



Report Number : ICRR0020601

## 1. Project Data

**Project ID**

P105404

**Project Name**

GZ- Southern West Bank Solid Waste Mgt

**Country**

West Bank and Gaza

**Practice Area(Lead)**

Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience Global Practice

**L/C/TF Number(s)**

TF-18376,TF-94496

**Closing Date (Original)**

30-Dec-2014

**Total Project Cost (USD)**

27,900,000.00

**Bank Approval Date**

14-May-2009

**Closing Date (Actual)**

30-Jun-2016

**IBRD/IDA (USD)**
**Grants (USD)**

Original Commitment

12,000,000.00

12,000,000.00

Revised Commitment

12,000,000.00

12,000,000.00

Actual

12,000,000.00

12,000,000.00

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**Project ID**

P154102

**Project Name**

GZ-Southern West Bank SWM Project - AF ( P154102 )

**L/C/TF Number(s)**
**Closing Date (Original)**
**Total Project Cost (USD)**

1,500,000.00



Bank Approval Date	Closing Date (Actual)	
11-May-2015		
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	1,500,000.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	1,500,000.00
Actual	0.00	1,500,000.00

## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

The objective of the Project was “to improve solid waste disposal services for the communities and businesses of Palestinian municipalities and joint services councils in the Bethlehem and Hebron governorates, through provision of an efficient socially acceptable and environmentally friendly mechanism, including (i) strengthening the joint services council administrative and technical capabilities for a cost-effective management of waste disposal services; (ii) improving the waste disposal services, through provision of a sanitary landfill facility and related infrastructure; and (iii) carrying out a public awareness campaign for promoting waste minimization, resource recovery and cost recovery for financial viability” (Trust Fund Grant Agreement, 2009). The Project Appraisal Document’s objectives are identical (PAD, p. 8).

### b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

### c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

### d. Components

#### **Component 1: Institutional Strengthening (Appraisal US\$0.50 million; Actual US\$0.11 million).**

Component 1 focused on improving the Joint Services Council institutional and human resource capacity; strengthening the Environment Quality Authority in monitoring and reporting on environmental aspects; and public awareness on solid waste management. The ICR did not provide an explanation for the difference between the amount estimated at appraisal and the actual reported amount, but the TTL clarified (5/8/2017) that donors have provided extensive technical assistance on a parallel basis in support of institutional strengthening, while coordinating with the Bank team.

#### **Component 2: Development and Implementation of Solid Waste Management Investments**

**(Appraisal US\$18 million; Actual US\$20.65 million).** This was the main project component (90% of



project cost), which included: (a) civil works and construction of a landfill facility; (b) installation of compactors for Hebron Transfer Station; (c) installation of waste recycling pilots at the landfill; (d) supply of operational equipment for the landfill; (e) supply of transfer station waste containers and hauling vehicles; (f) rehabilitation of existing dumpsite in Yatta, Hebron governorate, for use during the construction of the sanitary landfill and closure of all dump sites in Hebron and Bethlehem governorates by the end of construction period; (g) operational management contract for the sanitary landfill and transfer station; and (h) implementation of the Environmental and Social Management Plan, and the Abbreviated Resettlement Action Plans. The Additional Financing on 5/14/2015 provided for a venting and gas flaring system (ICR, p. 1).

**Component 3: Innovation Window for Waste Recycling and Composting (Appraisal US\$0.50 million; Actual US\$0.94 million).** The activities under this component included: (a) feasibility assessment and design of pilot projects for waste collection optimization, waste minimization, and waste recovery for recycling and composting, including plans toward organizing waste pickers into commercially-viable service organizations; and (b) implementation of pilot schemes in waste recycling.

**Component 4: Project Management (operating and administrative costs), and International Procurement Consultant and Supervision (US\$1.0 million; Actual US\$1.05 million).** This component financed incremental operating costs of the Joint Services Council technical operations, including staff salaries, training and travel related costs, consultant services for international procurement, supervision of construction and operational management.

#### **e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

At appraisal, the total project cost was estimated at US\$20 million. The cost consisted of a grant of US\$12 million from the Trust Fund for Gaza and the West Bank; parallel donor financing of US\$6 million (US\$5.6 million from the European Commission, and US\$0.40 million from the Government of Italy) for equipment and machinery; and a Borrower contribution of US\$2.0 million for land acquisition. Additional grant financing of US\$1.5 million from the Partnership for Infrastructure Development Multi-Donor Trust Fund was provided on 05/14/2015. All the grants were disbursed. The ICR indicates that the actual borrower's contribution increased by US\$0.6 million, and the European Commission's contribution by US\$0.30 million. With further parallel support of US\$0.35 million from UNDP and the Islamic Development Bank, the total actual cost amounted to US\$22.75 million. The project was further complemented by other donor-financed initiatives from USAID and the 'Global Partnership on Output Based Aid' aiming to strengthen upstream activities for waste collection at the municipality level. The project was appraised on 2/4/2009, became effective on 11/25/2009, and underwent a mid-term review on 6/4/2012. A Level-2 restructuring on 8/5/2010 extended the deadline for hiring a firm or non-government organization with social development expertise, which was delayed, as this was a dated covenant related to social safeguards; and another Level-2 restructuring on 7/31/2012 provided for fund re-allocations which increased incremental recurrent costs. In conjunction with the 2015 additional financing, the closing date was extended until 12/30/2015, which was followed on 12/21/2015 by an additional 6-month extension until 6/30/2016 to complete the closure and rehabilitation of the Yatta dump site (ICR, p. xi). The project closed on 6/30/2016.



### 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

#### a. Relevance of Objectives

The development objectives sought an ambitious reversal of an entrenched pattern of open unsanitary waste dumping to sanitary solid waste disposal arrangements. At appraisal, unsanitary and uncontrolled disposal practices created public health and environmental problems after years of solid waste management neglect. In the Southern West Bank, 60% of the total waste was disposed at two main unsanitary dumpsites (ICR, p.3). The remaining 40% of waste was either burned at smaller unsanitary dumpsites or randomly dumped on valuable agricultural land. Leachate from waste threatened underground water aquifers, with the risk of seepage washing into the Dead Sea (ICR, p. 3). Valuable agricultural land and natural landscapes were being despoiled, and unhealthy habitats facilitated the breeding of disease-transmitting vectors. The importance of solid waste management was highlighted in the National Development Plan (2006-2008), and the government created a Steering Committee in 2008 to address related waste issues (ICR, p. 4).

The objectives remain relevant to the Palestinian National Development Plan (2014-16), which referred to the project achievements as good-practice examples for the new solid waste management investments in Gaza and Central West Bank (ICR, p.15). The National Plan designated 8.3% of all infrastructure development sector expenditures to solid waste. The objectives also remain relevant to the current Bank Assistance Strategy (FY2015-2016) under Pillar 1 for strengthening public institutions and improving service delivery, including solid waste management.

#### Rating

High

#### b. Relevance of Design

The design was consistent with the stated objectives for improving solid waste disposal. The design laid out a clear results chain linking funding, outputs and intermediate outcomes, to outcomes, understood as follows: the provision of a sanitary landfill facility, transfer stations, landfill equipment and machinery, hauling vehicles, the closure of unsanitary dumpsites, the strengthening of institutional capacities, and increased public awareness, would all be reasonably expected to lead to improved solid waste disposal services. The overall design focused on disposal activities (ICR, p.2), and did not include waste collection. The TTL explained that a comprehensive design that would have also included waste collection was not feasible because of several reasons. There were funding limitations. Other donors would not commit full financing upfront, and some of them were already supporting collection activities. A comprehensive sectoral operation would have taken a longer time to prepare and to reach consensus. The Bank opted for an incremental approach which is a suitable strategy in fragile settings (TTL clarifications, 4/5/2017). In conclusion, given that the design was sound with a well-established causal chain, relevance of design is rated High.



**Rating**  
High

## 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

### Objective 1

#### Objective

Improve solid waste disposal services in Bethlehem and Hebron governorates.

#### Rationale

#### Outputs

- A sanitary landfill constructed and made operational (Target: 1 landfill; Actual: 1).
- Sanitary and environmentally sound transfer stations constructed and made operational (Target: 1 station; Actual: 2).
- Gradual closure of uncontrolled dumpsites (Target: 17 dumpsites; Actual 19).
- Operational and environmental staff provided with technical training (Target: 50 staff; Actual 60).
- Provision of equipment, landfill machinery, compactors, waste containers and hauling vehicles.
- Provision of a gas venting and flaring system.
- Installation of waste recycling pilots and feasibility studies.
- Compensations, settlements, provision of employment opportunities, and income generating schemes for affected persons, waste pickers, and herders, allowing households depending on livelihood income from waste picking to be integrated within improved and commercially viable waste management plans, or other income-generating plans (Target: 80% of households; Actual: 100%)
- Consultant services for international procurement, construction supervision and management.
- Funding of incremental operating costs, including staff salaries, training and travel costs.

#### Outcomes

The results presented by the ICR (pp. 17-18) show a significant improvement in solid waste disposal in several aspects, including appropriate practices and sanitary disposal, coverage, and satisfaction of beneficiaries:

PDO-Level Indicators	Target	Actual (June 2016)
• Direct project beneficiaries.	670,00	850,000
• Increase of municipal solid waste disposal in sanitary landfill.	75%	100%
• Discharge of leachate into landfill ground water.	Zero	Zero
• Target communities with full access to the sanitary landfill.	80%	95%



• Satisfaction of surrounding households and businesses with new practices.	80%	89%
• Participating municipalities satisfied with new disposal practices.	80%	100%

According to the ICR (p. 24), the performance of the strengthened joint services council administrative and technical capabilities led to its expanded role, including in updating of the national bylaw for Joint Service Councils, updating the National Strategy for Solid Waste Management in Palestinian Territory (2016-2020), setting the specifications for solid waste equipment and facilities, preparation of guidelines for public private partnerships, and the establishment of a national training center for solid waste management. The new waste disposal system was fully operational and managed by an international operator, competitively selected through a public-private-partnership process assisted by IFC's advisory services (ICR, pp. 11-12). The beneficiary impact assessment (2016) showed high effectiveness of the public awareness campaign (ICR, p. 16), which covered 75% of the municipalities, and a decrease in illegal dumping. Facilities for resource recovery were established at the new landfill and in one of the transfer stations. Carton, plastic, and iron were sold to local industries, and composted organic waste was sold to local farmers (TTL clarifications, 4/5/2017). The ICR stated that all former waste pickers at the Yatta open dumpsite were provided with jobs, or assisted to find new jobs at the Joint Services Council, or were trained to become economically independent (ICR, p. 2). Through the project, under-age pickers were allowed at vocational schools. Environmental and living conditions improved in the areas surrounding the previous open dumpsites, which also used to suffer from pollution caused by the burning of waste (ICR, p. 3 and p. 40). Based on the ICR observations (p. 17), the project has enabled a transformational shift in solid waste management services in two governorates, from a widely criticized primitive local open dumping, to a modern, internationally comparable landfill and waste disposal operation (ICR, p. 17), with sound environmental processes and social acceptability. Given that the objective was attained, and exceeded in several aspects, the achievement of the objective is rated High

**Rating**  
High

## 5. Efficiency

The PAD's economic analysis estimated an ex ante Net Present Value at US\$10 million and an Internal Rate of Return at 18%. The ICR concluded that the wider economic benefits generated by the project were positive, and estimated ex post Internal Rate of Return at 27% (ICR, p. 18). The economic analysis considered costs and benefits related to several aspects, including the pollution of potable aquifers; health care costs related to the impact from former dumpsites; support to new livelihoods for former waste pickers; and rise in property and land values. The project was estimated to contribute an average economic net benefit of NIS 5.12 million per year over the next 10 years, which would subsequently decrease to NIS 3.92



million per year. The results are consistent with the improvements to the environment and livelihoods that are normally achieved by solid waste disposal projects (ICR, p. 18). The financial position of the Joint Services Council of Hebron and Bethlehem in 2015 was found to be adequate with a financial internal rate of return of 17% and a trading surplus of over NIS 5 million (ICR, pp. 18-19).

There were some shortcomings in the efficiency of implementation. Incremental operating costs were revised upwards from the original estimate of US\$0.35 million to US\$0.65 million through reallocations of project proceeds (Restructuring Paper, 7/31/2012, p. 5). The construction of the new sanitary landfill incurred an 11% increase from US\$8 million to US\$8.9 million, but which was deemed acceptable for a large infrastructure project in a fragile country context (ICR, p. 1, and Additional Financing Project Paper, 3/19/2015, p. 7). The project was extended by one year until 12/30/2015 in conjunction with the additional financing, and by another period of six months until 6/30/2016 to complete the closure and rehabilitation of the Yatta dump site. Given favorable returns on the investment, but with minor shortcomings in the efficiency of implementation, overall efficiency is rated Substantial.

## Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	18.00	100.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	27.00	100.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

## 6. Outcome

Relevance of objectives is rated High as the project's solid waste disposal arrangements were ambitious and sought to reverse a pattern of unsanitary open waste dumping. The objectives were responsive to the needs of the community, and were aligned with the Bank and government strategies. Relevance of design is rated High as the design was sound and had a clear causal chain linking funding, outputs and intermediate outcomes, to outcomes. Achievement of the objective to improve solid waste disposal services in Bethlehem and Hebron governorates was exceeded and is rated High. Efficiency is rated Substantial in view of favorable returns with minor shortcomings in the efficiency of implementation. Taken together, these ratings are indicative of no shortcomings in the project preparation and implementation, and therefore an Outcome rating of Highly Satisfactory.





**a. Outcome Rating**  
Highly Satisfactory

## **7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating**

The risk that development outcomes would not be maintained is based on the assessment of the uncertainties faced over the project's expected remaining useful life of 20 years (ICR, p. 21). The financial sustainability risk is deemed to be moderate because of a favorable financial return. The ICR also notes that waste disposal fees were paid in full and on time (ICR, p. 21). The additional revenue from the sale of organic waste, recycling products, and landfill gas/electricity is expected to further improve the financial position of the Joint Services Council in the medium term. The technical sustainability risk appears moderate in view of the capability of the Technical Operations Unit in overseeing day-to-day operations. The ICR states that the government is expanding sector operations, has already committed to the Gaza Solid Waste Management Project (P121648), and is actively preparing a large landfill operation in the central West Bank for serving Ramallah and El Bireh governorates, and adjacent municipalities. The primary risks are related to the ongoing conflict situation, including roadblocks, increase in travel times, and hauling costs. Taking into account all of the above, the risk that development outcomes would not be maintained is rated modest.

**a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating**  
Modest

## **8. Assessment of Bank Performance**

**a. Quality-at-Entry**

The strategic relevance was high and the operation was responsive to community needs. The ICR states that the Bank was able to bring together global, regional and national experience in solid waste management programs (ICR, pages 4 and 5). The Bank safeguard policies and sector-specific guidelines for planning and operating solid waste management systems provided a sound framework for an integrated approach to solid waste management (ICR, p. 5). The project preparation process was comprehensive and included consultations, technical and institutional assessments, and incorporated lessons learned from previous solid waste operations, such as the need for phasing, clear definition of roles and responsibilities, site suitability, and continuous coordination with stakeholders (PAD, pp. 9-10). In addition to a series of technical, environmental, socio-economic, and financial assessments, the preparation also included innovative groundwork for waste recovery, social safeguards solutions, and public awareness activities. All required safeguards studies were completed (ICR, p. 9). The risks were identified and mitigation measures were





planned: main risks included exogenous political factors, lack of unity among Palestinian factions, donor coordination, availability of qualified staff, and access to the disposal site. The need for continuous dialogue with the Israeli authorities was highlighted (ICR, p. 9). The ICR stated that, in hindsight, risks and mitigation measures were correctly identified, and that this is reflected, inter alia, by the steady decrease in risk levels during project implementation (ICR, p. 9). Preparation and appraisal were consistent with the Bank's fiduciary role. Implementation and M&E arrangements were well prepared, and data collection responsibilities were clearly established (ICR, p. 12). Baseline information and targets were established at appraisal (ICR, p. 12). However, the Restructuring Paper of 7/31/12, stated that incremental operating expenditures were underestimated at appraisal (Restructuring Paper, p. 6). Through fund reallocations, the restructuring revised and doubled the appraisal amount from US\$350,000 to US\$650,000. Given satisfactory quality-at-entry, with minor shortcomings, the Quality at Entry is rated Satisfactory.

### **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Satisfactory

#### **b. Quality of supervision**

The Bank was proactive in its implementation support. It navigated through political issues and challenging collaboration between two governorates, working in an environment which included constant security issues and temporary halting of operations. When landfill gas buildup was discovered at Yatta dumpsite, the Bank Team initiated an exploration of options for gas-to-energy generation, and facilitated additional financing to install a venting system that complied with safeguard requirements, and that could later be upgraded to a gas-to-energy conversion system. When residents raised concerns regarding odor from a leachate pond, the Bank provided for an aeration system that has ensured a permanent reduction in odor (ICR, p. 12). Supervision of fiduciary and safeguard aspects was satisfactory, and Bank missions consistently included safeguards specialists who reviewed and reported on the effective application of safeguards instruments (ICR, p.13). The in-country presence of the Task Team Leader facilitated close follow-up between the bi-annual supervision missions. The ICR (p. 23) states that the quality of supervision "helped to build an excellent relationship between all stakeholders". As confirmed by Government counterparts during the ICR stakeholder workshop in November 2016, the partnership helped to generate a momentum for solid waste management sector reform (ICR, pages 8 and 17). Given high quality of supervision, with no observed shortcomings, the Quality of Supervision is rated Highly Satisfactory.

### **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Highly Satisfactory

### **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Satisfactory

## **9. Assessment of Borrower Performance**



### **a. Government Performance**

The Government, particularly the Ministry of Local Government, demonstrated commitment to the project. During preparation and appraisal, the government supported consultations with stakeholders and the civil society, and such consultations helped in mitigating risks associated with closing unsanitary dumpsites and constructing a large sanitary landfill. The government established a steering committee for the National Strategy for Solid Waste Management in the Palestinian Territory (2010-2014), which guided investments in the sector (ICR, p. 4). At the local level, it established the Joint Services Council for Hebron and Bethlehem, which was dedicated to steer investments, construction, operation and maintenance, and monitor results (ICR, p. 2 and p. 23). The local governments provided financial resources for land acquisition required for the new landfill, and subsequently for the adoption of guidelines for assessing and structuring solid waste management costs, tariffs and fee collection (ICR, p.23). The ICR states that the relationship and coordination with the Bank and other donors were excellent throughout the implementation period (ICR, p. 23). Minor shortcomings were noted, including the timeliness of involving the Technical Operations Unit in project preparation; the clarity of early allocations; and the process of site selection, acquisition, and licensing (Borrower's comments, ICR, pp. 63-64). Given satisfactory government performance, with minor shortcomings, Government Performance is rated Satisfactory.

#### **Government Performance Rating**

Satisfactory

### **b. Implementing Agency Performance**

The Joint Services Council of Hebron and Bethlehem was responsible for implementing the project through its Technical Operations Unit. The Council was committed to development objectives, and was involved in regular stakeholder consultations. The Joint Services Council ensured compliance with safeguard and fiduciary requirements (ICR, p. 24). The ICR stated that implementation of project activities and M&E were satisfactory (ICR, p. 23). The Environmental Quality Authority assisted in monitoring the operations. The ICR stated that the strengthened Joint Services Council drafted the national strategy for solid waste management, defined specifications, and updated the national bylaw for the Joint Services Councils as noted in Section 4. Minor shortcomings were noted. The contract for construction supervision "was not optimally designed and its performance guarantee was limited" (Borrower's comments, ICR, p. 65). The Borrower also noted that the supervision contract should not be awarded before the construction contract; and that the timing for awarding the construction contract should match the permit issuance and land availability (Borrower's comments, ICR, p. 65). The Restructuring Paper of 8/5/2010 stated that the Joint Services Council was unable to carry out the selection process for hiring a firm or non-government organization with social development expertise within the covenant deadline (Restructuring Paper, p. 4), and the restructuring extended the compliance date. Given satisfactory performance of the Joint Services Council, with minor shortcomings, the Implementing Agency Performance is rated Satisfactory.

#### **Implementing Agency Performance Rating**

Satisfactory



## **Overall Borrower Performance Rating**

Satisfactory

## **10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The objectives were specified, but the statement of objectives was unnecessarily long as it explained mechanisms through which the objectives would be pursued. The indicators reflected the objectives, and were measurable. Baseline information and targets were established at appraisal (ICR, p. 12). Data collection responsibilities were prepared through the existing structure. The design further included three beneficiary impact assessments at the baseline, mid-term and end line. Also, M&E design included a beneficiary feedback poll by telephone, social media outreach, and a qualitative outcome evaluation.

### **b. M&E Implementation**

Monitoring and evaluation were adequately implemented, and the required data was regularly collected. Environmental impacts were monitored on a daily basis through the landfill operator and independently verified by the Environmental Quality Authority on a monthly basis (ICR, p.12). Data collection on solid waste intake and participating municipalities was conducted on a daily basis through the landfill gate scan system. Feedback and performance data from municipalities and stakeholders were collected through the beneficiary impact assessments. A beneficiary feedback poll with 20,000 households in Bethlehem and Hebron governorates was undertaken in 2014 to measure satisfaction and awareness, and to inform citizens about the feedback and the grievance redress mechanism (ICR, p.12), however, the ICR did not provide information about the quality of the poll.

### **c. M&E Utilization**

Data collected through the M&E framework was used for regular monitoring of the operation. An outcome evaluation, undertaken in 2016, after the completion of all works, was used in assessing results. In addition, landfill monitoring data helped to identify capacity issues among municipalities (ICR, p. 13). The beneficiary impact assessments helped to address longer-term needs by municipalities, including waste collection equipment, and the needs of citizens, businesses and other stakeholders (ICR, p. 13). M&E arrangements, landfill gate scans, Environmental Quality Authority monitoring, and the grievance redress mechanism were found by the ICR mission to be sustainable. The ICR stated that the Joint Services Council and its Technical Operations Unit continue to use the established M&E arrangements in conducting their work (ICR, p. 13).

## **M&E Quality Rating**

High



## 11. Other Issues

### a. Safeguards

Two safeguard policies were triggered by the project: Environment Assessment (OP 4.01) and Involuntary Resettlement (OP 4.12). The ICR reported full compliance with both. The project was classified under environmental category "A". Safeguards instruments were developed and disclosed before approval of the project and the additional financing. According to the ICR (p. 13), considerable diligence was exhibited by the Borrower and the Bank. An environmental engineer was appointed to the Technical Operations Unit to regularly monitor compliance with safeguards. The Technical Operations Unit provided quarterly monitoring information on the implementation of safeguards (ICR, p. 13). Bank missions consistently included safeguards specialists who reviewed and reported on the application of safeguards instruments. Social safeguards were also monitored and focused on the compensation and employment opportunities for waste pickers at the old dumpsites, and landowners and herders at the new landfill.

### b. Fiduciary Compliance

**Financial Management.** The Technical Operations Unit of the Joint Service Council of Hebron and Bethlehem was responsible for financial management. Related institutional arrangements were adequate. In the early stages of implementation, Bank supervision noted some issues such as the lack of segregation of duties and the absence of ministerial signatures, and these were resolved. Annual audits were unqualified (ICR, p. 14), including the final audit of December 2016 (TTL clarification, 5/8/2017). Audit reports submitted to the Bank were found acceptable. There was compliance with Bank covenants. Financial management was consistently rated satisfactory or moderately satisfactory in the ISRs (ICR, p. 14).

**Procurement.** The Technical Operations Unit was responsible for all procurement under the project. The procurement plan was regularly updated, and incorporated agreed activity adjustments. The plan was also used as a management instrument to keep track of contract implementation. Procurement processing was transparent and timely (ICR, p. 14). Bank procurement procedures were complied with. Most procurement activities were subject to prior review by the Bank, except for minor works and goods. Procurement aspects were supervised from the Country Office, which provided implementation support to the Council's procurement specialist. The ISRs consistently rated procurement as satisfactory (ICR, p. 14).

### c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

Employment opportunities contributed to local community development in neighboring areas around the new project site, and USAID provided support for roads and schools (TTL clarifications, 4/5/2017). The project attracted further donor support (Section 2 e) to invest in waste management (ICR, p. 20), and, according to the ICR, the project created a momentum for a comprehensive solid waste management sector reform (ICR,



p. 8 and p. 17).

#### d. Other

##### **Dissemination of Learning and Knowledge, as the ICR was designated as an Intensive Learning ICR.**

According to the ICR (p. 26), dissemination of the operation's lessons was carried out through a series of learning and knowledge events and initiatives, which are summarized in the ICR (Annex 10), including: (i) task team participation in Bank events and brown bag lunches, peer reviewing of similar projects, workshops, and conference showcases; (ii) 2-day peer-to-peer learning event with mayors from the MENA region, (iii) online video summarizing lessons learned; (iv) online interactions with the Joint Services Council; (v) Policy Note on Solid Waste Management in Fragile Situations produced by the task team; and (vi) development of a Technical Learning Note for solid waste management.

## 12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Highly Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Modest	Modest	---
Bank Performance	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	The ICRR rates the Quality-at-Entry as Satisfactory, with minor shortcomings (Section 8a), and the Quality of Supervision as Highly Satisfactory. According to the harmonized guidelines, the appropriate rating to assign for overall Bank Performance is Satisfactory.
Borrower Performance	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	The ICRR rates both Government Performance and Implementing Agency Performance as Satisfactory with minor shortcomings, as noted in Section 9.
Quality of ICR		High	---

#### Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.



### 13. Lessons

The project has provided a number of lessons (ICR, pp. 27-28), and the following are drawn from the ICR:

- **Public Private partnerships can be designed as temporary arrangements to increase capacity and efficiency.** Under the project, the partnership was specifically designed to grow the technical capacity through on-the-job training of Joint Services Council staff by working side by side with the private operator.
- **Large infrastructure investments in fragile contexts require an incremental approach.** The project focused on specific and critical aspects of the solid waste management system, namely secondary collection and final disposal, complemented by institutional building, and public awareness raising. The new sanitary landfill created the necessary momentum to attract additional investments for the sector, which further strengthened waste collection services at the municipality level. Overall, while a comprehensive sector reform may not always be feasible in a fragile context, an incremental, and sometimes opportunistic, investment approach can lead to substantial improvements across the sector, as long as investments are clearly linked to the theory of change.
- **Social safeguards requirements can be leveraged to create significant social and economic benefits.** The project created sustainable livelihood alternatives for former waste pickers who were at risk of losing their livelihood when dumpsites were closed. Instead of only offering compensation for monetary loss, a livelihood assessment was conducted and a livelihood scheme designed for waste pickers and implemented by specialized NGOs.

### 14. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is clear, succinct, and consistent, both internally and with the guidelines. It is results-oriented. It explains what was planned against what was achieved, and compares the situation before the project and after completion of project activities. The ICR provides an adequate discussion on the results framework and causal chain, linking project outputs and intermediate outcome indicators within the achievement of development objectives. The analysis is thorough and the quality of the evidence is robust and well presented, which provides a basis for drawing conclusions. Additional strengths of the report include the quality of its analysis on financial sustainability and partnerships. The report offers useful lessons derived from project experience. The ICR also describes the dissemination of learning and knowledge that was undertaken after project closing, as the ICR was designated as an Intensive Learning ICR.



**a. Quality of ICR Rating**  
High