



## 1. Project Data

**Project ID**

P112712

**Project Name**

RW Emergency Demob and Reintegration

**Country**

Rwanda

**Practice Area(Lead)**
Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience  
Global Practice
**Additional Financing**

P148116,P162274,P148706

**L/C/TF Number(s)**

IDA-54320,IDA-H5140,TF-16108,TF-97476,TF-97484,TF-A3913

**Closing Date (Original)**

31-Dec-2012

**Total Project Cost (USD)**

19,092,734.00

**Bank Approval Date**

27-Aug-2009

**Closing Date (Actual)**

31-Dec-2017

**IBRD/IDA (USD)**
**Grants (USD)**

Original Commitment

8,000,000.00

12,241,116.00

Revised Commitment

16,970,000.00

12,241,058.61

Actual

16,160,163.14

12,241,058.61

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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

According to the Emergency Project Paper (p. 5) for the Second Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (SEDRP) and the Financing Agreement of February 8, 2010 (p. 5) the objective of the Project was to "support the efforts of the Recipient to: (i) demobilize members of Armed Groups of Rwandan



origin and the Rwanda Defense Forces; and (ii) provide socioeconomic reintegration support to such members following demobilization, with a particular focus on female, child, and disabled Ex-Combatants.” This Project was the third phase of the government’s program of assistance to support the peaceful transition of former combatants and government soldiers to civilian life, which was originally launched in 1997 after the genocide

**b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?**

No

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

The project included five components:

**1 . Demobilization (appraisal estimate US\$2.52 million, additional financing of US\$2.26 million, actual US\$5.53 million):** This component was to finance the demobilization of former armed group combatants. Key activities were to include activities such as general sensitization and counseling regarding civilian life, HIV/AIDS voluntary counseling and testing (VCT), socio-economic profiling, and support of basic needs while encamped, including catering services and basic health care. Under the additional financing AG XCs were provided with orientation for dependents.

**2 . Reinsertion (appraisal estimate US\$3.52 million, additional financing US\$0.70 million, actual US\$0.59 million):** This component was to finance assistance in accordance with past practices to assure consistency and equal treatment of all demobilized, and was to include a Basic Needs Kit (BNK), and Recognition-of-Service Allowances (RSA) for regular military personnel. AG dependents were also to be provided with a Basic Reinsertion Kit, as well as basic support and rehabilitation services. Through additional financing dependents of ex-combatants were to be provided with social and mental health orientation before resettling in their community of choice.

**3 . Reintegration (appraisal estimate US\$8.24 million, additional financing of US\$3.29 million, actual US\$14.36 million):** This component was to finance assistance to ex-AG and RDF members, and stage-I1 beneficiaries demobilized in late 2008, through micro-project and Vulnerability Support Window (VSW) grants, psycho-social counseling, HIV/AIDS awareness training, and community sensitization, support to capacity building of ex-combatants’ cooperatives, and, targeted reintegration assistance for children and the severely disabled. Through additional financing mental health screening, counseling, treatment, or referral for adult and children ex-combatants and support to disabled ex-combatants through Integrated Rehabilitation and Production Workshops were to be provided.

**4 . Mainstreaming of program activities (no appraisal estimate, additional financing of US\$0.96 million, actual US\$0.29 million):** This component was to finance the mainstreaming of program activities into long-term support services particularly related to the disabled, chronically or psychologically ill, and children. Also, this component was to finance the preparation, in collaboration with relevant ministries, of a phasing out strategy to mainstream activities and subcomponents to the various ministries and agencies. According to the Bank team (July 3, 2018) mainstreaming activities primarily was to aim at connecting



beneficiaries of the project to mainstream social protection services that were available in the country. As such, activities under this component were those that contributed to mainstreaming into long-term support services particularly related to the disabled, chronically ill, psycho-social assistance to ex-combatants, and services that target children. Therefore, mainstreaming activities were carried out as the project implementation progressed.

**5 . Program management (appraisal estimate US\$4.25 million, additional financing of US\$2.0 million, actual US\$7.64 million):** This component was to finance different project administration activities related to procurement, financial management, safeguards compliance, disbursements, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).

**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Cost:** The project was estimated to cost US\$19.1 million. Actual cost was US\$30.40 million. The difference was due to additional financing.

**Financing:** The project was financed through a US\$8.0 million grant by the International Development Agency (IDA) (US\$8.02 million disbursed), additional financing by IDA in the amount of US\$8.97 million (US\$8.13 million disbursed), a US\$4.5 million Trust Fund (US\$4.49 million disbursed), a US\$4.5 million Trust Fund (completely disbursed), a US\$2.34 million Trust Fund (completely disbursed), and a US\$0.8 million Trust Fund (completely disbursed).

**Borrower Contribution:** The borrower was to contribute US\$2.0 million which materialized.

**Dates:** The project's original closing date was December 31, 2012 which was extended by five years to December 31, 2017.

**Restructuring:** The project was restructured nine times:

- **On February 7, 2012** the project was restructured to modify the financing agreement regarding the financing management of the project since the amount of retroactive financing was included in the project budget.
- **On December 21, 2012** the project was restructured to extend the project's closing date from December 31, 2012 to December 31, 2013 to achieve all original objectives and results as foreseen under the project.
- **On November 25, 2013** the project was restructured to change the project's closing date from December 31, 2013 to June 30, 2014 to align it with the closing date of the additional financing which was under preparation at the time of this restructuring. Also, the proceeds of the credit were reallocated between disbursement categories.
- **On April 7, 2014** the project received additional financing in the amount of US\$8.9 million which added a few activities including: i) provision of social orientation for dependents of Armed Groups (AGs); ii) mental health screening, counseling, treatment, or referral for adult and children ex-combatants; and iii) support to disabled ex-combatants through Integrated Rehabilitation and Production Workshops.
- **On May 19, 2014** the project was restructured to extend the project's closing date from June 30, 2014 to June 30, 2016 to align it with the closing dates of Multi-Donor Trust Funds.
- **On July 27, 2015** the project was restructured to extend the closing date from June 30, 2016, to December 31, 2017 to allow for the return of AG members from Eastern DRC to Rwanda and give more time for the repatriation of these members which has been more difficult due to a deteriorating security situation in eastern DRC.



- **On January 30, 2017** the project received additional financing through a Trust Fund in the amount of US\$0.8 million to fill a financing gap that emerged due to detrimental fluctuations of the exchange rate between the SDR and the US\$.
- **On June 30, 2017** the project was restructured to reallocate funds between disbursement categories.
- **On September 29, 2017** the project was again restructured to reallocate funds between disbursement categories.

### 3. Relevance of Objectives

#### Rationale

Even though the first two phases of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) made progress, an estimated 8,000 Armed Groups members, mostly of the *Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda* (FDLR), were still outside of Rwanda, primarily in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) at the time of project appraisal. The FDLR was considered a significant destabilizing factor in the region. Given the progressively deteriorating security situation in the Eastern DRC due to the continued presence of the FDLR there, the governments of Rwanda and DRC aimed at disarming and repatriating a large portion of the estimated 8,000 remaining members of this group.

This project's objective supported the government's RDRP which aimed to continue the efforts to bring peace and stability in the region. The project also supported the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) (2008-2012) and the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) (FY09-FY12). The EDPRS identified vocational and technical training, including the need for training to meet specific needs of vulnerable groups, as key means to achieve the socio-economic transformation as outlined in the government's Vision 2020 strategy. The CAS identified under pillar two the importance of reducing social vulnerability through demobilization and reintegration. The objective of the project was also to support the second pillar of the Bank's most recent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) (FY14-FY18) which aims to improve the productivity and incomes of the poor through rural development and social protection.

#### Rating

High

### 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

#### Objective 1

##### Objective

Demobilize members of Armed Groups of Rwandan origin and the Rwanda Defense Forces:

##### Rationale



The project's theory of change linked the demobilization of ex combatants (XCs) and former child soldiers, dependents of the XCs received insertion benefits, integration benefits and increased access to services provided by government social protection to improve the capacity of beneficiaries to advance their socioeconomic reintegration into local communities and dismantling remaining armed elements in order to achieve long-term peace.

Most of the evidence on outputs and outcomes in this section of the Review is drawn from Annex 1 in the ICR.

**Outputs:**

- The demand for demobilization services achieved the target of 100%.
- The total number of beneficiaries was 17,438. This PDO indicator lacked a target.
- All ex-combatants were provided with a national Identification number before leaving the demobilization center, surpassing the target of 90%.

**Outcomes:**

- In total, 26,675 former members of the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) were demobilized, including 22,675 demobilized in the previous project and 4,000 demobilized in this project, achieving the target of demobilizing 4,000 ex-RDF members. Among those demobilized members were four women and 123 disabled members. Demobilization consisted of a three months program called the Pre-Discharge Orientation Program (PDOP) which was to support beneficiaries for their reintegration through the provision of information about life, society, government, medical support and psycho-social screening and counseling.
- The number of AG members who were demobilized increased from 7,091 members in 2009 to 11,830 members in 2017, not achieving the target of 12,591 members. Among the demobilized members were 43 women, 293 children and 147 disabled.

**Rating**

Substantial

**Objective 2**

**Objective**

Provide socioeconomic reintegration support to such members following demobilization, with a particular focus on female, child, and disabled Ex-Combatants:

**Rationale**

- The number of resettlement kits delivered to dependents of ex-AG members increased from 3,511 kits in 2009 to 11,917 kits in 2017, achieving the target of a total of 13,511 kits (including kits delivered during the previous project).
- All incoming ex-combatants were screened for mental health issues, surpassing the target of 75%.
- 84.8% of disabled ex-combatants were reported to receive Mutuelles de Sante (community-based health insurance schemes) benefits and 93.1% of disabled ex-combatants also received monthly allowances within nine months after their demobilization, slightly short of the target of 95%.



- The percentage of ex-combatants who received reinsertion benefits increased from 90% in 2009 to 100% in 2017, surpassing the target of 95%.
- The number of ex-combatants receiving reintegration grants (RGs) in time and in accordance with the implementation manual increased from 29,766 in 2009 to 38,559 in 2017, achieving the target of an increase of 9,500 ex-combatants.
- The percentage of ex-combatants who received Vulnerability Support Window (VSW) support and registered to receive training and who have successfully completed training/education/income-generating activity (IGA) increased from 67% in 2009 to 98.4% in 2017, surpassing the target of 90%. In detail, 98.5% completed VSW support in vocational training and apprenticeship, 98.18% in IGA support, and 91.52% in formal education (ICR, paragraph 38). The meaning and level of “formal education” achieved was not defined in the ICR.
- The project financed an annual football tournament which brought together ex-combatants (XCs) and their peers from the communities. The aim was to counter the stigma of having taken part in armed combat.
- A total of 220 houses for severely disabled XCs were built. This output did not have a target.
- The project referred more than 3,500 XCs for psychiatric treatment or psychotherapy in specialized institutions in Rwanda. According to the ICR (paragraph 42) while shortcomings in mental health support were noted during implementation (and validated by independent evaluations), the project adapted innovative tools such as Narrative Exposure Therapy (NET) which aims to help individuals to establish a coherent life narrative in which to contextualize traumatic experiences.

**Outcomes:**

- According to the ICR (paragraph 32) the reintegration grant (RG) was perceived positively by the beneficiaries, indicating an overall satisfaction with its use toward their economic wellbeing. Since a key element of the RG was its focus on guidance and advice regarding these benefits, more than 90% of XCs noted their integration choice was an informed one, while 93% of XCs stated that they obtained business development advice before using their grants, and 83.4% indicated that they were satisfied with their advice. Almost all XCs (99%) who received RGs stated that they developed viable sub-projects.
- The percentage of ex-combatants who were economically active increased from 73% in 2009 to 77.7% in 2017, surpassing the original target of 75% and the revised target of 70%. 82.7% of female ex-combatants, 69.5% of children of ex-combatants and 70% of disabled ex-combatants were active. The original target was revised to align it with economic activity levels of peers in host communities once more up to date information was available.
- In 2009 72% of ex-combatants reported social acceptance by their communities which increased to 78.7% in 2017, surpassing the revised target of 65% but not achieving the original target of 80%. When disaggregated, 76.2% female XCs, 69.8% of former child soldiers, and 71.7% disabled XCs reported social acceptance.
- By project closing, 69.6% of XCs, in comparison with 68.2% of community members, reported feeling belonging to their immediate community, while 69% of XCs in comparison with 69.3% of community members feel belonging to Rwandan society. 85.3% of XCs reported that they believed that they are treated as regular Rwandan citizen in their communities, and all XCs reported that they believe they treated better than community members when accessing medical care, interacting with local authorities, the judicial system, the police, and the education system.





- The percentage of demobilized persons who were satisfied with the services and information provided in the demobilization centers increased from 80% in 2009 to 94.14% in 2017, surpassing the target of 80%.
- The percentage of ex-combatants who settle down in their community of choice (with access to shelter and food security) increased from 95% in 2009 to 100% in 2017, surpassing the target of 95%.
- 82.7% of former female ex-combatants were economically active compared to only 53.2% of their peer female community members. On the other hand 69.5% of children of ex-combatants were economically active compared to only 33.3% of their peer children community members. Nevertheless, more disabled community members (70%) were economically active than disabled ex-combatants (58.5%).
- In 2017 more XCs than civilians had access to banking and credit institutions (73.9% versus 69.8%, respectively), and more XCs saved money after meeting household expenses (76.2% of XCs versus 61.4% community members).

**Rating**  
Substantial

### **Rationale**

In summary, since the achievements of both objectives were substantial, the project's overall efficacy was rated substantial.

**Overall Efficacy Rating**  
Substantial

## **5. Efficiency**

Since the project was financed in conformity with the World Bank Operational Policy on Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (OP/BP 8.00) no traditional economic analysis was required at appraisal. Consequently, the ICR did not include a traditional economic analysis either, but it did include a cost effectiveness analysis (Annex 4). The cost per beneficiary for SEDRP was US\$2,366 which compared with the first phase of the Rwanda Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project - EDRRP (US\$2,563 per beneficiary), the Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project (US\$3,132 per beneficiary), the Democratic Republic of Congo Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (US\$3,477 per beneficiary), the Mali Reinsertion Project (US\$3,300) and the Central African Republic Reintegration Project (US\$3,465 per beneficiary). This comparison indicated that the cost per beneficiary in this project was comparable to similar projects providing assistance to ex-combatants in the region. The ICR also compared the cost per beneficiary for additional specialized support for vulnerable ex-combatants (US\$1,035) with the first phase of the project where the cost was US\$775 and the Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project (US\$2,331 per beneficiary). In addition, the average cost



of specialized houses for disabled ex-combatants built by this project were US\$252 per square meter compared to US\$370 per square meter in the first phase of the project in Rwanda and US\$358 per square meter in the Burundi Emergency Demobilization and Transitional Reintegration Project.

In terms of operational efficiency, the project management costs by the end of the project were a high 25% of actual cost. This was probably to be expected given that a management cost of 22% of total cost was expected at appraisal. In addition, the project's demobilization and reintegration program was highly labor intensive, and the project's closing date was extended by five years.

Overall, based on the evidence in the ICR and this Review's assessment of the management costs, the project's efficiency is rated Substantial.

## Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

## 6. Outcome

The relevance of the objectives was high because of the importance of successful demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants to ensure sustained peace in Rwanda. The achievements of both objectives and the project's efficiency were rated Substantial. The overall outcome rating for this project is Satisfactory.

### a. Outcome Rating

Satisfactory

## 7. Risk to Development Outcome

According to the ICR (paragraph 88) the government continues to be committed to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants into Rwandan communities. However, the sustainability of the project's outcomes faces several challenges. On the one hand, in order to continue certain activities within Rwanda such as mental health





services and other services to support disabled ex-combatants and children of XCs the long-term provision of financial and human resources is critical. The ICR also stated that RDRC's role and the importance of support to highly vulnerable groups "seem to be well understood" by different stakeholders and that there is sufficient national support to maintain RDRC's role toward achieving national peace and development. On the other hand, the risks of a worsening political and security situation in neighboring countries, especially the DRC, pose a threat to the sustainability of this project's outcomes and the future repatriation and return of ex-combatants to Rwanda.

## **8. Assessment of Bank Performance**

### **a. Quality-at-Entry**

According to the ICR (paragraph 83) the project was based on the first phase of this project (EDRRP) and took lessons learned from that project into account. Also, as noted already, this project was aligned with the government's strategic objectives. Furthermore, this second phase took advantage of the already existing implementation structure for the first phase.

The Bank identified relevant risks such as the volatile security situation in the Eastern DRC, the likelihood of a financing gap between the time of the closure of the EDRRP and expected effectiveness of this project, and a reputational risk to the Bank in financing a project closely linked to a political and security situation. Risk mitigation measures were adequate and included communication and outreach activities targeting Rwandan combatants in the Eastern DRC, retroactive financing from IDA to prevent a potential financing gap, collaboration with other partners supporting the regional peace efforts and the sector, and a clear analysis of an exit situation if the security situation were to deteriorate or the implementation of any components become unfeasible (ICR, paragraph 84). The project's M&E design was adequate and did not have any significant shortcomings.

However, according to the ICR (paragraph 85) at the beginning of project implementation there were delays due to slow recruitment of key staff for the technical secretariat and lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities among staff.

### **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Satisfactory

### **b. Quality of supervision**

The ICR (paragraph 86) stated that supervision missions were conducted on a regular basis, usually two to three times per year. The Bank team also visited key project sites to check implementation progress. The Bank team consisted of staff members from all relevant fields. Progress towards achieving the PDO was documented in aid memoires and the Bank closely coordinated project supervision with donor partners. The project also benefited from the support of a staff member based in the local Bank country office. The Bank team restructured the project several times to address implementation bottlenecks and developed innovative interventions such as cross-border sensitization and mental health support. Also, the Bank team provided support by adding activities such as mentorship for children of XCs, mini-Pre-Discharge Orientation Programs (PDOPs) and information management. During the last two years of



project implementation the Bank provided additional support on safeguards through two country-office based staff.

According to the ICR (paragraph 78) the Bank addressed shortcomings in the project's Financial Management performance by providing technical assistance and hiring an international Financial Management consultant to address the shortcomings. However, even though there were several Financial Management related issues, the Bank team kept its Financial Management rating at Satisfactory from 2012 until project closing.

### **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Satisfactory

### **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Satisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The project's M&E design was based on the M&E program in the first Emergency Demobilization and Reintegration Project (EDRP)'s M&E. The M&E design activities which included specialized independent studies to collect data on indicators and implementation progress, and used the RDRC's existing Management Information System (MIS) for data management. An M&E officer at the RDRC headquarters was responsible for overseeing M&E activities. Based on the previous M&E design indicators were selected to measure progress towards achieving the PDO.

The project's theory of change and how key activities were supposed to lead to the intended outcomes were sound and well reflected in the Results Framework. The objectives were clearly specified and the selected indicators encompassed all outcomes of the PDO statement and captured how the selected activities were to contribute to achieving the PDO. The selected indicators were specific and measurable. Almost all indicators had baselines and targets. However, while the PDO indicators provided disaggregated data on former armed groups and former RDF members this was not the case for other indicators. The ICR (paragraph 71) stated though that all annual externally-administered surveys and studies provided disaggregated data by armed group/force affiliation.

### **b. M&E Implementation**

According to the ICR (paragraph 72) the project's M&E data were collected, analyzed, and reported adequately. In consultation with the government the Bank modified the Results Framework several times during project restructurings to reflect any changes in implementation. The ICR stated, however, that M&E data collected had inconsistency and quality issues due to shortcomings in internal progress reporting



between different units and between headquarters and provincial offices during the first 18 months of project implementation resulting in low quality quarterly progress reports. The ICR noted that this issue was resolved by October 2011. M&E data collection included four different types of surveys including community dynamic studies, payment verification surveys, tracer surveys, and independent external evaluations (ICR, paragraph 73). According to the ICR, despite the useful data these studies provided, they were time consuming and expensive. In addition to these studies, the RDRC and the Bank commissioned a number of external surveys, assessments, and studies to assess different aspects of the project such as the prevalence of mental health issues among XCs resulting in the introduction of a mental health component in 2014. According to the ICR (paragraph 74) the MIS system in RDRC had shortcomings in regard to accurate and up-to-date data regarding XC contact details resulting in statistically unreliable samples. The Bank provided additional technical assistance through an IT consultant, however, the MIS was never able to support the project's M&E implementation as was envisioned in the M&E design.

According to consultations between IEG and the Bank's project team (July 3, 2018) the improved M&E functions and processes are likely to be sustained since capacity within the M&E unit in the RDRC was built up during project implementation.

### **c. M&E Utilization**

According to the ICR (paragraph 75) M&E data were used to inform decision making such as modifying project targets or activities, and adding new activities such as modifications in mental health support and introducing mentorship for children of XCs. As noted already, based on the findings from annual evaluations and reports the project was restructured and the Results Framework was adapted several times.

### **M&E Quality Rating**

Substantial

## **10. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**

The project was classified as category B for environmental and social risks and triggered the Bank's safeguard policy OP/BP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP/BP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement). According to the ICR (paragraph 77) the project developed an Environmental and Social Management Framework which included detailed screening mechanisms and mitigation measures for sub-projects. Also, in 2014 a checklist-type Environmental Management Plan was developed to be used for sub-projects and construction sites and was mainstreamed at the district level.

The ICR stated that there were no cases of involuntary resettlement or displacement during project implementation. According to the ICR the safeguards compliance rating was Satisfactory.



## **b. Fiduciary Compliance**

### **Financial Management:**

According to the ICR (paragraph 78) at the beginning of project implementation the project experienced several Financial Management issues resulting from the technical challenges related to the introduction of the new Smart Financial Management System by the Ministry of Finance and Planning and staffing issues. In 2013, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) audited the project and identified several shortcomings such as disbursements erroneously posted in the wrong accounts in the general ledger, leading to misstatements of the amounts recorded in the books of account and reported in the financial statements for the affected accounts, noncompliance with tax regulations and overpayments of certain contracts, and subsistence allowance overpaid on behalf of demobilization vulnerable ex-combatants but retained by the bank for a long period. An action plan for how to address these issues was developed and implemented. Also, the Bank recruited an experienced international FM consultant who provided enhanced technical assistance and implementation support to the project's FM.

The ICR (paragraph 78) stated that in April 2011 the project's Financial Management performance was downgraded to Moderately Unsatisfactory due to reporting shortcomings. It was noted in the ICR that the Bank provided technical assistance and hired an international Financial Management consultant to address these issues resulting in quarterly interim unaudited financial reports and annual audited financial statements that were acceptable to the Bank. The project's Financial Management performance was upgraded to Satisfactory in 2015 and remained so until project closing. In June 2017, the OAG's report was clean in terms of financial reporting and compliance. The Bank's project team advised IEG (July 3, 2018) that the external auditor's opinion was unqualified.

### **Procurement:**

The RDRC was responsible for the project's procurement. However, according to the ICR (paragraph 79) it struggled to fulfill its responsibility in accordance with the Bank's requirement due to staffing issues. For example, the position of procurement officer within the RDRC was left unfilled during the first year of project implementation. Due to data management issues electronic records of all procurement processes of 2009 were lost but could be replaced since the RDRC kept hard copies. The ICR stated that procurement plans were prepared and updated in a timely manner. The RDRC used Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP), however, the ICR also stated that there were irregularities such as double planning of a single contract, uploading wrong documents for contracts, and indicating incorrect contract status. In 2015 the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) conducted an assessment which identified serious non-compliance issues with procurement procedures and guidelines such as significant delays in contract awards, lack of realistic procurement plans, poor contract management resulting in delays in contract implementation, and poor records keeping. According to the ICR (paragraph 80) the project addressed these issues promptly by providing trainings to increase the procurement unit's technical capacity. The ICR (paragraph 81) stated that until 2012 the project's procurement rating was Moderately Satisfactory and then was upgraded to Satisfactory until project closing. However, given the significant shortcomings the OAG assessment identified during implementation, it is questionable whether a procurement rating of Satisfactory at project closure was appropriate.



**c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

NA

**d. Other**

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**11. Ratings**

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Bank Performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

**12. Lessons**

The ICR (paragraphs 89 to 94) included six lessons learned from the project. This Review considered that the following specific lessons were particularly important with general application to other demobilization and reintegration projects.

- **Involving families of ex-combatants is critical for a successful demobilization and reintegration program.** This project included families of ex-combatants and provided spouses and dependents with access to benefits, which supported an enhanced economic and social integration of ex-combatants into local communities.
- **Reintegration programs require adequate resources to provide mental health and disability services to be successful.** In this project the financing of Integrated Rehabilitation and Production Workshops (IPRWs) and Narrative Exposure Therapy (NET) to support ex-combatants suffering from post conflict traumas were innovative and critical to addressing their mental health issues.

**13. Assessment Recommended?**

No

**14. Comments on Quality of ICR**

The ICR provides a good overview of project preparation and implementation in the main text and in Annex 1. The ICR is outcome driven, concise but not always internally consistent. For example, the data in Annex



3 on project cost "at approval" were not consistent with the data on the "original amount" of the project's financing in the Data Sheet. Inconsistencies are not necessarily errors and this one could have been explained in the ICR. In addition, the ICR states in paragraph 52 that there were "no major delays in procurement and implementation of key activities" but mentions quite major causes for project implementation delays in footnote 45 and paragraphs 80 and 83. Finally, with respect to the lessons drawn from the ICR, it would have been useful if the ICR had provided more lessons with general applicability to similar projects financed by the Bank based on this project's implementation experience.

Overall the quality of the ICR is rated Substantial.

**a. Quality of ICR Rating**  
Substantial