG may perform (Heikkila and Gerlak, 2015; Emmerson and others, 2011). The WBG can, for example, facilitate a safe and neutral space for information sharing and dialogue; act as neutral broker to overcome mistrust and free-rider problems; be a bridging organization by crowding in other actors and sources of public or private finance; fill a “structural hole” by helping to overcome information asymmetries and lack of coordination; or act as a pioneer and risk taker by leading innovative pilot solutions that can be scaled up collectively.
Assessing Collective Action, the Outcome of Convening

31. Assessing effectiveness of convening is challenging and will take into account the context and the goal of convening. The WBG uses its convening power to spur collective action and influence collective outcomes. Influence on achieving desired collective outcomes is therefore an important metric for successful use of convening power. Influencing collective action is a process that occurs in a complex context, with multiplicity of stakeholders, roles, and stages for the WBG to engage. Depending on specific objectives, the convening role(s) of the WBG, the means of influence and the stakeholders the WBG aims to reach can change. Therefore, the effectiveness of convening can only be assessed in the context of expected outcomes, and the specific roles and contributions WBG intended to play.

32. Effective convening can lead to different types of broad collective outcomes, such as:

- Fostering shared understanding. If successful, the WBG contributed to effecting changes in attitudes and positions.
- Promoting shared solutions. If successful, the WBG contributed to effecting changes in strategies, policies, financing, standards.
- Promoting shared implementation. If successful, the WBG contributed to the implementation of identified solutions, for example by setting up or supporting programs, partnerships, financial mechanisms, trust funds, and investments in countries.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Other options are also possible. The WBG may host a financial vehicle, an implementation arrangement, on an issue where it did little to foster shared understanding and solutions.
Many issues requiring collective action take decades to resolve and are shaped by factors beyond the WBG’s span of control. There could be situations where the WBG influenced shared understanding and contributed to shared solutions, but implementation failed. The evaluation will review long-term outcomes only in instances where efforts have had time to mature. Table 1 provides some indicative examples of how convening processes and activities can influence collective action outcomes.

Table 1. Indicative Convening Processes and Activities for Collective Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective Action Outcomes</th>
<th>Convening processes &amp; Activities</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fostering shared understanding (toward changes in attitudes and positions)</td>
<td>• Information sharing&lt;br&gt;• Joint statements &amp; declarations&lt;br&gt;• Multi-party agreements&lt;br&gt;• Conducting analytical (baseline) studies, research, data for shared use and understanding&lt;br&gt;• Establishing a joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fostering shared solutions (toward changes in strategies, policies, standards, etc.)</td>
<td>• Aligning strategies, action plans, and roadmaps&lt;br&gt;• Facilitating inter-organizational operational collaboration through aligning, harmonizing policies, operational frameworks&lt;br&gt;• Establishing clear roles and labor division (e.g. through MOUs)&lt;br&gt;• Setting common standards, methodologies, tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostering shared implementation (toward changes in behaviors)</td>
<td>• (Co)-establishing and participating in “backbone” partnerships or coordination platforms&lt;br&gt;• Coordinated or joint resource mobilization&lt;br&gt;• Implementing co-funded projects &amp; programs&lt;br&gt;• Coordinated or aligned implementation of projects &amp; programs&lt;br&gt;• (Co)-establishing or supporting innovative mechanisms for advocacy, financing and implementation of joint or aligned solutions&lt;br&gt;• Applying harmonized standards, methodologies, tools</td>
</tr>
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Source: IEG

Successful convening strengthens the WBG’s social capital and legitimacy, and the likelihood it will be tapped to convene in the future. Past convening efforts have enhanced internal capabilities (for example, addition of FIFs as a distinct business line), in the same way that physical exercise strengthens muscle tissue. The feedback from other participants of collective action also allows the WBG to learn, adapt and adjust its strategies of convening. And because of its size, WBG convening helps shape the organizational ecosystems of development: the world of agricultural research would not have been the same had the Bank not helped create the CGIAR.

Failure at convening, on the other hand, may involve raising expectations that cannot be met, wasting time and resources, or trespassing into other agencies’ terrain. An example is the Global Partnership for Oceans, closed in 2015 after only three years. Or there may be missed opportunities. After a review of extractive industries in the early 2000s, the WBG decided to remain engaged in oil and gas. It eventually announced its exit from oil and gas exploration in November 2017. Was the decision to not exit from oil and gas 15 years earlier a missed opportunity to position the WBG as an early leader on climate change?
**Purpose, Objective, and Audience**

36. The purpose of this evaluation is to assess when and how effectively the WBG exercises convening power on global issues. The evaluation is meant to inform discussions about the future of the multilateral system and the WBG’s role as the only global institution with a broad development mandate. The evaluation is timely for the reasons discussed in the sections above, chiefly that, in the context of an increasingly interconnected, multi-polar world; where the “development sector” has become fragmented with far more actors; where more demands are placed on the multilateral system; where the WBG covers a (possibly too) wide set of issues, including issues traditionally the mandate of other multilaterals and the UN; where the synergies and trade-offs between the global and country roles of the WBG are far from clear; and where in the past strategic management of the WBG’s global engagements has been challenging; there is a need for clear thinking on whether the WBG is doing the right things and doing things the right way in its convening for collective action.

37. Referring to IEG’s Strategic Framework, this evaluation will touch on both IEG objectives and all six pillars. The evaluation will consider what works and why in relation to inclusive growth, service delivery for the poor, and environmental sustainability; as well as address learning pertaining to tackling the most important development challenges, aspects of the Solutions Bank, and working in partnerships.

38. The **objectives** of this evaluation are to:

   - Inform the WBG Board on the relevance and effectiveness of WBG convening for collective action;
   - Foster learning on the appropriate role and scope of WBG convening and how to manage convening activities;
   - Provide evidence-based lessons on how WBG exercised its convening power in the past and what approaches to convening have worked well;
   - Provide frameworks and methodologies to assess convening power.

39. Like other major IEG products, the primary audiences for this evaluation are the WBG Board’s Committee on Development Effectiveness and WBG management. Given the topic, this evaluation may attract pronounced interest from beyond the WBG in academic and policy circles interested in global governance and international organizations.

40. Other multilateral institutions and member country governments may benefit from the findings of this evaluation, and a range of governments, think tanks, and academics may find it useful as well. Evaluators in organizations that seek global influence (foundations, think tanks, international organizations) stand to benefit from methodologies and approaches.

**Evaluation Questions and Scope**

**Evaluations Questions**

41. The evaluation will answer the following main questions:

   1. On which global issues has the WBG exercised convening power, and why?
2. How well is the WBG convening role on global issues grounded in the institution’s mandate, goals, and comparative strengths?
   a. What are the key drivers and modalities of WBG convening for collective action?
   b. Is it sufficiently selective in its initiatives and approaches to convening?
   c. To what extent does the WBG leverage the strength of other actors in advancing global agendas relevant to its mission?

3. How effectively has the WBG exercised its convening power on global issues?
   a. Does the WBG have adequate institutional capacity, resources, and skills for exercising convening power?
   b. How well are the WBG convening activities managed?
   c. What configuration of internal and external factors have made the WBG’s convening more effective?

42. The first evaluation question is about understanding the landscape of WBG convening. The second evaluation question is about doing the right things: the nature and relevance of the WBG’s convening role—in relation to its own priorities and strengths, as well as in relation to partners. Factors driving the WBG’s priority-setting will be studied to understand what supply and demand factors and circumstances precondition the WBG’s engagement in various global issues. The team will assess whether the scale, scope, modalities, and duration of convening (e.g. did the WBG pursue the issue sufficiently to achieve collective action?) were commensurate to the scale of the problems being addressed, as well as in relation to other actors in the space.

43. The third evaluation question is about doing things well: effectiveness when convening. The team will discern and assess mechanisms, processes, and types of actions used to convene. It will drill down on the gamut of internal and external factors (enunciated in figures 1 and 2) that render the WBG’s performance as a convener effective.

Scope

44. The definition of the scope for this evaluation has benefited from key informant interviews and workshops with management counterparts and IEG staff. All World Bank and IFC convening aiming to foster collective action on global issues form part of the universe of activities within the potential scope (the team will sample from within this universe, not all activities can be reviewed). The evaluation will not have a fixed evaluation period; the last five years will be in focus, but the period under review will vary depending on the issue and initiative.

45. The team considered but chose not to include in the scope WBG convening power at project and country level on issues such as country development strategies and donor coordination. The convening done by the WBG on single-country issues is undoubtedly important but is arguably less pertinent to the purpose of this evaluation, which is to advance thinking on global role. To some extent, convening around country and project specific issues is covered by other self-evaluation and evaluation products.

46. The team was informed by MIGA that its business model presently is purely transaction-oriented and does not include any convening and global public good roles. (This was not always so. In the past, MIGA operated advisory services and published think pieces). Hence, in the present there is no MIGA global role to evaluate.
**EVALUATION DESIGN**

47. The evaluation adopts a scorecard approach to curate and analyze data from a wide variety of sources and methods. This is a multidimensional performance matrix, also known in the literature as a balanced scorecard. The scorecard approach used for this evaluation is a common data collection and analysis framework that can provide a systematic way of comparing and contrasting the WBG’s relative strengths in convening on global issues. It will link performance drivers to outcomes. It will also balance internal and process indicators with external perception and results indicators to answer the evaluation questions.

48. The evaluation will use the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as proxies for the global challenges that require collective action. The scorecard approach will curate and analyze data mapped against the 17 SDG goals. The SDGs provide a useful framework to organize the analysis because they provide a sufficiently complete list of the major issues on the international community’s development agenda for the next 15 years. There are collective action issues and needs for convening around each of the SDGs. This is not to be an evaluation of WBG’s SDG efforts; it’s a framework for organizing data collection. Using a list of global issues that is external to the WBG but to which it subscribes allows the evaluation a wide coverage without the selection bias that would result if the team were to select only areas with major current WBG efforts.

49. The scorecard approach operationalizes the conceptual framework in Figures 1 and 2. It will have four composite dimensions for assessment (Figure 3). The “internal assets” perspective will cover internal WBG human, financial, knowledge, and technology assets and capacities it can leverage to convene. The “internal strategic” perspective will cover priority setting, roles, objectives, and channels of convening. The “demand” perspective will cover issues external to the WBG such as what others are doing, partnerships, and division of labor with other actors. The “results” perspective will cover relevance and effectiveness of WBG convening in select issues, see below.

**Figure 3 Performance Dimensions in Scorecard Approach**
50. To assess the “results” perspective dimension of the scorecard, the team will select specific global collective action issues and convening initiatives for inquiry. Given that SDGs encompass a broad range of global issues, it is impossible (and outside the scope of the evaluation) to provide a comprehensive assessment of the WBG’s convening role and effectiveness at the level of each goal. The level of analysis will therefore shift, from the broad SDG to one global collective action issue per SDG. These issues will be defined around salient challenges within the SDGs that require an international collective response, for example mobilizing private finance, pandemic risk, carbon pricing, lack of common standards and metrics for private and public actors, ocean pollution, and so on. The issues for results assessment will be selected based on strategy documents, high-profile events, expressed demand from the international community, and opportunity for empirical observation by the team. Two levels of results and effectiveness assessment will occur. All issues will be assessed quickly using existing data sources, web analysis, and a few interviews. In addition, the team will use small case studies (tentatively 4-5) to assess results and effectiveness in more depth. The small case studies will use direct participant observations, a larger number of interviews with a wider range of external stakeholders, and more in-depth analysis of web, bibliometric, media, and social media data.

51. A range of methodological approaches will be applied, see Table 2. Internal data sources on the strategies and resources spent on different types of convening activities will be supplemented by interviews with key stakeholders and available global perception survey results, stakeholder mapping, institutional analysis, and analysis of media data. Data sources for results assessment were mentioned above. Purposive samples of relevant internal and external stakeholders will be developed for each level and dimension of analysis. The principles of triangulation and reaching the “point of theoretical saturation” will be used to inform a decision on the number of interviews to be conducted.
Table 2. The Scorecard Approach: Data Collection and Analysis Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Types of questions covered</th>
<th>Supply side assets perspective</th>
<th>Supply side strategic perspective</th>
<th>Demand side perspective</th>
<th>Results Perspective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technical, financial social and human capacities for convening</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Comparative strengths</td>
<td>Strategic priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stocktaking of WBG resources (including trust funds and staffing) on global issues</td>
<td>Corporate documentation on organizational roles</td>
<td>WBG strategy documents</td>
<td>Synthesis of evaluative evidence on WBG partnerships and trust funds</td>
<td>Stocktaking of main global convening initiatives/events related to the SDG(s) and WBG roles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DESIGN LIMITATIONS**

52. The topic under evaluation is complex. There is no clearly identifiable portfolio, interventions are heterogenous (events, reports, partnerships, processes, financing mechanisms and so on), and include both formal and visible contributions and informal and unobservable contributions. Outcomes are intangible, and the team cannot use a universal metric for measuring success. The team will mitigate these challenges by applying contextual judgment.

53. There are also some data limitations. The paper trail is often limited, so the team will rely to some extent on perception data and expert judgment. Data availability could result in a bias toward formal convening. The team will mitigate these data limitations through the structured approach embodied in the scorecard to collecting a large cross-section of perspectives and data sources listed in table 2. When assessing effectiveness, the team will rely on proxy measures.

**QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESS**

54. This evaluation will go through IEG’s regular quality assurance process. The peer reviewers for this Approach Paper were Professor Ngaire Woods, Dean of the Blavatnik School of Government and Professor of Global Economic Governance, Oxford University; Dr. Annalisa Prizzon, Senior Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute, UK; and Jim Adams, former World Bank Vice President, chair Office of Development Effectiveness, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia. The draft evaluation report will also be peer reviewed by Bernard Sheahan, founder and head of Infrastructure Ideas. The draft Approach Paper has been discussed.
at a workshop with management representatives and, likewise, the draft final report will be discussed at a workshop.

55. Extensive, repeated engagements with external experts form part of the methodology and will provide further contestability during the process. To this effect, the team will convene a reference group of seasoned professionals with diverse skills in evaluation methods, global public policy, and international organizations. The team is working closely with IEG’s methods advisory function on defining and implementing the methodology.

**EXPECTED OUTPUTS, OUTREACH AND TRACKING**

56. The main output will be an evaluation report of no more than 50 pages. The evaluation team is foreseeing extensive external outreach to experts and policymakers in academia, think tanks, governments, other multilaterals, major foundations, and civil society. These external engagements will help collect data and be leveraged to disseminate the report’s findings. Online outreach channels are under exploration. A detailed dissemination plan will be ready at the time of reviewing the draft report.

**Resources and Timeline**

57. Under the direction and guidance of Emanuela di Gropello (Manager) and Auguste Kouame (Director), the team will be comprised of Anna Aghumian (co-TTL), Rasmus Heltberg (co-TTL), Stephen Hutton, and Eduardo Fernandez Maldonado (all IEG staff). Estelle Raimondo will provide advice on methods. Consultants Arunjana Das and Gail Davenport are also in the core team. Other IEG staff and consultants will contribute as needed. Yezena Yimer will provide administrative support.

58. Following submission of the Approach Paper to the Board’s Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE), the report preparation will take approximately nine months including visits to partner organizations and shareholders, and another two for incorporating feedback from WBG management and processing for submission to CODE (Table 3). The report will be finalized and submitted to CODE in the fourth quarter of FY19.

**Table 3. Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“PROACT” workshop with Management</td>
<td>May 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e-Submission of Draft AP to CODE</td>
<td>June 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEG management one-stop review of draft report</td>
<td>March 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“REACT” workshop with WBG Management</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft report circulated to WBG Management</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e-submission of final report to CODE</td>
<td>May 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


Attachment 1: Defining Key Concepts

An ongoing literature review informs the key definitions and concepts proposed in this paper. A key finding is that there is no universally-accepted definition of convening power, and no analytical framework has yet been proposed. Literatures in political science, international relations, and organizational management use terms such as soft power, legitimacy, collaborative capacity, leadership, and influence to describe the core elements of convening. In its corporate strategy and other documents, the WBG uses the terms convening role, convening services, and convening power interchangeably. Convening power is closely linked to playing a leadership role in addressing challenges at a global scale. Most of the references around convening are along the lines proposed by Carlson (2006): "A leader acts as a convener by creating a forum or place where key interests or stakeholders can participate in a collaborative problem-solving process."

Concepts from political science related to soft power and collaborative governance will help the evaluation to scaffold an analytical framework. Soft power -- ability to affect others through the co-operative means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes -- encapsulates some features of convening. Agenda setting that is regarded as legitimate, positive attraction and persuasion are soft power behaviors (Nye 2011, p.83). Although political scientists have generally associated soft power with that of states, there were also few attempts to apply it to international organizations such as the United Nations.

Scholars have often associated an ability to influence others to the perceived authority and legitimacy of the international organization. Authority is often considered to be the essence of governance and seen as a combination of power and a legitimate social purpose. The authority of international organizations is generally attributed to a range of factors, including their rational-legal structure, policy expertise, and impartiality. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is associated with normative beliefs about the actor or its performance and efficiency. “Collaborative capacity” is also cited as one of the factors that enables an actor to collaborate with others, and is defined as “the capacity of a group of actors to coordinate activities in a collaborative fashion with the aim of tackling public issues” (Spekkink and Boons, 2015, 613). Scholars argue that such collaborative governance is more impactful when it is nurtured and facilitated by strong autonomous “backbone organizations” (conveners and coordinators), and “strategic intermediaries.” International organizations can often play the role of backbone organization.

Global public goods (global public goods) are goods with benefits and costs that potentially extend to all countries, people, and generations. Pure public goods share two rare qualities—non-excludability and non-rivalry. This means that when provided to one party, the public good is available to all, and consumption of the public good by one party does not reduce the amount available to the others to consume. There are few pure global public goods (Kaul and Mendoza, 2003), motivating a more pragmatic definition adopted by many (see below). For example, the ozone layer is a pure global public good (all the world’s peoples benefit from its protective cover, and one person’s benefit does not reduce the protection available to others). International fisheries are a partial public good, because it is practically impossible to levy a charge on boats entering the fishery (it is non-excludable) but it is rival (one boat’s catch reduces the stock available for other boats to catch). Many global public goods are national
public goods that have become interlinked in the wake of increasing openness and connectivity across borders.

Global public goods can be pragmatically defined as “issues that are broadly conceived as important to the international community, that for the most part cannot or will not be adequately addressed by individual countries acting alone and that are defined through a broad international consensus or a legitimate process of decision-making.” (ITFPG 2006, 13). Most global public goods require international cooperation. Once international regulatory systems are established, they are available to all states and consumption by one state does not reduce its availability to others. Public goods are often undersupplied. A critical role of any national government is to supply national public goods and by extension, many argue, it is the role of international organizations to supply global public goods.