



## 1. Project Data

<b>Project ID</b>	<b>Project Name</b>		
P106280	NG-Lagos Eko Secondary Education (FY09)		
<b>Country</b>	<b>Practice Area(Lead)</b>	<b>Additional Financing</b>	
Nigeria	Education	P148593,P148593	
<b>L/C/TF Number(s)</b>	<b>Closing Date (Original)</b>	<b>Total Project Cost (USD)</b>	
IDA-45910,IDA-53900	31-Dec-2013	95,000,000.00	
<b>Bank Approval Date</b>	<b>Closing Date (Actual)</b>		
16-Jun-2009	31-Aug-2016		
	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>	
Original Commitment	95,000,000.00	0.00	
Revised Commitment	128,027,029.44	0.00	
Actual	127,615,415.53	0.00	
<b>Prepared by</b>	<b>Reviewed by</b>	<b>ICR Review Coordinator</b>	<b>Group</b>
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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective as stated in the Financing Agreement was to "improve the quality of public junior and senior secondary education in Lagos State" (Financing Agreement, p. 5, Schedule 1).

### b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes



**Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?**

Yes

**Date of Board Approval**

17-Jun-2014

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

The project had 4 components:

**Component 1** Promoting Secondary School Effectiveness through School Development Grants (Original allocation: US\$62.6 million; Revised allocation 2013 restructuring: US\$69.2 million; Revised allocation including 2014 Additional Financing: US\$100.7 million; Actual: US\$92.5 million).

This component provided school development grants to secondary schools to raise education outcomes. A central aspect of this component was to decentralize the management of the school grants and to build engagement at the district and school levels to improve education quality. Thus, training for school leaders, district officers, School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs) and Zonal Project Administrators (ZOPAs) was a key element to build capacity in school improvement planning, grant operations, and M&E. The component had three sub-components:

1. *Secondary school development grants*, which were designated to be used for yearly discretionary resources with an explicit focus on raising education quality and allocating funds toward priority needs as defined at the school level.
2. *Secondary school performance awards*, in which additional performance grants were designed to be awarded to the top 20-40 percent of schools based on criteria for measuring quality improvements against the baseline (for e.g. test scores, teachers' attendance, etc.).
3. *Public-Private Partnership grants in technical education*, in which grants were given to five technical colleges at the secondary level based on public-private partnership (PPP) development.

**Component 2** Enhancing Quality Assurance for Junior and Senior Secondary Schools (Original allocation: US\$13.7 million; Revised allocation 2013 restructuring: US\$15.2 million; Revised allocation including 2014 Additional Financing: US\$24.1 million; Actual: US\$19.1 million).

The component was to support Lagos State in measuring progress, identifying deficits, providing feedback to service providers, and establishing appropriate benchmarks and standards. The aim of supporting the standardization of academic testing was to ensure a systematic, transparent, and comprehensive assessment of the quality of the secondary education sector in Lagos State. The results from the assessments were used to guide the government's efforts in improving quality of education services and in promoting greater school accountability in order to improve learning outcomes.

This component had two sub-components:

1. *Standardized testing for secondary schools*, to establish a standardized system for measuring student learning achievements in core subject areas; and
2. *Strengthening teachers' professional development*, to support teachers in developing the skills to



better teach the core subject areas. This was mainly done through training sessions and conversion courses.

**Component 3** Project Coordination and Management (Original allocation: US\$4.6 million; Revised allocation 2013 restructuring: US\$5.5 million; Revised allocation including 2014 Additional Financing: US\$7.4 million; Actual: US\$10.7 million).

This component financed necessary resources for project management, coordination, M&E, and the implementation of a communications strategy to inform schools of the grant opportunities. Specific activities under this component included:

- TA for project management
- Training activities
- Operational expenditures for project implementation and supervision
- Goods (vehicles, computes for the Project Support Unit (PSU); and
- M&E studies

**Component 4** Strengthening of the Federal Post-Basic Education Strategy (Original allocation: US\$5 million, Revised allocation 2013 Restructuring: US\$5.1 million; no additional funding under the 2014 AF; Actual: US\$5.1 million).

This component was to provide capacity building and technical assistance to the Federal Ministry of Education to enhance the development of the national post-basic education strategy and to support policy dialogue on the strategy with the states. The component included study tours and exchange programs, and aimed to provide support to at least three states in preparing their secondary education strategies.

**After restructuring (Additional Financing):**

There were no significant changes to the components and their activities after the Additional Financing. The components remained largely the same, but the project scaled-up activities that had proved successful under the original project.

**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project Costs, Financing and Borrower Contribution**

The project was financed through two IDA credits which together amounted to US\$137.2 million. The original credit was US\$95 million, and an additional US\$42.3 million was allocated through Additional Financing. The actual disbursements were US\$127.4 million, i.e. 92.8 percent of total allocated funds. The remaining allocated funds were cancelled. The borrower did not contribute financially to the project, and there were no other co-financers.

**Dates**

The project was Appraised on 02/23/2009, Approved on 06/16/2009 and Effective on 11/09/2009.

The project underwent five restructurings; four of those were level-II restructurings (on 10/23/2013, 02/07/2014, 12/17/2015 and 06/30/2016), and one was a level-I restructuring with Additional Financing



(on 06/27/2014). The Mid-Term Review was conducted on time, in December of 2011. The original closing date was 12/31/2013, and the actual closing date was 08/31/2016, i.e. a 2 years and 8 months (32 months) extension in total. The PDO did not change. Some of the key associated targets were revised upwards, supported by the Additional Financing.

### 3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

#### a. Relevance of Objectives

Education had been high on the agenda for Nigerian authorities in the years leading up to the appraisal of this project. As described in the ICR (p. 2, p. 19), at the Federal level, the government had prepared the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) already in 2003. This multi-sectoral reform emphasized the importance of education for socioeconomic development. NEEDS was followed by a major educational reform program in 2006 that promoted institutional reforms to improve efficiency and effectiveness of education service delivery.

At the State level, the Lagos State Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy (LASEEDS) from 2007 included education as a key pillar, and the Lagos State Education Sector Plan (ESP) from 2008 aimed at providing accessible, equitable, quantitative, and qualitative education for all. This was followed by the Lagos Economic Advancement Plan (LEAP) for the provision of adequate social services and infrastructure to stimulate employment. The strategy emphasized education policies, curriculum review, rehabilitation of schools and libraries, teachers' incentives, and school construction as important instruments for socioeconomic development. Results Areas 2 and 3 of the World Bank's Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for 2005-2009 was well aligned with the priorities in LEAP, focusing on i) supporting improvements in governance; ii) maintain non-oil growth; and iii) promote human development. The PDO for this project was thus highly relevant to both national, federal and Bank strategies at the time of appraisal.

The PDO continued to be highly relevant throughout the life of the project. It was consistent with the key aims of the Ministerial Strategic Plan (MSP) (2016-2019), where the emphasis is to improve quality assurance at all levels of education, promote access to education, and to strengthen governance and accountability within the sector. The current CPS (2014-2017) put emphasis on improved quality and efficiency of social service delivery at the state level, which is consistent with this project's emphasis on improving the quality of secondary education. The PDO was thus highly relevant also at project closure.

Relevance of Objectives is rated **High**.

**Rating**  
High

**Revised Rating**  
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#### b. Relevance of Design

Relevance of Design is rated **Substantial**, as the project's components and activities were likely to contribute



to the achievement of the project's development objective. The components and activities related to (a) school development grants, school performance awards, and PPP grants in technical education – all with the aim to enhance quality of secondary education; together with (b) the development of standardized testing and teacher training; (c) capacity building for a functional M&E system, a functional and professional examinations board, professional inspectors, TAs and management; and (d) the overall strengthening of the Federal Post-Basic Education Strategy.

The quality of the results framework is adequate. There was a clear statement of objectives which was linked to intermediate and final outcomes. Although the causal chain between funding and outcomes is not clearly spelled out in the project documents, this causal chain can be deduced from the project description. Exogenous factors and unintended effects were not identified.

The results framework in the PAD (Annex 3, pp 50-55) was solid and had identified relevant indicators at both outcome and output levels. One weakness was that some of the expected outcomes only had identified indicators at output level.

Relevance of Design is rated **Substantial**.

**Rating**  
Substantial

**Revised Rating**  
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#### 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

##### Objective 1

##### Objective

To improve the quality of public junior and senior secondary education in Lagos State.

##### Rationale

The objective was **substantially** achieved under both the original financing and additional financing.

##### Outputs:

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Achieved at Completion
<b>IO Indicator #1:</b>	School principals and vice principals trained on performance improvement and grant operations			
	0	1,706	4,609	4,255
<b>IO Indicator #2:</b>	District staff trained in project monitoring, administration, and financial management			
	0	693	2,143	1,994
<b>IO Indicator</b>	Secondary schools receiving grants within 60 days of school opening			



<b>#3:</b>	0	80%	80%	86%
<b>IO Indicator # 6:</b>	Partnerships between technical colleges and private sector			
	0	5	5	4
<b>IO Indicator #7:</b>	Percentage of activities proposed in plans of technical college completed successfully and on time			
	0	60%	60%	80%
<b>IO Indicator #8:</b>	New Standardized tests developed and administered			
	0	18	18	48
<b>IO Indicator #9:</b>	Testing agencies release exam results within 2 months of administration			
	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>IO Indicator #10:</b>	Number of teachers trained on leadership and/or core subject areas			
	0	5,385	22,182	22,457
<b>IO Indicator #11:</b>	Number of teachers trained under school grants			
	0	1,615	22,182	22,457
<b>IO Indicator #12:</b>	Required procurement, technical and financial monitoring reports are provided in a satisfactory and timely manner.			
	0	95%	95%	100%
<b>IO Indicator #13:</b>	Results based monitoring and evaluation system established and implemented continuously			
	0	95%	95%	100%
<b>IO Indicator #14:</b>	Detailed program and annual plans developed, discussed, and agreed with the Bank by December 31 of preceding year			
	0	100%	100%	100%
<b>IO Indicator #15:</b>	Number of state secondary education plans supported under the project			
	0	5	5	5
<b>IO Indicator #16:</b>	Annual program outputs and reports disseminated in first quarter of succeeding year			
	0	100%	100%	100%
<b>IO Indicator #17:</b>	Technical college staff trained in project management administration and financial management			
	10	40	N/A	40
<b>IO Indicator #18:</b>	Number of functional EMIS centers developed in the education districts			
	0	25	N/A	25
<b>IO Indicator #19:</b>	Number of districts reporting against agreed data using the EMIS for producing results			
	0	6	N/A	3

The data presented here are derived from tables (a) and (b) in the ICR (unnumbered pages), and the source of the figures used in the ICR are government data and data from the Examination Board.

Most of the indicators that were identified as "Intermediate Outcome" indicators are in fact output indicators. Nearly all of the output targets were achieved, only a few were not fully achieved, but came close.

#### **Outcomes:**



Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Achieved at Completion
<b>PDO Indicator #1:</b>	Percentage of public junior secondary students at or above credit (meaning pass or higher grades) for Junior Secondary Certificate Exam, disaggregated by English, Math and Integrated Science			
English:	32%	45%	74%	64%
Math:	31%	45%	49%	70%
Integrated Science:	27%	45%	69%	69%
<b>PDO indicator #2:</b>	Percentage of public senior secondary students with pass grade in the West Africa Senior Secondary Certificate Examination disaggregated by English, Math and Science (Biology)			
English:	46%	50%	84%	96%
Math:	45%	49%	83%	88%
Science (Biology)	33%	37%	85%	91%
<b>PDO Indicator #3:</b>	Public junior secondary students at or above credit in BECE (junior secondary exam) averaged over five subjects including English and Math (indicator added at restructuring)			
	24%	N/A	28%	36%
<b>PDO Indicator #4:</b>	Public senior secondary students at or above credit in WASSCE (senior secondary exam) averaged over five subjects including English and Math (indicator added at restructuring)			
	19%	N/A	45%	50%
<b>IO Indicator #4:</b>	Percentage of targeted schools demonstrating improvement in learning outcomes (here measured as percentage of students passing the exams).			
	0	40%	40%	84%
<b>IO Indicator #5:</b>	Targeted number of schools reporting above 80% teachers' attendance during school year			
	0	50%	50%	100%

The data presented here are derived from tables (a) and (b) in the ICR (unnumbered pages), and the source of the figures used in the ICR are government data and data from the Examination Board.

