



Report Number : ICRR0021221

## 1. Project Data

**Project ID**

P119380

**Project Name**

Africa - 2nd phase fish.GEF (GBissau)

**Country**

Western Africa

**Practice Area(Lead)**

Environment &amp; Natural Resources

**L/C/TF Number(s)**

IDA-H6530

**Closing Date (Original)**

30-Jun-2016

**Total Project Cost (USD)**

16,000,000.00

**Bank Approval Date**

31-Mar-2011

**Closing Date (Actual)**

29-Sep-2017

**IBRD/IDA (USD)**
**Grants (USD)**

Original Commitment

6,000,000.00

0.00

Revised Commitment

6,000,000.00

0.00

Actual

5,517,621.93

0.00

**Prepared by**

Ebru Karamete

**Reviewed by**

Stephen Hutton

**ICR Review Coordinator**

Christopher David Nelson

**Group**

IEGSD (Unit 4)

**Project ID**

P122182

**Project Name**

Africa - 2nd phase fish.GEF (GBissau) ( P122182 )

**L/C/TF Number(s)**
**Closing Date (Original)**
**Total Project Cost (USD)**

8,000,000.00



Bank Approval Date	Closing Date (Actual)	
31-Mar-2011		
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	2,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	2,000,000.00
Actual	0.00	1,643,912.98

## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

The West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP) was approved in 2009 as a multi-phase, multi country Adaptable Programmatic Loan (APL; later changed to Series of Projects, SOP). This report covers the second program series of the first phase of the WARFP (APL-B1). The program objective is "to sustainably increase the overall wealth generated by the exploitation of the marine fisheries resources of West Africa, and the proportion of that wealth captured by West African countries."

The project development objectives stated in the Financing Agreement (p. 6) and Project Appraisal Document (p. 6) is:

**"to strengthen the capacity of the Recipient to govern and manage targeted fisheries, reduce illegal fishing, and increase local value added to fish products".**

### b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

### c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

### d. Components

The project had four components:

**1. Good Governance and Sustainable Management of the Fisheries (Appraisal Estimate: US\$0.3 million IDA and US\$1.7 million GEF; Actual: US\$0.18 million IDA and US\$1.35 million GEF).**

This component included capacity building for the government and stakeholders to ensure sustainable and profitable use of marine fish resources by strengthening the policy and regulatory framework for the use of fish resources; conducting assessments of the status of key fish stocks to form a basis for



management; developing information management tools at the local, national and regional levels (dashboards); and conducting a feasibility study on co-management.

Restructuring: The preparation and adoption of fisheries management plans were revised to updating and adopting fisheries management plans. This was done since management plans had already been in place and only needed updating.

## **2. Reduction of Illegal Fishing (Appraisal Estimate: US\$4.7 million IDA; Actual: US\$3.63 million IDA)**

The component aimed to reduce illegal fishing by financing sustainable fisheries surveillance systems such as monitoring centers and stations, sea patrols and a satellite-based Vessel Monitoring System (VMS); providing technical assistance and training to staff involved in inspection and surveillance operations; and studying options for sustaining the operating costs of MCS.

Restructuring: The leasing of a large surveillance vessel was changed to the hiring of a surveillance vessel and crew, and the purchase of a civilian patrol vessel was dropped. These changes were required since National Fisheries Inspection and Control Service (FISCAP) did not have the capacity to independently maintain the vessels.

## **3. Increasing the Contribution of the Marine Fish Resources to the Local Economies (Appraisal Estimate: US\$0.4 million IDA; Actual: US\$0.5 million IDA)**

The component complemented EU investments in a Fish Inspection and Quality Control Department and a certified competent sanitary authority for the export of fish products to the European market; developing protocols and standards for quality and traceability; helping the Fish Inspection and Quality Control Department develop annual work plans and budgets; and training local fishers on improved product handling and on access to local commercial microfinance opportunities.

Restructuring: The support to the Fish Inspection and Quality Control Department was downscaled from bringing it to a status of accreditation for certification of fishery products exports to the EU, to establishing a functional competent authority with qualified staff, equipment and reagents. This change was due to a recognition that the project did not have control over the accreditation process but it could support the establishment of a competent authority.

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## **4. Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation and Program Management (Appraisal Estimate: US\$0.6 million IDA and US\$0.3 million GEF; Actual: US\$1.2 million IDA and US\$0.3 million GEF)**

Project management and coordination at the country level as well as regionally (CSRP Regional Coordination Unit (RCU), based in Dakar, Senegal). Regional actions were financed through a US\$0.3 million IDA subsidiary agreement between the World Bank and the Government of Guinea-Bissau, and included harmonization of fisheries policies with those of other countries in the sub-region. The component also financed M&E and procurement activities, communication and awareness raising on the program.



#### e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

**Project Cost:** Total project cost at appraisal was estimated at US\$ 8 million, actual costs were lower with US\$ 7.16 million (90 % of the planned amount).

**Financing:** The IDA grant (IDA-H6530) of US\$ 6 million disbursed US\$ 5.5 million and GEF grant (TF-99597) of US\$ 2 million disbursed US\$ 1.65 million and 1.2 million was canceled at closing.

**Borrower Contribution.** No Borrower contribution was planned.

**Dates:** The project was approved on March 31, 2016 and effective six months later, on September 30, 2011. The original closing date was June 30, 2016 and the actual closing date was on September 29, 2017. The closing date of the original project was extended for 15 months via two Level II restructurings in June 2016 and May 2017 to make up for start-up disbursement delays and a nine-month disbursement suspension during the 2012 military takeover.

**Restructuring:** The project went through two Level II restructurings. The first restructuring (approved June 14, 2016): (i) extended the original closing date for one year; (ii) reallocated IDA proceeds to redistribute the vessel lease amount and a third of the cost of purchasing a patrol vessel between all the other IDA allocations in a manner that supported the implementation of the revised work plan for the extended project duration, including project management costs; (iii) made revisions in the result framework; i.e. the original PDO Indicator of recovery of overexploited fisheries and increase in net economic benefits from targeted fisheries were revised since they were not aligned with the objective of the project but rather with the long-term goals of the program. Therefore, PDO Indicators were defined for governance improvements, improved surveillance capacity, and enhanced capabilities of the sector to export locally produced quality products. The second restructuring (approved on May 8, 2017), extended the closing date another three months.

No split rating is conducted as: (i) PDO was not revised; (ii) although some outcome indicators were replaced with new ones they were in general relevant to measure the objectives, with the exception of the last objective, yet having a split rating would not change the efficacy and the outcome rating.

### 3. Relevance of Objectives

#### Rationale

The original project development objectives were **highly** relevant to the country, region and sector strategies and needs. Analytical work identified three key constraints for the sector in West Africa: lack of capacity to govern and manage the resource sustainably, and prevent overexploitation and IUU fishing; and failure to add value locally to the fish caught in West African waters. The project development objectives addressed these directly.

At the time of the WARFP preparation in 2009, despite rising production levels, most of the region's commercially important fish stocks were fully or overexploited. Profitability in many of the fisheries was also declining due to increasing fleets and costs and declining catch rates per vessel. High levels of resources



were being lost to illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing – estimated to be equivalent to 18 percent of the region's total harvest (ICR p.5).

While the fisheries sector contributed seven to ten percent of GDP and as much as 40 percent of the government's annual budget in some years, local value added to fish products, and fish exports were practically zero. The sale of fish licenses to foreign fleets was one of the two main sources of export revenue. However, employment in the sector was estimated to be relatively low, as there had not been a culture of fishing in the country. The country's strategy of renting out its fish resources to foreign users in exchange for public revenues was logical given the historical lack of fishing in communities and a ruined port infrastructure after the civil war. However, this scheme was unsustainable since the country had not put in place basic sector governance and management measures to ensure that the resources and the revenues they generated were sustainable. The project targeted specific species that were largely utilized by foreign fishers rather than small-scale domestic fishers in Guinea-Bissau.

The project development objective was in line with the country strategies. The government's draft National Fisheries Strategy at the time (replaced by a new strategy in December 2014 through project support) highlighted sustainable management of the marine fish resources, and achieving an optimal contribution of the sector to economic growth and poverty reduction by building the capacity for governance of the fisheries, combating and reducing illegal fishing and increasing in-country landings and value added of fish products. Realizing that these objectives required regional collaboration, the government became a member of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, an inter-governmental fisheries cooperation organization and a key West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP) partner, together with six other coastal countries from Mauritania to Sierra Leone. The PDO is particularly relevant to the 2015-2019 National Strategic Plan for the sector which was developed with the support of the project and was used to inform the fisheries policy section of the 10-year development plan.

The project development objective was relevant to World Bank strategies. The Interim Strategy Note (ISN) for FY09-FY17 identified agriculture, forestry and fisheries as key sources of current and future economic growth for the country, and defined its first pillar of support around strengthening economic management and laying the foundations for improvements in the productive sectors, indicating that Guinea-Bissau was expected to join the WARFP. The PDO was relevant to FY18-21 Country Partnership Framework (CPF) Focus Area 2 on improved natural resources and disaster risk management, and the cross-cutting theme of improving governance and institutions. Additionally the project objectives were relevant to the 2008 Africa Regional Strategy's objective to promote governance of natural resources and have countries work together on a regional basis, including on regional public goods such as fisheries; and to the 2011 Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa which prioritized support for coordinated interventions in regional public goods such as fisheries; and to the GEF operational program goals under the International Waters Focal Area, of multistate cooperation to rebuild marine fisheries and reduce pollution of coasts and Large Marine Ecosystems while considering climate variability and change.

## Rating



High

## 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

### Objective 1

#### Objective

The Project Development Objectives (PDO) were:

"to strengthen the capacity of the Recipient to govern and manage targeted fisheries, reduce illegal fishing, and increase local value added to fish products. "

This review will parse the PDO into three objectives for the analysis of achievement of the PDO: (i) to strengthen the capacity of the Recipient to govern and manage targeted fisheries; (ii) to strengthen the capacity of the Recipient to reduce illegal fishing; and (iii) to strengthen the capacity of the Recipient to increase local value added to fish products.

#### Rationale

##### Outputs:

- **Fisheries sector legal and regulatory framework.**
  - A National Strategic Plan was developed for the sector and adopted by the Council of Ministers in December 2014 with a five-year action plan.
  - A new Fisheries Decree was developed with project support and adopted in October 2017, shortly after project closure. and four sectoral regulations were developed to ensure sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in alignment with international instruments, and appropriate actions against illegal fishing. Two of the regulations were adopted by the Council of Ministers during the project and shortly after, i.e. a new Fisheries Decree was developed with project support and adopted shortly after project closing in October 2017, and sectoral regulations were developed to ensure sustainable exploitation of fishery resources in alignment with international instruments, and appropriate actions against illegal fishing. This allowed FISCAP to monitor the movements of vessels in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
- **Capacity to prepare fisheries management plans.**
  - The 2010 management plan was updated and adopted by the Fisheries and Maritime Secretariat (SEPEM) in 2014, to reflect the current number of vessels and new licenses and revised regulations. The recommendations of the management plan were applied by the government in issuance of fishing licenses. The ICR noted that (p.16), during the last project year, the number of licenses issued decreased, showing that government new capacities were indeed used to improve management of fisheries indicating some capability and willingness to reduce catch size as part of sustainable management.
- **Capacity to generate, manage and utilize sectoral data.**
  - Two stock assessments of the targeted fish stocks and pelagic fisheries were carried out in 2014 and 2016 by an international consultant, and bio-economic models for shrimp and cephalopods were developed in early 2017 based on time series of available data from the assessments. Their results informed revisions to the legal and regulatory framework and to the fisheries management plan.
  - Dashboard equipment and software were provided to SEPEM in 2015, staff were trained from Center for Applied Fisheries Research (CIPA), National Fisheries Inspection and Control Service (FISCAP) and the artisanal and industrial fisheries directorates on its use.
  - The target for Fishery Performance Indicators (FPI) use was exceeded with four assessments carried out



instead of two in 2017 (for targeted fisheries in Biombo, Buba, Caio and Varhela).

- An electronic national ship register system was created followed by a census in all regions of the country to update the registration database (data entry ongoing).
- A national system for monitoring landings by artisanal fisheries was also set up by training and posting field agents and investigators at strategic landing points.

**Outcome:**

The above investments helped to achieve the following: (i) The availability, reliability and security of key sectoral data has increased. (ii) Better-informed decision making can be made on access control to the fisheries, indicating that the government is working towards improving the sustainability of the fish stocks. (iii) National and regional collaboration on the sector can be achieved more effectively as the governance tools and capacities provided by the project have helped the government negotiate fisheries agreements with various countries that are in line with sustainable management plans for specific fisheries. Within the context of these agreements, fleets are required to adhere to certain fishing restrictions to ensure the sustainability of targeted fisheries (iv) The revision of the sector's legal and regulatory framework and the adoption of the FISCAP statute allowed the government to plan an institutional reform in FISCAP (to be implemented under the second phase project), and keep up with new surveillance tools and internationally accepted fishing practices.

The achievement of the objective is rated Substantial.

**Rating**

Substantial

**Objective 2**

**Objective**

ii) To strengthen the capacity of the Recipient to reduce illegal fishing

**Rationale**

**Outputs:**

The project mainly supported FISCAP that lacked the necessary logistics, budget, equipment, qualified personnel and premises to conduct land and sea controls. The following outputs were achieved:

- The project provided abroad training to FISCAP staff) on subjects including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, ship mechanics, sea and port inspection, VMS and radar data analysis. The ICR did not provide information on how many staff was trained.
- FISCAP's headquarters was established (meeting the intermediate outcome indicator), equipped with remote sensing and communication equipment and technologies.





- With project support, a competent authority was established within CIPA in Bissau in 2014 in collaboration with the EU.
- Surveillance stations were also built/equipped in Caravelha, Ponta Caio and Cacine, covering the whole EEZ.
- Short and long-range radio equipment and solar energy equipment were provided to the stations, the latest generation satellite-based VMS/ Automatic Identifier System (AIS) were introduced in both the fisheries monitoring center and on industrial vessels..
- Chartering of a Senegalese patrol vessel for the high seas, was financed which was less expensive option than procuring a vessel that was initially planned. Two FISCAP's patrol vessels was rehabilitated.
- A study on financial sustainability options for surveillance, was financed for discussion by the government within the framework of a second phase project.

#### **Intermediate Outcomes:**

Although the project supported strengthening of patrolling capabilities, the patrolling abilities could not be fully utilized as planned (the intermediate outcome target 150 patrol days per year was partly achieved with 102 patrol days in 2017; also the monthly average patrol days of 22 was also under achieved with 8 patrol days on average in 2017). This was due to frequent administrative changes in FISCAP as a result of several changes in the government over a short period.

- In terms of strengthening of national and regional collaboration on enforcement, a consensus was reached (reportedly through encouragement of the World Bank) between FISCAP, the French Navy and the National Guard on the roles and responsibilities of each agency for monitoring at-sea activities. This agreement, paved the way for the three agencies to pool financial and human resources and conduct joint patrols.

#### **Outcomes:**

The project substantially achieved the objective of strengthening the capacity of the Recipient to reduce illegal fishing. In order to measure reduction of illegal fishing, the project used percent of observed/inspected small-scale vessels committing serious infractions (defined any fishing infraction punishable by arrest according to current legislation, e.g., fishing without a license, fishing in no fishing areas, and using illegal fishing gear or explosives). This reduced from 22 percent to two percent compared to a target of ten percent. In addition, this rate for industrial vessels was reduced from 25 percent to six percent compared to the same target. This result is attributed to a considerable amount of project-funded investments and to improve the country's Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) systems and FISCAP's capacity to use them, and enhancing sub-regional collaboration mentioned above.

The achievement of the objective is rated Substantial.

#### **Rating**

Substantial





### **Objective 3**

#### **Objective**

(iii) To strengthen the capacity of the Recipient to increase local value added to fish products

#### **Rationale**

##### **Outputs:**

- Local laboratory staff were trained on fish quality assessment, fish sanitary standard procedures and the use of purchased equipment and reagents the preparation of protocols for quality assurance and traceability standards as planned.
- The competent authority was supported in the preparation of a roadmap for achieving EU accreditation and the authority has filed an evaluation request with the EU in early 2017, awaiting response.
- The project provided training to fishers, merchants and processors as planned (no number was given).

##### **Intermediate Outcomes:**

- Strengthened quality testing capacities: The target of one ton for products tested destined for export was exceeded with 976 tons of targeted fish and fish products (croaker, snapper and grouper) tested for export at the newly established and equipped laboratory in 2014-2017. Products underwent sample quality control inspections, and were exported to South Korea and Senegal frozen, iced, dried and smoked.
- According to the ICR (p. 21), sanitary conditions for handling fishery products at these sites had been noticeably improved with decreasing post-harvest losses.

##### **Outcomes:**

The increase in surveillance activities across the maritime area resulted in a rise in revenues to the public treasury from increased licensing (as illegal fishing converted into legally registered activities) and collected fines starting in 2016. The strengthening of the entire national MCS system played a key role in this trend and without surveillance, fishing vessels could have continued to fish without a license. Thus, surveillance support provided by the project has been an essential part of securing revenues to the government.

To measure this objective the project designed two indicators during appraisal, i.e. “two overexploited fisheries showing signs of recovery, as measured by an increase in total catch per unit of fishing”; and “increase in tons of fish caught per fishing vessel per year”. However, during restructuring these indicators were replaced, as the targets as designed in the original indicators were not achieved. Instead the project designed the indicator “new quantities of target demersal fish and fish products destined for export tested at the quality control and inspection laboratory”. Although the indicator was overly achieved, this was more of an output or intermediate outcome level indicator and did not directly measure the increase in value added objective.



IEG's assessment is that the scope and ability of project activities was weakly aligned and causally linked to the objective of increase value added of fish products. The project activities were mainly to address the institutional capacity related barriers and this was only one step to increase value addition in the country. The improvement of laboratory testing capacity for fish products to be exported, in order to ensure quality standards for exports, in due course contribute to increased exports. In addition, training for fishers and processors to improve sanitary conditions for fish handling and decrease post-harvest losses, would also somewhat contribute to increased value added for the sector.

However, there were key barriers for the sector that needed to be addressed to substantially achieve this objective. For example, there was no small/artisanal fisheries industry in the country and industrial fisheries companies that received licenses were mainly foreign companies. Funds needed to be mobilized from the private sector to create a local industry, but given the weak investment climate surrounding the fisheries sector in the country, this was not intended. Moreover, a fundamental gap for the sector to develop was the lack of local landing and marketing infrastructure, particularly a functioning port.

Therefore, with the absence of these key aspects it is not possible to achieve the objective of value addition in the sector, therefore it is rated Modest.

**Rating**  
Modest

### Rationale

The overall efficacy of the project is rated **Substantial**, but marginally so. The ICR presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the project activities led to improved governance of the sector through improved regulatory and institutional capabilities; also, reduction in illegal fishing practices could be accomplished through better patrolling and surveillance activities; and via international agreements and efforts encouraged by the project. Balanced by that, there was no direct evidence on the achievement of increase in value added objective.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**  
Substantial

## 5. Efficiency

### Economic and Financial Efficiency:

The ex-ante analysis used the most recent sector statistics available to calculate: (i) the existing net economic benefits from the fisheries, (ii) the expected net economic benefits from the fisheries over the next 30 years under a business-as-usual scenario, without the project, and (iii) the projected net economic benefits over that



same time period as a result of the project investment. The benefits included increased profitability of fisheries and higher economic returns from the sector. The ICR noted that (p. 64), the original idea of the project that the economic model used was to limit the total number of fishing canoes to control fishing effort, which, in turn, would allow the stock to recover. However, improved fish stocks, was not part of project's objective and activities did not directly influence the stocks at this level. The net economic benefits for the fisheries included the return to owners, to Government and to participants, after all variable and fixed costs as well as depreciation costs, capital cost, and the opportunity cost of labor are accounted. After eight years of project implementation, the investments made by the project were estimated to generate an additional US\$11 million per year in net economic benefits from the targeted fisheries for the country. Over 30 years, the net present value using a 10 percent discount rate would be over US\$82 million, with an internal rate of return of over 50 percent. Considering that the project activities alone seemed unlikely to achieve increased profitability of fisheries sector in the short term, these assumptions seemed unrealistic.

Ex-post analysis: Net Present Value and Financial Internal Rate of Return was calculated based on government revenue from licenses and fines of illegal fishing. There are some shortcomings with the analysis. First of all this was a financial analysis not an economic one, i.e. revenues from licenses and fines are only financial transfers, not a true economic gain. In addition, ICR noted that the government revenue has increased 1.5 to 2.3 times more than what it used to receive before the project taking the average value of the total revenue for 2010 and 2011 as the base, then calculating the total revenue difference from the base value for each year; and assuming that the difference from the base is entirely attributed to project interventions, these differences were considered as the revenue flow or project benefit. The resulting Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for the project, considering the government revenue increase as a benefit alone, was 22 percent. However, the ICR did not provide information on the assumptions for future cash benefits, after the project closed. This is particularly important, because the number of licenses and therefore the revenue decreased during the last year of the project, the ICR noted this as an improvement that (p.16) the new capacities were indeed used to improve management of fisheries. If the revenue from licenses is a decreasing trend not an increasing trend due to better management of the sector, then the future cash benefits might be overly estimated.

#### **Administrative and Operational Efficiency:**

The closing date of the original project was extended for 15 months to make up for start-up disbursement delays and a nine-month disbursement suspension during the 2012 military takeover. There were inefficiencies with the procurement and financial management activities. In addition, project management was rather high compared to total project cost (17 % of total cost).

Based on shortcomings of the financial analysis in addition to administrative and operational inefficiencies, project efficiency is rated Modest.

#### **Efficiency Rating**

Modest



a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	50.00	100.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	22.00	100.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

## 6. Outcome

The Relevance of Objectives is rated High; Efficacy of the objective “to strengthen the capacity of the Recipient to govern and manage targeted fisheries, reduce illegal fishing, and increase local value added to fish products is rated Substantial, but marginally so due to lack of evidence on increase in value added of fish products; Efficiency is rated Modest due to shortcomings in the financial analysis, combined with administrative and operational inefficiencies. The combined outcome rating is **Moderately Satisfactory**.

### a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

## 7. Risk to Development Outcome

**Institutional Risk:** There is the regional co-dependence of coastal countries on a successful reform process, whereby one country’s sustainable success is partly dependent on its neighbors given the transboundary nature of the resource. Therefore, through series of operations similar reforms are planned to be implemented in the neighboring countries. For this project in specific, the elements that would contribute to the sustainability of the outcome were the adoption of the revised set of strategy, policy and regulations for the sector, and the increase of government staff’s capacity to independently carry out key management functions. The key risks to development outcome were those related to the constant underfunding of the government, which puts at risk some project investments. These include primarily surveillance activities that require substantial financing for vessel operation and repair, maintenance and operation of the fisheries center and coastal stations, and salaries to staff; payment to data management staff to maintain the national dashboard and vessel register; and quality control by the laboratory which incurs operating costs, and costs of equipment maintenance and materials. Several elements are aimed at mitigating the risk of funding for surveillance. For example, the project supported an analysis of financing options for surveillance, and the five-year National MCS Strategic Action Plan incorporated these options. The study also proposed cost reduction measures which were used during the course of implementation. Additionally, several regional initiatives have been under way to reduce the costs of surveillance in CSRP member states through joint surveillance patrols, and the establishment of a sub-regional register of fishing vessels, a regional observer program, and the regional dashboard.



## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

### a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was part of a regional program. The need for a regional program emerged from the recognition that the important fish stocks of West Africa as well as illegal fishing problems were in general shared between multiple coastal states, as was the problem of illegal fishing. The participating countries were also linked through labor markets and trade with partners within and outside the region, requiring effective coordination between countries.

The strengths of Quality of Entry included the following:

- The project team utilized lessons learned from projects in the region and in the country in the design of the project. Some of the key lessons were: (i) investments must begin with the governance framework for the sector, to ensure for fisheries that are already overexploited, can be rehabilitated, and can grow sustainably to profitable levels; (ii) investments in improved fisheries surveillance show immediate results in reducing illegal fishing. Background analyses and studies were carried out to inform the design and lessons from past and similar projects were well taken into consideration. For example, resources among various agencies should be pooled in collective agreements to help reduce costs towards reducing illegal fishing.
- The design was informed by discussions with a variety of stakeholders and partners with particular emphasis on generating successful synergies with the EU, which had been and continues to be a key development partner in the sector.

Identified risks and mitigation measures were in general sound,. Two risks were rated High, i.e. commitment to fighting illegal fishing and weak governance and capacity of the implementing agency and four were rated Moderate, i.e. complex project design, social and environmental risks, unavailability of the project team to monitor and provide implementation support, and reputational risks to the World Bank from unauthorized use of patrol vessels. Mitigation measures included promotion of transparency of sectoral data, including fines and arrests, and multi-stakeholder involvement to mitigate weak commitment to fighting illegal fishing. Also, substantial capacity building related activities were included to mitigate weak governance and capacities. Weak quality at entry aspects were:

- The project activities that mainly included institutional capacity building activities were weakly aligned with the increasing value added from the sector part of the PDO.
- Several of the assumptions used in the economic analysis were over-ambitious and the assumed increases in profitability of the sector did not seem justified given the limited scope of project activities in this area (see efficiency),

Even though there were delays in effectiveness, the administrative and accounting manual was not ready at the beginning, contributing to the delays and several fiduciary challenges at the beginning of the project.



## **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

### **b. Quality of supervision**

The project benefitted from the support of county Task Team Leaders (TTLs), based in Washington and Dakar, in addition to the regional TTL. The frequency of World Bank implementation support missions and guidance were in reportedly adequate. Through the Bank support, the PIU eventually gained capacity on procurement and FM. The missions were on average one to three per year, except 2012 during which only financial management and procurement assessments were carried as a result of the nine-month suspension after the coup. Aide memoires contained details on progress, results and achievement of outcomes, and reportedly presented frank evaluation of weaknesses and shortcomings with concrete action plans. They were used to evaluate progress and informed discussions with the government on measures to enhance performance. For example, the two restructurings after the Mid-Term Review, were a result of these consultations and in general helped to complete the activities.

One important weakness of supervision was that although the World Bank made adjustments, through restructurings, to the M&E plan, as well as allocation of resources and the duration of the project, the PDO was not revised to make it more aligned with the project activities. The dropping of indicators measuring value addition on the sector, without revising the value addition part of the PDO, were not sufficient.

## **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

## **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The design of the M&E plan had several weaknesses: (i) project activities were weakly linked to the value added aspect of the PDO, therefore, first two PDO-Level Indicators designed to measure that were not relevant (i.e. "Two overexploited fisheries showing signs of recovery, as measured by an increase in total catch per unit of fishing effort;" and "Increase in annual net economic benefits from targeted fisheries"; (ii) the baseline and target for the beneficiaries Core Indicator were set as the total population of the country rather than those directly affected by the project, as intended by this indicator; as the number of people trained is relevant, but this is still a weak indicator, as the number of beneficiaries/or people trained is an output level indicator and (iii) the indicator for the management plans did not take into account the pre-existence of a management plan. These weaknesses were partly corrected in the June 2016 restructuring, resulting in dropped, revised and new



indicators at both the PDO and Intermediate levels. However the PDO was not revised. In addition, the revised results framework had other shortcomings such as inadequate baselines and targets for the new indicator for the local value added objective, for the revised indicator on patrols, and in the setting of target female beneficiaries.

## **b. M&E Implementation**

The PIU with the close support of the CSRP conducted M&E of project, however only after the PDO Level Indicators were replaced, the new PDO Indicators were monitored and reported on. The ICR noted that (p. 33) an M&E officer in the PIU could have better facilitated information collection from the relevant government agencies whose staff changed frequently.

## **c. M&E Utilization**

The ICR noted that (p. 33), progress reports were used to inform discussions with the government, restructurings, work plans and budgets. Progress toward achieving the GEF International Waters corporate goals was reported using a tracking tool at mid-term and completion. Fisheries Performance Indicators were used to generate assessments for targeted fisheries in four sites, while setting baselines for discussing co-management sites under the follow-on project. The data in the regional dashboard will become available to the public, and the national dashboard was incomplete by project closing.

## **M&E Quality Rating**

Substantial

# **10. Other Issues**

## **a. Safeguards**

The project triggered OP/BP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment as Category B (Partial Assessment) as small works were planned under Component 2, which were expected to have minor impacts on the environment. OP/BP 4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement was not triggered, as there were no specific interventions or access restrictions at the community levels. However, considering the program's long-term objective of strengthening management of fish resources, the potential for involuntary restrictions on traditional access to resources was considered, and the government adopted the WARFP Regional Process Framework. The government also prepared an Environmental and Social Management Framework and committed to undertaking a social assessment of the impact of the project on fisheries resources management and implementing its measures as needed, and this was a covenant in the financing agreement. Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs) or Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) were to be prepared as needed during implementation.

Safeguard coordination and monitoring was not carried out by the government (Prime Minister Office's Unit





for Environmental Impact Assessment), therefore a consulting company to guide the PIU was hired. The World Bank mission in June 2016 noted that works for FISCAP headquarters and surveillance station in Ponta Caio, had begun without World Bank's prior approval of ESIA as required. Also, there were unclarified land ownership issues.. The safeguards team requested twice an environmental and social safeguards audit to be conducted prior to project closing. The ICR informed that (p. 34), the audit would take place prior to the appraisal of the second phase project and inform its safeguards instruments and capacity enhancement measures. Therefore, the social impact assessment covenant was not complied with partly due to delays in the implementation of activities to be assessed. The ICR concluded that as the implementation process was not well followed, the project did not fully comply with OP/BP 4.01.

## b. Fiduciary Compliance

**Financial management.** Financial management was rated unsatisfactory by the Bank until mid-2013. After the accountant was replaced, it gradually improved, and in 2017 it was rated Satisfactory.. Initial problems were reportedly due to the absence of the administrative and accounting manual, a financial management system and computer hardware; duplicate payments in bank statements; absence of periodic bank reconciliations; and inefficient internal control mechanisms. In 2013, the World Bank upgraded the financial management performance rating to Moderately Satisfactory as improvements had been noted with the preparation of the manual and financial management system, as well as high quality of interim financial reports and an unqualified opinion on project account by the external auditor. This continued through the rest of implementation, and in 2017, the rating was upgraded to Satisfactory.

**Procurement.** The project was overall in compliance with procurement procedures (ICR p. 35). Although procurement was slow during the first few project years, no mis-procurement was noted. Procurement performance was by the Bank rated Moderately Satisfactory during most of the implementation period and Satisfactory in 2017. The procurement delays were the result of unavailability of national and international interest in advertised bids and difficulties within the PIU to use revised procurement procedures.

## c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

No unintended impacts were reported.

## d. Other

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## 11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
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Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

## 12. Lessons

The ICR provided comprehensive lessons. The most important follow with some modification of language:

**Partnering with relevant regional organizations helps better coordination and project implementation and hence leads to better project results impacting regions as a whole.** The Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (CSRP) played an important role through facilitating dialogue between participating fisheries ministries under the Regional Steering Committee (RSC) and enhancing data transparency across the sub-region through the dashboard. CSRP was also in a good position to guide the government on particularly procurement and M&E, and facilitate collaboration with other countries in areas of mutual interest, such as stock assessments and surveillance, as it had the experience from the first set of WARFP projects. .

**Reforming the fisheries sector to generate sustainable benefits requires an incremental approach and long -term commitment.** As demonstrated by this project, APL/Series of operations type of instrument may be beneficial. Reforms involving changing behavior to control resource use and reduce illegal actions in a context of limited government budgets and capacities requires considerable allocations of time and capacity building actions, particularly in initial phase. Second phase projects can focus around countries' priority investments with emphasis on further strengthening institutions to ensure that fisheries management functions are sustainable, and engaging communities in fisheries management.

IEG developed the following lesson:

To achieve an objective such increased value addition from local fisheries sector, many constraints need to be addressed and it is not realistic to include such an objective for projects dealing mainly with institutional capacity development. The gaps in Guinea Bissau were small/artisanal fisheries industry in the country was lacking and funds needed to be mobilized from the private sector to create a local industry; also local landing and marketing infrastructure, particularly a functioning port was missing. These activities were beyond the scope of the project. Therefore, the project activities were weakly linked to this objective, yet the PDO was not revised during the course of implementation.

## 13. Assessment Recommended?

Yes



Please explain

This is one of the first fisheries governance projects implemented as part of a program in the West Africa region, and it could provide important learning opportunities when assessed together with other projects in the region.

#### **14. Comments on Quality of ICR**

The ICR was quite comprehensive as well as included good formulation of lessons. However, the ICR had weaknesses regarding quality of evidence and analysis in general, for example the ICR did not provide adequate assessment of the third PDO regarding value addition in the sector. Also, the efficiency analysis did not measure the true economic benefit and had weak assumptions.

##### **a. Quality of ICR Rating**

Substantial