



## 1. Project Data

**Project ID**

P096407

**Project Name**

3A-Abidjan-Lagos Trade &amp; Transp. Facilit

**Country**

Western Africa

**Practice Area(Lead)**

Transport &amp; Digital Development

**L/C/TF Number(s)**

IDA-46950,IDA-46960,IDA-H5490

**Closing Date (Original)**

30-Sep-2016

**Total Project Cost (USD)**

0.00

**Bank Approval Date**

23-Mar-2010

**Closing Date (Actual)**

30-Jun-2017

**IBRD/IDA (USD)**
**Grants (USD)**

Original Commitment

228,000,000.00

0.00

Revised Commitment

227,825,536.30

0.00

Actual

210,567,867.90

0.00

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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

The objective of the project was to reduce trade and transport barriers in the Recipient's ports and on the roads of the Corridor within the Recipient's territory (Financing Agreements: Benin page 5, Ghana page 6, and Togo page 6).

### b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No



**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

The project was structured around four similar main components across all three recipient countries - Ghana, Togo and Benin – namely: (a) trade facilitation, (b) infrastructure rehabilitation, (c) project management and coordination, and (d) HIV/AIDS program and performance monitoring.

Component A. Trade Facilitation (appraisal cost US\$13.7 million, actual cost US\$10.6 million). It included following sub-components:

- 1 . Facilitation of collection and sharing of relevant information and data among customs agencies along the corridor.
- 2 . Establishment of a trade facilitation single window within the Recipients' ports of Lome and Cotonou, aimed at facilitating the handling of all transactions at the Recipients' ports in an efficient and speedy manner.
- 3 . Acquisition of equipment, materials, communication tools and technical advisory services required to: (i) establish a joint border posts along the Recipients' borders with the neighboring countries along the corridor; and (ii) strengthen the capacity of the Recipients' border agencies to discharge their duties and responsibilities efficiently.
- 4 . Formulation and carrying out of training programs and activities aimed at enhancing the expertise and the abilities of relevant stakeholders involved in the implementation of the project to discharge their responsibilities for the project efficiently.
- 5 . Streamlining of customs procedures, formulation of customs procedures manuals and dissemination of the same among the relevant stakeholders.
- 6 . Establishment of an adequate internal reporting system aimed at improving management control of customs agencies operations.
- 7 . Strengthening of the operational capacity of the Recipients' National Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Committees.

Component B. Improvement of the Road Corridor's Infrastructure (appraisal cost US\$234.3 million, of which IDA, actual cost US\$261.1 million). It included following sub-components:

- 1 . Carrying out technical design and detailed engineering studies for the road improvement and rehabilitation works to be carried out under the project.
- 2 . Improvement of: (i) about 110 km of road in Ghana on the Agona Junction – Elubo section along the corridor; (ii) about 17 km in Benin on the Godomey - Pahou section along the corridor, and (iii) about 8 km of road in Togo on the Aneho – Hillacondji section along the corridor, including enlargement of the Aneho bridge; and (iv) supervision of the related civil works.
- 3 . Implementation of social and environmental mitigation measures required under this Component B of the Project.



4. Provision of technical assistance, material and equipment for road safety.

Component C. Project Management and Coordination (appraisal cost US\$3.6 million, IDA financed, actual cost US\$3.6 million). This component would fund the technical advisory services and logistical support (including office equipment, materials, supplies and vehicles) required to sustain management and coordination of project implementation activities including monitoring and evaluation of progress achieved in the execution of the Project.

Component D. HIV/AIDS Programs and Corridor Performance Monitoring (appraisal cost US\$6.0 million, IDA Financed, actual cost US\$6.0 million). It included following sub-components:

1. Formulation and execution of programs of activities aimed at reducing the impact of HIV/AIDS and preventing the spread of HIV infection among communities established and/or operating along the portion of the corridor located within the Recipients' territories.
2. Collection and treatment of data required to measure and monitor performance in the areas of trade, transport and HIV/AIDS along the Corridor, and wide dissemination of such data across the Recipients' territories and beyond.

**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Cost**

The actual cost was US\$281.3 million, higher than the appraisal estimate of US\$257.5 million. There is a difference in cost based on funding sources: IDA credit and grant amount to US\$210.5, while the Borrower Contribution of US\$53.5 million adds up to US\$264 million, substantially lower than the actual cost of US\$281.3 million. The project team informed IEG that the US\$210.5 million refers to the disbursed amount. The final disbursement/cancellations for Ghana and Benin have not been processed and some of the transactions needed to be actualized in the Client connection system, so the disbursed amount was the latest value available. The costs at project closing were based on restructuring papers, cost overrun information in Aide Memoires, and the latest available financial reports.

**Financing**

The project was the first phase of the Abidjan-Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation Program. This was an Adaptable Program Lending (APL) with two credits and a grant.

The actual IDA financing for **Ghana** was US\$110.2 million, lower than the appraisal amount of US\$120.0 million.

The actual IDA financing for **Benin** was US\$69.2 million, lower than the appraisal amount of US\$75.0 million.

The actual IDA grant for **Togo** was US\$31.1 million, lower than the appraisal amount of US\$32.8 million. There was no cofinanciers for this project.

There were three restructurings, and in 2012 the baselines and targets were updated:

- The first level 2 restructuring was approved in May 2013 for Togo to address the cost overruns



incurred by the activities under Components B. This restructuring reallocated funds from Category 2 to Category 1, to cover the last payments of contractors and supervision consultants for road civil works.

- The second restructuring was undertaken in June 2015 for Togo to allow the completion of activities supporting customs modernization and those of the National Facilitation Committee.
- The third restructuring was approved in September 2016 for Ghana and Benin to allow the completion of the regional facilitation activities under Component A for Ghana and Benin, and the remaining civil works under Component B in Benin. Under this restructuring the closing date of the Bank credits to Ghana and Benin was extended from September 30, 2016 to June 30, 2017. The restructuring also reallocated funds from Category 2 to Category 1 for Benin to cover the funding needed for ongoing road works.

### **Borrower Contribution**

The total actual borrower contribution was US\$53.4 million, considerably higher than the appraisal commitment of US\$29.5 million. Individual countries actual contribution was: Ghana US\$35.5 million (appraisal commitment US\$13.5 million); Togo US\$5.2 million (appraisal commitment US\$5.0 million) and Benin US\$12.7 million (appraisal commitment US\$11.0 million).

### **Dates**

The project was extended by nine months and closed on June 30, 2017 to allow the completion of the regional facilitation activities under Component A for Ghana and Benin, and the remaining civil works under Component B in Benin.

## **3. Relevance of Objectives**

### **Rationale**

At the time of the project appraisal, there were inefficiencies along the trade and transport corridors in the West Africa region. On the transport side, most roads were going inland from the ports rather than east west. The roads were in poor road conditions and there was limited modal competition due to the lack of a coastal railway and very limited coastal shipping. The region was plagued by many sectoral and institutional constraints such as illegal checking points, long port dwell times, costly non-harmonized and insufficiently automated customs procedures, which negatively affected trade along the corridors.

There was a need for a concerted regional strategy to upgrade and maintain the roads and improve interconnectivity. The Abidjan-Lagos corridor was identified by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) through the Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Program (RRTTFP) as one of the highest priority corridors for economic and social development in the sub-region. Each road section was critically important for the sub-region's international trade. The road section in Ghana supported the movement of trade traffic from Abidjan to Accra, Lome and even to Ouagadougou. The Togo section linked Lome to the Benin border and was important for



traffic from the port of Lome to the hinterland countries. The road section in Benin carried heavy traffic from Tema port to Nigeria, as well as from Cotonou port to Lome and Accra. All these sections needed rehabilitation and enlargement to reduce the congestion on the coastal corridor.

The Accra Memorandum of Understanding on Transport and Transit Facilitation along the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor (September 2007), established the overall program's framework for policy dialogue on trade facilitation and regional integration to which all five countries and ECOWAS adhered.

The project was fully aligned with the priority support areas identified under the country strategies for the project countries. In Ghana, the 2013-18 Country Partnership (CPF) aimed to improve competitiveness by reducing the cost of doing business, through the reduction of borders crossing time. In Togo, the 2017-20 CPF is focused on promoting and strengthening logistics services such as the reduction of port dwell time in Lomé. The 2013-17 Country Partnership Strategy for Benin identified the need to enhance the performance of Cotonou port to prevent the 0.6 percent of GDP lost due to the port "underperformance and managerial issues."

The project objectives were aligned with the Bank's 2008 Regional Integration Assistance Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa which supported: (i) the development of regional infrastructure to improve cross-border interconnectivity, by developing an integrated, efficient, cost-effective and adequate transport system for economic growth and trade facilitation; (ii) institutional cooperation and economic integration to increase trade and investment with regional and non-regional economies, by focusing on the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, regional business environments and development of regional financial markets; and (iii) coordinated interventions to provide regional public goods for improved regional environmental, health, and social conditions, by reducing the expansion of HIV/AIDS among vulnerable populations along the intra transport corridor. The project objectives are consistent with the recent World Bank Regional Integration and Cooperation Strategy for Africa, FY18-23 which supports the development of regional infrastructure along economically important routes.

## **Rating**

High

## **4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)**

### **Objective 1**

#### **Objective**

Reduce trade barriers in the ports in Ghana, Togo and Benin.

#### **Rationale**

#### **Outputs**

- The project facilitated the implementation of a "single window" to reduce border crossing time in Lome



which fully became operational in 2016, and Cotonou which fully became operational in 2013. The single window is an electronic platform which optimizes, manages, and automates port and logistics information through a single submission. According to a socio-economic survey conducted by the Abidjan Lagos Corridor Organization (ALCO), 7621 importers, exporters and transit operators at Lome port directly benefited from the reduced port dwell time due to the single window.

- Although in July 2011 Benin was the first to pilot the single window, at the same time the Government adopted a parallel program to inspect imports, which was negatively perceived by the economic operators.
- The project funded studies that focused on reorganization of port operators' activities, as well as the legal and institutional framework, through training on IT and procedures, and provision of relevant equipment for the Lome and Cotonou ports. The recommendations of studies were adopted and containerized import and export procedures under customs systems in Ghana, Togo, and Benin were simplified.

## Outcomes

A substantial reduction in the cargo dwell time was observed at the three ports:

- The port dwell time at Lome in Togo was reduced from 18 days (baseline) to 9 days (50 percent reduction), surpassing the target of 14.5 days.
- The port dwell time at Cotonou in Benin was reduced from 19 days (baseline) to 14 days (26% reduction compared to the baseline), overachievement of the target by one day.
- Although there was no indicator in the PAD for the port of Tema in Ghana, nor an assigned target value (as this system had been operational since 2002, prior to the project's effectiveness), ALCO monitored it throughout the project lifetime and the port dwell time was reduced from 24 days (baseline) to 15 days (an estimated 37% reduction).

## Rating

Substantial

## Objective 2

### Objective

Reduce trade barriers on the roads along the corridor in Ghana, Togo and Benin.



## **Rationale Outputs**

- Awareness raising campaigns were organized by customs authorities on border crossing procedures.
- The project contributed to streamline procedures at the borders by providing training to customs officers, building an e-learning center for customs in Togo, and implementing updated customs procedures manuals in the three countries.
- In Togo, the project assisted the Customs to set up a policy framework which included an indicator related to customs formalities. Each customs unit manager signed a performance contract with the Executive Head of Customs providing quantified goals.

## **Outcomes**

On average, the border crossing time of trucks/merchandise along the corridor was significantly reduced by 47% (see Table 1 below).