All targets for the outcome indicators were either fully achieved or exceeded (except from the percentage of public junior secondary students passing the English exam, but the percentage still doubled compared to baseline). More detailed data on learning outcomes would have been beneficial, such as data related to drop-out rates, retention rates, and completion rates, in addition to gender-disaggregated data.

In addition to the achievement of increased pass rates for junior and senior secondary students, the project contributed to institutional strengthening and system building with regard to setting up a well functioning and sustainable M&E system which was new in Lagos state, and with regard to strengthening the examination board.





### ***Final outcome:***

An **impact evaluation** was conducted in July 2015 using a difference-in-difference and a regression discontinuity design, comparing learning outcomes (focused on pass rates) of Lagos public secondary schools from before and after 2009, and using private secondary schools in Lagos as a comparison group.

The results from the impact evaluation indicate that the project has had a large and positive effect on pass rates, where most findings are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. Before project start-up in 2009, pass rates were significantly higher in private schools than in public schools in Lagos state, but they have been very similar since the project started. The formal estimates indicate that the Lagos EKO project led to an increase in pass rates of 3 percentage points, and increase of about 60% on the pre-2009 pass rates. Furthermore, the findings show that pass rates in Lagos state were lower than those of its neighbors before 2009, but have been higher than in the neighboring states since the Lagos EKO project started. Regression results from the difference-in-difference analysis show that this effect is large and significant and represents an increase in pass rates of between 1.3 and 2.9 percentage points. This represents a large proportional increase on pre-2009 pass rates. Overall, the impact evaluation found that the Lagos EKO project and associated policy changes in Lagos since 2009 resulted in an increase in pass rates between 25% and 115%.

The impact evaluation appropriately discusses both the counterfactual and the extent to which the achievements reported can be attributed to activities funded by the project.

Efficacy is not rated High as the assessment of "learning outcomes" is quite limited both in the ICR and in the impact evaluation. Both the ICR and the impact evaluation present data solely on "pass rates" and do not measure other relevant aspects of "learning outcomes". Additional evidence relating to learning outcomes is missing, e.g., on transition rates from primary to secondary school, drop-out rates, retention rates, and completion rates. Gender-disaggregated data were presented in the PAD but were not included in the ICR.

**Rating**  
Substantial

## **5. Efficiency**

The returns-to-education analysis undertaken for the ICR found a positive and significant correlation between the level of education achieved and associated earnings accrued by an individual, showing that investment in post-primary education is particularly profitable in Nigeria. Individuals with some primary education earn 48





percent more than those with no education. The analysis done for the ICR shows that the earnings of individuals with some upper secondary education is on average more than twice the earnings of those with some primary education only.

At appraisal, a cost-benefit analysis indicated a 14.5 percent economic rate of return based on private cost and 19 percent based on public and private costs.

The cost-benefit analysis undertaken for the ICR assessed the project's quantifiable benefits in terms of promoting secondary school effectiveness through the provision of school grants and enhanced quality assurance for secondary schooling. Benefits pertaining to Components 3 and 4 were not included in the analysis.

The Net Present Value (NPV) was estimated for secondary school effectiveness (component 1) and enhancing quality assurance for secondary school (component 2) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) was based on these components. Under the base scenario, assuming a discount rate of 3 percent for Components 1 and 2, the analysis found that the benefit streams observed outweigh the incurred project costs, that is the project support under these two components was a positive investment.

Under the original credit, project implementation was largely efficient. The credit became effective only 5 months after Board approval, a time in which the Government undertook the necessary steps to set up and finalize the legal and financial agreements between the federal ministry and Lagos State. Key project activities were successfully implemented in a timely manner, including the disbursement of the school grants in all six districts of Lagos State during the 2009/2010, 2010/2011, 2011/2012, and 2012/2013 academic years. Grants were provided to between 628 and 653 schools. The last funding cycle in this period was the most efficient, indicating a cumulative strengthening of the system.

A delay in the approval of the Additional Financing delayed disbursements of the credit, which, in turn, delayed the provision of school grants for the 2013-14 school year. Despite this initial delay, the judicious use of school grant funding continued under the restructured project. For the 2013-2014 school year, funds were made available towards the beginning of the following academic year (in October 2014 rather than in March 2014). The rapid disbursement of school grants in October 2014, following effectiveness in August of that year, suggests a well-functioning and efficiently working PSU and grant disbursement system. A second disbursement of grants followed in May 2015 to catch up to the regular grant cycle. The transition in government in July 2015 resulted in a turnover of project staff, which delayed some of the project-supported activities including the final cycle of the school grants.

The project was restructured multiple times; twice under the original credit and twice under the additional financing, resulting in a delay of project closure of 2 years and 8 months, i.e. 32 months.

The ERRs done for appraisal and at completion are not comparable, and the figures are therefore not inserted into the table.

Efficiency is rated **Modest** mainly due to administrative inefficiencies and the many delays.



## Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

## 6. Outcome

### Outcome rating

Relevance of Objectives is rated High as the Objectives were well aligned with both national and WB priorities at both appraisal and closure. Relevance of Design is rated **Substantial**, as the project's components and activities were likely to contribute to the achievement of the project's development objective. Efficacy is rated **Substantial** as all targets for the outcome indicators were either fully achieved or exceeded, although not all the evidence was robust and some relevant data was missing. Efficiency is rated **Modest** mainly due to administrative inefficiencies and the many delays and restructurings. The overall Outcome rating is **Moderately Satisfactory**.

### a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

## 7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

An adequate and substantial risk assessment was carried out during appraisal (as presented in the PAD, para. 49, pp. 18-19), and relevant mitigation measures were put in place. Many of the risks did not materialize, partly due to adequate mitigation measures put in place. Risks to Development Outcome at closure are rated as follows:

1. *Inadequate technical capacity at the Ministry, Districts, and school levels* to implement the project. This risk was largely mitigated by substantial training of relevant government, district and school staff. Some project delays were experienced after the change of government in 2015, but implementation speed quickly



picked up, suggesting that capacity-building measures worked. The operation's emphasis on capacity building at the central, district, and school levels is likely to ensure that many of the project's achievements will be maintained and further benefit the education system in the near future. This risk is rated **Modest**.

2. *Implementation delays in school development grant and unpredictable and poor budget execution.* The mitigation measures of ensuring wide participation from school to State levels in tandem with training and development of simple procedures mitigated this risk to a large extent. Some delays were experienced following the delayed approval of the AF, and also following the change of government in 2015, but budget execution was generally timely and appropriately executed. This risk to development outcome is rated **Modest**.

3. *Weak M&E system and poor quality of existing data.* This risk was effectively mitigated by strong capacity building and by building up a robust M&E system that was new in Nigeria. This was largely successful and the risk is now considered to be **Low**.

4. *Commitment to reform agenda;* this did not materialize as the government showed dedication and commitment to necessary education reforms and strategies at both federal and state levels. This risk is rated **Low**.

5. *Exam malpractice.* This risk did not materialize as new standardized tests were developed and state of the art examinations equipment with computerized grading and reporting of test scores were used. Random sample reviews were conducted to monitor exams. The examination board received relevant training and performed their tasks accordingly. The standardized assessment system developed with project support has been maintained and is being used by the Lagos State Examination Board to administer standardized exams and to tabulate test results in a systematic and rapid manner. The government allocated financing in the amount of approximately US\$223,000 in its 2016 budget to support continued functioning of the Lagos State Examination Board in carrying out its mandated activities. It is highly likely that this will be sustainable and the risk to development outcome is rated **Low**.

6. *Weak financial management and procurement practices.* This risk was mitigated by training in financial management and procurement. The project did experience some minor irregularities early on in the implementation, but those were quickly addressed. All annual audits received unqualified opinions and reporting was timely and sufficient. The risk to development outcome is rated **Modest**.

#### a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Modest

## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

### a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was prepared in close collaboration with DFID and with the Lagos State's Government. Project preparation was generally thorough and technically sound. Several preparatory studies and analytical work were conducted with financing from a Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) grant to guide



the strategic selection of the project's priority areas. In addition, the project benefitted from a Quality Enhancement Review (QER) in late 2008. According to the ICR (p 10), the QER included recommendations for simplification of design, phasing in learning assessment in targeted schools, enhancement of support to Zonal Project Administrators (ZOPAs); and inclusion of indicators such as teacher/student attendance and inclusive school planning in the selection criteria for school grants. The QER recommendations were largely taken into account in refining the project design.

The PAD shows that technical, financial and economic aspects were taken into consideration in the project design, and implementation arrangements were relatively sound. Monitoring and evaluation arrangements were planned for and the risk assessment was realistic and appropriate. Despite this, the project underwent four restructurings, indicating some potential weakness in the project preparation phase.

### **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Satisfactory

#### **b. Quality of supervision**

14 supervision missions were undertaken during the seven years of project implementation. According to the ICR (p. 33), the composition of the Bank team was largely appropriate, with team members possessing the requisite skills for supervising and supporting the implementation of such a large-scale operation. The due diligence by the Bank's financial management and procurement teams was thorough. As fiduciary issues arose during project implementation, the Bank team was quick to react and provided necessary support and guidance. According to the ICR, the Bank team ensured the project's full compliance with fiduciary procedures. A thorough Mid-Term Review informed the design of the Additional Financing. The project team maintained a good working relationship with the Government.

While the established M&E system was generally sound, not all relevant data was tracked in the ISRs and ISR ratings could have been more stringent.

A delay in approving the Additional Financing caused project implementation delays, which in turn delayed the disbursement of school grants. The reason for this delay is not given in the ICR.

The ICR reports that an environmental audit found some areas where environmental and social safeguards were not fully adhered to, although deficiencies were not significant. There is no information as to how these matters were resolved and how the Bank staff was involved in finding solutions. Furthermore, the ICR reports that the government did not fully comply with the Bank's requirements related to the procurement of goods and services in their last procurement plan, and that the Bank was unable to provide a non-objection to the new capacity-building activities and procurement of IT equipment. These activities were therefore not carried out. The lack of reporting on safeguard compliance makes supervision quality barely MS (moderately satisfactory).

### **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory



## **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

## **9. Assessment of Borrower Performance**

### **a. Government Performance**

Government Performance and Implementing Agency Performance are rated together as the Government implemented the project.

The Federal Government of Nigeria and the Government of Lagos State have shown dedication and commitment to this project and to the development of the education sector in general. The Government collaborated closely with the Bank both in the preparation and in the implementation phase of the project. The Government acted quickly to sign the subsidiary financing agreement and to ensure parliamentary ratification and issuance of the legal opinion preventing delay in credit effectiveness. Legal covenants related to maintaining appropriate staff in the PSU and submission of quarterly reports were done in a timely manner. The State Government effectively supported the coordination among stakeholders for activities under Components 1-3, however, the project would have benefitted from better coordination and information exchange between the State Government (implementing Components 1-3) and the Federal Government (implementing Component 4).

Due to a change of Governments and a subsequent change of some project staff, there were some implementation delays (in developing Annual Work Plans, disbursement of school grants and training for teachers). The government played an active role in the operation's Mid-Term Review and its Financial Management and Monitoring and Evaluation performance was generally adequate. Towards the end of the project, there were some procurement issues and the Bank could not issue its non-objective, which resulted in the shortfall of two intermediate-level indicator targets.

### **Government Performance Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory

### **b. Implementing Agency Performance**

Implementing Performance is assessed together with Government Performance as the Government implemented the project.

The ICR mentions a "Project Support Unit" without outlining their role or institutional set-up. It is unclear whether the Project Support Unit operated as a fully independent Project Implementation Unit, or to what extent the project was implemented by the government directly. Component 4 was implemented at Federal level by an already existing PIU.

### **Implementing Agency Performance Rating**

Moderately Satisfactory



## Overall Borrower Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

## 10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

### a. M&E Design

The M&E design was thorough and sound. The project development objective was simple and clearly specified and the indicators reflected the objective adequately. The identified indicators were relevant, although there is a mix of indicators at outcome and output level in the Results Framework. The indicators were measurable in terms of number, timing, and location, and the proposed data collection methods and analysis were appropriate for the purpose. The M&E design was well embedded institutionally and had sufficient stakeholder ownership. The M&E system established under the project and as described in detail in the PAD, was sound and capable of collecting information on each of the project's performance indicators. However, the PAD (and the ICR) focused only on pass rates and ignored other relevant elements that might affect and be affected by learning outcomes, such as enrollment rates (transition from primary to secondary school), retention rates, and drop-out rates.

The devolution of responsibility down to the school, district, and state levels to ensure their participation in data collection and monitoring was an innovative approach to increasing community participation, promoting local ownership and fostering a results-oriented approach to school performance. The tests were relatively sound as they were rated by external examiners and through computerized systems organized by the Examination Board.

### b. M&E Implementation

All the PAD-enumerated indicators were actually measured. The Results Framework was strengthened during implementation in that two additional PDO indicators were added and targets were adjusted to reflect the additional resources made available in the Additional Financing. The agency responsible for the M&E system functioned effectively and efficiently and managed to develop and introduce a new M&E system in the State. The Government has full ownership of the M&E system and has continued to maintain and operate it also after project completion. The data was reliable and of sufficient quality. The ICR does not present any gender-disaggregated data, and according to the Project Team (meeting on April 10th, 2017), the government is not collecting gender disaggregated data. However, the PAD did present relevant gender disaggregated data.

An impact evaluation was undertaken to estimate the impact of the project on learning outcomes using difference-in-difference analysis which compared outcomes of Lagos public schools pre- and post-project, and outcomes of Lagos public schools both with outcomes of Lagos private schools and of neighboring states' public schools. In addition, the Impact Evaluation used Regression Continuity Design to estimate the effects of the grants. ***The impact evaluation, however, much in line with the ICR, focused exclusively on pass rates and treated "pass rates" as the only indicator for "learning outcomes". Neither the ICR nor the Impact Evaluation take other relevant indicators for learning outcomes into account, and focused***



*on pass rates only.*

### **c. M&E Utilization**

The overall M&E framework was designed not only to measure progress on activities and related outcomes, but also to provide continuous feedback useful in guiding action to improve performance. In particular, this was done through the School Report Card activity and a school ranking system, which fostered improvements in the use of grants and guided the development of School Improvement Plans. The quality of School reporting varied across schools, and more targeted support to the lower-performing schools would have been beneficial. The M&E system provided a comprehensive dataset that was used to assess the level of achievement on outputs and outcomes under the project.

Collection of data on grant spending by all schools was critical in better understanding school-level expenditures and needs across Lagos state, and in identifying linkages between school spending and improvements in learning outcomes. The collection and availability of school-level data summaries provided schools with a better understanding of their own achievements and limitations while also driving healthy competition among them. The information was used to guide school improvement planning and to improve performance.

### **M&E Quality Rating**

Substantial

## **11. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**

The project triggered the Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) due to small works under the school development grants that permitted a small portion (no more than 20 percent) of funds to be used for rehabilitation of schools. The Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared, approved and disclosed in-country prior to project appraisal, and the ESMF was published in the World Bank's Info Shop on December 15, 2008.

No complaints were reported under the original credit; however, an environmental audit found some areas where environmental and social safeguards were not fully adhered to, although deficiencies were not significant. The ICR does not report how these were resolved. The M&E specialists were given the responsibility for reporting on adherence to safeguards, which was problematic as the time the M&E specialist could devote to safeguards compliance monitoring was limited given the volume of M&E responsibilities he had.

The ICR reports that, despite these challenges, the project did not have significant environmental or social impacts. There is no further information as to whether the project had some or moderate environmental or





social impacts, nor whether these were positive or negative.

## **b. Fiduciary Compliance**

### ***Financial Management***

Seven audit reports were undertaken during the project, all of which revealed no significant irregularities and received an unqualified audit opinion. Reporting standards and protocols were adequate and interim unaudited reports were submitted in a timely manner and in accordance with established Bank procedures. While satisfactory budgetary systems were in place for planning and budgeting, there were some instances early in the implementation period when only partial compliance was observed. These issues were resolved by the Bank in cooperation with the Project Financial Management Unit and the government.

### ***Procurement***

The project established a functional procurement unit headed by an experienced procurement officer throughout the life of the project. The procurement unit followed the Bank's procurement procedures and no serious issues were identified during implementation support missions. Post-procurement reviews were conducted in line with the standards established by the Project.

Under the Additional Financing, small issues were observed such as poor filing of procurement documentation, a delay in publishing contract awards, and failure to seek guidance for two contracts above the procurement review threshold. These issues were adequately addressed by the government with support from the Bank team.

In the last procurement plan, the government did not fully comply with the Bank's requirements related to the procurement of goods and services and the Bank was unable to provide a non-objection to the new capacity-building activities and procurement of IT-equipment. These activities were therefore not carried out.

## **c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

The ICR does not report on any unintended impacts.

## **d. Other**

### **Gender**

The PAD states that there are almost no gender disparities in gross enrollment rates in Lagos, neither in primary nor in secondary schools, but that there are slightly more girls than boys attending school even at secondary levels (para. 6a, p. 2; Figure 1, p. 2; Table 1, p. 3; and para. 14, p. 31). The PAD even



presents gender disaggregated data for exam results (for how many girls and boys sat the exams, how many girls and boys got distinction, credits, pass and fail) for English, Math and Science (Table 11, p. 37). The ICR does not follow up on this and, in fact, does not mention gender issues at all. The ICR does not report on the effects that the project might have had on girls' and boys' learning outcomes; no gender disaggregated data on examination results are presented. The current situation for girls' and boys' schooling -- such as the number and proportion of out-of-school girls and boys, the number or percentage of girls and boys who transition or not from primary to secondary school, girls' and boys' enrollment rates, attendance rates, or drop-out rates in secondary school -- are not presented in the ICR. Nor does the ICR reflect on contextual issues, such as push or pull factors for teenage girls' and boys' school-enrollment, attendance, and drop-out rates.

### Poverty

The PAD states (para. 6a, p. 6 and para. 9b, p. 7) that "*Access to education at junior and secondary education, is low for the poor*. Lagos has poor education indicators, especially affecting poor households. Despite the relatively good gross enrollment indicators and low gender disparities in primary education, there remain a very high absolute number of poor households and children not receiving quality education services and/or not completing the general education cycle. Most poor children do not have access to quality basic and secondary education (GER 40 percent), resulting in high drop out and low completion rates and poor education outcomes. By targeting public secondary education, the project will focus on students from poor families." The ICR does not follow up on this statement in the PAD. The ICR states that the targeting and project design were pro-poor (ICR para. 89, p. 29), but it does not offer an analysis of the poverty situation and the relative attendance by poor students in secondary schools, nor how the project might have affected this.

## 12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Modest	Modest	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

### Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as



appropriate.

### 13. Lessons

The following lessons are adapted from the ICR:

- 1. Thorough project preparation, simple and relevant design is crucial to ensure achievement of project objectives.** Multiple preparatory studies were undertaken in collaboration with other donors and with the government, ensuring relevance and appropriateness of design and implementation arrangements. This facilitated adequate project implementation and results.
- 2. Allocating resources through a competitive funding mechanism (where schools receive funds based on results) can be an effective way to provide discretionary resources.** A decentralized, school-based approach may allow schools to assess their own needs and align funding against a set of activities in their school improvement plans. For the model to be successful, regular and accurate analysis of school performance is required, as well as capacity building, to allow schools to actively participate in this exercise.
- 3. A strong M&E system is critical to guiding school-level and sector-wide improvements.** In addition to the introduction of standardized tests at each grade level to measure year on year improvement, it is important to strengthen the local capacity to ensure close monitoring of school-improvement measures, including teacher attendance and participation of School Based Management Committees. Ensuring ownership at all levels is crucial in building up a strong and sustainable M&E system.
- 4. Strong Government ownership is required to ensure sustainability of grants.** Strong government commitment to continue support is an important aspect in ensuring that project gains are not lost at closure.

### 14. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is generally well written and contains relevant and important information. The quality of analysis is in general sound and the ICR also presents some data from an impact evaluation conducted on the project. It would have been beneficial, though, if more detailed data for learning outcomes had been presented, i.e. enrolment rates/transitions rates from primary to secondary school, retention rates and drop-out rates. It would also be advantageous if data disaggregated by grades (distinction/credit/pass/fail) and gender had been presented, as was done in the PAD. A thorough poverty analysis and the project's relative achievement in its intended poverty targeting (as outlined in the PAD) would also have been helpful. Gender and targeting issues did not receive full treatment in the ICR. The ICR also failed to report on Safeguard compliance.



**a. Quality of ICR Rating**  
Substantial