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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

**NIGERIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 929-UNI)**

June 29, 1984

Operations Evaluation Department

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GLOSSARY

ABU	-	Ahmadu Bello University
ATC	-	Advanced Teachers Training College
BCR	-	Borrower Completion Report
IE	-	Institute of Education
NCE	-	National College of Education
PEIP	-	Primary Education Improvement Program
PWD	-	Public Works Department
SBS	-	School of Basic Studies
UNESCO	-	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	-	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UPE	-	Universal Primary Education

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

NIGERIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 929-UNI)

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PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

NIGERIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 929-UNI)

PREFACE

This is a performance audit of the Third Education Project in Nigeria for which a loan was signed in February 1974, providing US\$54.0 million equivalent. The last disbursement was made on April 6, 1984 and the sum of US\$16.8 million cancelled.

The audit report consists of (a) a Project Performance Audit Memorandum (PPAM) prepared by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) and (b) a Project Completion Report (PCR) dated October 28, 1983 prepared by the Education Division, Projects Department, West Africa Regional Office.

The PPAM is based on material in the Association's files, including the Appraisal Report (No. 60a-UNI) of May 25, 1973, the President's Report (No. P-1174a-UNI) of June 11, 1973, the Loan Agreement dated August 16, 1973, the summary of Board discussions, and the PCR. Bank staff associated with the project have also been interviewed.

The PPAM concurs with the main conclusions of the PCR but is somewhat more critical of the Bank's performance. The PCR is of good quality and draws attention to major difficulties encountered by this project, most of which were similar to those which affected the two preceding education projects (PPARs No. 79-327 dated May 8, 1979 and No. 81-955 dated December 7, 1981). A completion report has also been prepared by the Borrower (BCR); the main text of that report is attached as an appendix to the PCR. The full BCR is available in the Regional Office's files.

As is customary in the preparation of audit reports, copies of the draft audit report were sent to the representatives of the Borrower for comment on April 18, 1984. No reply has been received from the Borrower.

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT BASIC DATA SHEET

NIGERIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 929-UNI)

KEY PROJECT DATA

<u>Item</u>	<u>Appraisal Estimate</u>	<u>Actual or Current Estimate</u>
Total Project Cost (US\$ million)	107.4	312.8
Overrun (%)		191/a
Loan Amount (US\$ million)	54.0	
Disbursed		37.2
Cancelled		16.8
Date Physical Components Completed	12/78	12/84
in Months Since Signature	64.5	136.5
Proportion Completion by Closing Date (%)		70
Proportion of Time Overrun (%)		112
Institutional Performance		Poor

CUMULATIVE ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS
(US\$ 000)

<u>CY</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1978</u>	<u>1979</u>
(i) Appraisal	108	972	4,752	20,790	46,548	54,000	54,000
(ii) Actual	-	-	-	-	-	6,150	6,490
(iii) as % of (i)	-	-	-	-	-	11%	12%
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>		
(i) Appraisal	54,000	54,000	54,000	54,000	54,000		
(ii) Actual	14,680	23,880	27,135	34,860	37,169		
(iii) as % of (i)	27%	44%	50%	65%	69%		

OTHER PROJECT DATA

<u>Item</u>	<u>Appraisal Estimate</u>	<u>Revisions</u>	<u>Actual</u>
First Mention in Files	-	-	11/06/70
Government's Application	-	-	01/72
Negotiations (in Nigeria)	-	-	03/73
Board Approval	06/21/73	-	06/21/73
Loan Agreement	08/16/73	-	08/16/73
Effectiveness Date	10/01/73	-	01/14/75
Closing Date	12/31/78	06/30/79	12/31/82/b
Borrower	Federal Government of Nigeria		
Executing Agency	Northern State's Ministries and Ahmadu Bello University		
Fiscal Year of Borrower	April 1 - March 31 at Appraisal Stage January 1 - December 31 since 1980		
Follow-on Project	None to Date		

/a The cost overrun compared to the estimated cost of the amended project is 119%.

/b Final disbursement occurred on April 6, 1984.

MISSION DATA

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Sent by</u>	<u>Month/Year</u>	<u>No. of Weeks</u>	<u>No. of Persons*</u>	<u>Staff Weeks</u>	<u>Date of Report</u>
Identification	UNESCO	02/71	5.4	10	54.0	09/71
Reconnaissance	IBRD	02/72	3.8	3	11.4	04/17/72
Preparation/ Appraisal	IBRD/ UNESCO	05-06/72	3.0	10	30.0	05/25/73
Postappraisal	IBRD	10/72	1.6	2	3.2	10/27/72
(Negotiation)	IBRD	02/73	1.5	5	<u>7.5</u>	
Total					103.7	

Staff Weeks**

Supervision 1	IBRD	02/74	1.5	5(ED,A,2E,FP)	7.5	04/11/74
Supervision 2	IBRD	06-07/74	2.1	4(ED,2A,E)	8.4	09/05/74
Supervision 3	IBRD	05/75	2.1	2(ED,A)	4.2	07/07/75
Supervision 4	IBRD	08/75	1.5	2(A,E)	3.0	11/21/75
Supervision 5	IBRD	07/76	0.7	3(EGR,ED,E)	2.1	08/13/76
Supervision 6	IBRD	02-03/77	3.0	3(EGR,ED,E)	9.0	05/13/77
Supervision 7	IBRD	06/77	2.6	1(EGR)	2.6	10/20/77
Supervision 8	IBRD	10-11/77	2.5	1(EGR)	2.5	02/01/78
Supervision 9	IBRD	02-03/78	1.4	1(EGR)	1.4	05/31/78
Supervision 10	IBRD	07/78	2.5	1(EGR)	2.5	08/31/78
Supervision 11	IBRD	11/78	2.6	2(EGR,A)	5.2	01/18/79
Supervision 12	IBRD	02-03/79	3.2	3(EGR,2E)	9.6	03/19/79
Supervision 13	IBRD	06-07/79	3.6	2(A,E)	7.2	08/21/79
Supervision 14	IBRD	10/79	2.2	2(A,E)	4.4	01/05/79
Supervision 15	IBRD	02-03/80	3.6	1(A)	3.6	04/24/80
Supervision 16	IBRD	07/80	3.6	1(A)	3.6	09/18/80
Supervision 17	IBRD	12/80	2.5	1(A)	2.5	01/30/81
Supervision 18	IBRD	07/82	2.4	2(ED,A)	4.8	09/15/82
Completion A,A,ED	IBRD	02/83	1.5	3	<u>4.5</u>	
Total					<u>81.6</u>	

* A = Architect ED = Educator FP = Facilities Planner
E = Economist EGR = Engineer

** Number of Staff-weeks are not only attributable to this project, as in some cases they cover also other projects.

COUNTRY EXCHANGE RATE

Name of Currency (Abbreviation) - Naira/Kobo (N)

Exchange Rates:

Working Papers	1 US\$ = 0.329 N
Appraisal Year (1973)	1 US\$ = 0.658 N
Intervening Years: 1974	1 US\$ = 0.629 N
1978	1 US\$ = 0.635 N
1979	1 US\$ = 0.604 N
1980	1 US\$ = 0.547 N
1981	1 US\$ = 0.618 N
1982	1 US\$ = 0.673 N
1983	1 US\$ = 0.724 N

ALLOCATION OF LOAN PROCEEDS (US\$)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Original Allocation</u>	<u>Revised Allocation</u>	<u>Actual Disbursements</u>
1. Civil Works	27,900,000	43,000,000	32,019,789.58
2. Furniture	3,900,000	0	0
3. Equipment	6,350,000	0	0
4. Architectural Fees	4,200,000	5,105,000	5,148,971.59
5. Technical Assistance	750,000	750,000	0
6. Unallocated	10,900,000	5,145,000	0
7. Cancelled	---	---	16,786,112.63
Total Disbursed	---	---	<u>37,213,887.37</u>
TOTAL	<u>54,000,000</u> =====	<u>54,000,000</u> =====	<u>54,000,000</u> =====

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

NIGERIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (LOAN 929-UNI)

HIGHLIGHTS

The Third Education Project in Nigeria (Loan 929-UNI) provided a loan of US\$54.0 equivalent in assisting the Government to: (a) expand and diversify secondary education; (b) increase the output of primary and secondary teachers; and (c) expand university education. The total project cost was estimated at US\$107.4 million. At the time the project was identified, prepared and appraised in the early 1970s, the Northern Region (subsequently divided into eight states) lagged considerably behind the rest of the country in educational development. The project, therefore, was deliberately aimed at the Northern Region (PCR, para. 2.16).

In 1979, at the request of the Government, the scope of the project was sharply reduced to about one-third of its original size. The university and primary teacher training components were deleted while the expansion of secondary education was reduced—from 59 to 31 schools of which 13 were to be new. However, the original amount of the loan was retained, in part, because of high cost overruns.

The major factors which led to these changes in project scope included: (a) slow progress in implementation, which contributed to the cost overruns;^{1/} (b) weak project management, both at Federal and State levels; (c) the creation of new states, which delayed the establishment of a strong project implementation capability at the local level; and (d) as a consequence of the Government's newly gained oil wealth, Kano State and some of the project institutions (e.g. Ahmadu Bello University) decided to pull out from the project and to finance their components with resources obtained from the Federal Government (PCR, paras. 2.19 - 2.22). At that time Bank-Government relationships were somewhat uneasy and in order to simplify implementation, extensions in Kwara State were eliminated.

The reduction in project scope was expected to expedite project implementation and minimize cost overruns. These expectations did not materialize. Shortly after the project was amended in 1979, Nigeria's financial situation started to deteriorate sharply, thus constraining the availability of federal funds and seriously delaying school construction (PCR, para. 3.13).

When the project account was finally closed in April 1984, only US\$32.2 million of the US\$54.0 million (or 69%) of the loan had been disbursed. At the time of the project completion mission (February 1983), only three of the planned 13 new secondary schools were completed, while the

^{1/} Inflationary consequences of the oil boom and a construction boom, not foreseeable at appraisal, drove costs sharply upwards.

others were still at various stages of construction (PCR, Table 3.1). Of the 18 school extensions financed under the project, eight were fully completed, four others were 75% or more completed, while three schools were less than 50% completed (PCR, para. 3.11). The extension to the Advanced Teachers Training College in Sokoto was completed, but the institution is not training technical subject teachers as originally planned (PCR, paras. 3.12 and 3.24).

This large project repeated several shortcomings of its two predecessors:^{2/} (i) preparation and appraisal were telescoped in one phase leading to deficiencies in project design, (ii) monitoring and supervision were insufficient, (iii) local counterpart training was inadequate, and (iv) equipment and furniture were dropped^{3/} from the project. There was very little institution building and one of the weakest points during implementation was project management (PPAM, paras. 9-18).

As a result, the project has had very limited success. The drastic reduction in scope substantially undermined the original project objectives while the inadequate implementation further weakened the project's outcome and impact. The substantial progress in Nigeria's educational development made during that period was largely unrelated to the project which in itself contributed little to these achievements.

The major lessons emerging from this project, as well as from the two previous ones, are the following:

-- In a complex federal structure and with an evolving relationship between central and state authorities, such as was the case in Nigeria, project design and preparation should be carried out very carefully and the Bank needs to establish a proper balance in its relationships with federal and state government levels. The implementation capability of the Borrower should be thoroughly explored, and important policy and social issues clarified before the project is finalized (PCR, paras. 2.14, 2.15 and 6.08; PPAM, para. 10).

-- It is important for the success of a project to (i) insure full commitment and involvement of all parties concerned, whether at Federal, State or local level (PCR, paras. 3.07, 3.08); (ii) carefully supervise project implementation, arranging for appropriate staffing and timing of missions commensurate with project size, complexity, and logistics of the country (PCR, para. 1.21 and PPAM, para. 11); and (iii) retain furniture and equipment among the items funded by the project when the latter is modified (PPAM, para. 4 and PCR, paras. 3.17 and 3.27).

^{2/} It is fair to say that since all three education projects started de facto nearly at the same time, there was little opportunity for the lessons of the first and second projects to be reflected in the design of the third.

^{3/} Equipment and furniture procurement remained in the first education project but were fraught with problems.

Other points of interest are the need to: (i) focus on realistic targets/assumptions at appraisal, in particular, as they relate to school location, boarding and staff houses; (ii) train local project staff thoroughly in Bank rules and procedures; (iii) give attention to the prequalification of contractors (PCR, para. 3.21); (iv) carefully determine and monitor consultant fees for architectural services; (v) insist on regular progress reports; and (vi) specifically in the Nigerian context, encourage the States to use the design handbooks as well as the procedure and management guides as developed by the consultant architects (PCR, para. 6.11).

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

NIGERIA THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 929-UNI)

I. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

1. At the time of project generation, the authorities in Nigeria strongly felt the need to develop the country's human resources especially in the northern states where education facilities lagged behind those in the south. Even with a relatively weak sector data base and without a long-term strategy for educational development, some priority areas for external support emerged during the dialogue between the Government and Bank staff (PCR, paras. 2.05-2.08).

2. Apart from the need to focus on the north, it was agreed that quality improvement was a major objective and also that a limited expansion of the secondary and university levels would be desirable. More specifically, the project had the following four basic objectives:

- (a) to improve access to and enhance the quality of university education;
- (b) to increase the annual output of teachers for primary and secondary levels and for practical subjects;
- (c) to develop a relevant curriculum in primary education, responding to special needs of the north; and
- (d) to expand and diversify secondary education.

3. The project content was as follows:

A. University Education (Ahmadu Bello University)

This project element was to provide (i) physical facilities and equipment to the School of Basic Studies (which prepares prospective university entrants), and to the Faculty of Education (thus increasing output of primary and secondary teachers); and (ii) eight staff-years of technical assistance and selected equipment for a pilot program in 66 primary schools, to be provided to the Institute of Education.

B. Teachers Training Colleges

- (i) Construction and equipping of eight new primary teachers training colleges;
- (ii) Expansion of 16 existing primary teachers training colleges to incorporate facilities for training in practical subjects; and

- (iii) Construction of two workshops and two staff houses at the Sokoto Advanced Teachers College in order to increase the output of technical secondary teachers.

C. Secondary Education

- (i) Construction and equipping of 19 new multilateral secondary schools; and
- (ii) Expansion of teaching facilities for 40 existing secondary schools.

More than half of the places provided in these new facilities were intended for the teaching of science and other practical subjects.

D. Project Implementation Assistance

Twenty-six staff-years of technical assistance for (i) supporting six State Project Units, providing architectural services and strengthening project management, and (ii) planning and operation of an education research and experimentation program at Ahmadu Bello University.

E. Studies

The agreement also required each of the four State Governments concerned, to carry out, within two years of the loan signing, detailed studies of their education policy and of certain aspects of the education system.

4. In 1979, the scope of the project was reduced to about one-third of its original size, while the original loan amount remained unchanged. This was mainly due to (i) large cost overruns, and a slow disbursement rate, (ii) an increased participation in education development on the part of State and Federal Governments reflecting fast growing financial resources from oil revenues. As a result, the university component (3. A above) was deleted while other project components were sharply curtailed (PCR, paras. 2.19 to 2.22). The amended project consisted of the following:

A. Teachers Training College

Construction of 100 places for wood and metal workshops.

B. Secondary Education

Construction of 13 new multilateral secondary schools, and extension of teaching facilities for 18 existing secondary schools. For

A and B, furniture and equipment were to be financed by the States.^{1/}

C. Implementation Assistance

The consulting fees were increased while technical assistance was reduced (i) to 14 staff years for architectural services in the Federal and State project units and (ii) 4 staff years to prepare a follow-on project.

D. Studies

At the same time, the studies to be carried out by the States and to be financed from the loan were to be funded by the Government.

5. Notwithstanding the sharp reductions in scope, the project was only partly completed at the closing date (September 1983). By that time, only three of the 13 new secondary schools had been completed, the others being at various stages of construction. Extensions to eight secondary schools had been fully completed, as well as the extension to the Advanced Teachers Training College. One secondary school extension was deleted and the others were under construction (PCR, para. 3.10-3.12). While the project was plagued by a series of physical implementation problems, the educational components have been carried out with a mixed degree of success. The secondary project schools, although not completed, and lacking equipment in some cases, are being used and their enrollment is not far from their appraisal targets. While the expansion of the Advanced Teachers Training College in Sokoto was carried out, no pre-vocational teachers are trained there, and thus, this component has not achieved its goal (PCR, paras. 3.25 and 3.27).

6. The closing date was postponed twice and finally established as September 26, 1983;^{2/} only 67% of the loan had been disbursed at that time: the remaining US\$17.8 million were cancelled. The total project cost estimated by the completion mission is US\$192.8 million (by December 1984), 35% over the estimate for the amended project and 79.5% over the estimate for the initial project.

^{1/} It is not clear why during the reorganization of the project content the Bank did not accept the recommendations of supervision staff, to keep the financing of equipment and furniture within the project.

^{2/} Because several withdrawal applications sent on time by the Borrower were not received by the Bank, the project account was reopened and disbursement continued. The project accounts were finally closed in April 1984. The amount cancelled is US\$16.8 million.

II. SELECTED ISSUES

7. The Project Completion Report covers the experience with project implementation exhaustively and analyzes the difficulties encountered with project management at Federal and State level. It also covers adequately the educational outcomes and broadly assesses Nigeria's educational achievements during the project period, comparing them to the educational objectives set out in the appraisal document.

8. The audit memorandum therefore concentrates on four selected issues which emerge from this experience and which offer lessons for future education projects: bank performance, evolving responsibilities of Federal and State Governments, commitment of the Borrower, and shortcomings of project management and in physical implementation.

A. Bank Performance

9. The PCR suggests that the main reasons for the unsatisfactory project results were insufficient commitment on the part of the Borrower and flaws in the project design. The audit agrees that these two elements were crucial, but considers factors relating to project generation, monitoring and supervision of equal importance. In each instance, the Bank's performance appears to have been less than adequate.

10. Insofar as project design is concerned, it is noted that in a country with complex institutional and geographical/logistic problems, the design could have been simpler and greater care could have been taken to insure a thorough preparation and appraisal (PCR, para. 6.08). The experience with this project underscores the risk involved in launching a project (i) with seven geographically dispersed project units, (ii) without timely identification and proper training of project managers, (iii) before resolving policy issues at State levels, and (iv) at a time when responsibilities between Federal Government and States concerning education and finance were still evolving. Telescoping preparation and appraisal in one phase contributed to the difficulties encountered later on.

11. Despite the foreseeable problems caused by the unsatisfactory project preparation and appraisal, subsequent supervision and monitoring were weak, which compounded these problems. The PCR highlights the irregular and unsystematic supervision (PCR, para. 1.21) of what became a project with eight different project units dispersed in the northern part of the country and a Federal project unit in the capital. The missions made a commendable effort to visit State capitals but could not make sufficient visits to project sites. This raises once more the budgetary and staffing constraints faced by Regional Offices in mounting adequate supervision missions. The size and complexity of this particular project would have required above normal supervisory resources. The missions concentrated heavily on the hardware side, with architects and engineers, during a period of spectacular changes in national education policies: during nearly four years (early 1977 to the end of 1980) 11 consecutive supervision missions went to Nigeria without an educator. When the project was amended, equipment and furniture were

dropped from the loan, despite experience gained by the Bank which demonstrated the risk of concentrating on civil works only. Project monitoring was also less than adequate as reflected in (i) the lack of thorough training in Bank procedures of project managers (PCR, para. 3.06),^{3/} and (ii) a lack of initiative on behalf of the Bank to help the Borrower overcome its problems in financial management of the project.^{4/} The availability of a special account (revolving fund) might have eased financial management problems. The monitoring function could have been strengthened if the Bank had more firmly, and from the start insisted on timely progress reports. Changes in the Bank's operational management and discontinuity in staff assigned to the project added to the disappointing performance.

B. Evolving Responsibilities of Federal and State Governments

12. The changing and sometimes unclear institutional responsibility of State and Federal Government for educational and financial matters created serious problems for the implementation of the project. The complex relationship inherent in a federal structure was exacerbated because during the period of the project the relationship between the Federal and State Governments was being redefined (PCR, para. 6.08): (i) On the one hand, there was a shift towards greater autonomy for local administration especially in the field of primary education (which became the responsibility of newly created local Governments). This was reflected in the absence of federal grants for primary education in the Fourth Education plan and there was a rapid quantitative expansion of this level of education^{5/} (PCR, para. 5.07), but the primary teacher training component was dropped from the project.^{6/} However, the transfer of effective authority for implementation, from Federal to State Government was not always accompanied by a readiness of the State administrations to assume this new role; (ii) on the other hand, the Federal Government strengthened its role in shaping educational policy and in the allocation of financial resources to the sector. This is illustrated by the promulgation of new national education policies in 1977 and in 1981 and by the spectacular growth in Federal recurrent expenditures for education^{7/} (PCR, para. 5.06). Despite some efforts during implementation

^{3/} Some efforts were made by the Bank but frequent staff changes negated these.

^{4/} The Borrower's completion report -- foreword and paras. 6.4-6.8 emphasizes the difficulties encountered by lack of sound financial management and control.

^{5/} Which was called for by the change to UPE.

^{6/} Government, however, began an expanded crash program for training primary teachers needed for the UPE and did away with the need for the proposed study on alternatives to formal primary schooling, included in the project.

^{7/} In fact, Nigeria committed a very high 10% of its GDP to education (Federal - State - Local) during the period of project implementation.

the Bank did not succeed in striking the proper balance in its relationships with the Federal and State Governments.

C. Commitment of Borrower

13. Lack of commitment from the states (and to a lesser extent from the Federal Government) was a major obstacle for implementing the project.^{8/} The State Governments remained ambivalent towards the project objectives, having been largely bypassed at appraisal (PCR, paras. 1.04 and 2.15) and not having been adequately consulted by federal authorities on important aspects of project implementation. In addition, the strong federal drive towards educational development and a temporary but substantial increase in state revenues (mainly from petroleum exports) induced some of the State agencies participating in the project to avoid what was perceived as cumbersome World Bank procedures and use their own resources instead.

14. This lack of commitment clearly contributed to the shortcomings of the project. For example, (i) state project units and their managers were weak, and difficulties arose in staffing them properly and on time, which had repercussions for procurement and disbursements; (ii) later on, when the oil boom subsided and public revenue became more scarce, the states did not make adequate budgetary provisions for the project; even the block grants made by the Federal Government were amalgamated with the states' general revenues and not made available for the project. This resulted in contractors not being paid and consequent delays in construction; and (iii) most states failed to produce topographic surveys and soil tests (PCR, para. 3.17). Inadequate commitment at the federal level was illustrated by the failure to strengthen the federal project office by hiring an architect/engineer and an accountant.

D. Shortcomings of Project Management and in Physical Implementation

15. The PCR stresses that the federal project office and most of the state project units have been weak, mainly at the technical level but also in terms of their administrative status. This weakness has been another major constraint to project implementation and resulted in inadequate supervision of construction. Moreover, no progress reports were sent to the Bank by the project units.

16. The PCR analyzes the various aspects of physical implementation and suggest a variety of reasons for shortcomings and delays. The Audit would like to emphasize several aspects in the implementation process which deserve special attention.

17. In the first place, in reorganizing the content of the project, equipment and furniture were dropped from the disbursement process (PCR, para. 2.23), obviously to reduce project costs but probably also for reasons

^{8/} The project spanned a period of four different national governments and successive governments cannot be expected to be as committed as its predecessor to a project which it had no hand in formulating.

of administrative convenience, as it became evident that the detailed monitoring by the Bank of procurement would become too formidable a task. The decision to drop equipment and furniture is difficult to justify especially in light of the supervision mission's observation that "too often buildings and extensions are left idle, sometimes for years, because of an inability to carry through with the additional inputs necessary to put facilities into use".^{9/} Similar difficulties were experienced in the first two Nigerian education projects but because the three projects were implemented almost simultaneously, there was little opportunity for feedback.

18. Furthermore, the award of civil works contracts has been less than satisfactory: about half of the contracts had problems or showed poor performance. It also seems that, because of the construction boom following Nigeria's rapid growth of oil revenues, the project could only attract marginal contractors, without the required experience, capital and technical competence (PCR, para. 3.21).

19. On balance, the audit concludes that the project has not been successful. The drastic reduction in scope substantially undermined the original project objectives while the inadequate implementation further weakened the project's outcome and impact. The fact, that substantial progress was made in Nigeria's educational development during the project period was largely unrelated to the project itself which contributed little to these achievements.

^{9/} Supervision mission August 1975: letter to the Permanent Secretary of Education of KWARA State.

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NIGERIA
THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT
(LOAN 929-UNI)
COMPLETION REPORT

October 28, 1983
(Revised April 2nd, 1984)

Projects Department
Western Africa Regional Office
Education Division

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I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Background

1.01 The Third Education Project in Nigeria (Loan 929-UNI) provided a loan of \$54.0 million equivalent to the Government to expand and improve education in the former Northern Region. Specifically, the project aimed at: (a) expanding and improving primary and secondary teacher output; (b) expanding and diversifying secondary education; and (c) expanding university education at Ahmadu Bello University. The project was approved by the Bank's Board of Executive Directors in June 1973, and became effective in January 1975.

1.02 The scope of the project was reduced drastically in 1979 in response to large cost overruns and protracted implementation delays. Even in its reduced form, the project was not implemented fully. The Project account was closed in September 1983, 57 months after the original closing date, with only \$36.2 million of the \$54.0 loan amount disbursed. The remaining \$17.8 million was cancelled. The principal features of the project are summarized below under the headings project generation, project implementation, and project outcome. The principal lessons which can be derived from the project are highlighted under Lessons Learned and Conclusions (Chapter VI).

Project Generation

1.03 Project generation began in September, 1971, with a Unesco identification mission. The mission was unable to formulate a design of a possible project. However, the mission produced a lengthy list of possible project components which served as a basis for the Bank's continued dialogue with the Government. Subsequently, the Bank sent a reconnaissance mission in February 1972 to more precisely identify project components (para. 2.13). Throughout project generation, the Bank and the Government were in agreement that the project should concentrate on the north, where education was less developed than in the south. Further, there was a consensus that the project should address quality improvement (through better preparation of teachers) and that limited efforts would be made for expanding enrollments at the secondary and university levels.

1.04 On the basis of these agreements, the Bank fielded a combined preparation and appraisal mission in May 1972, three months after the return of the reconnaissance mission. The appraisal mission operated under severe time constraints: it was unable to visit most of the project sites, or to discuss in detail project implementation arrangements with state officials and resolve policy differences between the Bank and some of the state Governments (such as those pertaining to boarding facilities and staff housing). Perhaps, because of these limitations, the project received insufficient attention and commitment from state Governments (para. 2.15).

1.05 The project that was eventually appraised had the following components:

- (a) Teacher Training. Construction and equipment of eight new primary teacher training colleges (4,000 places) and expansion of 16 existing colleges (8,000 places); expansion of one advanced teachers college

- to train annually 100 practical subject teachers;
- (b) University Education. Expansion and improvement at Ahmadu Bello University;
 - (c) Secondary Education. Construction and equipment of 19 new secondary schools (13,000 places) and expansion of 40 existing secondary schools (25,000 places);
 - (d) Policy Studies. Agreement with each State to undertake four policy-oriented studies;
 - (e) Project Implementation. 18 manyears of technical assistance for 6 state project units and for architectural services for the federal project unit. (+ 8 manyears for ABU)

Project Implementation

1.06 From the beginning, the project was beset by a host of problems. First, it took over 15 months after loan signing to become effective, as the Government was unable to meet the principal condition for loan effectiveness (i.e., appointment of architects). Once the loan became effective, a number of factors made it difficult for the Project Office to carry out its responsibilities. (These included inadequate resources, a shortage of full-time project staff, insufficient authority and a high turnover of Project Directors). At the state level, these difficulties were further exacerbated with the creation of new states which delayed further the establishment of Project Units and the appointment of project staff.

1.07 Amendments to the Project. In 1979, at the request of the Government, the scope of the project was sharply reduced to about one-third of its original size, while maintaining the original amount of the loan. The following factors contributed to the decision to amend the project: (a) slow progress in project implementation, resulting in potentially high cost overruns; (b) weak project management, which led to an extremely slow rate of disbursements; (c) the Government's improved financial capacity which tempted some of the project entities (e.g., Ahmadu Bello University) to withdraw from the project in favor of direct Government financing of their components; and (d) an overextended construction industry, and overextended managerial and administrative capacities during the "oil boom."

1.08 The revised project concentrated on secondary school expansion, but on a reduced scale (with construction of 13 new schools and the expansion of 18 secondary schools and one advanced Teachers Training College). The university and primary teacher training components were dropped. The technical assistance component was reduced and the policy studies were no longer financed from the loan, as the Government undertook to finance these with its own resources.

1.09 The revised project, though greatly reduced in scope, was estimated to cost more than the original project, as prices had risen sharply throughout Nigeria during the oil boom period. The estimated total cost was US\$142.2 million (compared to US\$107 million), of which half was foreign exchange cost. As the loan amount was kept at the same level (US\$54 million), this

resulted in reducing the Bank's share from approximately 50% to only 37%.

1.10. It was anticipated that the reduction in project cost would speed up implementation and contain cost overruns. This expectation did not materialize. Shortly after the project was amended in 1979, Nigeria's financial situation started to deteriorate sharply. The federal and state Governments found it increasingly difficult to finance local costs, and to pay contractors on time. Construction was often interrupted when contractors were not paid for long stretches of time; so e were forced to abandon construction sites.

1.11. The project account was closed in September 1983, almost 10 years after original loan effectiveness, and 42 months after the loan was amended. At the time of Project Closing, only US\$36.2 million of the US\$ 54.0 million (67%) of the loan was disbursed. The remaining US\$17.8 million loan amount was cancelled.

1.12. At the date of Project Closing, only three of the 13 new secondary schools that were included in the revised project were completed (Toro, Donga and Illela). The rest were at various stages of completion -- ranging from 37% (Udei) to (83%) Ikara (Annex 1-1). Eight of the 18 secondary schools and the advanced Teachers Training College that were extended were fully completed, and another four were 75% or more completed. On the other hand, three schools were less than 50% completed (para. 3.11), and one school was deleted because of misprocurement.

1.13. Architectural Services. The consultants' task of preparing architectural designs was complicated by difficulties in obtaining Government and Bank clearances (particularly after the creation of new states), by the failure of most states to furnish topographic surveys and soil tests, and by cost reductions after designs had been completed. On the whole, the designs developed by the consultants were straightforward and functional and the construction drawings, specifications and bills of quantities were of good professional quality. Teaching accommodations generally adhered to the agreed recommendations (paras. 3.15 and 3.16).

1.14. Consultant Fees. In accordance with local practice, the consultants' contract provided for three phases of fees to be determined as percentages of total construction costs, with an allowance made for repetitive work. However, in retrospect the agreed percentages seem to be generous and not to have taken into account the large number of identical or similar accommodation components. Fees for supervisory services were "open ended" in that they were to be adjusted to the costs of contracts to be awarded, even if construction was not completed. Greater care should have been taken in determining and monitoring consultant fees.

Implementation of Educational Components

1.15. Secondary School Expansion was the most important element left after the project was amended. As many of the project-assisted schools are not yet complete, it would be unrealistic to expect that they are attaining appraisal enrollment targets in all instances. Yet many of the partially completed schools are already being used, even those (such as Udei) which are less than 50% completed. Of the 13 new schools constructed under the project, the most recent enrollment shows that those schools have reached 84% of appraisal targets (Table 3.1). Enrollment rates for the 18 secondary schools expanded

under the project are not available, but judging from the expansion of secondary education in the northern states as a whole, appraisal targets have probably been attained, if not exceeded (paras. 3.25-3.26).

1.16. Diversification. The project assisted the extension of the Advanced Teachers Training College, Sokoto, for the purpose of training technical teachers. Even though physical facilities are completed, the component has not achieved its goal, as the state (Sokoto) does not as yet have a clear-cut policy on which institution to use for training technical teachers (para. 3.27).

1.17. Policy Studies. The states were required to undertake four policy-oriented studies. After considerable discussion with the Bank, it was agreed that three of the studies (review of primary teacher training, financing plans for educational expansion and demand for technical teachers) had been met by studies that were conducted by the states to meet specifically other objectives. The fourth study (the need for boarding facilities) was undertaken by one state (Kano) and the Bank considered that study applicable for all states (paras. 3.28 and 3.29).

Educational Outcome

1.18. In view of the tremendous social, political and economic changes that took place in Nigeria during the long implementation period of this project (1973-1982), it is virtually impossible to single out educational outcome directly attributable to this project. Even though the physical components of the project were only partially implemented, and only 67% of the loan amount was disbursed, it should be noted that the enrollment objectives stated in the original project and later taken over by the borrower have been substantially achieved across the country, and more specifically in the northern states. In certain respects, such as expansion of secondary education, teacher training and university education, the progress achieved through the Government's own resources has been well beyond what had been projected at appraisal. For instance, at appraisal secondary school enrollment for the northern states was projected at 179,000 for 1982. The actual 1982 figure was in excess of 320,000. The comparable figures for primary teacher training are 28,000 and 144,000, and for university education, 17,000 and 24,000 (Table 5.2).

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

1.19 Three significant lessons emerge from implementation of the project. These pertain to: (a) the Government's commitment; (b) the Bank's performance; and (c) flaws in project design.

1.20 Government Commitment. The anomaly in performance between the project institutions, and what the (federal, state and local) Governments were able to achieve with their own resources raises a major question regarding commitment to the project. At a time when federal and state Governments were substantially increasing their investments in education, the project was beset by financial difficulties. Further, the federal and state governments did appoint project managers (after long delays), but did not provide them with sufficient staff, resources and authority to manage the project (paras. 2.18 and 6.04).

The Bank's Performance

1.21 Bank supervision missions were irregular and unsystematic, in particular in the early stages of project implementation. At times, differences of opinion between the Bank and project management made it difficult to organize missions. Mission composition was heavily biased in favor of architects and engineers. (The latter accounted for 65% of supervision time). In contrast, educators accounted for less than 15% of supervision time. While serious procurement and hardware or physical implementation problems were the cause, the result was that educational issues received only marginal attention in a period when Nigeria passed through an extraordinary educational upsurge.

Flaws in Project Design

1.22 The project was dispersed over a large area and was under the jurisdiction of six ^{1/} state Governments, with the federal Government as a coordinator. Inevitably, such a large geographical and institutional dispersion and the complex relationships inherent in a federal Government structure contributed to difficulties in project implementation and supervision.

1/ Later on there were eight states involved.

II. PROJECT BACKGROUND

Socioeconomic Setting

2.01 Countrywide. The project was appraised in May 1972, and was designed to support the federal Government's goal of bringing national unity and strengthening coherence among the federated states. It focused on six northern states. ^{1/} The specific purpose was the redressing of imbalances of educational opportunities for most of the disadvantaged states, an important element of national education policy.

2.02 In 1972, with a population estimated at 70 million, ^{2/} and a land area almost four times that of Great Britain, Nigeria has been a country marked with large regional differences. The three dominant ethnic groups, the Yorubas, Ibos, and Hausas, inhabited the western, eastern, and northern regions respectively, and spoke different languages. The per capita income, increasing at a rate of 8% per annum, was still under US\$100 in 1972, while the population was also growing at 2.5% per annum.

2.03 The Government was federally structured with strong administrative control over the states on policies, revenues, and external relations. Moreover, the states were expected to implement policy decisions taken at federal level.

2.04 The economy was based on a slowly developing agricultural sector accounting for 50% of GDP and employing 70% of the labor force. However, there was an upsurge in the growth of the nonagricultural sectors, (about 10% a year during the 1960s), due to continuing industrial progress and growth in the petroleum sector. Yet Nigeria will remain, for many years, a poor country -- its per capita income at best doubled to US\$200 by 1980 -- and will continue to be plagued with the problems of inequitable distribution of growth between sectors, regions, and rural and urban areas.

2.05 Northern States. At appraisal, the northern states were the most disadvantaged. Programs for economic, social, and cultural development evolved only very slowly. Subsistence agriculture, together with some

^{1/} The six northern states are: Benue Plateau, Kano, Kwara, North-Central, North-Eastern, and North-Western. Subsequently, the six states were further broken down to create three more states. Only two states remained substantially intact: Kwara and Kano. Of them, Kano subsequently withdrew from the project (paras. 2.20 and 2.22). Consequently, the data for determining the comparative progress achieved within the demarcated states during implementation period has been difficult to gather.

^{2/} Although other estimates at that time had placed the population to 11 million lower (UN) and 13 million lower (Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research).

commercial agriculture, contributed to about 70% of GDP and employed 80% of the labor force, compared to the national average of 50% and 70% respectively. Programs for development were hampered by inadequate coordination among states, a poor transport infrastructure, a paucity of trained local manpower, and a meager tax base. The average per capita income was about 40% less than that of the south. Moreover, despite the federal subsidy for 80% of the northern states' revenue, the public per capita expenditure in the northern states was only half that of the south.

2.06 Education Sector. During the time the project was being identified and appraised, (1970-72), one of the most pressing problems facing Nigeria was the development of its human resources. The national enrollment ratios of education were very low; for example, the ratio was 34% for the primary school-aged group, and 4% for the secondary school-aged group. Less than 21 pupils per 100,000 population entered institutions for higher education. Because of an insufficient supply of secondary school leavers, many of the university student places remained unfilled.

2.07 With the exception of the five-year plan, the country did not have a long-term strategy for educational development. The curriculum emphasized academic subjects excessively, impeded modern methods of teaching, and prepared students mainly for the civil service and other white-collar jobs. There was almost unanimity among policymakers on the desirable structure of primary education, type and length of teacher training, and on language of instruction. Public resources available for education were about 3.5% of the GNP.

2.08 The educational status of the northern states was even worse (see table below). It was about one-third the national average. Moreover, there was greater inequity and higher imbalances in quality between the southern and northern states.

Table 2.1

Comparison of National Average Enrollment Ratios With
Enrollment Ratios for Northern States (1970)

	<u>National Average 1970</u>	<u>Six Northern States</u>	<u>Ratio of Northern to National Average</u>
Primary enrollment ratio	34.0%	13.0%	1:2.6
Secondary enrollment ratio	4.2%	1.7%	1:2.5
University students for population of 100,000	21.0%	7.0%	1:30
Per pupil expenditure	\$5.00	\$2.00	1:2.5

2.09 The access of girls, compared to boys, was less than one-half for primary education, and less than one-third for secondary education. Among the primary teachers, only 14% were women. More than one million students continued their studies in unrecognized Koranic schools, compared to about 770,000 who were enrolled at the primary level. There were too few secondary graduates to fill the places available at universities or other postsecondary institutions. Still, only about 30% of the primary school leavers were able to proceed to secondary education. About 2% of the adult population was literate.

2.10 The poor development of human resources had an acute impact on the northern states. About 20% of the positions in the northern state Governments remained vacant due to the lack of qualified candidates. The state Government employed, at huge costs, about 4,500 expatriates to meet its manpower shortages. Enrollments at the primary and secondary levels could not be expanded, due to the lack of qualified teachers. The secondary education depended heavily on expatriate teachers, who accounted for about 40% of the total teaching force. Instead of entering into teaching, graduating teachers choose to proceed to the university, where the various faculties were competing with each other to fill their places. The Ahmadu Bello University (ABU), the only institution of higher learning in the northern states, had an enrollment of about 4,000. Yet each faculty at ABU had surplus places. In contrast, the south had five universities.

2.11 Resources were also minimal. The per pupil expenditure was extremely low, about US\$2.00, despite the fact that education in northern states claimed about 36% of the recurrent public expenditure, and its share of the development plan (1971-76) was as high as 13%. This was primarily due to the extremely low revenue base of the northern states. Furthermore, higher levels of boarding and expatriates drained out the limited resources.

Project Identification

2.12 The first education credit to Nigeria (Cr. 72-UNI) for US\$20 million was appraised in 1966. Fully disbursed, the project assisted in improving the quality of secondary education by providing science laboratories, workshops for technical training, and expanded teacher training throughout Nigeria. The second education loan (Ln. 814-UNI) for US\$17.3 million was appraised in 1971. It focused on the same areas and grew out of the need for reconstructing those schools included in the first project, but had been damaged by the Civil War (1969-70) in eastern Nigeria. Neither project had concentrated on the needs of the educationally disadvantaged northern states.

2.13 Generation of the Third Education Project began with a Unesco identification mission. The mission was neither able to recommend a rational educational development strategy nor formulate a design of a possible

project. Nevertheless, the Unesco mission produced lengthy lists of possible project components.^{1/} The Bank decided to proceed with a dialogue with the Government on the basis of this list, and mounted a reconnaissance mission in February 1972 to identify more precisely the project components.

2.14 This mission agreed with the Government on three criteria for the definition of the project content. First, it should concentrate on northern states. Second, the educational standards would be raised, mainly through better preparation of teachers and development of relevant curriculum. Third, limited efforts would be made for expanding enrollment, especially for secondary and higher levels of education. On the basis of this agreement, the Bank decided to field a combined preparation-appraisal team. To respond to the apparent political urgency for immediately meeting the educational needs of the north, the mission was also sent fairly early (May 1972), within three months of the return of the reconnaissance mission. The duration was also limited, only four weeks in the field, leaving less than a week to spend in each of the six states.

2.15 As a result, the appraisal mission operated under severe constraints. First, there was little time to properly analyze the reconnaissance documents and prepare the identification components. Second, discussions with the state officials were hurried and on general terms, mainly because the mission members were unable to complete some of the basic appraisal requirements. For example, in the limited time left for visits to the states, it was impossible for the members to visit all of the proposed sites, or to reach agreements with state officials for establishing new state project units. Third, the mission realized that there were many policy issues that still needed resolution, both by the federal and state governments. For example, there was considerable disagreement within the states, and between the Bank and federal government, on the necessity for, and the size of, boarding facilities and staff housing. Rather than delaying or extending the appraisal, the mission decided that those related policy issues be resolved in the future by the conduct of several studies by the states (para. 2.18). Perhaps because of these limitations, the project received very little commitment from the states and was often viewed as a project imposed upon them by the Federal Government and the Bank.

^{1/} It was later discovered by a Bank reconnaissance team that some of the project components proposed by Unesco were not thoroughly discussed with the Government and some of the items did not represent their request. For example, one of the components related to upgrading of the Koranic schools in the north, a concept which the Federal Ministry of Education rejected, since it felt integrating these schools into the formal system was not a viable proposition. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture considered Unesco's proposal to expand and upgrade the Farmer Training Institutions as premature, since it was still assessing its own training needs and preparing its own training plan. The Federal Ministry of Finance did not support a proposed plan to expand the Faculty of Engineering at the University of Lagos.

Project Objective

2.16 The strategy of the Second National Development Plan for 1970-74 for education was directed mainly toward:

- development of diversified curricula for primary and secondary education;
- accelerated expansion in enrollment for secondary education;
- an expanded program for the training of teachers; and
- continued development of university education.

The Third Project, as appraised, supported the above strategy but directed it entirely toward the northern states.

2.17 Project Content. Four basic objectives were considered priorities for educational development in the northern states and the project was designed at appraisal to address them. These were: (a) to improve access and quality of university education; (b) to increase the annual output of teachers for primary and secondary levels and for technical subjects; (c) to develop a relevant curriculum in primary education, responding to special needs of the north; and (d) to expand and diversify secondary education. The total project cost, including contingencies, was estimated at US\$107.4 million. The Bank loan was for US\$54.0 million. The base cost of the project, excluding contingencies, was US\$84.1 million. The components included those which follow.

University Education (US\$5.32 million)

The project focused on three areas:

(a) School of Basic Studies. The project made provisions for physical facilities. The goal was to better prepare prospective university entrants as well as increase their number. The output was expected to be doubled from 750 to 1500 students.

(b) Faculty of Education. Facilities and equipment were to be provided to increase the enrollment by 280 (from 200 to 480). This was designed to meet the demand for more primary and secondary school teachers.

(c) Institute of Education. Provisions were made for eight staffyears of technical assistance and selected equipment required for an experimental practical work program in the upper grades of 66 primary schools. The pilot study would help in adapting the primary school curriculum to the needs of Northern Nigeria.

Teacher Training (US\$17.63 million)

Programs were designed to increase output of teachers for both primary and secondary levels.

(a) Primary. Provision was made for construction and equipment for eight new primary teacher colleges to provide a total of 4,000 places, and the expansion of 16 existing colleges to incorporate facilities for training another 8,000 students in technical subjects.

(b) Secondary. To expand technical teacher training, provisions were made at the Sokoto Advanced Teachers' Colleges for two workshops and two staff houses. It was expected that the faculty would be able to train 100 additional teachers in wood and metal work.

Secondary Education (US\$58.87 million).

Expansion and qualitative improvement of secondary education was the major thrust of this component. Provisions were made to build 19 new multilateral secondary schools to provide a total of 13,000 places and broaden the educational opportunities of another 25,000 students by expanding enrollment and teaching facilities for another 40 existing schools. Of the 38,000 student places, more than half were intended for the teaching of science and other diversified subjects.

Project Implementation (US\$2.23 million).

To facilitate the implementation of the project, provisions were made for: (a) 18 staffyears of technical assistance for six state project units; and (b) architectural services and federal project administration.

Policy Studies

2.18 The appraised project also included agreement by each state Governments for the conduct of four policy studies. They were concerned with: (a) review of teacher training policies, especially for primary levels; (b) current practices on student boarding and staff housing, and consideration for alternative policies; (c) an analysis of the long-term demand for technical teachers; and (d) a plan for quantitative expansion of education in Nigeria. Each of the six states agreed to complete the studies within two years of the loan signing. Moreover, the study on student boarding and staff housing (item (b)) was made a condition for disbursements for these expenditures.

Amendments to the Project

2.19 In 1979, at the request of the Government, the scope of the project was sharply reduced to about one-third of its original size, while the original amount of the Bank loan was maintained. This was done to expedite the implementation of the project and to take account of the changed sectoral policy environment. Three issues were critical. First, slow progress in the implementation of the project raised the serious prospect of high cost overruns; second, weak project management led to an extremely slow rate of disbursements; and third, some project components were absorbed in the national UPE program.

2.20 Further complications arose during implementation when new states were created and added to the project, while others withdrew. In February 1976, the number of states in the federation increased from 12 to 19. Of the

original six states participating in the project, two remained substantially intact, and the remaining four were broken into six states. It took some time to reallocate schools and other facilities to the newly created states. Moreover, the new states also needed time to establish a viable administrative structure and new project units to take over the responsibility of implementation from previous units which had already started some phases of implementation. Only by early 1979, were the new project units able to appoint project officers and proceed with implementation of the project.

2.21 Furthermore, in the light of increased availability of fiscal and foreign exchange resources, the federal Government gave higher priority to educational development. In 1976 it launched an ambitious educational program with the objective of establishing universal primary education throughout Nigeria by 1980. The new program totally absorbed the project components concerned with the training of primary teachers and was financed from local resources. Given the federal push, some of the implementation agencies considered that, with their substantial increase in revenues, mainly from petroleum exports, they could proceed with the implementation of the project components more rapidly and without following the usual Bank procedures. With this in mind, Ahmadu Bello University and Kano State withdrew from the project.

2.22 And finally, the delay in effectiveness overtook some of the events planned. For example, by the time the loan became effective in January 1975, the Government had already begun implementing some parts of the components with its own resources. The Institute of Education had already started the primary school improvement study. The results of the pilot study were also in the process of being adopted in the primary school curricula in each state in conjunction with the federal JPE program.

The Revised Project

2.23 The following is a comparison of the original and revised project:

(Please see Table 2.2 on following page)

Table 2.2

Comparison of Original Project With Amended Project

<u>Project Item</u>	<u>Original Project</u>	<u>Amended Project</u>
<u>University education</u>	Ahmadu Bello University Assistance to: a. School of Basic Studies b. Faculty of Education c. Institute of Education	<u>Withdrew</u> The ABU proceeded with development from its own resources
<u>Teacher Training</u> Primary level	a. Eight new primary teacher colleges b. Sixteen extensions to primary training colleges. extensions; Kano state proceeded with four new primary teacher colleges	<u>Withdrew</u> Federal Government assumed responsibility for four new primary teacher colleges, and all
Secondary level	Sokoto advanced teachers college; 100 places for wood and metal workshops	Retained
<u>Secondary Education</u>	a. Nineteen new multilateral schools. b. Forty extensions for diversified education	Reduced to 13 new schools Reduced to 18 extensions; the Kano state assumed responsibility for 21 secondary school exten- sions
<u>Studies</u> parti-	Modified (Para. 3.28) cipating state	Four studies by each
<u>Project Implementation</u>	a. Consulting fees b. Technical assistance	Modified Reduced
<u>Equipment and Furniture</u>	For secondary schools and training colleges to be partly financed form the loan	Not to be financed from the loan; states assumed responsibility for procu- rement of equipment and furniture.

See also Annexes 2 - 1 and 2 - 2.

2.24 The amended project thus financed: (a) construction and equipping of 13 new secondary schools to provide a total of 8,600 places; (b) extensions to 18 multilateral secondary schools; (c) extension to one advanced teachers college to train 600 technical subject teachers, and (d) technical assistance for project implementation and for preparation of a new project.

2.25 The total cost of the revised project was estimated at \$142.2 million, of which about half was foreign exchange costs. Originally, the project was estimated to cost \$107.4 million with a foreign exchange cost estimated at about \$54.0 million (para. 2.17).

III. PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

Project Management

3.01 Federal Project Office. The Federal Project Office was responsible for: (a) handling all matters involving other Federal Ministries; (b) preparing progress reports for the Bank; (c) keeping financial and other records on the execution of the project; (d) supervising the state project units and coordinating the bidding process for civil works, furniture and equipment. A number of factors made it difficult for the Project Office to effectively carry out its responsibilities.

3.02 First, inadequate resources were allocated to project management, and, therefore, staffing problems plagued the Project Office. The Loan Agreement stipulated that there should be a full-time Project Director, a full-time accountant and adequate support staff. In fact, the Project Office was understaffed during much of the implementation. Not only was the Project Director also responsible for the First Education Project (until 1977) and the Second Education Project (until 1980), but from 1980, he spent part of his time on study leave. The accountant, who was not hired until the summer of 1979, was shifted to other tasks in 1980. In addition, the Project Office had to share its support staff with other offices.

3.03 Second, the performance of the Project Director was hampered by insufficient authority and inadequate access to the decision-making levels of Government. The Loan Agreement stipulated that the Project Director would report directly to the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Education. However, to gain access to the Permanent Secretary, the Project Director had to go through the Secretary of the Bureau of External Aid for Education, the Assistant Director of Education for Student Affairs and Foreign Aid, and the Director of Education.

3.04 Third, there was a high turnover of Project Directors, with four directors over the life of the project. Fourth, it was difficult to supervise the state project units because communications, poor in Nigeria to begin with, were made even more difficult by gas shortages, air strikes and inadequate travel funds.

3.05 At appraisal, it was decided that consulting architects were needed to provide the Project Office with architectural expertise and to coordinate the services of executive architects. However, this expertise was not available to the Project Office because a decision was made to combine the functions of the consulting architects with those of the "executive architects," who were to be hired by the state Governments. Realizing that it needed independent architectural advice, two architects were assigned to the Project Office but they stayed little more than a year. Even while they were in the Project Office, these two architects were prevented from visiting the states because of a lack of travel funds. Thus, the Project Office had little capacity to evaluate the services of the consulting and "executive" architects throughout the project.

3.06 The state Project Units were responsible for site supervision, preparation of reports and procurement of civil works, furniture and equipment. The establishment of the state Project Units was difficult and

time-consuming. As the state Ministries of Education in the northern states had never implemented a Bank project, new Project Units had to be created and the staff trained. Project Managers were not identified during appraisal, and most of them were not appointed until the end of the first year of implementation. Project Managers were hired although they had no experience with Bank procedures. Their lack of experience resulted in significant implementation delays. For example, the Project Managers had difficulty in filling out and submitting withdrawal applications despite repeated assistance by supervision missions and a visit from the Bank's Controller's Department. While implementation delays occurred everywhere, some states performed better than others. The better-performing states were distinguished by the fact that they had greater commitment, as reflected in the cooperation of state officials at all levels.

3.07 Staffing of the state Project Units caused delays, as it did in the Federal Project Office. One of the conditions of effectiveness was that each state Project Unit would have a full-time Project Manager and adequate support staff. However, not one of these managers was able to work full-time on the project, and none sought involvement of school principals in the extension, furnishing and equipping of their schools. Thus, valuable feedback on project implementation was lost. Often, school principals did not know how facilities were to be used or what furniture and equipment to expect. Project implementation at the state level was further delayed in 1976 when the six northern states were divided into nine states. The creation of these additional states meant that new Project Units had to be established. Project Managers had to be identified, hired and trained.

3.08 Initially, the relationship between the consulting architects and the state Project Units was strained because the Project Agreements stipulated that each state Project Unit would select its own "executive" architects. The decision to combine the functions of the consulting architects and the "executive architects" was made at the federal level without adequate consultation with the states. This decision weakened the commitment of the states to the project and contributed to their belief that the project was being imposed on them by the federal Government and by the Bank.

Project Implementation

3.09 The project account was closed in September 1983, about eight and a half years after loan effectiveness, and 50 months after the project was revised. Even after the scope of the project was reduced drastically, only 67% of the \$54 million loan amount was disbursed. The status of implementation with respect to the various components of the revised project is discussed below, and summarized in Annexes 1-1, 2-1, 2-2 and 3-1. Annex 3-2 is a comparison of the planned implementation schedule with the actual dates.

Implementation of Civil Works

3.10 New Secondary Schools. The revised project provided for the construction of 13 new secondary schools. At the time of Project Completion, only three schools were completed or virtually completed (i.e., over 90 percent completed). These were: Toro Government Secondary School in Bauchi State; Donga Government Secondary School in Gongola State; and Illela Government Secondary School in Sokoto State. The other schools were only

partially completed (Annex 1-1).

3.11 Extensions to Secondary Schools. The revised project provided for the extension of 18 secondary schools. Of these only eight were fully completed and another 4 were 75% or more completed. On the other hand, three schools were less than 50% completed, 1/ and one school was deleted from the amended project following misprocurement.

3.12 Extension to an Advanced Teachers Training College (ATC). The extension to the ATC at Sokoto has been completed and is in full use (para. 3.24). However, the facilities are not being utilized to train practical subject teachers as had been intended at appraisal.

Cause of Construction Delays

3.13 When the project was revised in 1979 and drastically reduced in scope, the country was experiencing an unprecedented economic boom as a result of a sharp increase in foreign exchange earnings from petroleum exports. The consequent push for development projects overstretched the construction industry to its limits and gave rise to a sharp escalation in construction costs. The reduction of the project's scope was expected to expedite project implementation and contain the anticipated cost overrun. However, these expectation did not materialize, when shortly after the project was amended, Nigeria's financial situation started to deteriorate sharply, and the federal and state governments found it increasingly difficult to finance local costs. As a result construction was often interrupted when contractors were not paid for long stretches of time, thereby forcing some of them to abandon construction sites. (See paras. 2.19 - 2.22.)

3.14 Other factors which contributed to the delay could perhaps have been foreseen at appraisal. First, the loan was awarded when project preparation was in its early stages, as was the practice at that time. Architects, for example, were not selected prior to appraisal and their selection was made a condition of effectiveness (which took 15 months to meet). Second, implementation time was estimated at 5 1/2 years, which was the average time for education projects appraised during this period. This proved to be inadequate in view of the geographical dispersion of the project, the implementation capacity of the borrower and Nigeria's communications and transportation problems. Third, the unusually complex conditions and agreements -- which included the subsidiary lending arrangements between the federal and the state Governments -- inevitably consumed valuable time which was not provided for in the implementation schedule.

Consultants - Architectural Services Agreement

3.15 For each of the first two Bank-assisted education projects in

1/ These are: Ayangba Government Secondary School in Benue State; Fandan-Kaje Government Secondary School in Kaduna State; and Kontangora Government Secondary School in Niger State.

Nigeria, the architectural tasks of designing buildings and organizing and supervising construction were divided and the component services supplied separately by a number of consultants. In the First Education Project, an expatriate firm was engaged as "consulting architects" to prepare a Design Guide and local architectural firms were engaged as "executive architects" to prepare detailed designs and bidding documents. In the Second Project, the same expatriate firm was again retained as "consulting architects" but the firm was commissioned not only to revise and expand the Design Guide prepared for the first project, but also to prepare full construction drawings and bills of quantities for all "above ground" elements of all "standard" buildings. The "executive architects" engaged by the states were commissioned to prepare site plans, foundation designs, and for construction supervision and the design of "nonstandard" buildings.

3.16 While an arrangement of divided architectural functions similar to that above was initially proposed for the Third Project, ^{1/} it was subsequently decided to combine all necessary architectural services. Two firms in joint venture, one Nigerian and the other Swedish, were selected in October 1973. Because the deliberations on whether to combine all architectural functions and the drafting of terms of reference were protracted, the consultants were not appointed until January 1975. Since their appointment was a condition of loan effectiveness, effectiveness was delayed by 15 months.

Scope of Professional Services

3.17 Professional services included preparation of revised design handbooks, procedures and management guides, as well as full construction drawings and bidding and contract documents. The consultants were also expected to assist in the preparation of furniture and equipment lists and to assist in equipment deliveries and installation, and preparation of periodic progress reports. Of these services, most of those relating to delivery of furniture and equipment are still outstanding (Para. 4.03) and substantial quantities of furniture and equipment still have to be delivered, and some still need to be ordered. The consultant's preparation of architectural designs was complicated by difficulties in obtaining Government and Bank clearances for submissions because of the reorganization of the states, because of the failure of most states to furnish topographic surveys and soil tests, and because of a cost reduction exercise embarked upon after designs had been completed.

3.18 The designs developed by the consultants are straightforward and functional and the construction drawings, specifications and bills of quantities prepared are comprehensive and of good professional quality. Apart from the increased numbers of classrooms provided to satisfy state requirements, teaching accommodations generally conform to the architectural worksheets, which formed the basis of appraisal cost estimates (Annex 2-1). ^{2/}

1/ Staff Appraisal Report, para. 5.03.

2/ The state PWD designs used for the construction of the two new schools (Ikara and Jibya) in Kaduna State are considerably more functional. Since they do not appear to be any more economical than the consultants' designs in terms of space or construction standards, the state Government's rationale in deciding to use them is obscure.

3.19 The consultants' contract provided for three phases of fees to be determined as percentages of total project construction costs in accordance with the existing regulations of the Nigerian Institute of Architects, Engineers and Surveyors. The fees were to reflect reductions for repetitive work. In view of the number of institutions with identical or similar accommodation components (i.e., 60 secondary schools and 24 primary teacher training colleges), the percentages of estimated costs agreed to as fees for design seem, in retrospect, to have been generous. Fees for the supervisory services were "open-ended" in that they were to be adjusted to the costs of the contracts to be awarded, even though construction may not have been completed. The fees actually paid to the consultants amounted to about US\$24.0 million and included, in addition to the services described in the agreement, US\$0.8 million for reimbursement of expenses, US\$0.4 million for resident site supervisors' salaries, and about US\$5.0 million for additional supervision services needed because the consultant's agreement had a time limit and had to be extended. The total fees paid was 33% of construction costs certified by the extended closing date and/or 23% of the estimated final cost of the project at December 1982. Greater care should have been given to project preparation and to monitoring consulting fees.

3.20 Contract Awards. In line with the 1968 Companies Decree No. 51, (the Indigenization Decree), only contractors or companies registered in Nigeria were prequalified. To register, a company had to be incorporated in Nigeria with a no less than 60% of its shares held by Nigerians. There is no evidence that the Bank was requested to limit civil works procurement to local contractors only, or evidence that the Bank accepted such a request. As a result, procurement was not in accordance with ICB guidelines, as stipulated in the Project Agreement. In 1979, the Bank and the Nigerian Government reached a compromise on procurement guidelines for future Bank-assisted projects.

3.21 Prequalification of contractors was performed by the consulting architects. Although the consultants tried to prequalify only competent contractors, many of the contractors finally invited to tender did not have the experience, capital and technical ability to handle civil works contracts. Out of 39 contracts, 12 were terminated and reawarded, three showed misprocurement and six were abandoned. Performance on the remaining 18 sites ranged from poor to satisfactory. In some cases, artisans and businessmen were awarded contracts, thereby seriously jeopardizing the objectives of the project. In future, more attention should be given to the prequalification of contractors, and only those contractors who have successfully completed similar contracts both in size and complexity should be invited to tender. Performance bonds and Bank guarantees have little value in Nigeria; penalties for delays are rarely enforced while contracts are regularly adjusted for inflation.

3.22 Procurement of Equipment and Furniture. The consultants monitored the procurement of equipment and furniture and contracts awarded by the States Tender Board. The Bank did not review the award of contracts, nor did the

Bank reimburse for equipment and furniture as these were not eligible for reimbursement under the amended project.

Implementation of Educational Components

3.23 The project as originally appraised had four basic objectives: (a) to improve access and quality of university education in the north; (b) to increase primary and secondary school teacher output; and (c) to expedite the move toward diversification of the secondary school curriculum by expanding the output of technical teachers (para. 2.17). The project also included agreement by the state Governments to conduct four policy studies (para. 2.18).

3.24 When the project was amended in 1979, the university and primary teacher training components were dropped from the project and financed with Government and university funds (para. 2.21). Enrollment in teacher training institutions and at the university in 1982 far exceeded appraisal projections for that year (paras. 5.13 and 5.15). Thus, the enrollment objectives set forth at appraisal with respect to those components have been achieved.

Expansion of Secondary Education

3.25 Expansion of secondary education was the most important element left after the project was amended. The revised project was to assist in the construction of 13 secondary schools (for 8,000 new places) and expansion of 18 existing schools (for 10,800 new places). Although most of the new schools are not completed, they are being used. This is a clear indication that the demand for secondary places identified at appraisal still exists. In fact the demand may be greater today than in 1972 because the massive expansion of primary education through the UPE campaign is at present felt acutely at the secondary level. Of the 13 new schools, the most recent enrollment data available (1982) show that those schools have reached about 84% of their appraisal targets even though only three of the schools are fully completed (para. 3.10, and Table 3.1, overleaf).

Table 3.1
Projected and Actual Enrollments
at Nine New Secondary Schools

	<u>Projected Appraisal Target</u>	<u>Actual Enrollment August 1982</u>
Toro	800	1130
Illela	600	820
Udei	600	80
Wase	600	410
Nassarawa-Egon	600	0 ^{1/}
 Bokkos	 600	 521
Donga	800	990
Agbaja ^{2/}	800	408 ^{2/}
 Kaiama ^{2/}	 <u>800</u>	 <u>340^{2/}</u>
 TOTAL	 <u>5600</u>	 <u>4699</u>

3.26 Enrollment data for the 18 secondary schools that were expanded under the project (para. 3.11) is not available. But judging from the expansion of secondary education in the northern states as a whole, there is every reason to believe that the appraisal targets have been achieved, if not exceeded (Table 5.2).

3.27 Diversification. The project assisted in the expansion and equipping of the Advanced Teachers Training College (ATC) in Sokoto to train technical teachers for secondary schools. This component has not achieved its goal, even though the physical facilities are complete. No pre-vocational subject teachers are being trained. Several factors caused this to happen. First, Sokoto state, which was responsible for providing the equipment for the

^{1/} School building less than 50% completed.

^{2/} Enrollment in dilapidated secondary schools that would be replaced by the new facilities.

workshops, was unable to do so. As a consequence, the completed workshops continue to be used as classrooms. Second, in 1980, Sokoto state relegated to the Institutes of Technology the task of training technical teachers. The ATC now concentrates exclusively on the training of science and art teachers. Third, because of considerable debates on which institutions are better equipped to train technical teachers in the state, only a few of the qualified teachers sought employment in the ATC, and none were hired.

Policy Studies

3.28 Four studies were required for each state under the project. By 1979, the Bank had decided that the requirement for three of them had been met by studies that were conducted by the states to meet other objectives:

- (a) the study to review primary teacher training policies was waived because the studies being conducted by the states in conjunction with their preparation for universal primary education were considered sufficient to satisfy the informational requirements of the Bank;
- (b) the requirement for a detailed study of the financial plan for each State's educational expansion plans was considered to have been deemed satisfied by the states' contribution to the Second Development Plan (1975-80); and
- (c) the study of the demand for technical teachers was waived because the Second Development Plan proposed the building of four new technical colleges in the north. It was thought that the outputs of these institutions would be sufficient to meet demand.

3.29. The fourth study area was to have been an analysis by each state of its boarding and staff housing policies for secondary schools and primary teacher training colleges as a condition of disbursement of project funds. The states maintained that the need for these facilities in the northern states, where many school districts covered large and remote areas, was obvious and did not require a study. In fact, North Central State ^{1/} informed a supervision mission that they would withdraw from the project rather than build schools without these facilities. Finally, one state, Kano, did conduct a study which justified these facilities. It was considered applicable to all states, thus satisfying the condition of disbursement.

^{1/} This state was subsequently renamed to "Kaduna".

IV. PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING

4.01 At appraisal, total project costs were estimated at US\$107.4 million. The foreign exchange component was estimated between US\$50.9 million and US\$54.0 million "depending on the outcome of international bidding" (SAR, para. 4.19). The loan, amounting to US\$54.0 million, was expected to cover all foreign exchange costs. Table 4.1 below shows appraisal estimates of project costs by component. The cost for civil works was based on the contract awarded under the Bank's First Education Project; it was US\$150 per square meter in June 1972, plus 10% for physical contingencies and about 19% for price contingencies. (See also Annex 1-1 for "Civil Works Costs by Institutions".)

Table 4.1

Project Costs by Components
(Original Appraisal Estimates)

	Naira Million			US\$ Million			
	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	Total	
% of Total							
Ahmadu Bello University	1.90	1.60	3.50	2.89	2.43	5.32	6.3
Teacher Training	6.12	5.48	11.60	9.30	8.33	17.63	21.0
Secondary Education	19.98	18.74	38.72	30.38	28.49	58.87	70.0
Technical Assistance	0.12	0.50	0.62	0.18	0.76	0.94	1.1
Project Administration	0.58	0.30	0.88	0.88	0.46	1.34	1.6
BASE LINE COSTS	28.70	26.62	55.32	43.63	40.47	84.10	100.0
Physical Contingencies	2.76	2.40	5.16	4.20	3.65	7.85	9.3
Price Contingencies	5.72	4.44	10.16	8.68	6.76	15.44	18.4
TOTAL PROJECT COSTS	<u>37.18</u>	<u>33.46</u>	<u>70.64</u>	<u>56.51</u>	<u>50.88</u>	<u>107.39</u>	<u>127.7</u>

The appraised costs by various categories of expenditures are shown in Table 4.2, below.

4.02 The loan of US\$54.0 million was to cover the foreign expenditure

costs of Civil Works, Furniture, Equipment and Technical Assistance as follows:

Table 4.2

Allocation of Loan Proceeds

			US\$ Equivalent
Category	Appraisal	Amended	Actual
Civil Works	27,900,000	43,000,000	31,027,789.58
Furniture	3,900,000	0	0
Equipment	6,350,000	0	0
Architectural Fees	4,200,000	5,105,000	5,148,971.59
Technical Assistance	750,000	750,000	0
Unallocated	10,900,000	5,145,000	0
TOTAL	<u>54,000,000</u>	<u>54,000,000</u>	<u>36,176,761.17</u>

Cost of Amended Project

4.03 In 1979, for reasons discussed earlier (paras. 2.19-2.22), the scope of the project was reduced substantially, without, however, reducing the loan amount. The Government agreed to finance procurement of furniture and equipment so that the loan would concentrate largely on financing of civil works and professional fees.

Table 4.3
Comparison of Original and Amended Cost Estimates
(US\$ million)

	<u>Original Appraisal Estimates</u>			<u>Amended Project (1979) Estimates</u>		
	Bank	Govt.	Total	Bank	Govt.	Total
Construction	34.7	46.9	81.6	48.1	59.0	107.1
Profession fees	4.7	5.1	9.8	5.1	14.9	20.0
Furniture	5.0	0.4	5.4	—	8.1	8.1
Equipment	7.6	0.5	8.1	—	6.2	6.2
Technical Assistance	0.7	0.2	0.9	0.6	—	0.6
Project Administration	1.3	0.3	1.6	0.2	—	0.2
TOTAL	54.0	53.4	107.4	54.0	88.2	142.2
Project Administration	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	<u>54.0</u>	<u>53.4</u>	<u>107.4</u>	<u>54.0</u>	<u>88.2</u>	<u>142.2</u>

4.04 Even after the project was closed, construction was still incomplete on a number of project sites (paras.3.09-3.11). The Completion Mission estimated that if the amended project had been about fully implemented by Closing Date, the cost of the project would have been as estimated in 1979 i.e. US\$142.8 million. According to the Completion Mission it would require an additional US\$50 million to complete the amended project (December 1984). A comparison of actual disbursements or certified Government costs, and estimated project cost to complete the amended project is shown in Table 4.4, overleaf. Annex 4.1 contains the Schedule of Disbursements, comparing the estimated with the actual schedules.

Table 4.4

Comparison of Actual Disbursements
or Certified Government Costs
and Estimated Project Costs to Complete Amended Project

(US\$ Million)

	Actual Disbursements Certified Costs (December 1982)			Estimated Cost to Complete Amended Project (December 1984)		
	Bank Disb.	Govt.	Total	Bank	Govt. <u>1/</u>	Total
Construction	31.1	39.9	71.0	31.1	110.6	141.7
Professional Fees	5.1	15.7	21.0	5.1	24.7	29.8
Furniture	-	1.1	1.1	-	12.2	12.2
Equipment	-	2.1	2.1	-	8.8	8.8
Technical Assistance	-	-	-	-	-	-
Project Administration	-	-	-	-	-	-
 TOTAL	 <u>36.2</u>	 <u>59.0</u>	 <u>95.2</u>	 <u>36.2</u>	 <u>156.3</u>	 <u>192.5</u>

Financing

4.05 At appraisal the Bank loan of US\$54.0 million constituted 50% of the total project cost of US\$107.4 million. When the project was revised, the Bank loan for US\$54.0 million covered 36% of the estimated US\$142.2 million total project cost. The 1979 revision left some elements of the financing plan the same and changed others. The revised loan continued to cover 44% of the civil works expenditures, and 48% of the expenditures for architectural fees and project administration. The percentage of technical assistance financed by the loan was increased from 80% to 100%. Financing for furniture and equipment, which was 100% in the original Loan Agreement, was eliminated when this responsibility was assumed by the Government.

4.06 Disbursements. The first disbursement took place nearly six years after negotiations, in the same quarter as the original closing date. The rate of disbursement was less than half the projected rate. As September

1/ The costs by category were derived by prorating the mission's estimate of additional costs needed to complete the project (i.e., \$50.0 million).

1983, when the project account was closed, only US\$36.2 million (or about 67 percent) of the US\$54.0 million loan was disbursed, largely because construction had been delayed (paras.3.12-3.13). Disbursements for civil works were US\$31.1 million, or about 44% of total certified expenditures for civil works. Disbursements of US\$5.1 million for architectural fees and project administration were about 24 percent of total certified expenditures for this category.

4.07 State commitment to the project was weak because the states were not adequately involved in early stages and because they viewed it as the Bank's project, not as their own (para. 2.15). As a result, state Project Managers found it difficult to ensure that funds for the project were available in budget estimates. Delays were then encountered because funds were not available to pay contractors. The situation became so serious that in 1976 the federal Government stepped in and made a grant to the states to enable them to complete the project. However, these funds were not distinguished from general state revenues and, in most cases, were not used for the project.

V. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOME

5.01 The implementation of the project spanned about ten years (1973-1982). During this period, substantial changes took place in Nigeria with respect to: (a) framework of government--a shift from military rule to civilian rule; (b) greater autonomy for local administration; and (c) a higher inflow of economic and financial resources, mainly due to the export of petroleum. Public commitment for education also gained momentum. Given such substantial changes in social, economic, and political structure, it would be difficult to identify educational outcomes arising directly from the project. However, it is possible to make a tentative assessment of Nigeria's educational achievements during this period, and compare them to the broad educational objectives stated by the appraisal mission.

5.02 This chapter has two sections. The first reviews the countrywide progress in education; the second reviews the progress achieved by the northern states for those components which were modified or excluded from the project in 1979. The progress of the components retained in the amended project was discussed in Chapter III.

Countrywide Progress

5.03 A most notable feature in Nigerian education is the phenomenal rise in enrollment for all levels. During 1970-82, the total enrollment in the country grew annually at 12.3%, 18.3%, and 10.5% for primary, secondary, and university education respectively (Table 5.1). Very few countries in Africa have been able to demonstrate such impressive quantitative growth. But more striking, the progress of the northern states for primary and university education, about 19.5% and 16.2% respectively, exceeded the national average and helped in bridging the gap between the southern and northern states.

Table 5.1
Progress in Enrollment
Nationally and for Northern States Between 1970-1982
(000's)

<u>Level</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>National</u>	<u>Northern States</u>	<u>As Proportion of National Enrollment</u>
Primary	1970	3,661	768	21%
	1980	14,702	6,518	44%
Rate of annual increase		12.3%	19.5%	
Secondary	1970	298	44	15%
	1982	2,226	323	15%
Rate of annual increase		18.3%	18.0%	
University	1970	20	4	20%
	1982	66	24	36%
Rate of annual increase		10.5%	16.2%	

Sources: 1. SAR, May 1973 - Appendix II.
2. Fourth National Development Plan (1981-85), includes Kano State under Northern States.

5.04 The achievements reflect both the national consensus and official policy that education is the most important element of Nigeria's development strategy. Besides the consensus, four factors have contributed to the growth of education. They are:

- (a) higher availability and commitment of resources;
- (b) stronger role by the federal government in educational policy and decision making;
- (c) higher involvement of local governments for implementing local education decisions; and
- (d) greater capacity for analysis, planning, and research to develop policies conducive to local needs.

5.05 Resources. Nigeria committed on the average about 10% of its GDP ^{1/} to education, compared with 3.5% in the 1960s. The 10% figure is probably more than for any other country without a centrally planned economy. During the third Five-Year Plan (1976-80), education accounted for about US\$4.9 billion, or about 12% of the planned public sector program. The allocation for the fourth development plan (1981-85), US\$13.3 billion, represents about 10.6% of the planned public expenditure program.

5.06 Federal Role. The federal Government has played a stronger role, brought in new policy initiatives, and has used its control over finances to bring in substantive reforms. A national educational policy developed in 1977 by the Federal Government has been further reviewed in new educational policies issued in 1981. The new policies have taken into account both the anticipated needs for education and Nigeria's realistic prospects of meeting its needs. Within the framework of the national policy, the Federal Government launched, with heavy subsidies, programs for universal primary education and related teacher training, expanded programs for technical and vocational education, and assumed all costs of university education. The proportion of federal recurrent expenditures on education grew from about 2% in the early 1970s to about 40% by the early 1980s, an indication of the significant role that the federal Government plays in educational decision making.

5.07 Local Government. Concurrent with the federal push for UPE, the responsibility for the administration and maintenance of primary education was delegated to the newly created local governments. In fact, a notable feature of the Fourth Plan is the complete absence of federal grants for primary education. Though local control has fueled rapid quantitative expansion, the experience suggests that it has, however, limited its ability to maintain the quality of primary schooling and prevent deterioration.

5.08 Analytical capacity. Nigeria has been well endowed during this

^{1/} Including federal, state and local governments.

period with a large number of educational research and policy institutes. Besides the establishments of the Nigeria Education Research Council, a network of researchers and academics across the country, there are institutes of education in each of the seven universities. Moreover, specialized institutes have been set up on educational technology, on school broadcasting, and on curriculum research and development. Innovative institutions like the Kano Educational Research Council, for example, have combined inspection of schools with the development of educational materials. Their activities have contributed both in absolute and in relative terms to the development of relevant educational policies.

Progress in Northern States

5.09 During the ten years from 1972-82, much progress took place in the northern states. In certain areas, such as expansion of secondary education, teacher training and university education, the progress achieved through the Government's own resources has been well beyond what had been projected at appraisal (Table 5.2). This section will discuss briefly some of the achievements made in the expansion of primary education, teacher training, university education and policy studies. (See Annexes 5-1, 5-2 and 5-3.)

Table 5.2
Achievement of Northern States in Enrollment
Compared to Projections in the SAR for 1982
(000's)

Level	Projected in SAR	Actual/Estimate	Times Increase
Primary	2326	6518	2.8
Secondary	179	323	1.8
Teacher Training Primary	28	144	5.2
University	17	24	1.4

Source: 1. For projection of FY82: Annex 4 of SAR, May 1973.
2. For actual/estimated enrollments; Federal Ministry of National Planning, Fourth National Development Plan, January 1981. The composite data of northern states includes Kano state.

Expansion of Primary Education

5.10 During appraisal in 1972, enrollment at the primary level for the northern states was extremely low, (about 770,000), accounting for about one-fourth of the national enrollment. The appraisal mission observed that the immediate priority for primary education was the development of curricula

relevant to needs of the northern region: increased equity in educational opportunities between the states, rural and urban regions, sexes, and higher rates of transition to secondary education. The project provided funds for the Institute of Education to undertake an experimental work program for primary schools (para. 2.17).

5.11 In 1976, the federal Government launched a program of free primary education with the objective of making it universal throughout Nigeria by 1980. Although the program fell short of achieving its objectives, it had significant impact in the northern states. Annual enrollment grew at an average rate of 27%, with rates ranging from 41% to 23% among the eight states. Compared to the projected enrollment of about 2.3 million for 1982 in the SAR, actual enrollment in northern states in 1982 stood at about 6.5 million, accounting for about 44% of the national enrollment.

5.12 Two policy measures have contributed to the goal of achieving greater relevance. First, the medium of instruction would now be either the mother tongue of the child or the language of the immediate community. Second, Ahmadu Bello University, with the assistance of the Federal Ministry of Education and UNICEF, implemented a program for quality improvement. Largely following the steps proposed in the Bank project, it included inter-linked activities for review and adoption of curriculum, in-service training of teachers, and distribution of learning materials in selected states from 1973-78. As a result, better materials were developed for religious education, social and creative arts, and Nigerian languages. Subsequently, the Nigeria Educational Research Council received a grant to test the applicability of the primary education quality-improvement program nation-wide.

Teacher Training

5.13 Simultaneously with the federal push for UPE, an expanded program was mounted for the training of primary teachers. The component related with primary teacher training in the Third project was absorbed in the Government's new program and was financed from local resources. In 1979, a Bank document discussing an amendment to the project stated that the project goals relating to primary teacher training had been substantially achieved. ^{1/} The annual enrollment of the teacher training institutions grew between 1976-80 at an average rate 17.2%. In 1982, total enrollment in teacher training institutions stood at more than five times that was projected at appraisal (Table 5.2). This was due to the expansion of existing institutions as well as the setting up of new institutions. The total number of colleges increased from 98 to 125.

5.14 Rationalization of Policies. Three measures were taken during the last ten years. First, during the review of the national policy on education in 1977, policies on teacher training were fully reviewed. The new policy clearly defines several types of teachers needed for Nigerian education and

^{1/} Nigeria - Proposed Amendment of the Third Education Project (Loan 929-UNI), dated August 23, 1979.

their required qualifications. Moreover, for each of the five types of teacher training institutions, functions have been assigned and the length of their training determined. Second, greater emphasis has been placed on upgrading of existing teachers, as opposed to preservice training. The ABU has taken a lead to implement these policies (para. 5.15). Third, the teaching of science has been emphasized for colleges preparing Grade 2 teachers, mainly to increase their supply for elementary science teaching. Overall, the ratio of qualified teachers has improved. Moreover, although complete data is unavailable, there is adequate evidence in the states visited by the Completion Mission that the dependence on expatriate teachers for secondary schools has been substantially reduced, probably to about 10% of the teaching force from about 40% in 1972.

University Education

5.15 Opportunities for higher education in northern states have also been vastly improved. During appraisal, the ABU, the only institution for higher learning for the region, drew an enrollment of 4000, accounting for about one-fifth of the national enrollment. In 1982, the ABU was one of eight institutions of higher learning serving the needs of the northern states. Two more universities are expected to start at Gongola and Niger from September 1983. Collectively, in 1982, the northern universities drew about 38% of the national enrollment, compared to 20% in 1972. Still the prime institution in the north, ABU's growth is also impressive. Enrollment has almost tripled to 9,000, the number of departments increased from 49 to 74, and the teaching staff has doubled to 2,000. About 75% of the teaching staff are Nigerians, compared to about 40% in 1973. The ABU now draws about 15% of the national enrollment.

5.16 The succeeding paragraphs outline developments which have taken place in three University-related components of the original project, which were subsequently withdrawn from the project by the University.

5.17 School of Basic Studies. The School of Basic Studies (SBS) provides a one-year tutorial program to improve the quality of entrants to university education. The original project provided for physical facilities to enable the university to double its output from 750 to 1500 students by 1978. Subsequently, though the University withdrew from this Bank project, it decided to proceed with the proposed project components from its own resources.

5.18 By 1982-83, the SBS exceeded its enrollment target (Annex 5-3). Moreover, the SBS has introduced several qualitative changes that were not stipulated in the SAR. First, to meet the increasing demands on science and mathematics teachers in secondary education, a new stream was introduced in 1976 for better preparation of entrants in science and mathematics. Moreover, since 1979, an increasingly higher proportion of entrants has been channeled to the science stream. Second, the criteria for choosing entrants from an increasingly large pool of applicants have been modified. In 1982, about 20,000 students applied for about 1,600 student places at SBS. Three criteria were chosen to encourage entry of girls, to draw students with high academic achievement, and to attract pupils from poor regions of the northern states. About 85% of SBS enrollment is selected from northern states. Third, the faculty has been strengthened, and now comprises 102 teachers, of whom 70% are

Nigerian.

5.19 Moreover, the SBS is well endowed with physical facilities. The school occupies two large administrative blocks. It has four laboratories, each accommodating 150 students in physics, chemistry, biology, and geography, and two lecture theaters. Because of the qualified staff and better physical facilities, the University is now considering a proposal either to delegate to the SBS exclusively the task of preparing entrants in science and mathematics from FY84, or to convert the school into a two-year junior college.

5.20 Institute of Education. During appraisal, the Institute of Education (IE) was perceived as a vehicle to improve the upgrading of teachers and to experiment, develop, and adapt a primary school curriculum relevant to the needs of northern Nigeria. The Completion Mission has concluded that the Institute has exceeded these expectations.

5.21 In 1973, the Institute, with the assistance of Unesco/ UNICEF and the Federal Ministry of Education, instituted an experimental primary education improvement program (PEIP), which was completed and evaluated in 1978. The program helped in developing new learning materials. Where possible, it adapted the existing teaching materials, tested them systematically in about 66 experimental schools, modified them as a result of feedback, and trained teachers to use the new materials. Textbooks or curriculum were developed in English, mathematics, science, physical and health education, social studies, and creative activities. In each subject, opportunities were provided for pupils to gain practical experience. An evaluation conducted by the University confirmed that the revised learning materials and the concept of intensive training of teachers has been well received. ^{1/} Moreover, a study conducted by Kano State in 1978 demonstrated that students participating in the PEIP program did better in national entrance examinations. Encouraged by these results, the Federal Ministry of Education has now given a grant to the Nigeria Educational Research Council to test national applicability.

5.22 Moreover, the Institute has become a leader for innovations on in-service training of trainers. It is the principal institution for upgrading existing teachers and closely monitors its training program to relate to the needs of state ministries of education. The institute currently offers five types of courses: first, a postgraduate diploma, comprising one year of full-time study; second, a full-time NCE program comprising three academic years; third, a part-time NCE program comprising five summer courses of ten weeks each; fourth, an intensive course for the supervision of primary schools; and finally, a mobile teacher-education program to upgrade practicing teachers with no training experience. The institute upgraded, in conjunction with three associated institutes, about 3,000 teachers each year between 1978-80.

5.23 Faculty of Education. The faculty of education prepares teachers for

^{1/} Lassa, Peter N., An Evaluation of the Primary Education Improvement Project; Institute of Education; Ahmadu Bello University. Nigeria, 1977, p. 230.

entry to teaching at primary and secondary levels. The Bank project stipulated that enrollment in faculties would be increased from 200 to 480.

5.24 During the three years from 1979 to 1982, the enrollment at the faculty exceeded 1200 students. At least one-third came from the School of Basic Studies, one-half were teachers upgraded by the Institute of Education, and the remaining students were admitted directly from secondary schools.

5.25 Currently, the Faculty comprises four departments, one each for general education, technical and vocational education, physical and health education and library sciences. The Faculty offers both degree and diploma courses. It has 77 staff members, of whom only 20 are expatriates.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSIONS

Attainment of Project Objectives

6.01 The objectives of the amended project have not been fully achieved. As implemented, the project has assisted the establishment or expansion of only 32 ^{1/} of the 83 ^{2/} educational institutions provided for when the loan was signed. Only 64% of the loan (or about US\$34.8 million of US\$54 million) has been disbursed. Contrary to original intentions, the loan has not financed the provision of any equipment or furniture requirements and only about seven manyears of the 26 manyears of technical assistance services originally allowed for.

6.02 Even so reduced, the project is still incomplete, although the implementation time had been extended by four years from the original Closing Date. Substantial quantities of the instructional equipment and furniture required for project institutions -- and now being financed entirely by the Government -- still have to be received, and some still need to be ordered. Of the equipment actually received, many of the larger workshop items are not in use because of faulty installation.

6.03 On the other hand, the enrollment targets projected in the original project and later taken over by the Borrower have been substantially achieved both in the northern states and across the nation. This anomaly in performance, in the context of the same project, raises questions regarding commitment of the Borrower to the project, limitations of the Bank's procedure on the project as well as possible impact of unresolved policy issues on project implementation. These issues are reviewed in the following paragraphs.

6.04 Commitment. The commitment of the Borrower to the project was less than expected, mainly at state levels, and is evident in several ways. First, there was low availability of resources for the project. At a time when both the federal and state governments were substantially increasing their allocation to education, and were incurring heavy expenditures on construction of educational institutions all over the country, the project itself was beset with financial difficulties. Even the block grants of the federal government, sufficient to finance state and local costs, were not earmarked for the project. In fact, during the entire period of implementation, the project suffered from a lack of local financing. Second, the project was managed by staff who were low in the administrative hierarchy. The project managers were new both at the federal and state levels, and were placed two to three tiers below the top management level. As a consequence, they had very little policy and decision-making authority. Their tasks involved mere coordination, rather

1/ 31 secondary schools and one advanced teacher training college

2/ 59 secondary schools, one advanced teacher training college, 24 primary teacher training colleges and a school of basic studies, Faculty of Education and Institute of Education at Ahmadu Bello University

than implementation of projects. Moreover, there was a lack of continuity. The federal project office had four project directors; each of them was transferred within a short time, leaving little time to gain experience with the Bank-assisted project. In some states (e.g., Sokoto and Kwara), the Completion Mission had difficulty identifying professionals who were associated with the project during the earlier period. Third, some of the project managers were not fully aware of Bank procedures. It is not evident from the records whether the state project managers had any course or orientation with respect to Bank procedures. In some states, the consultant-architect representatives were perceived by the state project office as staff and agents of the Bank, instead of consultants hired by and for the federal and/or state governments. This perception persisted despite efforts on the part of Bank supervision missions to correct it. Many of the positions in the project office remained vacant and in some states, it took a long time to fill these positions. And finally, there was progressive shifting of effective authority for implementation from the federal to state governments, even when some states were not prepared to assume that authority.

Bank Group Performance.

6.05 Several limitations in Bank procedures also restricted the implementation process. First, the project was not closely supervised. Supervision took 84.1 staffweeks. This may appear prima facie to be a large figure. In reality, the allocated time was not sufficient for supervising a project which was very large, and geographically dispersed over eight states. In fact, in some respects the task could be comparable to supervising of eight separate projects.

6.06 Second, supervision missions were irregular and unsystematic. Eighteen missions, exclusive of the completion mission, supervised the project. The average interval between the missions was 8.5 months; the average duration was 17 days. Five of the missions were large, with three to five members, while seven of the missions had one staff member. On five occasions, the supervision mission stayed in the country for more than three weeks. But during these long stays, the mission was required, in addition to supervision, to identify and prepare future education projects. In other cases, it included joint supervision of the First and Second Education Projects. It should also be noted that between January 1981 and September 1982, a lapse of about 20 months, the project was not supervised at all.

6.07 Third, mission composition was not properly balanced. Architects and engineers accounted for about 65% of the supervision time. In contrast, educators accounted for less than 15%. None of the eleven supervision missions mounted between March 1977 and July 1982 included an educator. This is all the more surprising as it was during this period that Nigeria was passing through its extraordinary educational upsurge and introducing significant policy changes and reforms. (However, educators did visit Nigeria during this period to update the Bank's knowledge of the sector.) The complexity of the project, and its educational ramifications would have necessitated visits by experienced educators. Even with 18 missions, Bank staff did not visit all of the project sites and left much of the supervision to the consulting architects.

Flaws in Project Design

6.08 The implementation of the project also suffered from flaws in project design. First, the project was designed to be sufficiently large to make an impact on meeting the essential needs of the northern region. The objective, however laudable, failed to take into account important considerations. The project was dispersed over a large geographical area and was to be administered by six different state project units. This was also the period when Nigeria emerged from a protracted Civil War (1967-70) and was in the process of redefining the relationship and authority between the federal and state governments. The states were still unclear on many of the social policies the federal government was initiating at that time and their respective roles for those policies. Moreover, transportation was weak. In fact, it was easier to travel between the countries in West Africa than to travel between states within the northern region. These constraints strained the capacity of the Nigerian administrators to manage the project. These considerations were not given adequate consideration during project design.

6.09 The project components, especially for secondary education, were designed with developmental principles in mind. However, they did not materialize. For example, the SAR recommended that the new project secondary schools should be located in sparsely populated and less developed towns. Two inter-related reasons were cited. First, it was reasoned that the towns could then become poles for development, enabling their schools to draw students from poorer rural towns and villages. Second, because the students would come from outlying areas, it was felt that the schools should provide 100% boarding and staff housing.

6.10 Both expectations were unfulfilled. The concept of creating poles for development through new schools in particular did not materialize. This was because some of the schools were located in remote and sparsely populated areas where, even under the best of circumstances, there is not a large enough catchment area to serve as a catalyst for development. The Secondary School at Agbaja (which was visited by the Completion mission, the first visit by a Bank mission to that school) and the Secondary School at Kaima fall in this category.

6.11 Design Guides. In addition to design and procedure guides that were prepared for a previous project, the consultant architects were required to prepare a set of design handbooks and procedure and management guides specifically for the northern states. However, the consultants themselves prepared the full construction drawings, and the guides were not used by the states. The existence of these guides, as well as of complete construction drawings for commonly used educational facilities, should be born in mind when considering the scope and type of architectural services needed for future projects in the northern states.

6.12 See Annex 6-1 for compliance with loan and project agreement covenants.

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COMPLETION REPORT

CIVIL WORKS COSTS BY INSTITUTION
(Naira 000's)

	Appraisal Est. Real. Cont.	Incl. Cont.	Contract Date	Contract Amount	Gross Cost.	Est. Final	% Comp.	Remarks
BAUCHI STATE								
B1-B2 GSS Tere	1,192	1,537	10/78	6,298	6,548	6,700	98%	Completed and operational since September 1980, partially furnished and equipped.
TOTAL BAUCHI STATE	1,192	1,537	-	6,298	6,548	6,700	98%	
BEKWE STATE								
B2-B3 GSS Udal	1,146	1,473	02/79	5,114	2,348	6,300	37%	Contracts terminated in July 1981 but not rewarded. School partially operational in half completed facilities and without equipment and furniture.
B1-BW12 GSS Idah	132	170	09/77	438	342	342	100%	B1, B2, B3, B6 are practically completed, equipment delivered installed but not working because electrical sub-contract never completed.
B2-BW13 GSS Ankpa	132	170	09/77	1,271	933	933	100%	
B3-BW14 GSS Oguja	132	170						
B6-BW17 GSS Oguja	132	170						
B6-BW15 GSS Sholoko	138	170	12/78	516	240	420	57%	B1, B5 contracts was never completed, equipment delivered but not installed.
B5-BW16 GSS Ayanga	138	170	12/78	579	110	320	34%	
TOTAL BEKWE STATE	1,950	2,495	-	7,918	3,973	8,315	48%	
CONGOLA STATE								
B3-B4 GSS Donga	1,198	1,541	06/79	3,969	4,207	4,207	100%	School practically completed and in use since September 1981. Not furnished and not equipped.
TOTAL CONGOLA STATE	1,198	1,541	-	3,969	4,207	4,207	100%	
KADUNA STATE								
B4-BE1 GSS Ikara (Approved Contract only)	264	340	1,979	1,004	960	1,150	83%	Disprocurement on two out of three contracts - corresponding loan proceeds reallocated. Other two contracts practically completed, school opened September 1980.
B5-BE6 GSS Jimba	806	1,037	10/76	3,204	1,906	3,600	53%	Poor contractor, school started in half completed facilities.
B7-BE7 GSS Minia-Cwari	46	59	10/76	230	237	237	100%	Completed, equipment delivered but not installed.
B8-BE8 GSS Pandan-Kaje	46	59	10/76	263	130	320	41%	Contractor abandoned site.
B9-BE9 GSS Makarfi	46	59	10/76	237	274	274	100%	Completed in 1979, equipment delivered but not operating.
B10-BE10 GSS Kaduna	46	59	10/76	222	231	231	100%	
B11-BE11 GSS Musawa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Disprocurement, corresponding loan proceeds reallocated.
B12-BE12 GSS Samaru-Sankwa	46	59	10/76	276	190	320	59%	Contractor abandoned site.
B13-BE13 GSS Zaria	46	59	10/76	223	232	232	100%	Completed, equipment delivered but not working.
B14-BE14 GSS Zura	46	59	02/79	350	208	270	77%	Rewarded, slow progress
TOTAL KADUNA STATE	1,392	1,790	-	5,905	5,098	7,334	69%	

NIGERIA - THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (Ln. 929-UNI)

COMPLETION REPORT

CIVIL WORKS COSTS BY INSTITUTION

(Naira 000's)

ANNEX 1-1

Page 2 of 2

	Appraisal Est. Excl. Cont.	Incl. Cont.	Contract Date	Contract Amount	Gross Cert.	Est. Final	% Comp.	Remarks
<u>KWARA STATE</u>								
B6-KW22 GSS Agbedja	1,198	1,541	07/79	3,409	2,811	3,800	74%	Construction started only late in September 1980. One of the six contracts had to be terminated and reawarded. Progress is satisfactory but slow.
B7-KW23 GSS Kaina	1,198	1,541	07/79	3,626	2,436	4,000	61%	
<u>TOTAL KWARA STATE</u>	2,396	3,082	-	7,035	5,247	7,800	67%	
<u>NIGER STATE</u>								
B8-NW4 GSS Kuta	862	1,109	12/78 06/80	4,590	3,724	5,500	67%	B8 - B15, Contracts terminated and reawarded without Bank's review and approval
B15-NW6 GSS Kontagara	48	62	12/78 06/80	271	257	550	47%	
<u>TOTAL NIGER STATE</u>	910	1,171	-	4,861	3,981	6,050	66%	
<u>PLATEAU STATE</u>								
B9-BP1 GSS Vase	1,146	1,474	03/78	4,960	3,239	5,300	61%	Very slow contractor, some incomplete facilities used since September 1980.
B10-BP2 GSS Nassarawa Eggon	1,146	1,474	02/78	5,102	2,580	5,500	49%	Both contractors have abandoned the site.
B11-BP5 GSS Bokkos	1,146	1,474	02/78	4,983	3,074	5,300	58%	Same as for GSS Vase.
B12-BP6 GSS Ansaikio	1,146	1,474	05/79	4,921	3,187	4,700	68%	The staff houses are practically completed and the academic facilities only 30% completed.
<u>TOTAL PLATEAU STATE</u>	4,584	5,986	-	19,966	12,080	20,800	58%	
<u>SOKOTO STATE</u>								
B13-BV2 GSS Illele	862	1,109	06/76	5,057	5,100	5,500	93%	All buildings except kitchen/dining complex were handed over in September 1979 and are in use. No additional work has been performed since early 1981.
B16-BV7 GSS Shinkafi	48	62	04/77 06/80	113 79	193	220	88%	B16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 civil works more or less completed, on all extensions. Equipment not procured and facilities are being used as classrooms.
B17-BV8 GSS Comai	48	62	04/77 06/80	107 77	153	230	67%	
B18-BV9 GSS Gwadabawa	48	62	04/77	198	310	380	82%	
B19-BV10 GSS Gusau	48	62	04/77 06/80	114 78	192	230	83%	
B20-BV1ATC - ATC Sokoto	46	59	04/77 06/80	224	340	340	100%	
<u>TOTAL SOKOTO STATE</u>	1,100	1,416	-	6,047	6,288	6,900	91%	

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Country: NIGERIA

COMPLETION STUDY

IBRD/IDA Education Projects

Pays:

ACHEVEMENT

Projects Education BIRD/AID

Project: Education III COMPARISON OF ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED AND ACTUALForm VProject: UNIT AREAS AND UNIT COSTS FOR NEW INSTITUTIONS

Fiche

COMPARAISON ENTRE LES SURFACES ET COUTS

Credit: No. 929-UNI UNITAIRES PREVUS ET REELS POUR LESPrêt: ETABLISSEMENTS NOUVEAUX

TYPE/LEVEL OF INSTITUTION TYPE/NIVEAU DE L'ETABLISSEMENT	GROSS AREAS PER STUDENT PLACE OR LIVING UNIT SURFACE BRUTE PAR PLACE D'ELEVE OU PAR LOGEMENT (m ² /sq.)		COSTS PER STUDENT PLACE OR LIVING UNIT ^{1/} COUTS PAR PLACE D'ELEVE OU PAR LOGEMENT ^{1/} (In US\$ equivalent) (en dollars EU)						
			Buildings and Site Development Construction et VRD*		Equipment and Furniture Equipement et Mobilier		TOTAL		
	Original Estimate Prévue	Actual Réelle	Original Estimate ^{2/} Prévus ^{2/}	Actual ^{3/} Réels ^{3/}	Original Estimate ^{2/} Prévus ^{2/}	Actual ^{3/} Réels ^{3/}	Original Estimate ^{2/} Prévus ^{2/}	Actual ^{3/} Réels ^{3/}	
A. ACADEMIC AND COMMUNAL FACILITIES ENSEIGNEMENT ET SERVICES COMMUNS									
BAUCHI	Toro	5.83	9.11	1020	5069	185	149	1205	5218
BENUE	Udei	5.78	8.12	945	3900	190	160	1135	4060
GONGOILA	Donga	5.78	8.13	945	2568	190	146	1135	2714
KADUNA	Ikara	5.77	7.17	687	3130	180	161	867	3291
	Jibiya	5.60	6.85	684	3970	160	170	844	4140
KWARA	Aghadja	5.78	8.14	945	2406	190	158	1135	2564
	Kaima	5.78	8.14	945	2600	190	158	1135	2758
B. STUDENTS' BOARDING FACILITIES INTERNAT									
	Toro	5.59	7.00	992	2854	55	82	1047	2936
	Udei	5.59	6.18	930	3773	55	94	985	3867
	Donga	5.59	6.20	930	2480	55	73	985	2553
	Ikara	5.65	5.35	684	2330	55	81	739	2411
	Jibiya	5.65	5.35	684	3100	55	81	739	3181
	Aghadja	5.59	7.66	684	2327	55	97	739	2424
	Kaima	5.59	7.66	684	2514	55	97	739	2611
C. STAFF HOUSING LOGEMENTS DE FONCTION									
	Toro	99	173	21300	44000	0	0	21300	44000
	Udei	99	161	23000	47000	0	0	23000	47000
	Donga	99	130	23000	44000	0	0	23000	44000
	Ikara	97	157	18300	68500	0	0	18300	68500
	Jibiya	97	210	18300	95700	0	0	18300	95700
	Aghadja	99	177	18300	41000	0	0	18300	41000
	Kaima	99	177	18300	46000	0	0	18300	46000

^{1/} Excluding professional fees

Honoraires non compris

Date: March 1983^{2/} Excluded Contingencies (US\$ 1.00 - 558)Imprévu et augmentation des prix non compris (1,00 dollar EU -)^{3/} Current Exchange Rate (US\$ 1.00 - 66)Taux de change actuel (1,00 dollar EU -)

Country: NIGERIA

COMPLETION STUDY

IBRD/IDA Education Projects

Pays:

ACHEVEMENT

Projets Education BIRD/AID

Project: Education III COMPARISON OF ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL

Form

Project: UNIT AREAS AND UNIT COSTS FOR NEW INSTITUTIONS

Fiche

COMPARAISON ENTRE LES SURFACES ET COUTS

Credit:

Loan: No. In. 929-UNI UNITAIRES PREVUS ET REELS POUR LES

Crédit:

ETABLISSEMENTS NOUVEAUX

Prêt:

TYPE/LEVEL OF INSTITUTION TYPE/NIVEAU DE L'ETABLISSEMENT		GROSS AREAS PER STUDENT PLACE OR LIVING UNIT SURFACE BRUTE PAR PLACE D'ELEVE OU PAR LOGEMENT (m ² /sq.)		COSTS PER STUDENT PLACE OR LIVING UNIT ^{1/} COUTS PAR PLACE D'ELEVE OU PAR LOGEMENT ^{1/} (In US\$ equivalent) (en dollars EU)					
				Buildings and Site Development Construction et VRD*		Equipment and Furniture Equipement et Mobilier		TOTAL	
		Original Estimate Prévue	Actual Réelle	Original Estimate ^{2/} Prévu ^{2/}	Actual ^{2/} Réels ^{2/}	Original Estimate ^{2/} Prévu ^{2/}	Actual ^{2/} Réels ^{2/}	Original Estimate ^{2/} Prévu ^{2/}	Actual ^{2/} Réels ^{2/}
A. ACADEMIC AND COMMUNAL FACILITIES ENSEIGNEMENT ET SERVICES COMMUNS									
NIGER	Kuta	5.77	8.46	731	4887	180	170	911	5057
PLATEAU	Wase	5.78	7.97	945	4215	190	147	1135	4362
	N. Eggon	5.78	7.97	945	4274	190	147	1135	4421
	Bokkos	5.78	7.97	945	4215	190	147	1135	4362
	Assaikio	5.78	7.97	945	3695	190	147	1135	3842
SOKOTO	Illela	5.77	8.59	731	4674	180	141	911	4815
B. STUDENTS' BOARDING FACILITIES FACILITIES INTERNAT									
	Kuta	5.65	6.40	699	3696	55	85	754	3781
	Wase	5.59	6.17	930	3263	55	73	985	3336
	N. Eggon	5.59	6.17	930	3385	55	73	985	3458
	Bokkos	5.59	6.17	930	3263	55	73	985	2933
	Assaikio	5.59	6.17	930	2860	55	73	985	2933
	Illela	5.65	6.53	699	3554	55	67	754	3621
C. STAFF HOUSING LOGEMENTS DE FONCTION									
	Kuta	97	170	17800	65000	0	-	17800	65000
	Wase	99	184	22800	64900	0	-	22800	64900
	N. Eggon	99	184	22800	67300	0	-	22800	67300
	Bokkos	99	184	22800	64900	0	-	22800	64900
	Assaikio	99	184	22800	56800	0	-	22800	56800
	Illela	97	180	17800	65400	0	-	17800	65400

^{1/} Excluding professional fees

Honoraires non compris

Date: March 1983^{2/} Excluded Contingencies (US\$ 1.00 - ____)Imprévu et augmentation des prix
non compris (1.00 dollar EU - ____)^{3/} Current Exchange Rate (US\$ 1.00 - ____)

Taux de change actuel (1.00 dollar EU - ____)


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ANNEX 2-2

NIGERIA

Third Education Project (Ln. 929-UNI)

IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE



▨ Appraisal
▨ Actual

5:83

NIGERIA - THIRD EDUCATION PROJECT (Ln. 929-UNI)

SCHEDULE OF DISBURSEMENTS

IBRD/IDA FISCAL YEAR AND QUARTERS	PROJECT DATA	APPRAISAL ESTIMATES (EST. EFFEC- TIVE DATE 10/01/73)	DISBURSEMENT ESTIMATES (ACTUAL EFF. DATE 01/14/75)	ACTUAL TOTAL DISBURSE- MENT	ACTUAL DISBUR- SEMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF APPRAISAL ESTIMATES 5/4
73	1 2 3 4 Negotiations Board Approval				
74	1 2 3 4 Appraisal Effect.	100 540 594			
75	1 2 3 4 Actual Effect.	756 972 1,350 1,890	108 540		
76	1 2 3 4	3,132 4,752 6,588 10,314	594 756 972 1,350		
77	1 2 3 4	13,878 20,790 28,620 36,180	1,890 3,132 4,752 6,588		
78	1 2 3 4	43,200 46,548 49,896 51,084	10,314 13,878 20,790 28,620		
79	1 2 3 4 Appr. Closing Date Revised Closing Date	52,920 54,000	36,180 43,200 46,548 49,896	6,150 6,150 6,490	14 13 13
80	1 2 3 4 Amended Project		51,084 52,920 54,000	6,490 7,700 9,800 12,360	13 15 18 23
81	1 2 3 4			12,360 14,600 14,630 21,460	23 27 27 40
82	1 2 3 4			21,460 23,880 23,880 24,654	40 44 44 46
83	1 2 3 4 Amended Closing Date			26,539 27,135 34,860 36,177	49 50 65 67

NIGERIA

Third Education Project - Completion Report

Enrollment in Secondary Education
in Eight Northern States Assisted by
Third Education Project (1976-1981)
(in 000s)

	1975-76	76-77	77-78	78-79	79-80	80-81	Annual Rate of Increase
Bauchi	4	5	5	8	13	19	33
Benue	14	22	31	47	45	47	27
Gongola	6	8	10	15	20	21	29
Kaduna	18	24	32	35	35	45	20
Kwara	28	32	38	48	61	75	21
Niger	4	5	6	8	11	11	22
Plateau	11	12	17	21	27	28	29
Sokoto	6	7	8	10	20	22	29
TOTAL	91	115	147	192	232	268	27

NIGERIA

Third Education Project - Completion Mission

Growth of Education Institutions in Northern States between 1975-1980
(in 000s)

		1975-76	1979-80	Rate of increase 1976-80
Bauchi	Primary schools	1066	2477	24.0
	Secondary schools	10	48	48.0
	Teachers colleges	8	14	15.1
		<u>1084</u>	<u>2539</u>	
Benue	Primary schools	1200	2786	23.0
	Secondary schools	58	183	33.0
	Teachers colleges	8	13	13.1
		<u>1266</u>	<u>2982</u>	
Gongola	Primary schools	1581	2224	8.9
	Secondary schools	18	44	25.0
	Teachers colleges	12	12 #	-
		<u>1611</u>	<u>1180</u>	
Kaduna	Primary schools	859	2857	35.0
	Secondary schools	29	74	26.0
	Teachers colleges	18	15 #	-
		<u>906</u>	<u>2946</u>	
Kwara	Primary schools	539	1414	27.0
	Secondary schools	70	105	10.8
	Teachers colleges	13	13*	- *
		<u>622</u>	<u>1532</u>	
Niger	Primary schools	931#	1133	4.9
	Secondary schools	13	27	20.0
	Teachers colleges	14	14*	- *
		<u>958</u>	<u>1174</u>	
Plateau	Primary schools	685	1648	24.0
	Secondary schools	38	75	18.6
	Teachers colleges	14	16*	3.4
		<u>737</u>	<u>1739</u>	
Sokoto	Primary schools	732	3378	46.0
	Secondary schools	23	58	26.0
	Teachers colleges	25	25*	
		<u>780</u>	<u>3461</u>	
TOTALS		<u>7970</u>	<u>18,653</u>	

* Consolidation and modification to larger sizes to accommodate more students.

Data pertains to 1976-77.

NIGERIA

Third Education Project (Loan 929-UNI)

Completion Mission

Growth in Enrollment in School of Basic Studies. Ahmadu Bello University

(1970-1982)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>ARTS</u>	<u>SCIENCE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1970	128	118	246
1971	NA	NA	324
1972	NA	NA	923
1973	NA	NA	1085
1974	NA	NA	894
1975	NA	NA	860
1976	200	387	587
1977	409	332	741
1978	529	551	1080
1979	751	848	1599
1980	602	883	1485
1981	676	882	1558
1982	760	1000	1760
Annual Rate of Increase	16.00	19.50	17.80

Source: School of Basic Studies
Ahmadu Bello University, February 1983.

NIGERIA - Third Education Project (Loan 929-UNI)

Completion Report

COMPLIANCE WITH LOAN AND PROJECT AGREEMENT COVENANTS

<u>REFERENCE</u>	<u>COVENANT</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
P.A. 2.04 ^{1/} L.A. 2.03 ^{2/}	I.C.B. Procurement Procurement to be under April 1972 Bank guidelines.	There was local competitive bidding only with Bank's tacit agreement. Some state tender boards did not adhere strictly to the Bank's procurement guidelines. There was misprocurement in three cases and reallocation of corresponding funds.
L.A. 2.04	Closing Date December 31, 1978	The Loan Closing Date has been postponed twice: from December 31, 1978 to June 30, 1979, and then to December 31, 1982.
L.A. 3.01 (d)	The Borrower is to protect the Bank's and its own interests with appropriate clauses in subsidiary agreements.	Subsidiary Agreements acceptable to the Bank were signed by the Government and all states in December 1974. Only Kwara State signed the amended Project agreement.
L.A. 3.01 P.A. 2.08	The Borrower should maintain a Project Implementation Unit (federal level) which would be properly staffed, and each state would also establish and maintain Project Units.	Project Units have been maintained both at the federal and state levels, but they have not always been adequately staffed.
L.A. 3.03 (a) P.A. 2.02 P.A. 2.03	Borrower to appoint consultant architects acceptable to the Bank. State governments should use services of consultants appointed under section 3.03 (a) of Loan Agreement. State governments to employ executive architects acceptable to the Bank.	One architectural firm was appointed by the federal Government to provide both the services of consultant and executive architects. In Kaduna state, the architectural division of the Ministry of Education provided designs and supervision for the two new schools.
L.A. 3.04	Borrower to operate the project institutions effectively.	In the few cases where students have been enrolled, the institutions still lack furniture, equipment, and teaching materials.
L.A. 5.01 L.A. 5.03	The Bank and the Borrower are to cooperate. The Government is to afford the Bank the opportunity to visit Nigeria for supervision purposes.	For a one-year period, 1976, the Government failed to approve missions to Nigeria to work on this project.
P.A. 2.01	The states are to implement project items efficiently and provide financing required to build and operate project components.	Some states were only partially committed to the project. Financing remained a major issue despite the Federal Government's payment of its share of the costs to the states.
P.A. 2.06 (a)	The Government is to provide design, furniture and equipment lists, bidding and contract documents to the Bank for review and comments.	Government only rarely submitted documents for review to the Bank. However the consultant architects copied most of their correspondence and documents to the Bank.
P.A. 2.09	By August 1975, states are to report on current policies on providing school boarding and staff housing.	The states, except for Kano, did not report in writing but all instructed the consultant architect to design boarding facilities for full student enrollment, and staff houses at the rate of one house for about 25 students.
P.A. 2.10	By August 1975, states are to report on primary teacher training policies.	The states have not reported on this covenant. The federal Government has taken over construction of the training school.

^{1/} P.A. Project Agreement.

^{2/} L.A. Loan Agreement.

FEDERAL MINISTRY OF EDUCATION

THIRD IBRD EDUCATION PROJECT

LOAN - 929 - NIGERIA

BORROWER COMPLETION REPORT

February 1984

Project Office,
Bureau for External Aid,
LAGOS

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F O R E W O R D

I am pleased to have the privilege to present this Project Completion Report. I have gone through the Report and I feel very much touched by the so many constraints that beset its full implementation, more so as most of them could easily have been eliminated.

2. The most outstanding constraint identified in this Report is irregular cash flow. This was not because the provision for funds was inadequate. A comparison of total expenditure in column 12 and total Receipts in column 11 Annex 1D shows clearly that the problem was not lack of adequate funds for the project. Successive Federal Governments have made generous grants to the States to fund the Project. Reimbursements from the loan were also directly received by the States. A total of both the Federal Grants and the Loan Reimbursements was more than enough to fund the project to full completion on schedule. The main problem was therefore a visible absence of sound financial management and control, leading to diversion of specific project funds to other uses.

3. My Ministry has taken note of the issues raised and the problems encountered at implementation. We will ensure that these mistakes do not re-appear in the implementation of future World Bank Education Projects.

4. I wish to commend the staff of the Project Office of the Bureau of External Aid (BEA) for their objectivity in presenting the Completion Report. I also wish to commend the World Bank for their cooperation. It is my fervent hope that this cooperation will result in more successful implementation of future IBRD Education Projects. I commend those States like Bauchi which completed their components of the project with a sense of commitment. My Minister will however continue to monitor the progress of the uncompleted components of the project to ensure that full completion is achieved within six to twelve months.

5. Once again, I commend this Report and hope that the lessons learnt will guide us in the implementation of future projects. Thank you.

Sgd./-

Alhaji Ibrahim Yerima Abdullahi
Minister of Education, Science and Technology
Federal Ministry of Education, Science & Technology, Lagos

7th February, 1984

BORROWER COMPLETION REPORT

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THIRD IBRD EDUCATION PROJECT

LOAN 929 - UNI NIGERIA.

Borrower Completion Report

1. Background:

1.1 At the end of the Nigerian Civil War, the Federal Government requested the World Bank for assistance in building and equipping Secondary Schools and Primary Teacher Training Colleges in the then Six Northern States plus ABU Zaria component.

These were:

Benue-Plateau State

Kano State

Kwara State

North Central State

North Eastern State

North Western State

and ABU Zaria.

It was seen feasible too, to take on an expansion programme of a large number of Secondary Schools along with completely new ones.

1.2 The Federal Government had also planned the Universal Primary Education Programme to take off in September 1975. More Teachers were therefore required for the successful implementation of this revolutionary programme. The need for more Secondary Schools and Primary Teacher Training Colleges in the Country, and especially in the Northern States, was too evident for any serious survey to identify. With the availability of so much abundant evidence in terms of teeming Student population without the required Secondary Schools for them, and Teacher Training Colleges for the production of more Primary School Teachers for the new Universal Primary Education programme, the World Bank's appraisal of the project presented a positive report. A loan of \$54m was consequently successfully negotiated.

2. Project Content and Physical Implementation:

2.1 On 16th August, 1973, the Federal Government entered into a loan agreement with the World Bank for a loan of \$54m for the Third IBRD Education Project. This loan No. 929-UNI was to assist in funding the building and equipping of an original project content of 34 new Secondary Schools/Teacher Training Colleges and Extensions to 51 existing post primary Institutions in Six Northern States as identified in 1973. The original project content estimated to cost N209.4m was revised three times before a final project content was approved for implementation in 1976.

2.2 In 1975, the project content was scaled down to 25 new Secondary Schools and 51 Extensions to existing post primary Institutions to cost N145.8 million. In October of the same year, it was scaled down again to 21 new Secondary Schools plus 51 Extensions to cost N131.8 million.

2.3 In order to effect cost reduction in the face of spiral inflationary trend, and with the withdrawal of ABU Zaria and Kano State components, the project content was further reduced to 11 new Secondary Schools plus 35 Extensions.

2.4 In 1978, Kwara State decided, after extensive negotiations, to drop their 15 Extensions in preference for Two new Secondary Schools at Agbaja and Kaiama. Since 1978, the project content has therefore been stable at Thirteen (13) new Secondary Schools and 20 Extensions.

2.5 With the Creation of new States in 1975, Eight States with the following project components participated.

Bauchi State	1.	GSS	Toro (New)
Benue State	2.	GSS	Udei (New)
	3.	GSS	Ayangba (Extension)
	4.	GSS	Idah "
	5.	GSS	Gboloko "
	6.	GSS	Ankpa "
	7.	GSS	Ogugu "
	8.	GSS	Ofugo "
Gongola State	9.	GSS	Donga (New)
Kaduna State	10.	GSS	Jibiya (New)
	11.	GSS	Ikara (New)
	12.	SMC	Kaduna (Extension)
	13.	GSS	Samaru Zonkwa (Extension)
	14.	GSS	Makarfi (Extension)
	15.	GSS	Fadan-Kaje "
	16.	GSS	Birnin Gwari "
	17.	GSS	Musawa "
	18.	GSS	Zaria "
	19.	GSS	Daura "
Kwara State	20.	GSS	Agbaja (New)
	21.	GSS	Kalama (New)
Niger State	22.	GSS	Kuta (New)
	23.	GSS	Kontagora (Extension)
Plateau State	24.	GSS	Wase (New)
	25.	GSS	Bokkos "
	26.	GSS	Asaikio "
	27.	GSS	Nassarawa "
Sokoto State	28.	GSS	Illela "
	29.	GSS	Gwadabawa (Extension)
	30.	ATC	Sokoto "
	31.	GSS	Shinkafi "
	32.	GSS	Gummi "
	33.	GSS	Gusau "

2.6 Details of physical implementation of Civil Works in terms of percentage Completion is at Annex II. All disbursement for Civil Works for all the sites attracted the relevant 44% percent reimbursement except for Contracts A & B of GSS Ikara, and the re-determined contract for GSS Mussawa, all in Kaduna State. The World Bank did not approve these contracts awards because of procurement formalities. In the case of GSS Kuta and GSS Kontagora re-award contracts, all in Niger State, good sense prevailed at last, and they were approved by the World Bank for reimbursement.

2.7 Work on most of the sites was at completion stages at the close of the project on 31st December, 1982. Our records show that only about 50% of the project achieved practical completion, in respect of Civil Works, Furniture and Equipment.

3. Equipment and Furniture :

3.1 Only about 45% of the Schools had equipment installed. Some of the extension Schools had technical equipment installed. I understand the Government and the World Bank agreed to delete equipment component of the project from Bank financing. In the August 1980, meeting at F.M.F. between representatives of the Government and the Bank, the matter was not raised for discussion. In any case the idea of increasing the Reimbursable amount to 61% of total expenditure which was being negotiated at the time raised hopes that if execution of Civil works was accelerated, the loan at the close of the project on 31/12/82 would be completely disbursed. Unfortunately, circumstances unforeseen such as economic recession began to set in and cash flow became very scarce and irregular.

3.2 Efforts made to reinstate the Equipment component for Bank financing was rejected as being belated by the Bank. There was no trace in the records of when the agreement was reached to delete such an important component of the project as Equipment and furniture originally meant to attract 100% reimbursement.

3.3 However, whatever were the reasons for deleting the Equipment and furniture component of the project from Bank financing, that decision is regrettable. In a situation where virtually all Technical Equipment for Education were procured overseas, and at a time when Foreign Exchange was becoming very scarce, it is a set back to delete from Bank financing the one component of the project that attracted 100% Reimbursement i.e. Equipment and Furniture.

4. Statement of Finance

4.1 From January 1975, when the project commenced, to 31st December, 1982 when the project closed, a total of N51,330,421 was disbursed by the participating State Governments on the project. A total of N23,818,680 was expected to have been received as reimbursement (mainly on civil works) from the loan of \$54m from the World Bank. The Federal Government made a grant of N56.93m to the 8 participating States to enhance the States liquidity, thus enabling them to execute the project and generate reimbursement from the loan. Meanwhile, Kano State received N12.89m in 1977 and withdrew from the project. Details of funding, disbursement made and reimbursement received from the loan are at Annexure I^A. Annual disbursement on Fiscal year basis is as follows:

Fiscal year	Disbursement	Cumulative
1975 - 77	745,369	745,369
1977 - 78	1,788,849	2,534,218
1978 - 79	6,511,249	9,045,467
1979 - 80	10,661,943	19,707,410
1980	11,095,529	30,802,939
1981	10,386,762	41,189,701
1982	10,140,720	51,330,421

For further reference, see Annex I^B.

5. Retention of Consultancy Services:

5.1 The Federal Government retained the services of Professional Consultants to design, plan, coordinate and supervise implementation of Civil Works, and Equipment and Furniture. A total of N17.5m was paid to the Consultants Messrs Ekwueme Associates, (renamed SWACON in October 1979, for the duration of 8 years, from 1st January, 1975 to 31st December, 1982. The Consultants provided both Principal and Executive services with 40 professionals and 40 Support Staff, and a net work of field offices in 9 States including a coordinating base in Lagos. Apart from the Lagos and Kano Offices, all others were opened at the instance of the Federal Government for reasons of logistics due to the wide territorial spread of project locations.

5.2 The Services of the Consultants included production of:

- 1. Preliminary and Structural designs for 72 Institutions in phases I & II.**
- 2. Supervision and Coordination of Implementation of phase III in 31 Sites of post primary Institutions.**
- 3. Preparation of withdrawal applications for World Bank Reimbursement from the loan.**
- 4. Supervision of Supply and Installation of Equipment and furniture.**
- 5. Provision of Site Supervisors (Clerk of Works) for 11 new Sites.**
- 6. Production of periodic progress Report on the project.**

5.3 It is regrettable that much of the expenditure on Consultancy was incurred on partially executed but abortive Contracts whose Phases I and II were completed. This involved 41 out of the 72 institutions in the original project content but abandoned in Phase III of implementation.

5.4 It is also regrettable that as a result of constraints of irregular cash flow, and attendant slow implementation, serious time overrun accrued as the project's closing date had to be extended from December 1978 to 31st December, 1982. This extension attracted cost overrun in terms of

- (i) Spiral inflation, increasing the cost of the project as much as 30% to 40% of the Original Contract Sum.
- (ii) Paying Commitment Charges to the World Bank to retain the undisbursed part of the loan until 31/12/82 when the project closed.
- (iii) About 30% depreciation of the naira Exchange rate in recent times reduced the withdrawable amount from about U.S. \$40m to \$36m.
- (iv) From 1/4/80 to 31/12/82 the Federal Government retained the services of the Consultants (SWACON) with N4.9m for 33 months for the continued supervision and implementation of the project in keeping with the Federal Government's Contractual obligation to the World Bank. This gives an average of N148,485 per month instead of N208,000 in previous years. This fall in fees due to the Consultants was as a result of stringent negotiation, when it became obvious that reliance on the provisions of the FMOW's Agreement would be more favourable to the Consultants. It was also due to the fact that Phases I and II of the Consultancy Services Cost much more than Phase III.

6. Issues and Problems of Implementation:

6.1 The Third IBRD Education Project, Nigeria Loan 929-UNI closed on December 31st, 1982, after eight (8) years of Implementation, four (4) of which constituted time overrun, beyond the original closing Date of December 1978.

A further Six months ending 30/6/83 was allowed to clear all outstanding withdrawal applications. Thanks to the spirit of cooperation of the World Bank.

6.2 Given contemporary degree of need and desirability, this project ought to be favourably disposed to succeed. But unfortunately a number of factors combined to frustrate implementation as scheduled. One of these Constraints is weak feasibility study. There is abundant evidence that the appraisal for this project was rather inconclusive and indecisive. Even several years after implementation had begun, and the loan had become effective, project contents were being reviewed over and over from year to year. (See paragraph 2 under Project Content and Physical Implementation). From 1975 to 1978 the Project content continued to be adjusted here and there. For many of the Project Components, commencement of Construction work started late in the life of the Project (e.g. Kwara State). Again, there was a wide disparity in commencement period between one State and the other. The fact that the project closed on the same date for all the components irrespective of when each started is understandable. Nevertheless, it became rather difficult to evaluate project implementation for all the sites with the same parameter.

6.3 The project seemed rather ambitious starting with 72 Institutions in 1975 when the loan became effective and then scaled down to 33 sites in 1978. The problem that was oversighted here was whether there was real appraisal of the suitability of some of the sites as Project Components and the appropriateness of the scope of the project. Again, there was the wide territorial spread of the siting of the many project components. How effective were the logistics and strategies for supervision of implementation? What undertakings were made by the participating State Governments to carry out their obligation under the project agreement? The impression as at 1979 was that the States were under no obligation whatsoever and therefore they found it hard to consider according any priority to the project. This view does not apply to a few States such as Gongola, Bauchi and lately Kwara.

6.4 Another important prerequisite that was found missing was arrangement for sound financial management and control. There were no designated Bank Accounts by virtually all the States as at 1979. Incomes specifically for the Project from Federal Government sources and Bank Reimbursements received by the participating States were enough to meet the revised final cost of the project if there was prudent financial management and control.

6.5 If there was this prerequisite and a sense of commitment to the Project by the participating State Governments, there would have been:

- (a) Regular cash flow and sufficient funds for the Project.
- (b) Completion of the Project on Schedule and therefore no time overrun.
- (c) No Cost overrun beyond manageable limits.
- (d) Considerable achievement made in terms of objectives, goals and targets set.

6.6 Unfortunately, this prerequisite was taken for granted. Nobody expects a new State in its early infancy in which virtually every programme of all the sectors of the economy and Development is seen as a priority, not to use money paid into the States Capital receipts for other purposes other than the project for which such monies were paid into the Treasury.

6.7 Since there was this lapse at the appraisal Stage, i.e. absence of guarantee for adequate arrangement for sound financial Management and control, this problem became critical and fundamental to successful Project implementation. The general effect of this situation was that

1. There was irregular cashflow and lack of adequate funds for the project.
2. Funds generated were hardly recycled for the project.
3. Payments were hardly made in time. Sometimes it took 12-18 Months to effect payment of Interim Certificates.
4. Contractors either abandoned their sites or became non-challant. When some were eventually paid, they became reluctant to reinvest in the project since they were uncertain as to when the next payment would be effected. The case of Messrs Coignet Nig. Limited of Niger State was a case in point.

6.8 In 1979 the Project Office succeeded in getting 4 of the 8 States to open Bank Accounts. Kwara, Benue, Plateau, and Gongola States opened designated Bank Accounts for the Project. Bauchi had a Below-the-Line-Account reserved for the Project. Unfortunately Benue and Plateau did not successfully utilise this Account as no funds were paid in till very late in the life of the Project. The phenomenal success achieved by Kwara and Gongola States were attributable to their opening and operating a Bank Account Specifically for the project.

6.9 Another related set back was that because the project passed from one succeeding Government to another, over the years it was seen by each succeeding Government rather as a liability than an asset. Therefore the State Government felt reluctant to invest, since they did not initiate the Project.

6.10. Nevertheless the project since 1979 recorded appreciable progress in implementation in response to the sheer resourcefulness and ingenuity of the new Project Officers at the BEA. The States were specifically requested to invest in the project in order that the Federal Government might consider relieving the States of all liabilities for the Loan. In actual fact this promise will be effected as the machinery to implement it has been set in motion. This promise and affective interest and commitment displayed by the Officials of the Project Office BEA, changed the unwilling posture of some of the States to react favourably. It is therefore gratifying to note that at the close of the Project about 85% of the project Components was at different stages of completion. M51m out of M65m for Civil Works had been executed and \$36m out of \$54m had been withdrawn from the Loan.

6.11 The other factor that constituted a rather dispensable bottleneck was the political factor in Project Implementation. Preponderance of political influence was brought to bear on the choice of sites that were later dropped by succeeding State Governments after phases I & II of implementation had been completed by the Consultants. This factor also affected siting of some of the surviving components at rather inaccessible locations with very difficult terrain. The result is an unusual increase in cost without any matching results for the Project. There is no way in which one could maximise project fund utilization for very positive results in such a situation.

6.12 It is also pertinent to note here that deviation from Set procurement guidelines by the state Governments in their award of contracts constituted a serious set back. It is known that some of such deviations were politically motivated. Regular prompting by the Project Office BEA and the Consultants did not go down very well. However, in some cases reasons given for such deviations were found to be reasonable and in the best interest of the project.

6.13 Another negative political thrust, was the rather over defensive posture of some State Governments by seeing every reaction to decisions taken by them as constituting a challenge to their authority and autonomy. The Project Office BEA found it a hard nut to crack convincing some of the States that certain guidelines had to be followed in their decision-making to avoid any conflict or misunderstanding.

6.14 Yet another dispensable cause of conflict was the insensitivity and over bearing posture of some Bank Officials to the political realities of the time. In a developing country, complex, and as politically sensitive as Nigeria, understanding of local situations and adjusting to it is a prerequisite if one has to react in a way that could generate positive results rather than the negative and dispensable conflicts. Some of the set backs in this project stem from a misrepresentation of facts and insensitivity to local situations, bordering on a crisis of confidence. The famous GSS Ikara Contract award issue is a case in point. The facts do not deserve a place in this Report.

6.15 The irony of it all is that those, contracts insisted on by the Bank for awards such as GSS Jibiya failed, while others such as GSS Ikara, that were not approved for Bank Reimbursement succeeded. With a bit of understanding, such head-on collision and flexing of muscles would have been unnecessary. No issue however is being made of the examples here. The Project Office had had occasions to pacify State Governments who felt their authority was being eroded by the posture of some Bank Staff.

6.16 It is therefore necessary to state here that while the generality of Bank Staff had behaved commendably, a few of them required some patience and understanding to succeed in their mission to help achieve the development objective of the project. One overriding factor i.e. success of the project, if allowed to place its preponderant weight on all considerations, there would be little need for insistence on the rather intangible and negative elements that generate delays, time overrun and unnecessary conflicts.

6.17 Equally sad was the prevalence of a negative psychological factor: the rather apathetic and indifferent attitude of some of the participating State Governments to the project. Kano State Government withdrew its components from the project after receiving specific grants of about N13m (Thirteen Million Naira) for the project from the Federal Government. The attitude of Benue State especially in respect of efforts to implement the GSS Udel component amounted to rather culpable negligence.

Plateau State which, with four new Schools, was initially seen as the anchor of all hopes for successful execution of the project, and reasonable disbursement from the loan, came ultimately terribly short of all expectation, mainly because of rapid turn-over of Project Managers and poorly staffed Project Unit. Kaduna State presented a contradiction that was inherent in the turn-out of events. GSS Jibiya awarded to a foreign firm with a Nigerian front, was a disastrous failure in terms of rate and standard of performance. So was also Messrs Coignet (Nig.) Ltd of Niger State. On the other hand GSS Ikara of Kaduna State whose re-award was not approved for reimbursement, got completed at a record time. But for the World Bank's reconsideration of the re-awards for GSS Kuta and Kontagora, the story would have been the same as GSS Ikara in Kaduna State.

6.18 Kwara State's late re-entry into the project, (thanks to a new initiative from the Project Office BEA in 1979 and Bank's responsiveness) saw an accelerated and remarkable pace of project implementation only halted by inadequate funds and termination of the loan in December 1982. Most of the issues and problems of project implementation could have been avoided if there was a proper psychological orientation on the part of the participating States who ought to have given the project the attention and sense of commitment it deserved. Apart from Bauchi, Gongola, and lately Sokoto and Kwara States, a sense of total commitment, in the attitude of most of the participating State Governments to project implementation was apparently missing.

7. Project Administration and Management:

7.1 It is now necessary to reflect from the point of view of Project Administration and in what way the inadequacies of the P.I.U. affected Project Implementation and management.

7.2 The Project Office BEA had the most unenviable task of coordinating a Project that was in terms of appraisal and preparation evaluatively defective. Efforts made to use three personnel from CFTC to set up Project Implementation Units in the Eight Participating States especially in Kwara, Benue and Sokoto States partially succeeded. The success attained was partial because it was not sustained. The P.I.U. in other participating States like Plateau was weak and ineffective. Kwara State had a Project Engineer and Architect assisting the Project Manager in the execution of the Project. Bauchi had a Quantity Surveyor as Project Manager who did a good job.

7.3 The Federal Government provided Consultants who played a very commendable role in not only providing the required Consultancy Services, but also played the role of advising Government on issues in the Project. Nevertheless, there was no doubt that the Project Office BEA was ill-equipped and without the relevant key personnel except the Project Director. Efforts to provide a Project Architect, and a Project Accountant as stipulated by the loan agreement, did not succeed for long. The extra-ordinary Time overrun that the project was subjected to, also frustrated efforts made.

7.4 The Coordinating Work of the Project Office BEA would have been more successful if the Government allowed the Project Officials the opportunity to carry out regular periodic visits to Project Sites and States for on the spot supervision. The Project Officials physical presence at a site or State Ministry during Supervision tours did tremendously improve the morale and State of preparedness, interest, and participation of all the affected State Governments.

7.5 Two instances will clearly illustrate this contention. But for the timely intervention of the Project Director BEA in Kwara State where a stalemate was imminent arising from misunderstanding between the State Government and the Contractors the situation could have deteriorated and consequently the project would have been adversely affected. Plateau State would not have realised when they did, that there was adequate fund in their designated Bank Account to provide regular cash flow to pay up arrears and continue implementation. Furthermore, the reinforcement provided by the visiting Project Officials from BEA and Bank Staff served the State Project Units as an invigorating tonic for enhanced performance arising from enhanced attention given to the project by the State at that point in time. The lack of regular supervisory visit to Project States and Sites on the other hand had a stalemating effect on project components for which the State Government would have had instant prompting for action.

7.6 Another factor that affected effective Project Supervision is the problem of Civil Service red tapism. While a trained Project Manager identifies constraints and requires instant action to remove them, the time element involved in processing approval and facilities to effect the required change adversely affects achievement of that objective, and damps the morale of the project officials.

7.7 The economics of Project Management allows a business-like approach that enables a Project Manager to take measures to pin down the factors leading to time and cost overrun to bare peripheral limits. This means that effective Project Management would require an organic frame-work, unfettered by the tedious and slow pace bureaucracy of the Civil Service. This in turn means that the P.I.U. should be delegated such authority and facilities to effect its goals and objective, outside the strict Civil Service Control. Unfortunately the Project Office BEA was only an integral part of the Federal Ministry of Education and therefore was bound to follow normal Civil Services processes in decision making and control.

That being so, it was seen normal for the Project Office to be reminded from time to time that it was part and parcel of the Civil Service whenever actions were taken that tended to be outside the normal routine, but in the best interest of the project.

8. Recommendations:

8.1 The lessons that are learnt during the implementation of this project are many and call for measures designed to remove such constraints that have been identified if future projects are expected to succeed in their implementation and Management.

8.2 The following suggestions if considered favourably and implemented will help reduce to the barest, the problems encountered in this project in the implementation of future projects.

- (1) There should be a sound pre-project evaluation and preparation so that 'Guestimates' become near 'Estimates' for the project. Constraints that tend to lull the project into time over-run and consequent cost over-run should be envisaged and necessary counter measures taken when they ultimately emerge as intervening variables in the process of implementation. On no account should the planning and preparation phase of the gestation period be underrated and treated with levity. The attendant effect of this situation in the implementation phase is usually disappointing.
- (2) The P.I.U. should be such that has inherent project Management Control factors to ensure smooth implementation; such as delegated authority for instant decision-making, required Key personnel for monitoring and Coordinative Services provided, and some financial control mechanism ensured.

8.3 There has to be a great deal of interpersonal relationship, between the Bank and Government staff with a depth of understanding of situational factors and cooperation that should generate positive results. Whatever are the differences, the one considerable factor that should cement a more healthy relationship is "Success of the project, its objectives, goals and targets."

8.4 There should be a project content that is manageable in size and scope: not too many, scattered and varied as to make the logistics of supervision difficult, and not too few as not to make a reasonable impact. The project content should be one that should attract available adequate funds to ensure regular Cash flow for steady implementation.

8.5 In order to avoid cost over-run, time over-run should be kept under strict check, the transient nature of price fluctuation notwithstanding.

8.6 Finally, in all future projects involving State participation and external financing, the participating States should be made to give adequate guarantee that will make it mandatory for the States to carry out their Contractual obligations with a sense of commitment.

8.7 The implementation of the Third IBRD Education Project Loan 929-UNI was not as smooth as expected. Nevertheless, the experiences acquired in the process are invaluable. The problems encountered notwithstanding, we are happy to report that a great deal of the project's educational development objective was achieved. Where this has not been fully realised, the necessary foundation for its attainment has been laid. Our experiences will however help us to execute future projects successfully.

8.8 The success attained so far, would not have been possible without the cooperation of the World Bank's Education Project Supervision Staff, the Chief of Project Division for West Africa in Washington, the Resident Mission of the World Bank in Lagos, the Staff of the External Finance Division of the Federal Ministry of Finance, the Representatives of the Federal Ministries of Works and Justice on the Interministerial Committee for the project.