**Table1. Border Crossing Time**

	<b>Baseline value (hours)</b>	<b>Target value (hours)</b>	<b>Actual (hours)</b>
Ghana to Ivory Coast (Elubo)	24	19	20
Togo to Ghana (Kodjoviakope)	24	19	10
Benin to Togo (Hillacondji)	24	18	5
Benin to Nigeria (Krake)	48	38	31

## **Rating**

Substantial

## **Objective 3**

### **Objective**

Reduce transport barriers on the roads along the corridor in Ghana, Togo and Benin.

### **Rationale Outputs**

- The project rehabilitated 110 km in Ghana, 8 km in Togo and 16.5 km in Benin.
- The project supported ALCO and the National Facilitation Committees, to raise awareness of all border agencies and private users, and enabled policy reforms to redefine the way customs and local authorities



would control goods transiting along the corridor. The number of checkpoints per 100 km decreased to an average of 2.3 roadblocks per 100 km for Ghana, 3.7 for Benin, and 4 (over 53km) for Togo, almost reaching the target of 3 checkpoints per 100 km. In Ghana, average travel time on the rehabilitated road was reduced from 3 hours (baseline) to 1.5 hours at project closure. In Togo, average travel time on the rehabilitated road was reduced from 20 minutes (baseline) to 10 minutes at project closure. In Benin, average travel time on the rehabilitated road was reduced from 1 hour (baseline) to 25 minutes at project closure.

**Rating**  
Modest

### **Rationale**

The first two objectives were rated Substantial and the third was rated Modest. On balance, this leads to an overall Efficacy rating of Substantial.

### **Overall Efficacy Rating**

Substantial

## **5. Efficiency**

The ICR conducted an ex-post analysis to evaluate economic returns of the activities completed under the project applying the same methodology used at appraisal. The analysis was done for the trade facilitation component (Component A) and the corridor improvement component (Component B) separately. The investments in Component A amounted to 5 percent of the total project costs, and Component B accounted for 90 percent of the total project costs.

### **Trade facilitation:**

The ex-post economic analysis showed an economic rate of return (ERR) of 93% compared to the ex-ante value of 27%. Appraisal estimates were revised using the changes in baseline and target values for the port dwell and excluding the port of Lagos (Nigeria). This yielded an ERR of 63 percent. The ERR is therefore substantially overestimated and the real costs underestimated due to this attribution factor.

At appraisal, the ERR included the ports of Lagos (Nigeria), Lome (Togo), and Cotonou (Benin). Benefits stream was based on: (a) expected travel/dwell time and uncertainty decrease along the corridor; (b) value of time consignees' bear for storage and inventory, (c) value of time for passengers and crew, and (d) value of time for transportation equipment such as the fixed costs per day for a truck, and (e) unit maintenance costs for transportation equipment and infrastructure (PAD page 105).





Benefits are higher than at appraisal due to the correction of the baseline values for port dwell time in Lome and Cotonou. The ex-post ERR excludes trade facilitation activities for Lagos. Since import cargo volumes and transport costs in the ports of Lome and Cotonou were not monitored under the project, the ICR used the PAD level of cargo and trucking costs. The ICR notes (para 45) that these results should be interpreted with reserve as they do not account for counterpart infrastructure investments nor national programs and initiatives to implement the “single window” in the ports of Lome and Cotonou. The ERR is therefore overestimated and the real costs are underestimated due to this attribution factor.

**Corridor improvement:** The overall economic benefits of the project were derived from: (i) savings in travel time due to improvements in road infrastructure and (ii) savings in Vehicle Operations Costs (VOC) due to the improved quality of the roads.

In **Ghana**, the ex-post economic analysis yielded an ERR of 23%, which is roughly half of the ex-ante ERR estimate of 45%. This was mainly due to the increase in costs resulting from the changes in road design and alignment, as well as issues with quality of studies and procurement delays. Ghana suffered from project management deficiencies and implementation issues. Ghana incurred major delays in the procurement process and later in disbursements, leading to significant delays in the activities. Moreover, some activities such as Anyanu rest stop and the implementation of road safety measures on the rehabilitated road sections were not completed at project closure (paras 48 and 49).

In **Togo**, the ex-post ERR was 13%, roughly a fourth of the ex-ante ERR of 48%. This is also because of the increase in costs incurred due to changes in road design and due to issues with quality of studies and procurement delays (ICR para 50). Lack of resilience features in road investments in the face of climate change effects could undermine the sustainability in the long term. Given that the project targeted section in Togo is likely to be exposed to coastal erosion in the long term, and that there were no climate adaptation activities included in the project, likelihood of increased maintenance and coastal protection works seems high. This was not considered while calculating the ERR and may further lower economic efficiency (ICR para 53).

Only in **Benin** the ex-post ERR 57% is more than double the ex-ante ERR of 20%. Although an increase in costs was incurred due to issues with the quality of studies and procurement delays, and the project closing date had to be extended by 9 months to allow completion of activities, there were substantial benefits. These included increased traffic and substantial improvement in travel times on the rehabilitated section (25 minutes saved due to project works) (ICR para 50).

## Efficiency Rating

Modest

- a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:



	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

## 6. Outcome

The relevance of project objectives is rated high. The objectives to reduce trade barriers in the ports in Ghana, Togo and Benin; and to reduce trade barriers on the roads along the corridor in Ghana, Togo and Benin is each rated substantial. However, the objective to reduce transport barriers on the roads along the corridor in Ghana, Togo and Benin is rated modest. Efficiency of the project investments is modest. The outcome of the project is rated moderately satisfactory.

### a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

## 7. Risk to Development Outcome

The risk to development outcome is considered substantial because of following reasons:

**Inadequate road maintenance funding:** Overloaded trucks on the corridor will lead to untimely degradation of recently rehabilitated sections and allocation of funds for road maintenance is not a priority for the road agencies in the three countries.

**Risk of coastal erosion in Togo.** Coastal erosion is a significant risk for Togo. The ICR reports (para 97) that the government has commissioned a study with the African Development Bank to identify the extent to which the coastal infrastructure is vulnerable and to propose mitigation actions.

**Introduction of the government's program to inspect imports.** Trade facilitation and customs modernization is one of the major focus of regional organizations such as West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, project efforts to support implementation of the single window could be impacted in the long term by the governments program to inspect imports. All three Governments have appointed private firms through PPP to process inspection/verification of imported goods. If the inspection period is too long, it will affect the overall port dwell time, the time saved under the single window processes will be lost under the long inspection processes.

**Security conditions in the region may increase number of road blocks and checkpoints.** The number of



roadblocks and checkpoints along the corridor is subject to change based on local security conditions, as well as political direction (ICR para 95).

## **8. Assessment of Bank Performance**

### **a. Quality-at-Entry**

As mentioned in section 3 above, the Abidjan-Lagos corridor was identified by ECOWAS and WAEMU through the Regional Road Transport and Transit Facilitation Program, as one of the highest priority corridors for economic and social development in the sub-region. The Abidjan-Lagos Trade and Transport Facilitation Program was designed to complement the support provided by other multilateral and bilateral development partners to the West Africa region in preparing programs supporting regional integration, transport and trade facilitation on the corridor. It included the five countries in the region - Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. However, at the time of appraisal, not all countries were deemed ready for implementation. Therefore, the program was divided in two phases, the first phase included Ghana, Togo and Benin, and the second phase included Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. The overall program design also emphasized the importance of the participation of Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire to successfully implement the identified reforms addressing the bottlenecks along the road corridor.

There were some shortcomings in project design: (i) the statement of objectives which referred to the reduction in transport barriers in the ports of Ghana, Togo and Benin is not clear since the transport barriers are not relevant for ports, (ii) given that the project targeted section in Togo is likely to be exposed to coastal erosion in the long term, there were no climate adaptation activities included in the project; (c) the technical studies conducted at the preparation stage were unsatisfactory and needed to be revised, leading to the modification of the road alignment in Ghana and technical changes to the Bridge in Aneho (Togo). This resulted in significant cost overruns and delays in the execution of civil works; and (d) the M&E methodology had issues, which were identified during actual data collection and definitions and baselines for some indicators were revised.

### **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Moderately Unsatisfactory

### **b. Quality of supervision**

During the life cycle of the project, there was a high turnover in project task team leads (TTL) and core team members. The project TTL changed thrice (twice during implementation) and there were six social safeguards specialists and three environmental specialists. For an entire year, there was no environmental specialist dedicated to the project. In the last year of implementation, the TTL was proactive and strengthened the team by including four consultants: two environmental and two social safeguards specialists. The project team informed IEG that until after project closing the Project Team respond to the emerging issues through (i) monitoring the various RAP action plans prepared with the Client, and (ii) supervising the full completion of the RAP. The project supervision team included a customs and a road engineering consultant, both with strong



experience in the region and on similar projects. On an average, one full supervision mission was conducted per year, and interim supervision missions and additional guidance was provided as needed, especially in the last years of implementation. The Bank team was proactive and undertook three timely restructurings to ensure best use of project resources.

The Project Team clarified that the high number of safeguards specialists (six environmental and three social safeguards specialists ) was due to (i) the regional nature of the project involving three countries, each with different safeguards teams, and (ii) the need to resolve the delays with RAP implementation in Ghana during the last two years and to ensure safeguards compliance in Benin.

The implementation of Involuntary resettlement safeguards proved challenging in Ghana. The Project Team emphasized that this was common to infrastructure projects financed by the Bank and other donors in the country. The causes were: (i) the country's cumbersome regulations and methodology for land valuation by the LVB; (ii) the administration's heavy bureaucracy in allocating, approving and transferring money for PAP compensation payments; and (iii) lengthy and difficult procedures for actual compensation, in accordance with Ghanaian regulations for safeguards implementation (ICR para 71). The ICR reports (para 90) that throughout project implementation, the Bank team closely supervised safeguards implementation and as the issue escalated in the last two years to project closing date utilized the field staff. The Bank team was candid in reporting the issues in ISRs and downgraded the safeguards performance ratings. Only at the end of the project implementation period, the Bank brought a dedicated safeguards consultant to assist the implementing agency. The compensations were completed within a month from the closing date of the project. The Project Team clarified that the PIUs had in-house safeguards specialists throughout project implementation. To ensure the proper implementation of the RAP in Ghana, the Bank brought in an additional safeguards specialist.

### **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Moderately Unsatisfactory

### **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Moderately Unsatisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

At the preparation stage, an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) grant from the World Bank was used to develop the methodology for indicators. Baselines values were provided and targets were set. However, during actual data collection issues were identified and definitions and targets for some of the indicators were revised.

The intermediate outcome indicator "computerized port single window established and functional in Lomé and Cotonou ports" and the outcome indicator "reduced port dwell time" were adequate to measure the PDO to reduce trade barriers in the ports. However, there was no outcome indicator for the port of Tema in Ghana, nor an assigned target value. Also, there was no intermediate outcome indicator related to the single window for the



port of Tema.

The outcome indicator “border crossing time of trucks/merchandise along the corridor” was adequate in measuring the PDO “reduce trade barriers on the roads along the corridor in Ghana, Togo and Benin.”

There was no outcome indicator for the PDO to reduce transport barriers on the roads along the corridor in Ghana, Togo and Benin. However, the project included output indicators such as: (i) number of roadblocks per 100 kilometers reduced in each project country, (ii) increase in kilometers of roads rehabilitated. In the ICR results chain, an indicator on “reduced transport time on project rehabilitated sections” was included based on evidence from the economic analysis conducted for the ICR. Although a “target value” for the proposed indicator could not be identified, an average baseline value was considered based on ALCO estimates of transit speeds on the project targeted sections prior to the onset of the project.

The M&E framework was adequately designed to convey progress made towards PDO achievement at corridor level, however it could have been complemented to include indicators for training activities and policy dialogue for trade facilitation component. The project design overlooked intermediate indicators such as transport costs, trade volume and passenger travel, which are often an indicative of transport affordability. All indicators were easily measurable and time-bound.

ALCO was created under ECOWAS through the Accra Memorandum of Understanding in 2007 to carry out M&E at regional level based on the data collected by national road agencies, local port authorities and through stakeholder surveys.

## **b. M&E Implementation**

M&E for the project was funded through project resources allocated under the Togo grant and ALCO was responsible for carrying out M&E. It provided a regional monitoring “umbrella” and ensured data collection and monitoring of local, national and regional project performance indicators, as well as reporting to the national facilitation committees and IDA. ALCO was created at project preparation stage and its capacity was strengthened during implementation.

The ICR reports (para 77) that issues were identified with appraisal methodology during the first year of data collection. Consequently, the definition of the PDO indicators for port dwell time and border crossing time were revised and baseline and target values were recalculated when the second phase of the project was approved in 2012. Throughout the project lifetime all indicators were routinely updated and reported in ISRs.

## **c. M&E Utilization**

The ICR reports (para 79) the frequent ALCO reports provided the supervision team the necessary data on the corridor and the project’s performances. Comparative results across countries were widely disseminated through various stakeholder workshops, information sharing, awareness raising on trade and transport issues along the corridor. M&E provided a platform for regional policy dialogue on trade facilitation including



customs modernization reforms and improved port efficiency.

## **M&E Quality Rating**

Substantial

## **10. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**

The project was classified as an Environmental Category B as limited adverse environmental and social impacts were expected from project activities as the road improvement works did not require any road re-alignment or transverse any environmentally sensitive areas. The potential adverse environmental and social impacts of the road rehabilitation included: soil erosion, loss of strips of residential plots along road alignments, loss of residential houses, businesses, temporary structures, increased noise and dust.

The following safeguards policies were triggered: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01), Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), and Cultural Property (OP/BP 4.11). An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), including an environmental management plan (EMP), and Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) were prepared for each country and publicly disclosed prior to appraisal. The RAPS specified a "Grievances and Redress Procedure". The number of project affected persons (PAPs) were as follows: (i) Benin 101 households (404 persons); (ii) Togo 379 households, (1,920 persons); and (iii) Ghana 744 households (2,094 persons). Counterpart funding was secured at appraisal stage to ensure full compensation of PAPs prior to start of civil works.

Compensations were carried out in all three countries, albeit with prolonged delays in Ghana. The Ghanaian government compensated 2,094 PAPs in December 2012, before the start of the civil works in accordance with the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP). However, due to changes in the design/road alignment during execution of works, and the involvement of the Land Valuation Board (LVB) of Ghana, the RAP was amended, and more PAPs were added (the ICR does not provide the figures). The ICR reports (para 71) that there were substantial delays in payment of compensation because of: (i) Ghana's cumbersome regulations and methodology for land valuation by the LVB; (ii) the administration's heavy bureaucracy in allocating, approving and transferring money for PAPs compensation payments; and (iii) lengthy and difficult procedures for actual compensation. The ICR reports (para 82) that at project closing, the OP4.12 on Involuntary Resettlement was not complied with as approximately 11% of PAPs still needed to be paid. The Bank continued to monitor compensation payments after the June project closing date and full implementation of the RAP was achieved in August 2017.

The project team provided following additional information to IEG. In Ghana, the RAP was recently amended in 2017 when the number of PAPs reached 5,416 and the compensation was estimated at GHC 24.8 million (US\$ 5.6 million). As of August 28, 2017, 5,396 PAPs (about 99.5 percent of the total number of PAPs) have been fully compensated, with only 20 PAPs remaining to be paid. After this date, the remaining PAPs were able to collect their compensations at the GHA offices. (This information is available and fully detailed in the last ISR).





In Togo, the ICR reports (para 82) that the execution of the RAP was considered best practice. For Benin, the ICR reports that there were serious concerns with the implementation of both environmental and social measures.

Compliance with environmental and cultural property safeguards is not discussed in the ICR. The project team provided following additional information to IEG. Overall, no substantial issues were incurred during implementation on the environmental safeguards. Safeguards colleagues continued to closely monitor actions after the project closing date:

- In Benin, an environmental audit was done to assess environmental and social safeguards measures.
- In Ghana, the Environmental Safeguards rating was considered “Moderately Satisfactory”. It was noted that some of the borrow pits have been reinstated, while others have been left open at the request of the owners who would like to develop those areas further. GHA was expected to provide further documentary evidence of such agreements with landowners on the after-use. Structures at the camp sites were under the care of the local communities and needed to be cleaned up properly prior to closing of defects liability period. At the quarry site, a large depression created after the extraction of the rock had transformed into a lake that needed some protection measures.
- In Togo, environmental safeguards did not suffer from any major issues as:
  - The ESMP was correctly executed during the works, with a strong commitment from the National Bureau of Public Works (DGTP).
  - Specific actions were executed to mitigate soil and vegetation degradation during the works of the Aneho bridge, water and soil pollution, while limiting dust emission and noise. These recommendations followed a site visit (March 2013), which found that:
    - Drainage was not fully operational along Aneho Bus station due to congested pipes;
    - The coating plants dejections were filled into a pit, polluting the neighboring soils and water.
- The following visits were fully compliant as those issues were addressed

## **b. Fiduciary Compliance**

**Financial management.** The ICR reports (para 84) that the project did not experience any major fiduciary issues. The project maintained acceptable financial management arrangements and complied with the project’s reporting and accounting requirements. Except for Ghana, the project implementation units submitted audit reports on time.

**Procurement.** The ICR reports (para 85) that there were no instances of mis-procurement. Due to implementation delays, the contracts were amended once in Ghana, in four times in Benin, and twice in Togo. Delays were mainly due to changes to road alignment (in Ghana) and issues with the quality of



some technical studies.

### c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

Although not included as a formal indicator the Government's willingness to improve efficiency in customs procedures resulted in the establishment of a Togolese Revenue Authority in 2012.

### d. Other

None reported.

## 11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	---
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

## 12. Lessons

The ICR provides several recommendations based on the lessons learnt from the project (para 99). Four are presented below:

- The project was designed as a regional project but the implementation arrangements were at national level, and as such the project was implemented as three separate national projects. Throughout implementation, there was a major disconnect between customs related activities in the three countries. A higher-level corridor supervision and coordination layer would have assisted with implementation and ensured better synergy of activities and their complementarity. The Abidjan Lagos Corridor Organization (or similar regional level entity) could have been given a larger role, in addition to results dissemination, of coordination for the national facilitation committees, as well as supervision and coordination of country PIUs or implementing agencies, and overall supervision of activity plans. Future regional corridor operations should seek strong regional stakeholder support and encourage implementation as a regional-level entity.
- For regional projects, donor concentrated efforts are needed to ensure that financing gaps are covered. However, the fragmented approach with different timelines over the corridor proved to backfire in the long





term. For example, in Togo, the joint border post activities under the project were reallocated to the AfDB halfway through project implementation. However, works were at an incipient stage at project closing in June 2017. Similarly, the joint border posts funded under ECOWAS registered significant delays in operationalization. Closer long term coordination with other regional partners and clients should be sought and continuous dialogue should be encouraged on the attribution of activities and proposed timelines of implementation.

- For roads in coastal areas that might be affected by coastal erosion, the technical studies and designs should propose mitigation actions.
- Differences in country implementation capacity can negatively impact projects overall performance. The performance of one country (Ghana) during implementation negatively impacted the overall performance of the project in terms of timeline, achievement of objectives, and efficiency because of substantial cost overruns. This consequently overshadowed the performance of Togo which, despite challenges during implementation, could complete its activities and achieve its objectives before the initial closing date of the Project (September 30, 2016).

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is concise and reasonably well-written. It is candid while discussing the issues that arose during implementation. The lessons that the ICR draws are based on evidence and analysis. The ICR could have provided additional information on environmental safeguards and an explicit statement on the compliance with environmental and cultural property safeguards. The ICR did not provide the additional number of people/households that had to be compensated due to design changes and realignments in Ghana. The project team subsequently provided this information to IEG.

#### a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial