PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT

REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA

POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT
(CREDIT NO. 3176)

June 24, 2009

Sector Evaluation Division
Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)
Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = The Gambian Dalasi (GMD)

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGETIP  Public Works and Employment Agency (*Agence d'Exécution des Travaux d'Intérêt Public*)
CAS     Country Assistance Strategy
DCA     Development Credit Agreement
DoSLGL  Department of State for Local Government and Lands
ERR     Economic Rate of Return
Gamworks The Gambian Agency for the Management of Public Works
GOTG    Government of The Gambia
ICR     Implementation Completion Report
IEG     Independent Evaluation Group
IEGWBG  Independent Evaluation Group (World Bank)
LGA     Local Government Authority
MIS     Management Information System
MTR     Mid-Term Review
PACAB   Poverty Alleviation and Capacity Building Project (Cr.3 176)
O&M     Operations and Maintenance
PAD     Project Appraisal Document
PPAR    Project Performance Assessment Report
PPP     Purchasing Power Parity
PRSP    Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
TDA     Tourism Development Area
UNDP    United Nations Development Program

Fiscal Year

Government: January 1 – December 31

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<th>Position</th>
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About this Report

The Independent Evaluation Group assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, IEGWB annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations through field work. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming studies or country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons.

To prepare a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR), IEGWB staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, visit the borrowing country to discuss the operation with the government, and other in-country stakeholders, and interview Bank staff and other donor agency staff both at headquarters and in local offices as appropriate.

Each PPAR is subject to internal IEGWB peer review, Panel review, and management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is commented on by the responsible Bank department. IEGWB incorporates the comments as relevant. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are attached to the document that is sent to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors. After an assessment report has been sent to the Board, it is disclosed to the public.

About the IEGWB Rating System

IEGWB's use of multiple evaluation methods offers both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. IEGWB evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (additional information is available on the IEGWB website: http://worldbank.org/ieg).

**Outcome**: The extent to which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. The rating has three dimensions: relevance, efficacy, and efficiency. Relevance includes relevance of objectives and relevance of design. Relevance of objectives is the extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). Relevance of design is the extent to which the project's design is consistent with the stated objectives. Efficacy is the extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. Efficiency is the extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. The efficiency dimension generally is not applied to adjustment operations. Possible ratings for Outcome: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Risk to Development Outcome**: The risk, at the time of evaluation, that development outcomes (or expected outcomes) will not be maintained (or realized). Possible ratings for Risk to Development Outcome: High Significant, Moderate, Negligible to Low, Not Evaluable.

**Bank Performance**: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry of the operation and supported effective implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of supported activities after loan/credit closing, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: quality at entry and quality of supervision. Possible ratings for Bank Performance: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

**Borrower Performance**: The extent to which the borrower (including the government and implementing agency or agencies) ensured quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, toward the achievement of development outcomes. The rating has two dimensions: government performance and implementing agency(ies) performance. Possible ratings for Borrower Performance: Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.
Contents

PRINCIPAL RATINGS ........................................................................................................ V

KEY STAFF RESPONSIBLE .......................................................................................... V

PREFACE ...................................................................................................................... VII

SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ IX

1. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT ........................................................................ 1

2. OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN ............................................................................... 2

3. IMPLEMENTATION AND COSTS ........................................................................... 4

4. MONITORING AND EVALUATION ....................................................................... 5

5. OUTCOMES BY OBJECTIVE .................................................................................. 6

A. REDUCE BACKLOG OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND IMPROVE MAINTENANCE 6
B. ALLEVIATE POVERTY THROUGH CREATION OF TEMPORARY JOBS .............. 7
C. STRENGTHEN CAPACITY OF LGAS, LOCAL CONTRACTORS, CONSULTANTS AND GAMWORKS 7
EFFECTIVITY ................................................................................................................. 9

6. RATINGS ............................................................................................................... 9

OUTCOME .................................................................................................................. 9
RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ........................................................................ 10
BANK PERFORMANCE ............................................................................................... 10
BORROWER PERFORMANCE .................................................................................... 11

7. FINDINGS AND LESSONS .................................................................................. 11

ANNEX A. BASIC DATA SHEET ............................................................................. 13

ANNEX B. BORROWER'S COMMENTS .................................................................... 15

ANNEX C: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ............................................................... 17

ANNEX D: ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA FOR SUB-PROJECTS ........................................ 19

This report was prepared by Nilakshi De Silva, Consultant, who visited The Gambia in November 2007 to assess the project. Romayne Pereira provided administrative support.
ANNEX E: PROJECT OUTPUTS ................................................................. 21

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................. 25
### Principal Ratings

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<tr>
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* The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) is a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department. The ICR Review is an intermediate IEGWB product that seeks to independently verify the findings of the ICR.

### Key Staff Responsible

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Preface

This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the Poverty Alleviation and Capacity Building Project (Cr.3176) in The Gambia, for which the World Bank approved a Credit of US$15.0 million equivalent on March 16, 1999. A Supplemental Credit of US$4.0 million equivalent was approved on June 21, 2005. The Credit was closed on December 31, 2006, three years later than planned, when US$73,656 equivalent was cancelled.

The report is based on a review of project documents, including the Implementation Completion Report, Appraisal Report, legal documents and project files, and on discussions held with Bank staff involved in the project. An IEG mission visited The Gambia in November 2007 to review project results and met with over 50 interlocutors including officials of the central and local governments, members of the national assembly, municipal councilors, consultants, contractors, community leaders and other beneficiaries. The IEG mission traveled to Banjul, Kanifing, Brikama, Basse, Janjanbureh, Kerewan and Mansakonko councils and visited 33 out of the 79 sub-projects completed under the project including roads, markets, car parks, water supply projects, schools and the solid waste dumpsite in Bakoteh. IEG gratefully acknowledges the courtesies and attention given by all these interlocutors, as well as the excellent planning and logistical support received from The Gambian Agency for the Management of Public Works (Gamworks), the Department of State for Local Government and Lands (DoSLGL), and the Bank’s country office in Banjul.

IEG selected this project for a PPAR field assessment, as recommended at the ICR Review stage, to verify outcomes and provide an input into IEG’s ongoing special study into municipal management.

Following standard IEG procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to government officials and agencies for their review and comments. Their comments are presented in Annex B.
Summary

The Gambia is one of the smallest countries in Africa, and also one of its poorest with more than 60 percent of its 1.6 million inhabitants living in poverty. Rural to urban migration is high. More than 53 percent of this population now lives in urban areas. Rapid urbanization has increased pressure for more basic infrastructure.

According to the development credit agreement (DCA), The Gambia Poverty Alleviation and Capacity Building Project (Cr.3176) had three objectives, namely: (A) to reduce the backlog of public infrastructure and assets and improve their maintenance; (B) to alleviate poverty through the creation of temporary jobs, and (C) to strengthen the technical and managerial capacity of local government authorities (LGAs), local private construction firms, local consulting firms and The Gambian Agency for the Management of Public Works (Gamworks—the project implementing agency). Clarity of purpose suffered further when a mid-2005 amendment led to ostensibly “new” objectives, which were essentially re-drafts of the original ones. The “new” ones underscored the original objectives’ intent, while (A) gave more emphasis to the demand-driven approach to infrastructure provision, (B) remained unchanged, and (C) focused more narrowly upon municipalities and their finances. Despite this the objectives of the project remain substantially relevant to both country and Bank priorities in The Gambia.

To achieve the objectives, the project delivered physical investments in roads, markets, car parks, water supply, solid waste management, electricity, and education in eight local council areas throughout the country. A capacity building component provided training and technical assistance to local municipalities and to Gamworks. This project design was modestly relevant. It included investment, capacity building and studies components that could all indeed contribute to meeting the objectives. But the design did not include an effective means to monitor and evaluate project achievements.

Indeed, project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is rated negligible. The initial M&E design was very weak, notably with no explicit baseline data or targets for poverty alleviation—a striking omission for a project with “poverty alleviation” in its name. Beneficiary assessments and external consultant assignments provided some information, but not always data related to the project achievements.

Despite nearly on-time effectiveness, disbursement was only at 50 percent of target by the mid-term review (MTR) in May 2001. After that, implementation stalled again following a management crisis at Gamworks, triggered by the unlawful removal and replacement of its Director General. With that problem resolved, the pace of implementation accelerated rapidly and the original credit was fully disbursed by 2005. This opened the way for an expansion of the project and for the Supplementary Credit.

By providing infrastructure through stronger municipalities, the project did help improve the living conditions of 378,000 urban residents, above the targeted 360,000, according to Gamwork’s figures. The efficacy of achieving objective (A) of reducing the infrastructure backlog and improving maintenance was modest. The project helped finance additional
infrastructure, but provided no evidence on the clearance of existing infrastructure deficits that the operation intended to reduce.

Alleviating poverty through temporary job creation, objective (B) was substantially achieved through the creation of 29,275 person months of employment for unskilled labor (presumed to be poor) exceeding the 27,000 revised target (itself considerably higher than the original 20,000 appraisal target). But the extent to which this resulted in medium and long-term poverty reduction is unknown.

Objective (C), strengthening the financial, technical and managerial capacity of LGAs (including the 2005 municipal resource mobilization variant), local contractors and consultants and Gamworks was substantially achieved. Municipal revenues rose by 9 percent per annum over 2000-2006 in real terms, well above the intended targets of 5-6 percent. At their own request, 367 staff of local consultants and contractors were trained through the project, well above the 240 expected. Altogether 70 percent of the competitively bid works contracts under this project were awarded to local firms. Gamworks itself became a stronger, more open agency thanks to intense project training and project support. It was able to survive and remain effective after an unforeseeable crisis in its leadership.

Overall, the outcome of the project is rated moderately satisfactory, as there were moderate shortcomings in the achievement of the objectives of this operation. On balance, efficacy is rated substantial especially through temporary job creation to alleviate poverty and strengthening the managerial capacity of local governments. Efficiency is rated modest; high economic rates of return were reported for roads subprojects and are likely for some other sub-projects for which IEG saw evidence of a buoyant demand. But project implementation itself was less efficient as delays and extensions added considerably to project administration costs.

The Risk to Development Outcome is rated significant because of lack of funding mechanisms to continue to reduce the infrastructure backlog into the future on the one hand, and stronger LGA finances on the other, while continuing poverty alleviation from temporary employment creation has ended as far as this operation is concerned.

Bank Performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory, through project design work that failed to incorporate M&E, and inconsistent project objectives in project and legal documents raising doubts about the precise purpose of this operation, shortcomings that were partly overcome during supervision. Borrower Performance was Moderately Satisfactory, mainly because implementing agencies were able to effectively manage a diverse portfolio of investments, meet implementation targets, and Government maintained its support, but only after a slow start and a subsequent leadership crisis in Gamworks , (itself an indicator of weak Borrower performance).

The assessment points to the following lessons:

- Where local government lacks the experience in handling works contracts, a specialized agency such as Gamworks can provide the contract management services needed for the local delivery of infrastructure and urban services. Creating a single core group of specialists within such an agency makes particular sense in a small country with high attrition rates among local government staff.
• When project objectives focus on directly assisting the poor, the project design should facilitate identifying the poor clients and their priority needs as well as sound M&E to monitor the progress of poverty alleviation. The Bank is in a good position to deploy technical expertise for this purpose in the Gambia by drawing from its extensive global experience in this area.

• When municipal technical capacity and resources to maintain asphalt roads is limited, sub-project investments should consider engineering designs such as interlocking paving blocks, which require minimal maintenance.

• Also when LGA technical capacity is weak, municipalities need more technical assistance and training for staff at all levels. Service staff can hone basic technical skills such as those needed for maintenance and record keeping, for instance. At the leadership level, training of LGA managers and councilors can help make them more aware of the need for planning and budgeting of municipal services.

Vinod Thomas
Director-General
Evaluation
1. Background and Context

1.1 One of the smallest countries in Africa, The Gambia has a population of 1.6 million. In West Africa, it occupies a 25-50 km strip of land along both banks of 350 km of The Gambia River. The economy is predominantly agricultural and until the late 1990s, was susceptible to external shocks such as drought and commodity price shifts, particularly of groundnuts the main product. Agriculture still accounts for about 33 percent of GDP and an estimated 75 percent of employment. Since 2003 the country has achieved a real GDP growth averaging 6.4 percent per year, helped by incipient tourism, construction, and telecommunications sectors. GDP per capita, measured in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) at US$1,110 in 2006, significantly below the Sub-Saharan Africa average of US$1,681.

1.2 Despite this strong economic growth in recent years, The Gambia remains among the poorest countries in the World, and ranks 155 out of 177 countries in the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI). According to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 2006, more than 60 percent of the population is poor. Poverty is prevalent in both urban and rural areas—ffecting 57 percent and 63 percent of the respective populations. It varies considerably across the country’s diverse regions from a rate of 10 percent of the population in the capital city Banjul, to as much as 92 percent in the country’s least urbanized Kuntaur area in the central river division (details Annex C).

1.3 Many years of increasing rural to urban migration have led to 53.9 percent of The Gambia’s population living in urban areas today, compared to about 37 percent a decade ago. Immigration from neighboring countries has also contributed to the high urbanization rate. Nearly all of this urban population is concentrated in the Local Government Areas (LGA) of the capital Banjul, and in neighboring Kanifing and Brikama.

1.4 Administratively, The Gambia is divided into eight LGAs which comprise of a city council (Banjul), a municipal council (Kanifing) and 6 area councils. After many years of what can be termed “decentralization by default”, the quality of government services declined dramatically and those of non-governmental organizations took their place. Decentralization was eventually formalized by the Local Government Act of 2002 and the Local Government Finance and Audit Act of 2004. These Acts devolved the responsibility for providing many public services from the Government of The Gambia (GOTG) to the LGAs. However, there has been little tangible progress in implementing these laws as GOTG’s Departments of State continue to decide sector policy, including allocation of resources and responsibilities (IMF, 2006:6). In many sectors, including health, education, water resources and road infrastructure, the formal powers of LGA councils are not acknowledged in practice by some central government departments. As a consequence, LGAs still exert little influence in the definition of policy in these areas (Government of The Gambia, 2006).

1.5 The World Bank has been active in The Gambia since 1970, and IDA has financed 31 projects there through credits totaling some US$296 million equivalent to date. The Gambia Poverty Alleviation and Capacity Building Project (PACAB Cr. 3176) assessed
in this report is a follow-on project to The Gambia Public Works and Capacity Building Project (Cr.2554-GM, FY94 – FY98), rated Satisfactory by IEG. The Bank is one among more than 15 active donors in The Gambia. In an effort to help coordinate donor activity in the country, the Bank finalized a Joint Assistance Strategy for The Gambia in partnership with the African Development Bank in February, 2008.

2. Objectives and Design

2.1 According to the project’s Development Credit Agreement (DCA), which provides the clearer formulation, this operation, known by its acronym “PACAB”, had three objectives: (A) to reduce the backlog of public infrastructure assets, and improve their maintenance; (B) to alleviate poverty through creation of temporary jobs; and (C) to strengthen the financial, technical and managerial capacity of LGAs, local private construction firms, local consulting firms and The Gambian Agency for the Management of Public Works—Gamworks, the project executing agency (Box 1.) Less clearly, the PAD describes how the project also aimed to achieve the “sustainable provision” of infrastructure and to develop an “enabling environment” for municipal investment financing and employment creation. IEG’s assessment, as the ICR’s, is based upon the better focused DCA formulation of the objectives and upon the subsequent amendment (see below).

2.2 As a Supplementary Credit of US$4.0 million was approved in mid-2005, so too were the projects revised. But the “revision” consisted of minor re-drafting of the original objectives (A) and (C). In the words of the Agreement Amending the Development Credit Agreement, the two “new” objectives were: “provision of public infrastructure and services based on demand and on fulfillment of clearly defined criteria” and “implementation of a capacity building program aimed at improving the LGA’s resource mobilization and management”. The processing of the amendment was heavy, but the changes were very light.

2.3 For all the difficulties in formulation and revision, the project objectives are substantially relevant to the infrastructure provision and employment generation priorities of the Government of The Gambia (GOTG) and Bank strategy in the country. Reducing the backlog of public infrastructure, the focus of Objectives A, supports one of the five pillars of GOTG’s current PRSP, known as the Strategy for Poverty Alleviation—to provide for more of the unmet basic needs of the poor. Similarly, the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of 2003 and the Joint Assistance Strategy finalized in 2008, focus on enhancing equity and the quality of public services. The employment creation focus of Objective B supports the PRSP pillar enhancing the productive capacity of the poor. Strengthening LGAs and the local construction industry supports the CAS focus on promoting private sector growth and also building LGA capacity, the latter part of the CAS priority of strengthening public expenditure management.
Box 1. THE GAMBIA: POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT
– DESIGN SUMMARY

**Objectives:**

A. to reduce the backlog of public infrastructure and assets, and improve their maintenance [re-drafted to focus upon demand-driven aspect of the infrastructure and service provision]

B. to alleviate poverty through creation of temporary jobs. [not re-drafted]

C. to strengthen the financial, technical and managerial capacity of LGAs, local private construction firms, local consulting firms and Gamworks [re-drafted to focus capacity building upon municipal resource mobilization and management]

**Components:**


(i) construction or rehabilitation of infrastructure or public facilities in urban areas, which are identified by the local authorities, NGOs and CBOs; and (ii) area-wide solid waste collection and disposal system for Banjul City Council, Kanifing Municipal Council (KMC), and Brikama Area Council (BAC).

Part B: Capacity building (appraisal cost US$1.35 million [original: US$1.1 million + supplemental: US$0.25 million]; actual cost US$1.18 million), including:

(i) training, technical assistance to central government and local authorities; (ii) specialized training of local consultants and contractors through Gamworks; (iii) technical assistance to Gamworks for computerized Management Information Systems (MIS), supervision support and management assistance.

Part C: Studies (appraisal cost US$1.2 million; actual cost US$1.32 million) including:

(i) physical, management and financial audits of LGAs; (ii) solid waste management system for Greater Banjul; (iii) detailed engineering of storm water drainage and sanitation system improvements Banjul; (iv) a feasibility study for Municipal Development Fund.

Part D: Project Administration and Monitoring (appraisal cost US$1.57 million, actual cost US$2.60 million) to cover part of Gamworks’ operating costs incurred through the project.

Part E: PPF Refinancing (appraisal cost US$1 million; actual cost US$0.78 million) to reimburse the Government for project preparation costs.

Sources:

* Development Credit Agreement of April 1, 1999. Re-drafting from Agreement Amending the Development Credit Agreement of July 5, 2005 that authorized the disbursement of the Supplementary Credit.

* Project components remained the same throughout. Only their scope was increased by the 2005 Amendment.

2.4 The project design is rated modestly relevant. On the positive side, the design included investment and institutional components of the type needed to achieve the project objectives, on the other hand, the relevance of the design was weakened by a poor M&E. Individual subprojects under the investments component (which accounted for more than 70 percent of appraisal estimates) had not been identified up-front at the design stage. Instead, LGAs were to choose from a menu of eligible sub-projects (e.g. water, roads and markets focused upon the poor with the largest possible number of end-user beneficiaries). While the project components were not changed by the 2005 Amendment, the scope of each one was increased.
2.5 The design of the Implementation Arrangements recognized the limited capacity in The Gambia for LGAs to execute the necessary works by themselves. The arrangements gave responsibility for implementation to central level institutions such as Gamworks and the Department of State for Local Government and Lands (DoSLGL), whose Permanent Secretary acts as deputy chairman of Gamworks' high level Steering Committee. The chairman is the Permanent Secretary of the Department of State for Finance and Economic Affairs. Project implementation responsibility was Gamworks', through a “delegated management” framework, typical of AGETIP arrangements found in neighboring countries. Created in 1993, Gamworks is an independent, non governmental and non-profit agency that has important experience of other IDA-funded projects. By locating project implementation within such an existing agency with proven capacity, PACAB also avoided a recurring problem in The Gambia: how to reintegrate special project implementing units (PIUs) back into the formal government system upon implementation completion.

3. Implementation and Costs

3.1 Despite almost on-time effectiveness, the project got off to a slow start disbanding only US$2 million by June 2000 when US$5.4 million had been expected by then. However, the targets were overly ambitious given the context. In particular, the priority investment programs (PIPs) which were the basis for identifying subprojects in LGAs, could only be prepared well into project implementation itself. The project was restructured at mid-term review in November 2001, to speed implementation by reducing the number of subprojects from 110 to 75. Almost immediately after, however, project implementation stalled for almost two-years due to a leadership crisis at Gamworks, triggered by the allegedly unlawful removal of its Director General. By April 2004, with the establishment of a new management team at Gamworks acceptable to both GOTG and the Bank, project implementation resumed and accelerated rapidly. Through a 2005 Amendment the Bank approved a Supplemental Credit of US$4 million. This required further extending the project closing date to 2006, thereby accumulating a delay of three years.

3.2 PACAB's implementation arrangements worked well in The Gambian context. In particular, the Project Coordinating Unit located in DoSLGL helped LGAs better understand and accept Gamworks' activities. Most subprojects were implemented in the three urban LGAs of Banjul, Kanifing and Brikama, but some others were in far-flung LGAs such as Basse and Mansakonko. Gamworks hired the contractors and supervision consultants to implement the project through competitive tenders in accordance with Bank procurement guidelines. Overall, more than 70 percent of subprojects were awarded to local contractors, thereby helping to build local capacity. Where local contractor knowledge and experience was unavailable, such as for asphalting roads, for instance, contract packages were bundled together in order to attract international firms, some of which were awarded the contracts. There is no evidence to suggest that local contractors' costs were significantly different from foreign firms. What local firms lacked in economies of scale, they made up through the efficient use of local labor-intensive methods that they were familiar with.

3.3 Safeguards: IEG found no evidence of a lack of compliance with Bank safeguards during project implementation. Most sub-projects—particularly road and street
paving, drainage, water supply and solid waste management—made positive contributions to the environment, for instance. Solid waste disposal, a sensitive environmental issue in most cities, was not contentious in this project as it focused upon improving the operations of a site already in use. Indeed these sub-projects helped reduce environmental hazards from uncontrolled dumping for its surrounding residential urban neighborhood. Through rehabilitating existing infrastructure and services safeguard issues related to involuntary resettlement and deforestation did not arise.

4. Monitoring and Evaluation

4.1 The initial M&E design was very weak. It had no explicit baseline data or targets for poverty alleviation—a striking omission for a project with “poverty alleviation” in its name. Project M&E offered only two unclear indicators to measure progress in achieving three different project objectives. Neither one was appropriate. For example, performance in relation to creating an enabling environment for employment creation and income generation was to be assessed by looking at “the production of guidance to local authorities that they approach investment design and realization with the objective of mobilizing local firms and contractors…”. Achieving the objective of improving the living conditions of the urban population and the poor in particular, was to be assessed by the M&E simply counting the number of priority investment plans adopted by the LGAs (PAD p.25). At the mid-term review, the M&E design was revised and new, more appropriate indicators, such as the increase in resource mobilization by LGAs, were identified. However, the lack of baseline data regarding access to public infrastructure and facilities was not rectified, leaving the before- or after-project situations undocumented.

4.2 The effective implementation and utilization of M&E was prevented by inadequate information on reductions of service deficits and the share of the poor among the beneficiaries. Beneficiary assessments and external consultant assignments provided some additional data, but not always related to project achievements.

4.3 In utilizing the M&E, external consultants carried out a number of beneficiary and impact assessments that provided considerable data, going some way toward filling some gaps in the original M&E framework. Data was collected through key person interviews with LGA staff and focus group discussions with beneficiaries. Some data collected by project staff, such as on employment, had to be extensively cleaned by external consultants. A final impact study found that responsiveness of subproject selection to community needs—an issue identified through these assessments—had improved during the second half of the project (ADCO, 2006:51). Other results are not so persuasive. For instance, the Borrower ICR informs that “the project was able to provide 399,000 persons with access to at least one sub-project which is a clear indication of poverty alleviation” (Borrower’s ICR, p.8).
5. Outcomes by Objective

A. REDUCE BACKLOG OF PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND IMPROVE MAINTENANCE

5.1 Modestly achieved: While the project did indeed provide additional public infrastructure needed in the participating cities, it provided no evidence that the backlog had been reduced, as intended. The project financed 79 sub-projects in various sectors including roads, water supply, electricity, market and school infrastructure. (details Annex E). This was short of the appraisal target of 110. By providing infrastructure through larger municipalities, the project did help improve the living conditions of 378,000 urban residents, above the 360,000 targeted, according to Gamwork’s figures. About 17 km of mainly neighborhood roads in Banjul, Kanifing and Brikama were rehabilitated under PACAB, for instance. Local residents informed the IEG mission that these improvements have increased accessibility and reduced dust in these neighborhoods. In Banjul, where the side drains were also rehabilitated, residents told IEG about the improvement of the quality of life in their neighborhoods. Before the project, the windows of houses facing the road had to remain closed to keep out the stench of untreated sewage. The water supply distribution network was extended by 10km of pipes in five neighborhoods in Kanifing and Brikama, but it is not clear that these investments led to a much better service. More than 6,000 people who live in settlements surrounding the eight hectare Bakoteh Dumpsite have directly benefited from improvements to it, such as the introduction of less intrusive waste management techniques and fencing. The degree to which existing deficits of other services have been reduced is not clear, however, for lack of precise data. What remains clear is that backlogs still exist. Major urban centers such as Kanifing still do not have a network of storm water drains. Only about 40 percent of the urban population in Banjul and Kanifing is served by National Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC)’s water distribution network while only 30 percent of this population is connected to the power network (The Gambia Divestiture Agency, 2007). Local officials of the Kanifing

Box 2: Impact of Market Upgrading

“Before, the situation in the market was very bad. The canteens were congested. When you put things on your head, you couldn’t pass through. Electricity lines were hanging from all over, and if you put your hand up, you could touch them. Earlier you couldn’t get a vehicle into the market. Good work was done and now a vehicle can go into the market with heavy things. You can get merchandise into the market to sell them. But there is more to be done, there is more space that was not upgraded than was upgraded. The shed for vegetable sellers is overcrowded and most of the women are still selling on the road. The police comes and moves them off the road. These women have no place for storage”

-Female
Farafenni Market Committee

Source: IEG field visits. November 2007

1 That would have required knowledge about the rate of growth of demand for infrastructure and the condition of the existing stock, any failure of which would have increased the backlog.
2 IEG mission could not determine the number of new connections as a result of the extension of water supply system as neither the relevant LGA nor Gamworks is tracking the number of new connections given by NAWEC in these areas. Nor was data readily available about the service itself—e.g. water quality and reliability (hours service per day).
Municipality told the IEG mission that only about one third of the solid waste produced locally is collected and disposed of at the site in Bakoteh.

5.2 The project had some success in improving the maintenance of basic infrastructure. In LGAs, separate operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts were created to provide additional funds for maintaining PACAB-provided infrastructure. However, while all LGAs have O&M budget lines in place, the LGAs face constraints of equipment and technical experience in undertaking the necessary maintenance work. They only have comprehensive maintenance plans for revenue generating infrastructure, such as markets and car parks. As a result, these facilities are generally well maintained. Other project infrastructure, mainly paved roads, is already showing signs of severe wear and tear. Kayupa Street (1.2 km, approximate cost US$0.9 million) in Kanifing, which was completed less than one year ago, is already almost impassable due to large potholes in the middle of the roadway. On Perseverance Street (0.8km) also in Banjul, large potholes in the middle of the street are covered with old tires to prevent people from falling into them. The use of interlocking concrete paving blocks in Banjul city addressed the limited maintenance capacity in LGAs because this method required limited and low cost maintenance. Overall, however, most LGAs still do not have comprehensive maintenance plans in place. In Banjul City Council for example forward-looking preventative road maintenance is not carried out. It is mainly done after officials see that a road surface is already broken.

B. ALLEVIATE POVERTY THROUGH CREATION OF TEMPORARY JOBS

5.3 Substantially achieved through temporarily creating 29,725 person months of unskilled work (presumed to be for the poor) exceeding the revised target of 27,000 (itself raised from the appraisal target of 20,000 when additional funding was made available by the Supplemental Credit). On average, employment was provided for 5-6 months. Local contractors told the IEG mission that they do try to reemploy the same workers on later jobs. There is however no concrete evidence to show that provision of such employment has led to medium or long-term changes in poverty, but doing so was beyond the stated objective of this operation. The 2005 beneficiary assessment interviews (conducted with community members employed for PACAB subprojects) identified a number of other benefits of the program. These included the opportunity for beneficiaries to earn additional income, learn new skills and access to new job opportunities, allowing them to purchase food, pay children's school fees and generally improve their living conditions (SAHEL. 2005:34).

C. STRENGTHEN CAPACITY OF LGAS, LOCAL CONTRACTORS, CONSULTANTS AND GAMWORKS

5.4 Substantially achieved overall, with details as follows:

5.5 LGAs: Thanks in part to the project, local finances are now stronger and better managed. Municipal revenues rose in real terms by 9 percent per annum over the 2000-2006 period, well above the project targets of 5-6 percent. Other LGA revenues, such as annual market fees also rose. In Kerewan, for instance, they increased from US$4,000 in 2000 to US$200,000 in 2006. As mentioned earlier, LGAs assisted by PACAB established and funded special O&M accounts, where there had been none before the project. This was made possible through project provision of training and technical assistance in financial
management especially. About 100 days of training were provided to about 240 staff in the 8 LGAs in computer literacy, financial management and O&M of LGA assets (details Annex F). Some of these skills, notably computer literacy, have been used to improve LGA accounting generally. However, in a number of cases insufficient staff were available to take the training to fill the number of places offered by the courses. In rural LGAs these skills are still in short supply due to high attrition rates. The project also provided desks and chairs for LGA treasury departments, and motor cycles for revenue collectors, which are largely still in use. Local officials noted that having basic facilities improved their working environment and productivity. PACAB also provided 1-2 computers per LGA and basic computer training, but the effective use of computers remains limited to the more advanced LGAs such as Kanifing which has its own computer lab. LGAs also received some training from project external consultants for Revenue Increasing Action Plans, physical, management and financial audits as well as aerial mapping of their areas. Most of it went to central government staff in DoSLGL, however. The IEG mission could see the greater impact upon GOTG agencies and the more limited LGA results.

5.6 Contractors and Consultants: The number of private contracting and consulting companies able to provide quality works in The Gambia has increased. The PACAB experience provided them with opportunities to bid for (and sometimes win) contracts in a transparent manner. Under the project, 29 days of training were provided to 367 staff such as clerks of works and foremen from construction firms. The actual enrolment was well above the 240 expected. The firms themselves reported the sessions to be useful and relevant. In addition, project workshops were organized through the Gambian Association of Construction Contractors (GACCON). There are now about 15 consultancy firms active in infrastructure planning and design in The Gambia. Most of these firms get their business from Gamworks, still their biggest client. The firms appreciated the openness of the procurement process and the timely decisions (and eventual payments!) as positive outcomes of PACAB that have helped their own development. However some private firms, particularly in rural areas such as Farafenni, are finding it difficult to stay in business. Under PACAB itself 70 percent of the competitively bid works contracts under the project were awarded to local firms, a much higher share than under earlier externally funded projects in the Gambia.

5.7 Gamworks: As a result of the project, this formerly introspective agency developed a more overt approach to its partners and its work, openly marketing its products and services to municipalities and publishing a regular newsletter about its activities. PACAB provided Gamworks with substantial training, technical assistance and financial support. With a complement of just 20 staff, Gamworks received 427 days of training, some overseas, in a number of skill areas such as procurement, project management, financial management, office management, development of a management information system (MIS) and use of related software, communications. By implementing two IDA projects back-to-back, Gamworks has developed to the level that it now generates its own concept notes to source new funding for public infrastructure projects in The Gambia. Additionally, the ongoing support of the Bank to Gamworks during its leadership crisis in 2004 helped to strengthen the agency as an independent institution.
EFFICIENCY

5.8 The project was fully implemented within the overall cost envelope established at appraisal, an efficient result, but one that was undermined the three-year delay in completion. This delay helps explain the 66 percent overrun of Gamworks’ costs in project administration (Box 1). On the project’s investment side, all sub-projects had to achieve a minimum estimated economic rate of return (ERR) of 12 percent. At completion, high ex-post ERRs in the 34-42 percent range were estimated for project road investments accounting for one quarter of total project costs. But no ERR estimates were reported for other sub-projects in markets, water supply, electricity and solid waste accounting for 60 percent of total costs and that are equally amenable to cost benefit analysis. Since the worksheets and other data were not available locally, IEG was unable to either verify the analysis behind the reported ERRs, or make first-time ERR estimates where previously there had been none. During visits to the sites of these sub-projects, the IEG mission could observe their intensive use, inferring the existence of a strong demand needed to drive a good rate of return.

5.9 Temporary employment generation was more efficiently provided than expected. Overall, 49 percent more jobs were created than expected at appraisal through the execution of project works, while actual funding for them increased only 25 percent. There is also evidence that project costs were kept under control. An impact assessment conducted for Gamworks in 2006 found that the unit costs of PACAB subprojects, while maintaining good quality finishing, completion and detailing, were lower than those of similar non-PACAB projects (ADCO Development Consultancy, 2006:12). This result supports Gamworks’ other finding reported earlier in this PPAR that local contractors were as efficient as foreign firms as they were able to compete on price with them for works contracts.

6. Ratings

OUTCOME

6.1 Project outcome is rated moderately satisfactory, because there were moderate shortcomings in the achievement of the objectives of this operation. Thus, project infrastructure achieved service improvements and better maintenance, but how this reduced the “backlog” to be cleared is not evident. As intended, the project provided temporary jobs for poverty alleviation—indeed at a 49 percent higher level than targeted. The most significant project improvement, with substantial efficacy, came from strengthening the management capacity of LGAs. As noted earlier, efficacy in achieving the infrastructure and emergency employment objectives was modest. Overall, project efficacy in achieving its objectives is rated substantial. On balance, efficiency is rated modest, being stronger in the provision of road investments and temporary employment, and weaker in administration and implementation of the project itself.
Table 3. The Gambia: Poverty Alleviation and Capacity Building Project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Efficacy</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. to reduce the backlog of public infrastructure and assets, and improve their maintenance. [re-drafted to focus upon demand-driven aspect of the infrastructure and service provision]</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. to alleviate poverty through creation of temporary jobs. [not re-drafted]</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. to strengthen the financial, technical and managerial capacity of LGAs, local private construction firms, local consulting firms and Gamworks. [re-drafted to focus capacity building upon municipal resource mobilization and management].</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Outcome: Moderately Satisfactory</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

6.2 This risk is rated as Significant. For continuing in the future to reduce the infrastructure and service backlog, the project did not provide any long-term financing mechanism to help overcome GOTG’s and LGA’s inherent budget weaknesses for investment in these areas. On the other hand LGAs did establish and fund O&M accounts that can help them pay for ongoing maintenance of their existing infrastructure endowments. Even with money available though, several LGAs in The Gambia still needs to improve their technical services for maintenance and acquire more of the necessary equipment. On the employment side, the risks to continuing poverty alleviation are obviously high, as further inroads depend upon greater budgetary allocations for more labor-intensive works than the fiscal constraints of GOTG might permit. The financial risk is lower on the LGA side of this project, particularly building on the revenue gains already made. But outside the larger urban LGAs such as Kanifing and Brikama, technical and managerial aspects of LGA capacity remain limited.

BANK PERFORMANCE

6.3 Bank Performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Project design, while incorporating relevant objectives and components needed to achieve them, would have been stronger (and clearer) with consistent objective statements in the DCA and PAD. Inevitably, the differences raised doubts about the purpose and direction of this operation. Nor was M&E adequately incorporated into the design, leaving it unable to measure progress in reducing The Gambia’s infrastructure deficit and in poverty alleviation, two key project objectives. The project implementation arrangements, on the other hand, were appropriate taking into account the country context and its management capacity constraints. Bank supervision was effective in identifying and partly correcting some design issues at mid-term review and also in retaining the project focus on development effectiveness during and after the Gamworks’ leadership crisis. The Bank’s firm stand during the crisis has helped to strengthen Gamworks’ independence and effectiveness in the long term.
BORROWER PERFORMANCE

6.4 The performance of the Borrower and the implementing agencies is rated *Moderately Satisfactory*. Gamworks as the implementation agency was able to manage a diverse portfolio of works by contractors with varying levels of capacity, but only after a slow start and further interruptions caused by its management crisis. On the other hand, GOTG support varied over the life of the project, with strong support to complete the project once the management crisis at Gamworks was resolved. Of course, allowing this crisis to erupt and fester for so long is itself a shortcoming of Borrower performance.

7. Findings and Lessons

- Where local government lacks the experience in handling works contracts, a specialized agency such as Gamworks can provide the contract management services needed for the local delivery of infrastructure and urban services. Creating a single core group of specialists within such an agency makes particular sense in a small country with high attrition rates among local government staff.

- When project objectives focus on directly assisting the poor, the project design should facilitate identifying the poor clients and their priority needs as well as sound M&E to monitor the progress of poverty alleviation. The Bank is in a good position to deploy technical expertise for this purpose in the Gambia by drawing from its extensive global experience in this area.

- When municipal technical capacity and resources to maintain asphalt roads is limited, sub-project investments should consider engineering designs such as interlocking paving blocks, which require minimal maintenance.

- Also when LGA technical capacity is weak, municipalities need more technical assistance and training for staff at all levels. Service staff can hone basic technical skills such as those needed for maintenance and record keeping, for instance. At the leadership level, training of LGA managers and councilors can help make them more aware of the need for planning and budgeting of municipal services.
Annex A. Basic Data Sheet

POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT (Cr 3176-GAM)

Key Project Data (amounts in US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Appraisal estimate</th>
<th>Actual or current estimate</th>
<th>Actual as % of Appraisal estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total project costs</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan amount</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>115%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancellation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplemental loan amount</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-financing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Project Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steps in project cycle</th>
<th>Date planned</th>
<th>Date actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>03/16/1999</td>
<td>03/16/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing</td>
<td>04/01/1999</td>
<td>04/01/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>06/29/1999</td>
<td>06/29/1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan closing</td>
<td>12/31/2003</td>
<td>12/31/2003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Staff Time and Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage of project cycle</th>
<th>Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of staff weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lending</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY98</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY99</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY00</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision ICR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY99</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY00</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY01</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY02</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY03</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY04</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY05</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY06</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY07</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Follow-on Operation
- none
Annex B. Borrower’s Comments

Monika Huppi, Manager
Sector Evaluation Division
Independent Evaluation Group
The World Bank Group
Washington, DC
U.S.A.

Dear Madam,

Gambia – Poverty Alleviation And Capacity Building Project (Cr. 3176-GAM)
Borrowers’ Comments On The Draft Project Performance Assessment Report

I am directed by the Honourable Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, Mousa Gibril Bala Gaye to forward the comments on the above subject report as Borrower’s comment.

Please accept, Madam, renewed assurances of our highest consideration.

Yours faithfully,

Serign Cham
PERMANENT SECRETARY II

cc: Minister of Local Government and Lands
Liaison Officer for the Gambia, World Bank

Encl.
The GAMBIA – Poverty Alleviation and Capacity Building Project
(Cr. 3176-GAM)
Borrowers’ Comments on the draft Project Performance Assessment Report

PREAMBLE: The draft Assessment report was prepared by the group and the performance of the borrower rated “Moderately Satisfactory”. In earlier assessments by both the Borrower and the Bank, the rating was “satisfactory”. In comparing the discrepancy in rating, the Government believes the discrepancy is emanating from 5.1 and 6.1 which generally discussed the “backlog”.

Bank Comments

Project outcome is rated moderately satisfactory, because there were moderate shortcomings in the achievement of the objectives of this operation. Thus project infrastructure achieved service improvements and better maintenance, but how this reduced the “backlog” to be cleared is not evident......

Borrower Comments

The review misses the point that the backlog was due to the demand from the preceding project, the Public Works and Capacity Building Project (PWCBP). Due to the fact that there were more than 100 sub-projects that were priority and were qualified for funding from PWCBP but were shelved due to limited funds in the old project, then it became necessary for the PACABP as a follow-up project to reduce this backlog. This review is not taking this backdrop into consideration that PACABP was a follow-up on PWCBP to consolidate the gains made previously.

Having done 79 priority sub-projects really has reduced the backlog significantly and this objective of reducing backlog on public infrastructure has been significantly achieved.

If the above comments are taken into consideration, one could say that the Project outcome should be rated Satisfactory.
Annex C: Background Information

Table C.1 The Gambia at a Glance (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The Gambia</th>
<th>Sub Saharan Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population (% of total population)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>2,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty (% living below US$1 a day)³</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to improved water source (% of population)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to improved sanitation (% of population)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paved roads (% of total roads)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: World Development Indicators; UNDP, Human Development Index


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Annual Population Growth Rate (%)</th>
<th>Poverty Head Count (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banjul City Council</td>
<td>34,828</td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanifing Municipal Council</td>
<td>322,410</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brikama Area Council</td>
<td>392,987</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basse Area Council</td>
<td>183,033</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerewan Area Council</td>
<td>172,806</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janjanbureh Area Council</td>
<td>106,799</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuntaur Area Council</td>
<td>79,098</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mansakonko Area Council</td>
<td>72,546</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,364,507</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Central Statistics Department, Census 2003; Poverty Reduction Strategy: 2007-2011

³ As at 1998, when the most recent comparable data is available.
Annex D: Eligibility Criteria for Sub-Projects

Original Eligibility Criteria (PAD)

A. Guiding Principles
1. For the PACB Project, it is recommended that sub-projects to be financed using proceeds of the IDA Credit satisfy inter alia the following requirements. They should:
   (i) be targeted towards increasing the service levels in the basic infrastructure services that contribute to the improved quality of living in the communities -- which, in turn, will increase the population’s confidence in the ability of local government, and their willingness to pay for the services delivered;
   (ii) have the largest possible number of end-user beneficiaries;
   (iii) target (wherever possible) lower income group beneficiaries;
   (iv) be designed in such a way that their delivery be labor-intensive and provide maximum employment opportunities within sound economic parameters; and
   (v) be designed so that their future operation and maintenance (O&M) be sustainable.

B. Eligibility Criteria for sub-projects
2. To satisfy the requirement "i" above, the sub-project should include the provision (or rehabilitation) of one of the basic infrastructure services defined below:
   - Water Supply;
   - Facilities (e.g. markets) for the acquisition of basic necessities (e.g. food);
   - Access/mobility (roads and footpaths);
   - Human waste disposal (sewerage);
   - Solid waste management;
   - Storm water drainage;
   - Safety Lighting.

Source: Project Appraisal Document

Eligibility Criteria after updating at mid-term review

To be eligible, a sub-project shall meet the following criteria
(a) Be of undoubted economic and social use, based for example on cost effectiveness or profitability analysis.
(b) Fall within the following list: (i) Water supply; (ii) Markets and transport terminal; (iii) Neighborhood and access road; (iv) Solid and liquid waste management; (v) Storm drainage; (vi) Street lighting; (vii) Social and institutional facilities, including school classrooms and health centers that are compatible with sector policies.
(c) Period before commencement of works should be less than three months
(d) Cost of activities before commencement should be less than 10% of estimated total cost of project.
(e) The part allocated to labor should be more than 20% of the estimated total cost.
(f) Employment created by the execution of the project should last for more than two weeks.
(g) The presence of at least two registered firms (cf section 111) for qualifications in the geographical area of the execution of the project
(h) It should be possible to move at no further cost the necessary equipment to the project site within the time frame stipulated for the commencement of works
(i) There should not be any duplication with another project whose funds are readily available
(j) The Project should not have been eliminated from the State or Community Investment Program
(k) The beneficiary should have the financial and technical capacity to ensure maintenance of the equipment and show that it has effectively maintained past projects
(l) The works executed by the Agency for Local Communities should represent at least 75% of the total amount of works executed by it.
(m) The level of participation of the population concerned in the identification and design of the project, as witnessed for example by minutes of meetings with or requests from the community.
(n) Total cost should fall within the remaining financial resources available to the Agency under the credit.
(o) The project should not have a negative impact on the environment.

## Annex E: Project Outputs

### 1. Investment Component

Table (a): Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of sub projects</th>
<th>Main Outputs</th>
<th>Cost (US$)* in millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of 16.6 km of urban and 2.5 km of rural roads</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Improvements to 17 markets by constructing 610 canteens/shops and 14 open sheds</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car parks</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of parking areas, waiting sheds, toilets and lighting for three major car parks</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Extension of NAWEC water supply network by almost 12 km and new water supply projects in 3 rural neighborhoods including 3 boreholes, solar energy pumping systems, storage tanks, 11 km of distribution pipes and 106 standpipes</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Extension of the electricity network by 5 km, 2.5 km of streetlights and 192 street lighting poles along the TDA</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Various improvements to facilities in 8 public and private schools</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Improving the Bakoteh dumpsite and construction of 7.5 km of drains</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Improvements to government office buildings and other facilities</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>79</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>16.2</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gamworks

Table (b): Sub-Projects in Detail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>JUBBEW ROAD IN KMC--969 M Long with a drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>KWAMI ROAD IN KMC--341 M Long with a drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BANJUL ROAD IN KMC--290 M Long with a drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>REVEREND J.C. FYE ROAD IN KMC--1548 M</td>
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<tr>
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<td>FAKALIYA ROAD IN KMC--540 M Long</td>
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<tr>
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<td>SAINJEY NJIE ROAD IN KMC--620 M Long with a drain</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>GOLF COURSE ROAD IN KMC--441 M Long with a drain</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>SATANG JOW ROAD IN KMC--686 M Long</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AWA TALIBO ROAD IN KMC--969 M Long with a drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JOHN SINYAN ROAD IN KMC--548 M Long with a drain</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BAKADAJI ROAD IN KMC--712 M Long</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>LATRIKUNDA SABIJL ELF STATION ROAD IN KMC--550 M Long with a drain</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PAPA SARR STREET IN KMC--485 M Long with a drain</td>
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<td>RANKING STREET IN BANJUL--150 M Long with a drain</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>SAM JACK TERRACE IN BANJUL--284 M Long with a drain</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>LLEWELYN STREET IN BANJUL--250 M Long with a drain</td>
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<tr>
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<td>STANLEY STREET IN BANJUL--350 M Long with a drain</td>
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<td></td>
<td>INGRAM STREET IN BANJUL--250 M Long</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LANCASTER STREET IN BANJUL--925 M Long with a drain</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>PERSEVERANCE STREET IN BANJUL--850 M Long with a drain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTOR</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Markets | 17 | JANJANGBUREH MARKET -- 25 canteens/shop and 1 open shed  
BANSANG MARKET -- 41 canteens/shop and 2 open sheds  
BARRA CARPARK MARKET -- 36 canteens/shop  
LASSO WHARF MARKET -- 28 canteens/shop and 1 Admin Building  
FA RAFENNI MARKET Lot 1 -- 66 canteens/shop and 1 open shed  
FA RAFENNI MARKET Lot 2 -- 54 canteens/shop and 1 open shed  
SOMA MARKET -- 132 canteens/shop and 2 open sheds  
BIKAMA CRAFT MARKET -- 70 canteens/shop  
SANCHABA SULAY JOBE MARKET -- 32 canteens/shop and 1 open shed  
LAMIN MARKET -- 48 canteens/shop and 1 open shed  
BIKAMA MARKET -- 48 canteens/shop and 1 open shed  
BUNDUNG MARKET -- 1 open shed  
TALINDING MARKET -- 1 open shed  
EBO TOWN MARKET -- 1 open shed  
WASSU MARKET -- 1 open shed  
BASSE MARKET -- 20 canteens/shop  
KAUR WHARFTOWN MARKET -- 10 canteens/shop |
| Car Park | 3 | CARPARK IN BANJUL -- Rehabilitation works including waiting sheds, drainage and parking area and lighting  
CARPARK IN BRIKAMA -- Construction works including waiting sheds, parking area; office and toilet; access roads; fencing  
CARPARK IN WASSU -- Parking Area, waiting sheds; toilets and fencing |
| Water Supply | 8 | BRIKAMA WATER EXTENSION PROJECT -- 1000M of Pipes laid  
KOMBO NORTH WATER EXTENSION PROJECT -- 6925M of Pipes laid  
JESHWANG/EBOTOWN WATER EXTENSION PROJECT -- 1000M of Pipes laid  
FAJIKUNDA WATER EXTENSION PROJECT -- 1500M of Pipes laid  
ABUKO/TALINDING WATER EXTENSION PROJECT -- 1500M of Pipes laid  
DEMBAKUNDA WATER EXTENSION PROJECT -- 4371M of Pipes laid, 1 borehole, 1 solar energy pumping system, 22 standpipes and 2 NO 60m3 elevated water storage tanks  
GARAWOL WATER EXTENSION PROJECT -- 2735M of Pipes laid, 1 borehole, 1 solar energy pumping system, 35 standpipes and 2 NO 60m3 elevated water storage tanks  
GAMBISSARA WATER EXTENSION PROJECT IN 2 PHASES -- 4270M of Pipes laid, 1 borehole, 1 solar energy pumping system, 49 standpipes and 2 NO 60m3 elevated water storage tanks  
GAMBISSARA WATER EXTENSION PROJECT IN 2 PHASES -- 4270M of Pipes laid, 1 borehole, 1 solar energy pumping system, 49 standpipes and 2 NO 60m3 elevated water storage tanks |
| Electricity | 3 | ELECTRICITY EXTENSION PROJECT IN BRIKAMA MISERA -- Provision of Street lights; transformer Unit and 5km electricity network  
ELECTRICITY EXTENSION PROJECT IN KINDERDOF SCHOOL IN BRIKAMA -- Provision of 21/2km of street light network; electrification and distribution of school network  
STREET LIGHTING IN TOURISM DEVELOPMENT AREA -- Erection of 192 street lighting poles and luminaries; Construction of footpath 1.9km |
| Education | 8 | ARMITAGE HIGH SCHOOL IN JANJANGBUREH -- Rehabilitation Works including 18 classrooms; 8 Dormitory buildings; 4 Science Lab; 1 Kitchen Block; 1 Dining Hall; 1 Admin Block and Staff Room; 1 Carpentry Building; 1 Metal Workshop  
AHMADIBIYYA HIGH SCHOOL IN BASSE -- Construction/Rehabilitation Works including 20 Classrooms; 1 Office Block; 1 Staff Room; 1 Assembly Hall; 2.5km of Block work Fencing |
Table (b): Sub-Projects in Detail

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECTOR</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Environmental| 5      | ST JOHN’S SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF – Construction works including 3 classrooms; 1 office; toilet facilities; a science Laboratory; a computer room and a Multi-purpose School Hall  
BAKAU PRIMARY SCHOOL IN BAKAU – Construction of 350m Block work Fence  
METHODIST ACADEMY SCHOOL IN MILE 7 BAKAU – PHASE 3 - Construction Works including 12 Classrooms; 2 Science Lab; 2 Toilet Block; 1 Admin Block  
PIPELINE ISLAMIC SCHOOL IN KANIFING - PHASE 2 - Construction Works including 24 classrooms, 1 staff Room and 2 toilet block  
MARINA INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL IN FAJARA - Construction Works including 1 Admin Building (8 offices)  
ST. JOSEPH’S HIGH SCHOOL IN BANJUL - Construction Works including 8 classrooms; 1 office and 1 toilet facility  
BAKOTEH DUMPSITE - Clearing of 8 hectare site; preparation of land filling area; grading; compaction; construction of gravel access roads; Construction of a boundary fence; Construction of a guard house  
DRAINS IN BANSANG – Construction Works of 2.5km of Concrete Drains (covered)  
DRAINS IN SUMAKUNDA – 3 km of block work drains  
DRAINS IN BAKAU WASULUNGKUNDA - Construction Works of 2 km of concrete block work drains  
REFUSE COLLECTION SLABS IN KMC - Construction Works of 20 slabs |
| Others       | 7      | OFFICE BUILDING FOR DEPT OF WATER RESOURCES IN BANJUL - Rehabilitation Works including 25 Offices and 6 toilets  
MINI STADIUM IN SEREKUNDA EAST, KMC - Construction and Landscaping including Multi Purpose Hall (600m²) and Concrete Paving (Landscaping)  
THE GAMBIA FAMILY PLANNING CLINIC IN BASSE - Construction Works of 8 offices; 2 toilets and 1 kitchen  
HOME FOR THE AGED AND DESTITUTE IN BAKOTEH - Construction Works including 1 Admin Block, 13 Bedrooms; 3-Bedroom staff quarters; Nurses station and dining room; 605 perimeter block work fencing  
DRAINAGE AND LANDSCAPING OF JULY 22 SQUARE IN BANJUL – 17657m² of landscaping (grassing); 341m of Concrete covered drains; Rehab of existing toilet; Installation of sprinkler and lighting system  
CONSTRUCTION OF BRIDGE IN MANJAI KUNDA - Construction Works of an 8 meters span x 6m wide bridge  
SHEDS FOR SMALL ENTERPRISE IN BASSE - Construction Works of 8 sheds |
| Total:       | 79     | Source: Gamworks                                                                                                                                 |

2. Capacity Building Component

Table (c): Activities under PACAB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Government Area</th>
<th>No of persons trained</th>
<th>Duration of training (days)</th>
<th>Contract Sum US$ '000</th>
<th>Contract Sum US$ '000</th>
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<tr>
<td>LGA staff</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>190</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gamworks</td>
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<td>Construction industry</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
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Sources: DoSLGL
Bibliography


