



1. Project Data

Operation ID
P126877

Operation Name
RW-Support to Social Protection System 1

Country
Rwanda

Practice Area(Lead)
Social Protection & Labor

Programmatic DPL
Planned Operations: 3

Approved Operations: 3

L/C/TF Number(s)
IDA-H7590,IDA-H8370

Closing Date (Original)
30-Mar-2013

Total Financing (USD)
40,000,000.00

Bank Approval Date
20-Mar-2012

Closing Date (Actual)
30-Jun-2014

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Co-financing (USD)
Original Commitment	90,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	90,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	88,316,524.00	0.00

Sector(s)
Social Protection(64%):Public Administration - Social Protection(36%)

Theme(s)
Social Safety Nets/Social Assistance & Social Care Services(86%):Rural markets(7%):Income Support for Old Age, Disability & Survivorship(7%)

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Operation ID
P131666

Operation Name
RW-Support to Social Protection System 2 (P131666)

Country
Rwanda

Practice Area(Lead)
Social Protection & Labor



L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-H7590,IDA-H8370	Closing Date (Original)	Total Financing (USD) 50,000,000.00
Bank Approval Date 14-Mar-2013	Closing Date (Actual)	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Co-financing (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	0.00
Actual	0.00	0.00

Sector(s)
Social Protection(100%)

Theme(s)
Natural disaster management(10%):Poverty strategy, analysis and monitoring(30%):Social Safety Nets/Social Assistance & Social Care Services(20%):Social Protection and Labor Policy & Systems(30%):Gender(10%)

Operation ID P146452	Operation Name 3rd Support to the Soc. Prot. System DPL (P146452)
Country Rwanda	Practice Area(Lead) Social Protection & Labor

L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-54270,IDA-H9330	Closing Date (Original) 30-Jun-2015	Total Financing (USD) 70,000,000.00
Bank Approval Date 13-Mar-2014	Closing Date (Actual) 30-Jun-2015	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Co-financing (USD)
Original Commitment	70,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	70,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	70,829,850.00	0.00

Sector(s)



Social Protection(88%):Public Administration - Social Protection(12%)

Theme(s)

Social Safety Nets/Social Assistance & Social Care Services(50%):Social Protection and Labor Policy & Systems(50%)

2. Project Objectives and Policy Areas

a. Objectives

This ICRR reviews the performance of a series of three Development Policy Operations (DPO) supporting the social protection system, one each year, and covering the period from 2012 to 2014 – SSPS1 to SSPS3. The Development Objective for the DPOs, as set out in the Program Document for SSPS1 (Program Document, PD, p. 34) was to *support the efforts of the Government of Rwanda (GoR) to consolidate its social protection system to enhance efficiency and effectiveness and expand coverage*.

No statement of objectives was included in the Financing Agreement.

The revision involved dropping one objective – enhancing efficiency - that was included in the original design, while policy areas and indicators remained substantively unchanged. The Region plausibly argued that the specific focus on *efficiency* as a project objective was redundant, as efficiency measures served as inputs into *enhanced effectiveness* and *expanded coverage*, rather than as separate project objectives. Therefore, a split evaluation of the original and revised objectives will not be undertaken.

Achievement of objectives will be assessed based on the basis of two objectives: (i) efficiency and effectiveness; and (ii) coverage.

Given ongoing investment projects and involvement of other donors in the relevant policy areas, some of the outcomes in the Section on Achievement of Objectives below reflect not only legal and regulatory actions supported by the DPLs, but also the effects of interventions through technical assistance and other donor support.

- b. Were the program objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation of the series? If yes, were the changes part of the program document approved by the Board?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

No

c. Pillars/Policy Areas

The program supported implementation of the country's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS). It continued the Bank's focus on developing the country's safety net strategy - Vision 2020 *Umurenge* Program (VUP) – that had started under a previous DPO series - Community Living Standards DPO series (P122157, CLS). The SSPS series included four policy areas:

1 Strengthening policy development and management capacity of the SP sector by strengthening the sector leadership in the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) by (i) establishing the Rwanda Local Development Support Fund (RLDSF) as an autonomous agency under the MINALOC to coordinate core safety net programs; and (ii) developing social protection working groups (SPWG) and a related joint review system (JRS) including Government and donors to guide policy design and implementation of the country's National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS).

2 Consolidation of the SP management information system (MIS) involving the establishment of an integrated national MIS to capture, process, and report consolidated program information to facilitate improved delivery and monitoring of SP programs; and develop a complaints and appeals process.

3 Expanding coverage and enhancing harmonization of SP interventions by expanding the country's flagship safety net program, VUP (Vision 2020 Umurenge), providing direct support, public works, and financial assistance for income generating activities; and harmonizing it with the other major safety net programs - FARG (Genocide Survivors Assistance Fund), RDRP (Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program) and MINALOC Decentralized SP transfers.

4 Establishing operational linkages between SP and early warning systems linked to climate-related shocks. The program would support setting up



the institutional framework for linking safety net programs with early warning systems, quick response contingency plans, contingent financial resources, and adequate institutional arrangements.

d. Comments on Program Cost, Financing, and Dates

Project cost and financing. The commitments under SSPS1, SSPS2, and SSPS3 were US\$ 40 million, US\$ 50 million, and US\$ 70 million, respectively. US\$ 114 million were in grant form, while US\$46 million of SSPS3 was an IDA Credit. The total amount of US\$ 160 million was fully disbursed.

Borrower contribution. None

Dates: SSPS1 was approved on March 20, 2012; its original Closing Date of March 30, 2013, was postponed once, to June 30, 2014. SSPS2 was approved on March 14, 2013 and closed on June 30, 2015. SSPS3 was approved on March 13, 2014 and closed on June 30, 2015.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

The SSPS program objectives and key policy areas are aligned with Rwanda's 2013 National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) which is a central element of the country's Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). Key elements of the NSPS include consolidation of safety net programs, expansion of their coverage, and increasing program efficiency and effectiveness - the VUP. The PDO is also fully consistent with the Bank's Rwanda Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) 2014–2018. It supports the CPS's second strategic theme: improving the productivity and incomes of the poor, including through social protection. Support for social protection aims to consolidate past achievements while introducing and scaling up measures that are essential to further strengthening of Rwanda's social protection system. This support is also in line with the Bank's global and Africa Social Protection Strategies in its focus on consolidating policy reforms and enhancing performance of social protection programs.

Rating

High

Revised Rating

Not Rated/Not Applicable

b. Relevance of Design

The SSPS series contributed to the longer term objective of building a balanced social safety net. It built on the prior CLS DPO series that laid the foundation for a comprehensive national safety net by creating and piloting the VUP. In turn, the SSPS was followed by a third DPO series – a Social Protection System DPO introduced in 2012 – that aimed at further deepening the safety net reforms developed under the SSPS.

The SSPS was designed to strengthen capacity for safety net policy development and management in key institutions; and to establish a management information system to facilitate coherent administration of the VUP. In turn, this was aimed at facilitating wider coverage and greater effectiveness of the VUP. The building of stronger linkages with early disaster warning systems was to further secure the VUP's poverty alleviation effort by contributing to addressing the effects of temporary shocks on poor households.

Maintaining a programmatic DPO recognized the still formative nature of the institutional environment for safety nets, and provided the flexibility to adapt the program to evolving circumstances on the ground. That said, the formulation of the objective does not appear to have been sufficiently well thought, resulting in a change in the formulation of the DPO with the emphasis shifting from "efficiency and effectiveness" to "effectiveness", while the program remained unchanged. Likewise, consolidation of the MIS appears to have been overdesigned, contributing to delays in implementing that component.



Rating
Substantial

Revised Rating
Not Rated/Not Applicable

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

Objective: to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of its Social Protection System.

Achievement of the objectives is rated based on an assessment of the results in the following three policy areas.

Rationale

Policy area 1: strengthening the policy development and management capacity of the SP sector.

Outcome: Adequate capacity and performance standards maintained in key government agencies to monitor and evaluate progress in implementing the NSPS :

Policy development and management capacity was strengthened. The RLDSF had been established and staffed to coordinate safety net programs; it is operational. The interagency sector working groups and the related joint sector review system had been created and are considered crucial for better coordination in implementing the NSPS. The working groups meet regularly, and semi-annual sector reviews review progress in implementing the NSPS. The ICR (p. 19) notes that these processes so far have yielded positive results in terms of safety net program coordination and effectiveness, and also pointed to the need for further intensification of links with ministries and agencies outside the strict confined of social protection. Staffing targets had been met, and performance contracting had been introduced, which incorporated learning, training, and mentoring objectives as well as annual performance evaluations.

Policy area 2: consolidation of the SPMIS

Outcome: safety net program beneficiary registries managed through an integrated management information system

The framework for institutionalizing the MIS was agreed on, but the result fell short of the intended outcome – to have an operational MIS in place; that has not yet been achieved. It is still being developed under the follow-up program to the current series. The complaints and appeals mechanism for the VUP was rolled out nationwide under the program.

Policy area 4: establishing operational linkages between SP and climate-related early warning systems

Outcome: Safety net program responds adequately to the effects of periodic shocks on poor households

Policy guidelines were developed on how social protection programs were to respond in disaster situations in the context of the Government's national policy on disaster management. A process of data sharing, dialogue and implementation of early warning systems between the Ministry overseeing social protection and the Ministry of disaster management was developed. A risk financing strategy was developed for scaling up appropriate programs (notably direct cash transfers) and for introducing risk targeting in identifying at-risk households.

Rating
Substantial

Revised Objective

Not applicable because this objective was not revised.

Revised Rationale

Not applicable because this objective was not revised.



Revised Rating
Not Rated/Not Applicable

Objective 2

Objective
To expand the coverage of the Social Protection System

Rationale

Policy area 3: expanding coverage and enhancing harmonization of SP interventions

Outcome: Low level of inclusion errors in VUP

Expanding coverage. The program expanded the geographic coverage of VUP's direct support and public works components from 120 sectors in 2011/12 to 180 direct support sectors and 150 public works sectors in 2012/13. On that basis, the VUP's geographic sector coverage reached 40 percent of sectors. At the same time, household coverage for direct support increased by 71 percent, from 19,583 to 27,631 households; and for public works likewise by 71 percent, from 66,858 to 94,397 households. These numbers exceed initial targets by between 40 and 80 percent.

Enhancing harmonization. Alignment of the main cash transfer components in the VUP and the other major safety net programs was initiated. Common indicators were established, and they are collected and reported during joint sector reviews and fed into the national poverty reduction strategy. A review of the VUP household classification methodology was undertaken, and its targeting system is being revised. (During implementation, a review of the VUP household classification methodology was undertaken and, while VUP targeting was successful in reaching the poor, it also was prone to inclusion errors, leading to the Government's decision to review the methodology.)

Policy area 4: establishing operational linkages between SP and climate-related early warning systems

Outcome: Safety net program responds adequately to the effects of periodic shocks on poor households

Policy guidelines were developed on how social protection programs were to respond in disaster situations in the context of the Government's national policy on disaster management. A process of data sharing, dialogue and implementation of early warning systems between the Ministry overseeing social protection and the Ministry of disaster management was developed. A risk financing strategy was developed for scaling up appropriate programs (notably direct cash transfers) and for introducing risk targeting in identifying at-risk households.

Rating
Substantial

Revised Objective
Not applicable because this objective was not revised.

Revised Rationale
Not applicable because this objective was not revised.

Revised Rating
Not Rated/Not Applicable

5. Outcome



The relevance of the PDO is rated **high**, as it responds to both the Government reform program and the Bank's country strategy. Relevance of design is rated **substantial**, the rating affected by adjustments to the objective and the design of the MIS. Efficacy is rated **substantial** for both objectives, reflecting achievement of outcomes for all policy areas aside from policy area 3 (the management information system, which was not completed under the program). These ratings are reinforced by an impact evaluation that indicated that the VUP has contributed to increased asset holdings among beneficiaries, with gains increasing over time; and increases in their food intake also increased, as reflected in increased food expenditures.

- a. Outcome Rating
Satisfactory

6. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Rwanda remains vulnerable to political risk and external climatic and economic shocks. However, this is mitigated by continued internal and regional stability, and the support of major donors. Continued Bank engagement, as reflected in the new, ongoing, SPS series, also contributes to stability. Government commitment to further safety net reform is strong, including through the poverty reduction strategy and its NSPS. Government measures to protect priority budget expenditures in case of budget tightening also contributes to lowering risk.

- a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating
Modest

7. Assessment of Bank Performance

- a. Quality-at-Entry

The operation focused on one of the main strategic components of the country's poverty reduction strategy – developing an effective safety net. To do so, it included both institutional strengthening and expanded coverage – a focus that promoted efficiency in execution as well as program effectiveness. The operation was introduced into an environment of macro-economic stability. The design drew on previous engagement in safety net development in Rwanda, and it continued building the VUP, begun under the preceding DPO series. In some instances, initial targets may have been modestly set, and were subsequently raised as the series proceeded. The implementation of policies was supported by technical assistance using the Rapid Social Response Trust Fund and on close collaboration with bilateral donors active in strengthening the safety net. Monitoring and evaluation arrangements were adequate. The risk assessment included country-specific risks, vulnerabilities to external shocks, and program-specific risks: mitigating factors were assessed, and flagged risks did not influence project implementation, with the exception of the consolidation of the management information system, where an ambitious design and local capacity would delay implementation (ICR, p.37). The quality at entry had only minor shortcomings in the formulation of the PDO, which was revised during implementation (see Section 2a).

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Satisfactory

- b. Quality of supervision

The Bank team undertook regular missions during implementation; it had a strong composition of skills with the necessary expertise, and interaction with the Government was facilitated by locally based staff. The focus was on monitoring progress towards outcomes. The supervision process was proactive, as the team took advantage of the programmatic approach to draw lessons during implementation from impact evaluations and panel data to make adjustments in targets from one DPO to the next. Uncertainties about the original PDO were quickly recognized and the PDO revised as noted in Section 2a, while maintaining its development focus and retaining other key elements of the results chain. Interactions between the Bank team, Government, and lead donors were constructive. The active supervision input allowed adequate transition arrangements to be made, leading into the subsequent SPS program. While there were shortfalls in achieving the MIS (policy area 2), this related to uncertainties within government on the approaches to take in developing the MIS and the communications program.



Quality of Supervision Rating
Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Satisfactory

8. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The Government was strongly committed to the program and its objectives, as social protection was one of the two main planks of its poverty reduction strategy. It strove to create a favorable enabling environment through its political actions and economic policies that sought to mitigate two major risks that underlay consideration of the program. It was able to support implementation through appointment of key staff, as well as timely issuance of needed legislation and regulations (as indicated by the timely fulfillment of prior actions and triggers for each of the PDOs. Collaboration between the Government and key donors, including the Bank, was close. That said, the Government was slow to move on developing the MIS system, which was not available for the program (it is only being implemented under the subsequent SPS series); and it did not focus sufficiently on communicating about modifications to the VUP.

Government Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

Not applicable.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating
Not Rated

Overall Borrower Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The policy matrix and results framework (PMRF) for SSPS-1 presented prior actions and triggers for each of the three operations, as well as ten outcome indicators, along with baselines and targets for each year. The PMRF and the related indicators were to be revised before each operation. Under the program, a comprehensive MIS was to be developed; in the meantime, the VUP monitoring system, complemented with data from other sources, including district and sector levels, was to provide the necessary information for monitoring the program. It had been assessed by the Bank team during appraisal, found to be comprehensive and determined to be adequate for the purposes of the program. The ICR does not indicate any issues with the M&E system during implementation.

b. M&E Implementation

The program prepared sector-wide monitoring reports on a regular basis, and fed into the SWG's semi-annual joint sector reviews conducted by the Government together with the development partners. The VUP was monitored by the RLDSF, focusing on the former's monitoring and evaluation activities. The VUP system was to be replaced by the SSPS MIS, once it had been developed. However, it would be



delayed and had not yet been completed by the end of the program.

c. M&E Utilization

The reviews focused on policy, outcomes, and outputs, and made recommendations for the next six-month period, as well as for policy documents such as the NSPS. This information was used by the Government (and the Bank team) to monitor progress and adjust targets as the program advanced.

M&E Quality Rating
Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Environmental and Social Effects

No safeguard policies were triggered.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

The ICR reports no fiduciary issues.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

None noted.

d. Other

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Negligible	Modest	IEG assesses that risk factors outside the operation warrant a modest, rather than negligible rating.
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	The IEG rating reflects delays in decisions on the MIS modalities, and a modest communications strategy
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---



Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

12. Lessons

The following lessons learned are derived from the ICR:

Coordinated efforts across development partners well aligned with Government priorities provide important support to reforms.

Although always the driver of the reform effort, the GoR counted upon needed financial and TA support from its development partners, all under a well-coordinated and functioning donor-government group, the SWG, using regular backward- and forward-looking JSRs to ensure collaboration in monitoring progress and in implementing well-coordinated policies and programs.

A programmatic DPL can provide a powerful instrument in establishing an efficient integrated safety net, responding flexibly to support its evolution. Several factors facilitated the success of the programmatic DPL:

- The sectoral policy reforms were central to the World Bank's CPS, complementary to and well-coordinated with other World Bank-financed operations and non-lending services, and accompanied by critical TA needs.
- Effective development partner coordination, through policy support to the Government, implementation support, technical support, and external consultants, provided mostly by the donor partners, was achieved under the framework of the SWG.
- Implementation of the SSPS Program was characterized by a continuous process of implementing, monitoring, evaluating where possible, analyzing, and adjusting based on lessons learned—the programmatic nature of the DPL allowed the flexibility to constantly refine, adjust, and adapt the program to implementation experience and newly identified priorities and challenges.

Development of consolidated MIS requires several iterative steps and takes time. Programs and projects that support this type of activity should factor this into implementation schedules. A corollary lesson is that if broad, ambitious visions are developed, these need to be accompanied by clear, achievable implementation plans based on a thorough understanding of needs, use cases, and institutional capacity.

IEG observation:

A programmatic DPL can provide the continuity that is necessary to put in place and develop a comprehensive safety net that aims at promotion as well as protection. This is especially the case when building a system from scratch in an environment of constrained resources. It offers the security of piloting and gradual expansion of a program; and the gradual introduction and harmonization of multiple programs. It may be particularly useful in allowing the build-up of targeting systems and registries over a period of time, explore delivery methods, and develop links with sector ministries and agencies that affect both supply and demand.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR for the most part provides an adequate basis for assessing the programs – the quality of the analysis and, mostly, the quality of the evidence. On certain points it could have been more articulate – for instance on the efficiency-effectiveness matter, and in being more specific on links between policy areas and outcomes. In a number of instances it remains vague about results - for instance, what does it mean when the SWG/JSRs have yielded "good results so far"; such statements provide scope for ambiguity. Lessons are based on evidence and analysis, and the analysis in Lessons learned was well-focused. The document was internally consistent, and it followed OPCS guidelines. At 29 pages, it could have been more concise.



- a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial