Report Number : ICRR0020394

1. Project Data

Operation ID P117822	Operation Name SL-GRGG 4 BUDGET SUPPORT (DPL)
Country Sierra Leone	Practice Area(Lead) Macro Economics & Fiscal Management

Programmatic DPL
Planned Operations: 3 Approved Operations: 3

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Financing (USD)
IDA-48600	31-Jul-2011	10,000,000.00
Bank Approval Date	Closing Date (Actual)	
20-Dec-2010	31-Jul-2011	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Co-financing (USD)
Original Commitment	10,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	10,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	9,807,680.00	0.00

Sector(s)
Central Government (Central Agencies)(65%):Other Industry, Trade and Services(27%):Other Energy and Extractives(8%)

Theme(s)
Public expenditure, financial management and procurement(61%):Other Private Sector Development(12%):Debt management and fiscal sustainability(11%):Tax policy and administration(8%):Other accountability/anti-corruption(8%)

Prepared by	Reviewed by	ICR Review Coordinator	Group
Felix Oppong	Clay Wescott	Lourdes N. Pagaran	IEGEC (Unit 1)

Operation ID P126355	Operation Name SL-DPL 5 - Budget Support (P126355)
Country Sierra Leone	Practice Area(Lead) Macro Economics & Fiscal Management

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Financing (USD)
IDA-48600,IDA-50560	31-Aug-2012	24,000,000.00
Bank Approval Date	Closing Date (Actual)	
26-Jan-2012	31-Aug-2012	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Co-financing (USD)
Original Commitment	24,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	24,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	24,029,340.00	0.00

Sector(s)
Central Government (Central Agencies)(70%):Mining(4%):Other Energy and Extractives(15%):Other Water Supply, Sanitation and Waste Management(3%):Other Industry, Trade and Services(8%)

Theme(s)
Public expenditure, financial management and procurement(32%):Tax policy and administration(27%):Regulation and competition policy(36%):Export development and competitiveness(5%)

Operation ID	Operation Name
P133107	SL-GRGC-6 Gov Reform & Growth Grant FY13 (P133107)
Country	Practice Area(Lead)
Sierra Leone	Macro Economics & Fiscal Management

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Financing (USD)
IDA-48600,IDA-53480,IDA-H9600	30-Jun-2015	25,000,000.00
Bank Approval Date	Closing Date (Actual)	
23-Dec-2013	30-Jun-2015	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Co-financing (USD)
Original Commitment	50,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	24,962,385.00	0.00
Actual	25,128,243.00	0.00

Sector(s)
Central Government (Central Agencies)(56%):Other Education(11%):Mining(11%):Energy Transmission and Distribution(22%)

Theme(s)
Administrative and civil service reform(11%):Public expenditure, financial management and procurement(33%):Tax policy and administration(33%):Legal institutions for a market economy(23%)

2. Project Objectives and Policy Areas

a. Objectives

Project Portal Project Development Objective

The Program Development Objective (PDO) was to: (i) improve the allocation and efficiency of public spending to support poverty reduction; (ii) strengthen domestic resource mobilization and management; and (iii) increase provision of electricity (PAD GRGC 4, Credit and Program Summary). Although, there were different formulations of the PDO in the program documents, there was a consistent formulation in the Credit and Program Summaries of the other two operations. This Review will use the PDO statement in the Credit and Program Summary.

b. Were the program objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation of the series? If yes, were the changes part of the program document approved by the Board?

No

c. Pillars/Policy Areas

i. **Public Expenditure Management**.

The expected outcome of this policy area was to improve implementation of the poverty reduction strategy through reduced incidence of extra-budgetary spending and virement between expenditure heads. The government aimed at specifically improving the budget allocations made to social services (Education and Health) and eliminating laxity in fiscal management that resulted in rising fiscal deficits and risks, and growing contingent liabilities.

Some of the prior actions under this policy area included reallocation of budget heads in conformity to the budget law, submission of public debt management bill to Parliament, a review of the budgeting and accountability Act (2005) and Regulation (2007), biometric verification of teachers on the payroll, increasing the quality of 20 procurement plans, and reducing to less than 10 percent in 2009 the difference between the variance in expenditure composition of the 20 largest budget heads and the actual deviation in domestic primary expenditure.

ii. **Domestic Resource Mobilization**.

The expected outcome of this policy area is to improve the tax revenue by increasing the taxpayers with tax identification numbers. The increase in the tax revenue was expected to accommodate the rising non-debt expenditures after 2010. The government intended to achieve its target through increased tax compliance of Small and Medium Enterprises and a reduction in discretionary exemptions granted annually. The main prior actions for this policy area was the submission of a law to Parliament to reduce the opportunity for discretionary tax exemptions which was reducing tax revenue by 30 percent, and further increase the transparency of exemption decisions.

iii**. Public Sector Reform**
The expected outcome of this policy area is to expand the potential for increasing investment in the public sector by increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration and service delivery in the Civil Service. The reform also aimed at rationalizing the size of the public service. Some of the prior actions for this policy area included the submission of four bills to Parliament, that is: (i) Public–Private Partnerships Bill, (ii) Freedom of Information Bill, (iii) an Electricity and Water Regulation Commission Bill, and (iv) a National Electricity Bill. Other prior actions include Cabinet approval of principles to guide tariff methodology in the energy sector and formalizing power sales to the National Power Authority.

d. Comments on Program Cost, Financing, and Dates

The programmatic series provided the government of Sierra Leone with a total of US$59 million. The first and second operation were credits, while the third operation was a grant. The first operation in the series was appraised on November 16, 2010 and approved by the Board on December 20, 2010. It became effective on January 18, 2011 and SDR 6.4 (US$10) million was disbursed by the close of the operation on July 31, 2011. The second operation in the series was appraised on December 20, 2011 and approved by the Board on January 26, 2012. It became effective on January 31, 2012 and disbursed in full SDR 15.5 (US$24) million before closing on August 31, 2012. The third operation was also appraised on November 18, 2013 and approved by the Board on December 23, 2013. It became effective on May15, 2014 and disbursed in full SDR 16.3 (US$25) million before closing on June 30, 2015.

The TTL attributed the delay in the effective date of the third operation to the request by the authorities to convert the third operation from a 'credit' to a ′grant′, after board approval and signing of the Financial Agreement as a credit. The government requested the grant facility because of fiscal challenges it was facing from the decline in commodity prices, the closing of two iron mines and the Ebola outbreak. There were no reported exchange rate losses resulting from conversion from SDR to US dollars for all three series. The TTL indicated that the amount (US$50million) displayed in the Bank′s operations portal as the original commitment for the third operation is an error.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

The programmatic series addressed relevant challenges affecting the economy between 2010 and 2015. Some of the key challenges during the period included the rising fiscal deficit, limited and unsustainable energy supply, falling expenditures for social sectors, and increased demand for capital spending for rehabilitation and new construction. The rising fiscal deficit was partly a result of rising discretionary exemptions which weakened revenue performance, strong growth in domestic financed capital expenditures and rising wage bill.

The objectives of the program were in line with the government′s second and third Poverty Reduction Strategy. They were consistent with the World Bank′s Country Assistance Strategy for the period FY10-13 and the African Regional Strategy emphasizing improving governance, and increasing growth. The three operations were also fully aligned with the Joint Assistance Strategy which was prepared in collaboration with African Development Bank, the International Finance Corporation and other development partners in the Multi-donor budget support group.

Rating

High

b. Relevance of Design

The design of the three operations focused on three policy areas (Public Expenditure Management, Domestic Resource Mobilization and Public Sector Reforms) that were relevant to the objectives of the government program. Each prior action, trigger, and outcome target was linked to the three policy areas. The choice of programmatic series was appropriate and enabled the team to incorporate changing priorities of government as indicated in the second and third poverty reduction strategy papers of Sierra Leone. Most reform actions supported a causal chain linked to objectives and outcomes, in line with the changing country context within the period when the operation was designed and implemented.

Despite the appropriateness of the instrument and its linkages with the government's policy agenda, the design fell short in many other areas. Some of the policy actions were not adequately supporting the achievement of objectives. These policy actions were one time actions that had to be taken by government and were easily reversible after the program. Such policy actions attempted to micromanage the government instead of sustaining a plausible reform agenda. One such policy action is: "The portion of budget head 501 being assigned to the office of the vice president and Miscellaneous Services General will be reassigned to other appropriate budget head". Another policy action which could be easily reversed is the variance in the expenditure composition of the largest budget heads which should not exceed overall deviation in domestic primary expenditure by more than 9 percentage points (GRGC5 Results Indicator). This policy action was dropped in the sixth program. The annual budget has many budget heads and thus a sample of largest 20 budget heads would not remain the same over time. This was a measurement and comparability issue with this indicator that affected the design of the first two programs (GRGC4 and GRGC5). However, corrective measures were taken during the third program (GRGC6). The ICR indicates that some of the triggers in GRGC5 were either replaced or refined during the third operation to make them measurable and realistic. The design was made more relevant to the objectives during the third operation.(ICR pp4,5)

Sierra Leone's macroeconomic framework provided an adequate basis for the proposed series, based on prudent policies that seemed sustainable over the medium term. It was conservative in that it didn't take into account two new iron ore operators, and factored in fiscal restraints below desired levels due to revenue uncertainty. The country is reported by the ICR to have engaged in election year overspending in 2012 which resulted in a temporary suspension of an IMF program, but the government worked to get back on track. While initial growth through 2013 far exceeded expectations, there was a sharp decline after that due to the collapse of commodity prices, and the Ebola epidemic, both beyond the ability of policy makers to control. Other macroeconomic risks are discussed in Section 6.

Rating
Modest

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective
To improve the allocation and efficiency of public spending to support poverty reduction

Rationale

Efficacy is assessed against several outcome indicators as follows. The quantitative target aimed at minimizing the variance between individual budget categories and their respective allocations in 2014 to 15 per cent of the original budget was met, with a result of 13.6 per cent. Public domestic debt was stabilized at 11.6 percent of non-iron ore GDP, meeting the target of being below 13 per cent. Fiscal overhang was limited to 1.7 per cent of the revenue statutory limit on the central bank overdraft facilities, and the combination of the change in domestic expenditure arrears and unpresented checks (float) did not exceed 1.5 percent of total actual expenditure, meeting the targets of less than 5 per cent and 2 per cent respectively. Cash Management Committee reports met the target of including relevant arrears data in the first half of 2014. While the Committee did not meet starting in the second half of 2014 due to the Ebola epidemic, meetings resumed in 2016 and relevant reports started being produced. There was no overspending outside of Government Budgeting and Accountability Act proscriptions, so no supplementary budgets were required, meeting the outcome target. However, the target that 75 percent of procurements would be conducted through open competition was not met, with actual achievement of 42 per cent in 2014. In addition, the target of at least 98 percent of teachers on payroll having HR records was not met, with a result of 76 per cent in 2014.

Despite most of the outcome targets being met, there are still concerns with the quality of budget allocation which was reflected in large deviations in the expenditures compared to the budget plan. It also noted the laxity in fiscal discipline which reflected weakness in the underlying budget preparation. Unappropriated expenditures were frequently displacing appropriated expenditures. The ICR confirms the inadequacy of the policy actions and reports that: "despite the achievement of the quantitative targets, there were clear challenges with the budget allocation and efficiency issues in the public spending" (p. 12).

The ICR further states that off-budget spending was a common practice during the implementation of the programmatic series. Among the targets that were met was the stabilizing of domestic public debt. This target may have been met on the back of accumulating arrears, which is an indicator of hidden macroeconomic instability in the economy. Also, the target which aimed at limiting fiscal overhang had no baseline when the indicator was formulated and thus, it was difficult to assess the results as reported in the ICR. Another target that was met required government to submit a supplementary budget to Parliament if government actual expenditure exceeds the budget between 2013 and 2014. The government did not present any supplementary budget to Parliament and hence the target was met. The ICR does not confirm if indeed all actual spending were kept within budget. The GRGG 6 took corrective measures to address challenges with accumulated arrears and unpaid financial obligations. The cleaning up process defined the selected prior actions for GRGG 6 (p. 23). While the policy actions were important steps forward, continuing work will be needed to improve allocation and efficiency of spending in support of poverty reduction.

On balance, though there were mixed results within the implementation period, the program's major outcome indicators had been met at the closing of the program, with public debt stabilized and the variance between budget and actual reduced.

Rating
Substantial

Objective 2

Objective
Strengthen domestic resource mobilization and management

Rationale

Efficacy is assessed against the achievement of a strengthened domestic resource mobilization and management. The program target was to achieve a tax revenue to non-iron ore GDP of 12 percent by 2014, but it only increased from 9 percent in 2009 to 10.8 percent in 2014. The target was not met mainly as a result of the Ebola epidemic in 2014, along with the price decline which precipitated the closure of two largest iron ore mines. Tax revenue to non-iron ore GDP fell by 1.7 percent from 2013 and 2014 as a result of these shocks. The ICR reports a recovery of this indicator after 2014.

Although the tax revenue target was not met, the program managed to get 92 per cent of the large tax payers to file their tax returns on time, exceeding the target of 90 per cent from a baseline of 45 per cent in 2009. Also, a national Minerals Agency was established by an Act of Parliament and staffed to regulate the mineral sector. Increasing the number of large companies that file their taxes on time is usually expected to lead to increased revenue collections when the economy is stable and growing. Tax revenue would have fallen further in Sierra Leone without the policy action aimed at increasing the base of large tax payers filing their tax returns.

The ICR describes the revenue performance of Sierra Leone after the program as being weak compared to its neighboring West African countries. The third program document in the series duly acknowledges that income tax compliance has been historically low in Sierra Leone and envisages a structural deterioration in revenue collection from the non-mineral economy. By implication, a shock in the international price of mineral ores is likely to have a devastating effect on the Sierra Leonean economy. The program did not fully achieve its objectives, given that the prior actions were not sufficient to stimulate stronger revenue generation, in light of the unexpected Ebola shock. Still, Government efforts at bringing tax payers into the tax net and passing the National Minerals Agency are not easily reversible and could have long term benefits.

On balance, the objectives were substantially met at the end of the series as tax administration benefited from enrolling 92 per cent of the large tax payers, reducing the potential cost of revenue collection.

Rating
Substantial

Objective 3

Objective
Increase the provision of electricity

Rationale

Efficacy is assessed against the target aimed at getting a performance contract for the National Electricity company. This target was not met because investors were not ready to take up any contract during the Ebola epidemic, although as of mid-2016 shortlisted firms were preparing financial-technical proposals. The number of prepaid meters was increased from 29,000 to 80,000, exceeding the target of 50,000. The increase in collection efficiency from 67 per cent to 83 per cent was partially met, with a result of 76 per cent in 2015. A recent audit of the electricity utility suggests that the baseline figure was much lower than in the Program Document.

The program supported other reforms such as the passing the Freedom of Information Act and submission to Parliament of a bill to regulate the formation of public- private partnerships, which were expected to support the energy sector performance contracts. In addition, the National Electricity Act and the Act for the establishment of the Electricity and Water Commission were both adopted.

Rating
Modest

5. Outcome

The relevance of the program's objective is rated substantial while the relevance of design is modest, reflecting the shortcomings in the logical linkages between some prior actions, results indicators and program objectives. There were issues with the depth of the prior actions in addressing the challenges highlighted in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Country Assistance Strategy. The objective of protecting poverty reducing spending priorities was substantially achieved by the close of the series. Similarly, tax administration was substantially strengthened with 92 per cent of large tax payers filling the taxes. However, there were only modest achievement in increasing provision of electricity. While the number of prepaid meters usage increased, collection efficiency was partially met and the performance contract for the NEC was not met. On balance, the overall outcome is rated moderately satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

6. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

There are three major risks (macroeconomics, political and fiduciary) that could potentially undermine the program's achievements. The country is susceptible to macroeconomic shocks arising from external factors. It is likely to continue to be negatively impacted by prolonged global downturn which has affected the terms of trade through low mineral prices. But, there are also potential domestic risks to the macro economy which could arise from political interference to procurement procedures, and a rise in extra budgetary expenditures, as the cost of post Ebola recovery is uncertain. A high cost of Ebola recovery and heightened demand for social expenditure could potentially reverse some of the macroeconomic gains. The government's inability to transparently collate and report mineral ore revenues as stipulated in its mineral laws (2009), and the low capacity to generate non- mineral tax revenue are in themselves risks to a continued increase in poverty reducing expenditures. With high social expenditures looming against the restoration of fiscal discipline, the government's desire to implement its ambitious infrastructure program without ensuring adequate funding may result in budget re-allocation against social sector spending or an accumulation of either debt or arrears. There is a possibility of re-occurrence of extra budgetary expenditures amidst continued subsidization of the retail price of fuel. The potential of policy reversal could pose significant risk to the development outcomes of this program.

Election related expenditures risks are also likely to resurface in the next elections (2017) to distort budget allocations, if adequate measures are not taken to address the lack of political will and potential increase in demand for public services (which also occurred during the last elections). Finally, the current weak institutional capacity to sustain public financial reforms is likely to pose some fiduciary risks that may affect future Bank operations.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating
Substantial

7. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The preparation of the program benefited from considerable analytical and sector related work such as the Public Expenditure Reviews of 2004 and 2010, Procurement Audit of 2007, Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Report of 2010 and the Poverty Diagnostic for 2008. It also benefited from the government's published strategy documents such as the second and third Poverty Reduction and Strategy Papers, which had been prepared through broad consultation with senior members of government. The program document adequately reflected the Bank's own Country Assistance Strategies and the priorities of government. Through the Multi Donor Budget Support Group, civil society groups were engaged to provide input at various stages of the program preparation. The macroeconomic challenges and risks were adequately diagnosed throughout the three series.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

Supervision was carried out by the program team and other sector colleagues with at least a mission each year. The ICR reports that the implementation of the series was unhindered except for delays in the third operation because it was originally approved by the Board as a credit, but was later converted to a grant. The Bank maintained dialogue with government through its active participation in the Multi Donor Budget Group that jointly discussed, assessed the government's performance and progress towards achieving the outcome targets. The ICR reports that donor coordination resulted in improved performance assessment. However, implementation was affected by the Ebola epidemic and the collapse of international iron ore prices which heightened the fiscal risks affecting the country.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

8. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The ICR indicates that the government showed substantial commitment to the program. Through policy dialogue and engagement with the development partners, the government harmonized the various indicators from the Bank and other Development partners into a single Progress Assessment Framework to ease monitoring. Sierra Leone is a post conflict country with weak systems, and susceptible to global shocks. A fiscal slippage occurred in 2012 (Section 3b), but the government worked with the Bank to restore confidence in the economy. Government delayed the implementation of some of the reform actions especially in the electricity sector to accommodate the two shocks. (ICR pp. 7-8)

Government Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

The implementing agencies were the Ministry of Finance and Development, Ministry of Energy, National Revenue Authority, Ministry of Education, Sports and Technology and the Accountant General's Department. The ICR reports that they worked together and prepared strategies to monitor the indicators. While the staff of the Ministry of Finance were consistently accessible to the Bank for engagement on the progress of indicators, there was not enough consultations among the implementing agencies on the government side. In the Ministry of Education, there was lack of strong support for the implementation of the policy action aimed at verification of teachers on the payroll. The team attributed the results of the energy sector reforms to the change in the Minister of Energy during the implementation which resulted in a hostile environment for dialogue, and the lack of support from sector colleagues to follow up with the policy dialogue. These pushbacks and resistance resulted in delays during implementation. (ICR pp. 8).

In addition, the team informed IEG that the desired procurement results were not fully achieved because of the transfer of the procurement champion from the Authority during the implementation period. However, the ICR attributes the government's inability to meet the procurement indicator to the Ebola epidemic which necessitated sole sourcing under emergency, but it also mentioned that the effectiveness of the Procurement Authority was undermined by frequent interference from the authorities.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The program documents of the series had indicative baselines for all the quantitative indicators which improved the robustness of the design of the results framework.

The objectives were clearly specified and maintained in all the three series. The ICR notes that the M&E for the program was designed with the government and other Multi-Donor Budget Support Partners using the existing systems under the joint annual assessment/ reviews. The M&E design was adjusted during the second and third programs of the series to accommodate the changing needs of government. It was also aligned with the budget cycle of the government to ensure that implementing agencies adequately budgeted for their activities and received resources in a timely manner. However, the ICR reports design issues with the indicators that were expected to be assessed with publicly published data, some of which was either not available or in poor quality. The programmatic series put more emphasis on legislation especially in the fourth operation of the series (GCRC4).

b. M&E Implementation

The ICR reports that implementation was monitored through a continuous dialogue with government counterparts to assess progress and address potential bottlenecks. Together with development partners, the government engaged the World Bank in defining and monitoring all indicators. Some development partners also provided technical assistance to the government as a way to facilitate the implementation. The Ministry of Finance and Development aided the data collection process. The results indicators in the first two operations (GRGC 4&5) were not sharp and measured the completion of each stage of the operation rather than the entire program. The team addressed this challenge through refining the results indicators during the course of the program as a way to strengthen the achievement of the objectives.

c. M&E Utilization

The World Bank and Development Partners used the results of their assessment of indicators to engage in policy dialogue with government. This dialogue influenced pillars selected in the preparation of the Third Poverty Reduction Strategy paper by government. In particular, the ICR reports on discussions with government on poverty related expenditures and transfers to local councils.

M&E Quality Rating
Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Environmental and Social Effects

The ICR did not report of significant environmental issues. However, it indicated that an improvement in revenue mobilization was likely to lead to more resources being channeled to poverty-related projects that would benefit people in the bottom 40 percentile income group.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

The ICR did not report any fiduciary compliance issues related to the series. However, it indicated continued deficiencies in institutional capacity of the government that could affect fiduciary performance, M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

ICR did not report any unintended outcomes.

d. Other

There are no other issues .

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Substantial	Substantial	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

12. Lessons

This review supports some of the lessons cited in the ICR, especially the importance of having a functional Multi-donor Budget Group that will assist in the design, formulation and selection of indicators discussed with government. Other lessons cited in the ICR with adaptation in language include the following:

(i) The Ministry of Finance plays a critical role in ensuring that agreed reforms are implemented by various government agencies. In this case, the Ministry of Finance did not effectively use its budgeting and resource allocation powers to compel the Ministry of Education to focus on agreed reforms. As a result, the education sector target was not met.

(ii) The use of a programmatic series provided an opportunity for mid-term corrective measures to be taken by the team towards the achievement of the targets. The Bank team had an opportunity to re-evaluate their indicators after the first two operations and introduced new indicators during the third operation (SL-GRGG 6) to help them achieve the desired outcomes.

(iii) Selecting prior actions from the Progress Assessment Framework designed and discussed with government and other development partners works well and aids monitoring. In this case, the policy reforms were derived from the government's own reform agenda and harmonized with the reforms supported by development partners. This created ownership from all stakeholders during the implementation and monitoring of the Progress Assessment Framework.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provided detailed accounts and analysis on many important aspects of the programmatic series. However, it did not provide sufficient information on progress made on the fiscal situation ahead of each operation. Also, it did not report on the outcome of prior actions that required submission of bills to Parliament. It is not clear whether all the bills were passed by Parliament. SL-GRGG 4 is a credit in the PAD, but is listed both as a grant (pp. iv, v, vi, 1, 23, 25) and credit (p 6) in different parts of the ICR, without explanation.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial