



Report Number : ICRR0020763

1. Project Data

Project ID

P106063

Project Name

3A-West Africa Fisheries - Phase 1

Country

Western Africa

Practice Area(Lead)

Environment & Natural Resources

Additional Financing

P124844

L/C/TF Number(s)

IDA-46620,IDA-46630,IDA-46650,IDA-H5240,IDA-H7290

Closing Date (Original)

15-Dec-2014

Total Project Cost (USD)

112,600,000.00

Bank Approval Date

20-Oct-2009

Closing Date (Actual)

15-Sep-2016

IBRD/IDA (USD)
Grants (USD)

Original Commitment

45,000,000.00

0.00

Revised Commitment

35,986,256.66

0.00

Actual

33,377,829.69

0.00

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Project ID

P108941

Project Name
3A-West Africa Fisheries GEF (FISH)
(P108941)
L/C/TF Number(s)

TF-95536,TF-95537,TF-95538

Closing Date (Original)

15-Dec-2014

Total Project Cost (USD)

56,300,000.00



Bank Approval Date

20-Oct-2009

Closing Date (Actual)

15-Sep-2016

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	10,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	9,298,960.67
Actual	0.00	9,298,960.67

Project ID

P124242

Project Name

WARFP APL - A1: Additional
Financing (P124242)

L/C/TF Number(s)

TF-95536,TF-95537,TF-95538

Closing Date (Original)

Total Project Cost (USD)

10,000,000.00

Bank Approval Date

28-Jun-2011

Closing Date (Actual)

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	10,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	1,966,355.44
Actual	0.00	1,966,355.44

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP) is a series of 3 overlapping Adaptable Program Loans (APLs). Each APL will have two phases of five years for each phase.

The Project Development Objective (PDO) and Global environment Objective (GEO) of the first phase of APL-A (or A1) as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, p. 11) and all four Financing Agreements



were identical except that "the Recipient" mentioned in the individual financing agreements was specified in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) as "Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone." The PDO/GEO as articulated in the PAD (p. 11) was to:

"strengthen the capacity of Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone to govern and manage targeted fisheries, reduce illegal fishing and increase local value added to fish products."

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
No

d. Components

The project included four components of which GEF financed part of components 1 and 4 while IDA financed all four components.

1. Good Governance and Sustainable Management of the Fisheries (appraisal cost: US\$9.8 million, actual cost: US\$16.95 million). The aim of this component was to build the capacity of Governments and stakeholders to implement a shared approach that would ensure that the marine fish resources would be used in a manner that was environmentally sustainable, socially fair and economically profitable. It included the following four sub-components:

1.1. Development of the Capacity, Rules, Procedures and Practices for Good Governance of the Fisheries. This sub-component included technical assistance, training, goods and equipment and operating costs for: (a) a strengthened policy and regulatory framework for the use of the fish resources; (b) implementation of vessel registration and maintenance of vessel registries, initially for selected fisheries; (c) assessment of the biological and economic status of key fish stocks, as the basis for management; (d) development of tools at the community, national and regional level to ensure transparency and accessibility of basic fisheries management information for controlling access to the resources; and (e) preparation and implementation of management plans that set levels of sustainable exploitation for targeted fisheries.

1.2. Introduction of Fishing Rights. This sub-component includes technical assistance, training, small community works, and goods for piloting: (a) the introduction/strengthening of fishing rights to targeted industrial fisheries; and (b) the introduction of fishing rights to small-scale fisheries through a process of co-management.

1.3. Adjustment of Fishing Effort and Capacity to more Sustainable Levels, Introduction of Alternative Livelihoods where Needed. This sub-component included small grants to communities, micro-finance to fishers, buy-outs of fishing vessels and technical assistance for those fisheries that were already overexploited, in order to provide: (a) support to industrial fishing vessel owners to reduce fishing effort; (b) transition of fishers working on industrial fishing vessels into alternative livelihoods; and (c)



transition of small-scale fishers and fish processors to alternative livelihoods.

1.4. Social Marketing, Communication and Transparency. This subcomponent includes technical assistance, consultations and operating costs for: (a) social marketing and communication; and (b) a network of independent journalists reporting on the Program.

2. Reduction of Illegal Fishing (appraisal cost: US\$17.70 million, actual cost: US\$9.80 million). This component aimed to improve the fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) systems of participating countries and adapt them to the needs of fisheries management, within the framework of a coordinated approach between the participating countries. It included the following three sub-components:

2.1. Enabling Environment for Reducing Illegal Fishing. This sub-component included technical assistance for: (a) the strengthening or development of appropriate legal frameworks, judicial institutions and practices applicable to illegal fishing vessels and activities; and (b) the implementation of adequate financing mechanisms for fisheries surveillance.

2.2. Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) Systems. This sub-component included goods, works, operating costs and technical assistance for: (a) effective coordination of fisheries surveillance operations; (b) development of MCS plans and strategies; and (c) implementation of sustainable fisheries surveillance systems (including monitoring centers and stations, sea patrols and satellite-based vessel monitoring systems).

2.3. Strengthened Regional Collaboration for MCS. This sub-component included technical assistance to enable the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (CSRP) to monitor and support the network of Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) systems among the countries.

3. Increasing the Contribution of the Marine Fish Resources to the Local Economies (appraisal cost: US\$11.60million, actual cost: US\$4.96 million). The aim of this component was to increase the benefits to West Africa from the marine fish resources, by increasing the share of the value-added captured in the region. It included the following two sub-components:

3.1. Fish Landing Site Clusters. This sub-component included goods and works for construction of one or two key fish landing sites in each country, as economic clusters, including: (a) basic infrastructure such as jetties, cold storage and electricity; and (b) clusters of economic support services, such as ice production, repair of vessels and gear, provision of fuel, quality control, auction and marketing infrastructure, etc.

3.2. Fish Product Trade Infrastructure, Information and Systems – Regional Minimum Integrated Trade Expansion Platform (MITEP). This sub-component included goods, works, training and technical assistance for: (a) a national and regional network of quality control infrastructure and trade information and services, to support increased exports of fish products from West Africa; (b) a regional proactive trade information system to ensure traceability of targeted supply chains; and (c) training and technical assistance to local enterprises.

4. Coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation and Program Management (appraisal cost: US\$7.20 million IDA, actual cost: US\$12.64 million). The aim of this component was to support the countries to implement the Program in the context of the CSRP Strategic Action Plan, and to monitor and evaluate results. This component would support the following two sub-components:

4.1. National Implementation. This subcomponent included goods, works, technical assistance, training and operating costs for national Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in each participating country,



embedded within the agency or Ministry in charge of fisheries, and staffed by external and local project management specialists.

4.2. Regional Coordination. This sub-component included technical assistance and consultations for a Regional Coordination Unit at the CSRP, in order to: (a) support the harmonization of fisheries policy within the region; (b) conduct monitoring and evaluation of Program investments and share information and results throughout the region; (c) implement ongoing communication activities to raise awareness about the Program and implementation progress; and (d) provide implementation support to each of the countries, including the coordination of regional procurement.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost. The total project cost was expected to be US\$56.30 million. Actual cost as reported by the ICR (Annex 1) was US\$55.23million.

Financing. The project was to be financed through an IDA Credit worth US\$45 million and a GEF Grant worth US\$10.00 million. Actual amount disbursed was US\$42.61 and US\$9.31 million for the IDA Credit and GEF Grant, respectively. On October 28, 2011 the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (CSRP) received a US\$2.00 million IDA Grant. Also, in 2011 the World Bank secured a US\$10.00 million Africa Catalytic Growth Fund (ACGF) Grant (P124242) as additional financing to Liberia (US\$2 million, TF010654) and Sierra Leone (US\$8.00 million, TF010655). The ICR Annex 1 did not report the actual amounts disbursed for the CSRP and ACGF grants. It was also unclear how these grants fitted in the cost structure of the project. The ICR (p. 1) stated that "the performance of activities financed by the ACGF is described as part this ICR but will be fully evaluated separately after the closing of P159912 in June 2017."

Borrower Contribution. Total Government contributions was expected to be \$1.3 million of counterpart funds. Actual amount contributed according to the ICR (Annex 1) was US\$1.66 million part of which was an in-kind contribution.

Dates. The project was expected to close on December 15, 2014. Actual closing date was 21 months later on September 15, 2016. The project was restructured six times, five were Level 2 restructurings while one was an additional financing as follows:

1. On June 2, 2011, amount disbursed was US\$5.25 million, in order to allow the countries and the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission to access new financing sources previously unavailable, thereby scaling up the impacts of the project in terms of increased contribution of the marine fish resources to the local economies and regional information management capacities. Changes included US\$2.00 million Africa Catalytic Growth Fund (ACGF) to Liberia for the rehabilitation of the Mesurado Pier fish landing site; US\$8.00 million ACGF to Sierra Leone to support the development of the Kissy Harbor in Sierra Leone as a fish landing site, US\$2.00 million regional IDA grant to the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (CSRP) to support expansion of a regional fisheries information system by the CSRP. Also, some revisions were introduced to the Results Framework.

2. On December 10, 2012, the amount disbursed was US\$12.86 million, in order to address



implementation delays in Senegal due to project management weaknesses. Changes under restructuring included refocusing on key priorities, and reducing implementation complexities. Changes included dropping the fishing landing site cluster in Kafountine and increased focus on completion and maintenance of artisanal registry, consolidation and strengthening of community management structures established by the recently closed Integrated Management of Coastal and Marine Resources Project (GIRMaC) and the Sustainable Management of Fish Resources Project (GDRH) and fish resource rehabilitation measures, and securing rights for artisanal fleet. Dropping activities related to research and support for local artisanal counsels. Modification of local surveillance efforts and capacity building for local registration. There were also revisions to the Results Framework, the financing plan and to the implementation schedule to accommodate changes in design.

3. On July 24, 2013, the amount disbursed was US\$17.62 million, in order to accommodate implementation delays in Cabo Verde. Changes under restructuring included downscaling alternative livelihoods and landing site clusters, refocusing of resources around strengthened governance and surveillance, reallocation of proceeds, revisions to PDO level and intermediate results level indicators, and revisions to project costs to accommodate changes in design.

4. On December 15, 2014, the amount disbursed was US\$38.00 million, in order to address slower than planned implementation progress in all countries and a need to shift funding to priority national activities. Changes included extension of closing date by twelve months to December 15, 2015, reallocation of proceeds, suspension of a buyback program for industrial fishing vessels in Senegal, changes in disbursement schedule and change the target years of the Results Framework to accommodate the extension.

5. On December 8, 2015, the amount disbursed was US\$39.01 million, in order to extend the closing date by nine months to September 15, 2016 and reallocation of proceeds. Changes under restructuring included disbursement estimates and a modified implementation schedule to reflect the extension; removal of the legal covenant on vessel buyback in Senegal to reflect the removal of this activity in 2014, and addition of a legal covenant on a micro-credit program in Cabo Verde.

6. On August 8, 2016, the amount disbursed was US\$43.14 million, in order to enhance the ability of countries to capture the project's results by setting more relevant and measurable indicators and targets. Changes under restructuring included revision of PDO indicators and targets (change to end of project targets of two indicators, dropping of one indicator and addition of two new indicators); revision of intermediate results indicators and targets (revised phrasing of four indicators, revised end of project targets of three indicators, dropping of one indicator, and addition of eight new indicators).

The Mid-Term Review (MTR) was scheduled to be on January 15, 2012 (PAD, Annex 16). It was carried out on February 3, 2013.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

The marine fish stocks constitute a significant natural asset for the countries of West Africa, which is trans-boundary in nature. More than 1.6 million tons of fish were legally captured in West African waters each year,



with an estimated wholesale value of US\$2.5 billion. This valuable natural asset was likely to remain over the near to medium term as one of the main components of economic growth in the region. However, the region's fisheries face three key constraints: lack of governance, large amounts of illegal fishing and the lack of local value added. The result of these three constraints was that the size of West Africa's marine fisheries asset was much smaller than it should be, and much of the value of even this reduced asset leaves the region. At project appraisal, objectives of the first APL were highly relevant to the priorities of the fisheries sector for the governments of the four participating countries (Cabo Verde, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone). Objectives were also in line with the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (CSRP) Strategic Action Plan for fisheries (2002 - 2010) which focused in particular on strengthening resource management and increased monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) activities to reduce illegal fishing. Objectives were also in line with the Bank's Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa (RIAS, 2008) which noted that one of the main rationales for Bank's support to regional integration in Africa was the need for assistance with the management of shared natural resources, such as fisheries. One of the three pillars of the RIAS was to support coordinated interventions to provide regional public goods, focusing on regional water resources, forestry and fisheries. The RIAS also highlighted that the trans boundary nature of fisheries required regional collaboration to ensure sustainable harvesting and to prevent conflicts. In addition, objectives of the program were endorsed by the Conference of Ministers of Fisheries of the member states of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission on October 26 – 27, 2007 and December 5, 2008. Objectives were also in line with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy for Cape Verde (CAS, FY09-FY12). The CAS (p. 16) stated that the fisheries sector needs investment in infrastructure and strengthening of its institutional and regulatory framework in order to reduce small-scale fishing effort, promote alternative livelihoods to fishing, and adjust industrial fisheries to their commercial potential. Objectives were also in line with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy for Liberia (CAS, FY09-FY11) which identified fisheries as a shared resource with potential growth particularly through regional approaches (CAS, p. 21). Objectives were also in line with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy for Senegal (CAS, FY07-FY10) which identified fisheries as one among five areas of comparative advantage for Senegal. The CAS (p. 28) called for promoting sustainable development and management of natural resources including fisheries. Objectives were also in line with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy for Sierra Leone (CAS, FY06-FY09) which identified fisheries as an area that would benefit from added value (CAS, p. 21).

The GEO was also in line with the GEF's Strategic Objective 2, which aimed at catalyzing trans-boundary actions that address issues such as overexploitation of fish stock and associated biodiversity, and was consistent with SP1 (Restoring and Sustaining Coastal and Marine Fish Stocks and Associated Biological Diversity) of the International Waters Focal Area, under the GEF-4.

At project completion, objectives continue to be highly relevant at global, regional and country levels.

- At the global level, the project's objective was in line with the recommendations of the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010) and the UN General Assembly Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 to "conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development".
- At the regional level, the project's objective was in line with the Abidjan Convention and its regional approach to meeting transboundary marine environmental challenges, the Policy Framework and Reform Strategy for Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa that was endorsed by the Second Conference of African



Ministers of Fisheries and Aquaculture (CAMFA) in April 2014, and the AU's June 2014 Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods.

- At the country level, objectives were in line with the Bank's Cabo Verde's Country Partnership Strategy (CPS, FY15-17). The CPS included improvement of the fisheries sector's performance as a driver of poverty reduction, and in 2013, the government adopted a new Sector Policy Letter which aligns with the objective of the project. Objectives were also in line with the Bank's Liberia CPS (FY13-FY17) that sought to improve the management and productivity of fisheries, and the objective of the project was also in line with the Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy and Strategy of 2015. Objectives were in line with the Bank's Senegal CPS (FY13-17) CPS which sought to improve sustainable management of fishery resources. The CPS noted that the West Africa Regional Fisheries Program was the key program to improve governance in the sector and strengthen the entire fisheries value chain. Finally, objectives were in line with the Bank's Joint Country Assistance Strategy for Sierra Leone (FY10-13) which the World Bank continues to engage and operate under, and its outcome on enhanced productivity in agriculture and fisheries. Sierra Leone's government was in the process of revising its 2010 Fisheries Policy to reflect West Africa Regional Fisheries Program-supported priorities.

Rating

High

b. Relevance of Design

The West Africa Regional Fisheries Program (WARFP) was designed as a multi-phase Adaptable Program Loan (APL). Design of the first phase included a clear and focused statement of objectives. The Results Framework did not include clear links between the project inputs, outputs and expected outcomes.

Nevertheless, the detailed project description (PAD, Annex 4) included relevant details on these aspects. To achieve the stated objective, design featured three main components that were directly linked to the three elements of the PDO (building the capacity for governance of the fisheries sector; combating and reducing illegal fishing; and increasing local landings and value added of fish products). The first component included activities that would ensure that the marine fish resources would be used in an environmentally sustainable manner, socially fair and economically profitable. The second component included activities that would contribute to combating and reducing illegal fishing. The third component included activities that would contribute to increasing local landings and value added of fish products. The fourth component addressed national and regional coordination to ensure technical support to countries' low capacities and policy harmonization, and to address the regional dimension of the fisheries resources. The activities supported under the project components were relevant and directly linked to the PDO. Design could have benefited from the inclusion of aquaculture activities (even as a pilot) so as to provide an alternative means for meeting the demand for fish while reducing the pressure on capture fisheries.

However, design suffered from several shortcomings including underestimating the time and the amount of technical support required for the project to fully achieve the PDO in view of the limited experience of the four participating countries and the low capacities in the sector. Another design element that constrained the project was the aim to develop fish landing sites in Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone without prior consultations on these sites jointly with the governments and without site-specific environmental assessments in Senegal and



Liberia. As a result some activities were either cancelled or partially achieved. Design also underestimated the issue of incentives in the public sector to enforce access restriction on industrial boats, which traditionally had been an important formal and informal source of revenue for the sector.

Overall, relevance of design suffered from significant shortcomings and hence it is rated modest.

Rating
Modest

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

PDO: strengthen the capacity of Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone to govern and manage targeted fisheries, reduce illegal fishing and increase local value added to fish products.

The stated PDO has three elements (sub-objectives) that will be rated independently:

- (a) to strengthen the capacity of the four countries to govern and manage targeted fisheries;
- (b) to strengthen the capacity of the four countries to reduce illegal fishing in targeted fisheries; and
- (c) to strengthen the capacity of the four countries to increase local value added to fish products.

Rationale

(a) to strengthen the capacity of the four countries to govern and manage targeted fisheries. Rated: Substantial.

Outputs

The source of the results below is the ICR Results Framework Analysis.

- **Clear principles and policies are established to increase the wealth from fisheries through strengthened rights and equitable allocation of these rights which balances economic efficiency and social benefits.**
 - **Cabo Verde:** a Strategic Fisheries Development Plan (a policy statement for 2012-2017) was adopted by the government in 2014 as a government 'letter of sector policy' along with an implementation action plan. A Fisheries Act was developed and is under review for approval by the new government.
 - **Liberia:** a new Fisheries and Aquaculture Policy and Strategy was approved by the Cabinet in June 2015, defining national priorities and actions for developing the sector by 2030. A draft revised Fisheries Act was finalized and endorsed by Cabinet in July 2016. This indicator was revised to better capture the results of project financed legal and institutional reform interventions.



- **Senegal:** the 1998 Marine Fisheries Code was revised and adopted by the National Assembly in 2015, and promulgated by the President in 2016, including provisions for community-led fisheries management. A Marine Fisheries Decree was circulated for signature.
- **Sierra Leone:** policy reform was supported by NEPAD. The 2010 Fisheries Policy was not revised; a Fisheries and Aquaculture Bill and a Five Year Strategic Plan were reviewed but not validated; fisheries regulation was revised but not enacted; a Management Functional Review, including financial costing, was carried out but not approved by Cabinet.
- **Revised (August 2016): Legal and institutional framework for allocation of fishing rights to communities in place.**
 - Cabo Verde: Achieved.
 - Senegal: Achieved.
 - Liberia: Achieved.
 - Sierra Leone: not reported.
- **Small-scale fishing vessels in targeted fisheries that were registered (% of total).**
 - Cabo Verde: baseline: 50%, at completion: 100% (target achieved).
 - Liberia: baseline none, at completion: 100% (target achieved).
 - Senegal: baseline: 60%, at completion: 100% (target achieved).
 - Sierra Leone: baseline none, at completion: 100% (target achieved).
- **Registered small-scale fishing vessels that were allocated and enforced with current general fishing permits (% of total)**
 - Senegal: baseline: 30%, at completion: 55% compared to a target of 100% (partially achieved).
- **Registered small-scale fishing vessels that were allocated and enforced with defined and specified individual fishing/access rights (specified and legally recognized fishing license for small-scale fisheries) (% of total).**
 - Senegal: baseline none, target: 50%, actual achievement: none (target not achieved).
- **Specified individual fishing license scheme for small-scale fisheries in Senegal approved by the ministry in charge of fisheries**
 - Senegal: Not achieved.
- **Ratio of total number of fishing licenses in semi-industrial fisheries compared to total number of registered vessels in Cabo Verde (percentage):** baseline: 26%, actual achievement by completion: 57% compared to a target of 65%.
- **Ratio of total number of fishing licenses in artisanal fisheries compared to total number of registered vessels in Cabo Verde (percentage):** baseline: 4%, actual achievement by completion: 22% compared to a target of 55%.
- **Communities that were allocated fishing rights.**
 - Cabo Verde: baseline: none, at completion: none, target: 4 communities.
 - Liberia: baseline: none, at completion: 1, target: 2 communities.
 - Senegal: baseline: none, at completion: 20, target: 8 communities
 - Sierra Leone: none, at completion: none, target: 15 communities
- **Number of legally established Local Fishers Committees (CLP) which were allocated defined and**



legally recognized fishing rights (functioning as Territorial Use Rights Fisheries including the ones managing the Protected Fishing Zones and Artificial Reef Immersion Zone) in Senegal:

baseline: none, at completion: 8 compared to a target of 12.

- **Number of Fisheries Management Plans prepared for targeted fisheries and set levels of sustainable exploitation for these targeted fisheries, and create rights and allocation mechanism for those fisheries in Senegal:** baseline: none, at completion: 2, target: 2 communities.
- **Percentage of alternative livelihoods undertaken by artisanal fishers and members of crew from industrial vessel receiving micro finance access and small enterprise training from the project, sustained profitably in Senegal:** baseline: none, actual achievement at completion: 84% compared to an original target of 40% and a revised target of 70%. The alternative livelihoods undertaken included Poultry Farms (broilers and layers), Farms for beef fattening and stores for maritime hardware.
- **Number of vessels reduced in targeted fisheries that were overexploited:**
 - Cabo Verde: baseline: none, actual achievement at completion: unknown, target: 50
 - Liberia: not reported
 - Senegal: baseline (licensed industrial trawlers): none, actual achievement at completion: none, target: 10
 - Sierra Leone: no data.
- **Number of artisanal fishers and fish processors undertaking alternative livelihoods outside the fisheries sector and receiving micro-finance access and small enterprise training from the project in Cabo Verde:** baseline: none, actual achievement at completion: none, target: 40.

Outcome

- Territorial Use Rights Fisheries (TURFs) for coastal fisheries were legally established in two of the four countries: one in Liberia and eight in Senegal as planned. While Community Management Associations with proposed management areas were formed and officially established by local authorities (State/Island level) and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development in Cabo Verde and Sierra Leone, respectively, they were not officially provided with fishing rights/areas by the ministries in charge of fisheries before project closing, and therefore the governance target was not achieved by project completion for the latter two countries. In addition, the project fell short on achieving some of its output/intermediate outcomes targets. The ICR (Annex 3, p. 76) reported that Senegal was not successful in limiting the increase in the fishing effort of the small-scale segment.
- In a further communication after the preparation of this Review, the project team explained that the increase in fishing effort in the small-scale segment in Senegal was mainly the result of the decrease in the industrial segment which opened a space for the artisanal segment. The team also explained that "developing TURFs was a 10-15-year process involving three steps: (i) establishing an association of users, (ii) developing a set of rules approved by the association of users, and (iii) official recognition of the association and the set of rules regarding allocation of fishing rights ." With the project's efforts, all three steps were completed in Senegal and in Liberia and two out of three steps were completed in Cabo Verde and in Sierra Leone. This in turn reflected an improved ability to manage fisheries by managing the fishing



effort (monitor entry and exit) in a bottom-up approach.

- There were also encouraging signs of improved capacity at the regional level where according to the project team the project supported establishing a joint database of fisheries management variables as a tool to improve cooperation; and all countries have approved proceedings to arrest and prosecute vessels on behalf of another country with several joint surveillance operations were held already. Also, at the national level, the team noted that "securing space for the small-scale segment through management of the industrial segment to a precautionary level was a recommendation that has been followed by the governments of Cabo Verde, Liberia and Senegal beyond the initial expectations."
- Based on the afore mentioned information, outcome of this sub-objective is rated substantial despite some shortcomings.

Rating

Substantial

Objective 2

Objective

(b) to strengthen the capacity of the four countries to reduce illegal fishing in targeted fisheries. Rated: Substantial.

Rationale

Outputs

The source of the results below is the ICR Results Framework Analysis.

- **Total patrol days at sea per year in targeted fisheries (number of total patrol days/year).**
 - Cabo Verde: baseline: 70 days, actual: 196 days, target:150 days
 - Liberia: baseline: none, actual: 9 days, target: 100 days. The low number of patrols in Liberia reflects the reduction in illegal fishing in the country's waters, which necessitated less surveillance efforts (ICR p. xxvii).
 - Senegal: baseline: 200, actual:768 days, target: 400 days
 - Sierra Leone: baseline: 348 days, actual: 305 days, target: 696 days
- **Total patrol operations at the dockside per year in Liberia (days):** baseline: none, actual: 25 days, target: 21 days.
- **National Fisheries Inspectors established and operational in Cabo Verde.** Cabo Verde trained 22 fisheries inspectors and assigned them to the islands to inspect fishing vessels both onshore and at sea in collaboration with the coastguard. This activity created a positive impact as fishing vessels began to adhere to harvesting rules. This activity is sustainable as the government has since absorbed the inspectors as employees paid by the government.
- **A satellite-based fishing vessel monitoring system (VMS) is in place and functioning in all four**



participating countries.

- **Two coastal fisheries stations (target: 2, baseline: none) were established and operating for participatory fisheries surveillance purposes in Cabo Verde.**

Outcome

- In Cabo Verde, illegal fishing activities were reduced from 42% to 2.4% compared to the target of 20% (ICR, para 59). In Liberia illegal coastal fishing dropped from 83% at baseline to 33% in 2016 (ICR, para 60). Also, Liberian coastal communities experienced a change in fish availability with the sizes of all fish landed increasing and the overall volumes of fish caught more than doubling the levels in 2009, as confirmed by sampling on fish landings carried out by the project-funded Community Sciences program. These findings were reaffirmed by a recent World Bank study (Chu, J., Garlock, T.M., and Sayon, P. (2016) Impact Evaluation of Fisheries Development Projects. Washington, D.C: World Bank) which showed that the project improved the health of Liberia's fisheries following the significant reduction of illegal trawlers in the nearshore area. Also, feedback from fishing communities revealed that reduction in illegal fishing might have led to fewer conflicts with illegal fishers.
- While these results were encouraging, the impact of the project on illegal fishing activities in Senegal and Sierra Leone was not clear in the ICR. The changing in the wording of outcome indicators and changing targets several times made it difficult to assess the exact impact of the project activities in these two countries. In addition, the achievements in Liberia were a result of the project's support and parallel support from the US Coast Guard, United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (US NOAA) and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which raises the question of attribution.
- In a further communication after the preparation of this Review, the project team explained that in Senegal there was a 70% decrease in illegal fishing in artisanal exclusive areas at targeted sites. These results were made possible by providing for equipment and operating costs at major coastal surveillance stations at four sites. The team also noted that the project piloted participatory surveillance in which fishermen participated in surveillance operations. According to the team this "has contributed to a change of mindset as responsible fishers were able to take action and influence their peers."
- The team also explained that surveillance was nonexistent in Sierra Leone before the project. The project established the Joint Maritime Committee (JMC) through a partnership with relevant national agencies. The JMC was equipped with a Vessel Monitoring System. The presence of Monitoring Control and Surveillance (MCS) capacity was enough for foreign trawlers to start requesting licenses in Sierra Leone. As a result, official revenues from licensing of foreign industrial trawlers increased significantly to from US\$0.7 million in 2009 to US\$7.45million (compared to a PAD target of US\$1.4 million) in 2016 according to information provided by the project team. Finally, the team explained that the project built capacity and know how to strengthen fisheries surveillance. The project also worked with partners "as has always been the case because surveillance at sea requires cooperation between agencies whose mandate goes beyond fisheries."
- Based on the afore mentioned information and factoring in the success of the project in strengthening the capacity to govern and manage targeted fisheries, IEG finds enough evidence that the project also



succeeded in strengthening the capacity of the four countries to reduce illegal fishing in targeted fisheries. Therefore, outcome of this sub-objective is rated substantial.

Rating

Substantial

Objective 3

Objective

(c) to strengthen the capacity of the four countries to increase local value added to fish products.

Rated: Substantial.

Rationale

Outputs

The source of the results below is the ICR Results Framework Analysis.

- Pilot integrated fish landing site clusters established and operational (not achieved).
- One cold storage facility was established in Cabo Verde, however, it was not operational (partially achieved).
- In Cabo Verde, an enhanced fishing port (with water/electricity supply stations and auction hall) was established, but was not operational. An auction hall was completed and water and electricity supply stations were established and were functional, however the enhanced port was not operational due to delays caused by change in government, which intends to cause changes in the staffing of the port (partially achieved).
- An ice-making facility was in place and functional in Sal Island Cabo Verde (target achieved).
- An auction market at fishing port was set up and functional at island of Santiago in Cabo Verde (target achieved).
- No competent sanitary authority (CA) accredited for certification of exports to the European Union was established in any of the four participating countries (target not achieved). In Senegal, the project enhanced the capacity of the Ministry of Fisheries' Directorate of Fisheries Processing Industries to establish a Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) system, to implement a quality approach according to ISO 17020 and ISO 17025 standards, and to have in place control of the cold chain in fish processing and conservation units.
- In Liberia, the project funded a food safety policy, HACCP regulation and best practices, regulations on specific rules for quality control and additives, and lists of needed equipment and material for the Sanitary Authority. The design of the sanitary facilities was also prepared and a contract was awarded for its construction by project closing (target: sanitary authority for fish handling established, partially achieved).



Outcome

- As reported above, the project fell short on achieving several output/intermediate outcome targets. Furthermore, the original outcome indicator (*increase or stabilization in the volume of exports from targeted fisheries*) was dropped in 2016 due to an attribution gap; since exports were the result of a set of factors largely outside the control of the project which did not support any activities directly related to exports. A new outcome indicator was introduced in August 2016, one month before the project closed. The new indicator assessed post-harvest handling capacity at targeted sites measured by tons per year. The data reported in the ICR (p. xix) showed that Cabo Verde increased post harvest handling from 2500 tons per year in 2009 to 5,000 tons per year by project completion, target achieved. Also, Senegal increased post harvest handling from 17,500 tons per year in 2009 to 32,704 tons per year by project completion compared to a target of 18,500 tons/year. Liberia failed to achieve its target of 5,039 ton per year because cold rooms and an improved smoking oven were not completed before project closing. No data was reported on Sierra Leone. While the results on Cabo Verde and in Senegal were encouraging, there were still concerns about attribution as it was not clear how the project supported activities that contributed to the increments in post-harvest handling. Finally, the ICR reported that "fish landing sites were not completed in Liberia and Sierra Leone by project closing" (para 62).
- In a further communication after preparing this Review, the project team explained that in Cabo Verde, the project built an ice plant with a 15-ton ice production capacity (to extend the freshness of the fish which increases its value). The project also financed drinking water, electricity and sanitation systems (to provide a decent working environment), and an auction facility (to facilitate fish sales) at the fishing port of Praia. The incremental increase in post-harvest handling capacity was a direct result of the ice plant and improvement work at Praia. The team also explained that in Senegal, the project financed work at landing sites for Senegal to retain the EU accreditation. Without these investments, several landing sites would have lost their accreditation and would not have been authorized to continue export to the EU market, thereby decreasing their post-harvest handling capacity.
- With regards to the infrastructure construction at Mesurado and Robertsport in Liberia, the team explained that the infrastructure funded under the project was completed (this is new information that became available after the ICR). According to the team, infrastructure improvements resulted in better sanitary and work conditions. For example, travel along the rehabilitated access road has reduced travel times, the Bureau of National Fisheries was now housed in new offices where they were able to perform their duties. The caretakers of the Robertsport site have reported on the use of the fish smoking ovens at the landing site. The fuel supply, gear store and engine workshops were all working.
- With regards to In Sierra Leone, although landing sites were not built, the team explained that the project indirectly contributed to foreign investments in processing units, thereby leading to the same outcome. The Sierra Leonean requirement to land a third of catch in Sierra Leone was not implemented before the project because of the lack of surveillance capacity. With improvements in enforcement capacity, processing units were built to process and export Yellow Croaker, a highly valuable fish in Korea. Before the project, the catches were transshipped at sea on a larger boat for direct export, without notifying the Sierra Leonean administration.
- Based on the information reported in the ICR and new information provided by the team, there is enough



evidence that the project succeeded in strengthening the capacity of the four countries to increase local value added to fish products. therefore outcome of this sub-objective is rated substantial despite some shortcomings.

Rating
Substantial

5. Efficiency

Economic and Financial Efficiency *ex-ante*

- The PAD included a basic economic model of coastal demersal fisheries in the four countries to estimate the direct quantifiable benefits of the project. These benefits were measured as net revenue at first sale after fish landing so they did not capture enhanced benefits through the entire value chain. The anticipated benefits under a reform scenario in the four countries were compared to a baseline scenario.
- The economic analysis included three impact assumptions: a 33% reduction in small scale fishing effort in Cabo Verde, a full reduction in bottom trawling within six miles off the coast in Liberia and Sierra Leone; and a 50% reduction in coastal trawling effort and a freeze on small scale fishing effort in Senegal.
- The project investments were expected to lead to increased profitability in coastal fisheries in the order of US\$39 million over the five-year period from 2010 through 2014. Adding in the returns to labor and increased value added from fish landing site infrastructure, the total net economic benefits from the project investments in the four countries were estimated at US\$75 million over the five-year period, for an economic internal rate of return of 16%.

ex post

- Project efficiency was analyzed from five different aspects for each of the four countries: public revenues generated through surveillance activities, benefits due to physical recovery of fish resources (natural capital), flow of benefits of investments in infrastructure (produced capital), benefits of improved processes due to enhanced practice, technology and information; and benefits of strengthened capacity at regional, national and local levels (human/social capital).
- The project was the beginning of a long-term process towards sustainable fisheries for the countries, and achieving the long-term outcome of sustainable fisheries required appropriate sequencing of numerous activities. Therefore, full results that can be evaluated in a standard economic (or financial) analysis



framework were yet to materialize (ICR, para 69). That said, the project could have benefitted from a cost effectiveness analysis of the infrastructure investments.

- Some aspects of project efficiency was demonstrated in the overall efficient use of resources, for example, the project invested a total of US\$3.62 million in actions against Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing which resulted in an estimated generated income of US\$8.05 million between 2011 and 2015, of which US\$6.22 million were from collected fines. Also, in Sierra Leone, the total project disbursement on actions against IUU fishing was US\$1.46 million while the income generated through MCS activities averaged US\$489,000 annually between 2012 and 2014 from fines alone, and the country's public revenue base substantially increased since the beginning of the project. Including license fees and royalties in 2016, these generated US\$6.57 million in revenue to the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources. However, the afore mentioned amounts represented only about 9% of the total project cost.
- However, there were other instances where efficiency suffered, for example, the loss of around US\$0.3 million of IDA funds in Liberia due to poor site selection and construction of the Bureau of National Fisheries premises, hence rendering them unusable. Also, in Sierra Leone there was a loss of around US\$0.6 million of IDA funds on the purchase of a patrol vessel that was not supplied to the government (ICR, para 70). According to the ICR (p. 31, footnote 84) the latter expense was deemed an ineligible expenditure by the Bank (for more details see section 11 b).
- There was no overall economic or financial rate of return provided ex post.

Administrative and Institutional Efficiency

The project closed 21 months later than the expected closing date. These delays were to allow more time to achieve results in three countries (Cabo Verde, Liberia and Senegal). The project in Sierra Leone was not extended due to an ongoing investigation and overall weak performance (ICR, para 15). Also, the time from approval to effectiveness was nine months for Cabo Verde and Liberia, eleven months for Senegal and 13 months for Sierra Leone, compared to the average five months for Africa in general. The lag was due to delays in fulfilling effectiveness conditions. The outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Sierra Leone and Liberia hindered implementation in these two countries in particular activities that involved public gatherings and travel, such as training and workshops, vessel registration, and international and internal travels of suppliers and contractors (ICR, para 35). In a further communication the project team highlighted that the Ebola outbreak was a "*force majeure*" that the project not only managed to overcome, but played an important role as the fishing industry helped feed the population at a time when agricultural lands were abandoned during the disease outbreak."

Overall efficiency is rated modest due to the lack of an ex-post economic and financial analysis of project investments combined with delays in the four countries and poor performance in Sierra Leone.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

- a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:



	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	16.00	100.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of objectives was rated high but the relevance of design was rated modest. Efficacy of the first, second and third sub-objectives was each rated substantial, despite some shortcomings. There was enough evidence reported in the ICR and provided by the project team that the project succeeded in strengthening the capacity of the four countries to govern, manage and reduce illegal fishing targeted fisheries. Also, new evidence provided by the project's team combined with evidence in the ICR pointed to the success of the project in strengthening the capacity of the four countries to increase local value added to fish products. Efficiency was also rated modest due to the absence of an ex-post economic and financial analysis of project investments, implementation delays and other aspects of weak performance.

In this instance, with a high rating for relevance of objectives and modest rating for relevance of design, substantial rating for all three Sub-Objectives under Efficacy, and modest rating for efficiency, the Outcome rating is moderately satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Risk to development outcome is rated substantial. The rating is based on the following factors:

- **Increased fisheries management and governance capacity.** The project helped governments of participating countries to improve fisheries management and governance capacity through the adoption of new or revised legal and regulatory instruments for the sector by Cabo Verde, Liberia and Senegal, and the preparation and adoption of fisheries management plans by the governments of Senegal and Liberia, which together form an important cornerstone of the sector's governance in the future. Improved vessel registries and licensing systems of fishing units' constituent will become useful management tools only if governments invest sufficient resources in updating and enforcing them, respectively (ICR, para 79).
- **Reduction in Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing, fisheries co-management and the post-harvest investments which the project financed in Liberia and Cabo Verde are at a high risk.** To ensure their continuation beyond the project's lifetime, these outcomes will require high levels of financing, capacity and motivation which in most cases are insufficiently available. Fisheries monitoring centers and



surveillance operations will require strong government commitment to enforce new rules combined with continued presence of trained staff, funding for equipment repair and maintenance (including high fuel costs). Once large scale operators are deterred from illegal practices, a new surveillance approach may be warranted, which could be more collaborative and based more on coastal and terrestrial-based activities, with different equipment and lower costs (ICR, para 79).

- **Funding of operation and maintenance (O&M) of existing and planned infrastructure in Cabo Verde and Liberia is a concern.** Long term Operation and maintenance of infrastructure requires functional management systems and adequate funding to cover O&M costs of the facilities financed by the project (ICR, para 79).

- **Continuity of Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission operations post project completion.** Positioning a regional dashboard at the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission could improve the continuity of its operation. However, allocation of dedicated staff independent of project-support, as well as the capacity and continued commitment of the countries to share updated information on the various data subjects, i.e., ships and licenses, fishing authorizations, monitoring of fishing and socioeconomic database, are all critical requirements for Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission sustainability (ICR, para 80).

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Substantial

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

- The choice of the APL instrument was well-suited to support the long term reforms needed in the management and use of the region's fisheries, with logical sequencing of events and phasing of activities with agreed milestones, and flexibility needed in execution.
- The preparation focused on the program framework as a whole (for nine countries) which explains the relatively high preparation cost of over US\$0.64 million from the World Bank Budget and a World Bank-executed TF in addition to US\$1.19 million in recipient-executed preparation funding from the GEF and the Japan Policy and Human Resources Development Fund (ICR, para 82).
- Preparation benefitted from a Bank team composed of a wide range of specialties, including: environmental, social, private sector development and operations specialists supported by technical consultants and fiduciary experts. There were also frequent preparation missions and meetings with the CSRP, development partners, governments and stakeholders.
- Design benefitted from the lessons and experiences of the Sustainable Fisheries Livelihood Program (SFLP) financed by DfID in West Africa. Notable lessons reflected in the design included: the need to focus on reducing vulnerability in fishing communities through cross-sectoral approaches; and the



importance of strengthening and empowering fishing communities and their organizations to engage in local development and co-management of the fisheries. Design also benefitted from the global experiences in fisheries where three lessons were emphasized: a strong governance component that would accompany any investments in sector development and local value added, in order to ensure a sustainable supply of fish to local industry; fishing rights must be tailored to the specific context of countries with respect to the fish resources in question and the uses of those resources, including the social setting and culture; and investments in surveillance and enforcements should be as low-cost and pragmatic as possible, in order for the operating costs of surveillance to be kept to sustainable levels after completion of Bank financing.

- However, there were a number of notable shortcomings that negatively impacted quality at entry including: a longer than average preparation phase that still required effectiveness conditions which resulted in significant start-up delays, a design that underestimated the time scale and the amount of technical capacity needed and incentive structures of recipient countries, failure to identify the post-harvest investment sites in advance in several cases, which later contributed to implementation delays as there was general lack of preparedness for civil works as specific sites had not been identified and agreed to with the governments in several countries, finally insufficient environmental and social assessment carried out during preparation which resulted in substantial delays under Component 3.
- Nine risks were identified at appraisal, five were rated high and four were rated substantial. While weak political willingness to prosecute fisheries infractions was identified as a high risk, the proposed mitigation measure (transparent publication of information on infractions and prosecutions) "did not prove itself a sufficient deterrent during implementation in some countries" (ICR, para 19).
- M&E suffered from weaknesses including insufficient M&E knowledge during the preparation of the Results Framework which resulted in a complex design (see section 10 for more details).
- Overall, QAE suffered from significant shortcomings and is rated moderately unsatisfactory due to design shortcomings, insufficient risk mitigation, and M&E weaknesses.

Quality-at-Entry Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The project faced challenging conditions during implementation particularly with the outbreak of Ebola virus in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The Bank carried out implementation support missions to the four countries in a frequency of one to three per year, except for Senegal which was not visited in 2012 during the temporary project freezing--after a fiduciary review conducted by the World Bank discovered ineligible expenditures (see section 11 b for more details). Missions covered operational and technical meetings with a variety of national and local stakeholders, field visits, strategic consultations with technical and financial partners, and high level discussions with government officials as needed. According to the ICR (para 83) "almost all missions were conducted jointly with the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission Regional Coordination Unit and were reinforced with technical consultants." The Regional Coordination Unit and/or technical consultants conducted independent visits to the countries in between World Bank missions to focus on specific implementation aspects. Project implementation benefitted from assigning country-Task Team Leaders (country-TTLs) to each of the four participating countries (in addition to the regional TTL). This



ensured frequent support to the project implementation units and improved communication with the World Bank, however, this step might have produced even better results if carried out earlier in implementation rather than in 2014.

While the restructurings and additional financing were generally helpful in refocusing project funds and setting more realistic targets, amending outcome indicators late in the project (one month before completion) raises questions about the relevance of this action. Also, safeguard compliance should have received more attention. The project could have benefitted from staffing missions with a DC-based Lead Ecologist to provide guidance/supervision on environmental compliance. There were also weaknesses in procurement prior to 2013 due to the absence of a field based procurement specialist. This was rectified in 2013 when country-based procurement specialists became more engaged and provided closer support to the projects (ICR para 85).

Overall, supervision suffered from moderate shortcomings, and is therefore rated moderately satisfactory.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

- According to the ICR (para 87) "all four countries demonstrated commitment at entry to proposed reform measures, as was evident in their adoption of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission Strategic Action Plan, articulation of sector priorities in national strategies, allocation of IDA resources and participation in project preparation." However, all four governments took longer than usual to meet effectiveness conditions which lead to start-up delays.
- The government of Cabo Verde demonstrated strong performance through the early adoption of legal and regulatory framework changes, the reduction in illegal fishing, development and deconcentration of advanced vessel registration system, and the financial uptake of several project-funded functions. However, activities in Cabo Verde slowed down during the 2016 parliamentary elections.
- The government of Liberia also demonstrated strong commitment at the highest level through its support to reduce illegal fishing, adopt revised legislation, formal allocation of fishing rights to the communities in Robertsport, and transferring US\$0.36 million to allow the continued construction of the Roberts port cluster when funding was insufficient. However, the Liberian Port Authority's took two year to officially authorize the works in Mesurado, which contributed to implementation delays.
- The government of Senegal demonstrated strong performance during the last year and a half of the project with the enactment of a new Fisheries Code and Fisheries Policy, the completion of the artisanal fishing registry and the approved national strategy for sustaining the database with an allocation in the national budget. However, ineligible expenditures incurred by the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy in 2010-2012 resulted in a project freeze in 2012.



- Performance of the government of Sierra Leone was poor in general. There were delays in the government actions on proposed revisions to the existing legal and regulatory framework concerning fisheries management; and there was a World Bank investigation of the procurement of the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and a patrol vessel.
- Overall, Borrower performance suffered from moderate shortcomings and is therefore rated moderately satisfactory.

Government Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

The project was implemented through four dedicated project implementation units (PIUs) in each of the four countries. In Cabo Verde, the PIU was under the Ministry of Environment, Rural Development and Marine Resources; in Liberia, the PIU was under the Ministry of Agriculture, Bureau of National Fisheries; in Senegal, the PIU was under the Ministry of Marine Economy, Maritime Transport and Fisheries; and in Sierra Leone, the PIU was under the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources. According to the ICR (para 91) there was continuity in project coordination and key PIU functions despite some staff turnover. The four PIUs prepared and submitted work plans, budgets, procurement plans and M&E reports in an overall timely and quality manner, and submitted acceptable financial reports and external audits. However, there were weaknesses in financial management and procurement; and safeguard compliance was not carried out as envisioned.

According to the ICR (para 92) the Regional Coordination Unit of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission provided a number of services to the participating countries, including: an independent panel of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance experts who provided guidance to the governments; linkages to a regional fishing vessel register and dashboard; exchange visits and study tours with other countries under the program; and fiduciary and M&E support to PIUs. However, the Regional Coordination Unit did not have sufficient manpower to fully respond to national agencies' vast operational needs.

Overall, the implementing agencies suffered from significant shortcomings and is therefore rated moderately unsatisfactory.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design



- M&E data was to be collected by each PIU. A full-time M&E expert was based in the Regional Coordination Unit (RCU) to provide support to the PIUs in collecting data. Local level M&E was to be carried out by the relevant communities which were to receive training and equipment to carry out these tasks.
- The Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission would develop a regional dashboard of key environmental, economic and social fisheries statistics and help governments develop similar databases at the national level, to eventually feed information to the dashboard.
- The original Results Framework included three generic outcome indicators to assess the three elements of the PDO. While these indicators were relevant and measurable, they were tailored for each country. This made the aggregation of results at the project level, where relevant, impossible at times (ICR, para 40). Also, the use of different units of measurement within a single indicator was another difficulty in the inherent design, for example, the indicator to measure the increased local value added was measured as an increase in volume of exports in USD in Cabo Verde, Senegal and Sierra Leone, however, the same indicator was measured in metric tons of fish exported in Liberia.
- The intermediate indicators in the original results framework were missing a number of elements needed to fully measure the progress of the components, for example, the alternative livelihoods activities in Cabo Verde, stocks assessments, as well as a number of regional activities to be carried out by the Sub-Regional Fishing Committee.
- Overall, there was insufficient M&E knowledge during the preparation of the Results Framework, which resulted in a complex design and a set on indicators that suffered from issues related to attribution, relevance, measurability and clarity (ICR, para 82 and para 43).

b. M&E Implementation

M&E activities benefitted from the support of the RCU. According to the ICR (para 43) "countries were able to submit semi-annual and annual reports, which were aggregated into consolidated project-level progress reports." However, the PIUs were unable to report on some indicators due to difficulties related to attribution, relevance, measurability and clarity. Systems to monitor local site conditions were put in place for all countries except for Sierra Leone. While the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission dashboard was established, both the regional and national dashboard nodes were hindered by the lack of updated socioeconomic and fisheries production data as countries had not set up a systematic way to collect and process data.

Revision of the Results Framework. Revisions to the PDO level and intermediate results level indicators started with the 2012 restructuring, followed by the 2013 restructuring, and in 2016, a final restructuring recorded a comprehensive revision to the project's Results Framework, excluding Sierra Leone which had closed in 2014. Revisions included two of the three original outcome indicators and five of the twelve original intermediate outcome indicators.

c. M&E Utilization



According to the ICR (para 44) implementation progress reports were presented at the Regional Steering Committee (RSC) and fed into the work programs of countries; and information on progress by country was also used to compare country achievements during RSC meetings. Evaluation of the project benefitted from two World Bank studies that evaluated progress, discussed shortcomings and highlighted good practices and drew lessons. The project encouraged transparency in participating countries especially in Cabo Verde, Liberia and Sierra Leone as countries that made their vessel registries available to the public online and through the press. Finally, the ICR in many cases relied on the data generated by the project's M&E system to report on the different indicators tracking the implementation progress and final outcomes of the project.

Overall, M&E suffered from moderate shortcomings with a complex design, weak implementation and limited utilization. Therefore, M&E is rated modest.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as an environmental category B. It triggered two Safeguard policies: Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01, BP 4.01, GP 4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). The project utilized an Environmental Management Plan that was prepared as part of the Environmental and Social Assessment (ESA) in order to ensure that any potential impacts arising through the construction of small-scale landing site infrastructure would be mitigated, in accordance with the environmental assessment safeguard (OP 4.01). The involuntary resettlement safeguard (OP 4.12) was triggered, due to the potential for acquisition of land to construct fish landing sites and other small infrastructure; and the potential for involuntary restrictions on access to the fish resources as a result of Program investments to strengthen fisheries management. The ICR did not provide an explicit statement of compliance (or otherwise) with the World Bank safeguard policies for either of two triggered safeguards.

Environmental Assessment (OP 4.01, BP 4.01, GP 4.01). The safeguards risk related to infrastructure was considered low because the infrastructure works in Cabo Verde, Senegal and in Sierra Leone were either scaled down, dropped or did not move forward. However, there were occasional omissions related to minor works: for example, in Senegal, alternative livelihoods and the construction of fishers' houses were carried out without screening for impacts and subsequent safeguards instruments but since the works were very small, there were no complaints or consequences (ICR, para 45). The ICR (para 45) noted the need for stronger and more systematic safeguards capacity enhancement in PIUs and more frequent compliance supervision despite the low risk related to infrastructure.

Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12). In Sierra Leone, a landing site was identified at Kissy Dockyard on Sierra Leone's Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources property; however, the World Bank reported significant numbers of squatters' settlements on the property. A Resettlement Action Plan was launched, but in February 2012 Sierra Leone Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources informed the World Bank of the



government's decision to move the landing site to a location in Murray Town near the Sierra Leone Joint Maritime Committee. In 2013 the government and the World Bank confirmed that the proposed site in Murray Town was a Ramsar Wetland of International Importance and an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment was required (ICR, p. 18, footnote 64).

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management. Financial management benefitted from the support provided by the World Bank financial management specialists throughout; and assessments and reviews were done regularly. All four project audits and unaudited Interim Financial Reports (IFRs) were acceptable to the World Bank and timely submitted, and withdrawal applications were submitted on time. PIUs were adequately staffed albeit most of the time. However, financial management was weak in Senegal where a fiduciary review conducted by the World Bank in mid 2011 discovered ineligible expenditures incurred by the Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime Economy under the project among two others. As a result, disbursements under the project were put on hold for several months until a restructuring in December 2012. Financial management was also weak in Sierra Leone with ineligibilities in 2013 (see details below). In Cabo Verde, financial management performance was overall strong until the last year of implementation where there was a lack of task separation and inconsistencies in the financial and administrative manual. Liberia showed consistently strong financial management performance. Cabo Verde and Senegal used e-disbursement, but Liberia and Sierra Leone faced connectivity issues and used mostly manual applications.

Procurement. Procurement performance was stronger in Cabo Verde, Liberia and Senegal, and weaker in Sierra Leone.

- Project-assigned specialists were based in Sierra Leone and in Washington D.C., and procurement reviews were conducted regularly. While there were no violations in Cabo Verde and Liberia, processes were delayed by the lack of qualified consultants/bidders and frequent cases where just one bidder would apply.
- In Liberia, during a nearly two-year period of funding shortfall, procurement support was provided by a Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission-hired consultant with cross-support from a World Bank-hired consultant.
- In Senegal procurement improved after the change in the ministry and replacement of the procurement specialist, however, there were delays due to the PIU's obligation to follow national procurement procedures in addition to World Bank procedures.
- In Sierra Leone procurement had several shortcomings during the hiring of an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) consulting firm and purchasing of a patrol vessel as stated by the investigation. According to the ICR (para 39) "the ESIA procurement issues led to a World Bank investigation in 2015, which also included the procurement process of a new patrol vessel under Component 2. The investigation found, *inter alia*, that public officials had solicited kickbacks from the ESIA consulting firm in exchange for awarding it the contract, and that the vessel company fraudulently failed to disclose a commission to be paid to an agent, and that a portion of the commission was to be used, at least in part,



to compensate project officials. The investigation and the overall decline in performance in 2013 and 2014 resulted in the closing of the project at its original closing date of December 15, 2014."

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

Positive. Conflicts between artisanal fishers and foreign industrial trawl vessels were reduced as the latter were restricted from accessing Inshore Exclusion Zones (IEZs).

Negative. Conflicts emerged between fishing communities who had been provided management rights and communities which were not granted such rights. This was the case in Ngaparou in Senegal where Community Management Associations members were often confronted with incursions to closed or restricted fishing zones by canoes coming from unmanaged sites.

d. Other

12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Substantial	Substantial	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

The ICR included six lessons. The following are emphasized with some adaptation of language:

- **Multi-country/regional projects require sufficient Bank staff and budget to ensure adequate implementation support in each of the participating countries.** The country-TTL system was appreciated



by the counterparts as it facilitated communication between them and the World Bank and allowed timely feedback to all four countries. On the other hand, safeguards supervision was restricted by a shortage of specialized staff.

- **Reforming the fisheries sector to generate lasting benefits requires an incremental approach and commitment over time.** As experience from the project showed, carrying out sectoral reforms and affecting behavior changes to control resource use and reduce illegal actions in a context of limited government budgets and capacities requires considerable allocations of time and capacity building actions and gradual advancement of reform measures. In such cases, APL/Series of Projects is a useful instrument as it allows a phased and flexible order of interventions, as well as the addition of more countries as they become ready to join the process.

- **Community-led fisheries management is an effective mechanism for reducing fishing effort in the artisanal segment that requires substantial time and know-how to succeed.** Community Management Associations (CMAs) with legal access rights proved to be an effective mechanism for introducing new harvesting rules, local surveillance, stock enhancement measures (such as immersed artificial reefs) and local site monitoring, which together helped recover fish stocks in the co-managed fishing areas. Co-management structures also proved an important instrument for enhancing communities' internal cohesion, however the allocation of fishing zones to communities could result in conflicts between communities whom were granted and those whom were not granted such access.

14. Assessment Recommended?

Yes

Please explain

To verify results on the ground and assess achievements.

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provided thorough coverage of most project activities and reported candidly on most shortcomings. Discussion of outcomes was logical, however, it was not clear how the ICR derived its overall outcome rating. The ICR stated that "the overall outcome rating is deemed Moderately Satisfactory before and after the restructuring." However, the project was restructured five times, and it was not clear in the ICR which of these restructurings was factored into the rating decision. The ICR included six relevant lessons that reflected the project's experience.

The ICR could have improved on the following areas:

- Provide an estimated ex-post FIRR and EIRR or explain why this was not possible.
- Provide explicit statements of compliance (or otherwise) on the triggered safeguard policies.



- Report on the status of external audit reports.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial