



1. Project Data

Project ID P090075	Project Name ML-Transp Sec SIL 2 (FY07)	
Country Mali	Practice Area(Lead) Transport & ICT	Additional Financing P120903,P120903,P121693,P121693
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-43030,IDA-49720	Closing Date (Original) 31-Dec-2011	Total Project Cost (USD) 128,600,060.00
Bank Approval Date 24-May-2007	Closing Date (Actual) 31-Dec-2015	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	90,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	113,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	112,843,360.06	0.00
Sector(s) Rural and Inter-Urban Roads(83%):Sub-National Government(8%):Ports/Waterways(5%):Social Protection(2%):Other Industry, Trade and Services(2%)		
Theme(s) Rural services and infrastructure(29%):City-wide Infrastructure and Service Delivery(29%):Municipal governance and institution building(14%):HIV/AIDS(14%):Injuries and non-communicable diseases(14%)		
Prepared by Ranga Rajan Krishnamani	Reviewed by Victoria Alexeeva	ICR Review Coordinator Christopher David Nelson
		Group IEGSD (Unit 4)

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Financing Agreement (Schedule 1, page 5) was: **"To provide access and better transport services to the Recipient's rural and urban communities through improvement of essential rural infrastructure and important Bamako transport infrastructure."**

The PDO as stated in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 6) was: **"To provide better access and transport services to rural and urban communities especially by improving key rural in Mali and urban transport infrastructure in Bamako."**

The PAD further states that the specific objectives of the project were to: (i) Improve rural access in order to promote growth-supporting rural



and agro-industrial business activities in cotton growing areas. (ii) Facilitate minibus traffic by creating a bus only lane in Bamako's Boulevard du People (People's Boulevard) and reconstructing a dedicated circular road in downtown Bamako. and, (iii) strengthen the capacity of ministries and entities involved in the sector.

This assessment is based on the PDO stated in the Financing Agreement.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Components

Component 1. Rural Access. Appraisal estimate US\$81.00 million. Additional Financing (AF) estimate US\$27.00 million. With AF, the cumulative estimate for this component was US\$108.00 million. Actual cost US\$76.77 million. This component aimed at improving road access to promote growth-supporting rural and agro-industrial business activities in isolated rural communities. Sub-component activities included: (i). Rehabilitation of about 350 kilometers (km) of earth roads on Bandiagara-Douentza (including 140 km on the Togo-Tongo section and 210 km on the Kita-Toukoto-Bafoulable section). (ii). Spot improvement - as opposed to traditional approach of treatment of the entire road length - of about 1,400 km of interface low traffic-volume roads. (This method aims at treating specific bottlenecks in roads to ensure that roads are passable). (iii). A pilot operation using performance-based four-year contracts on about 400 km of rural roads. (iv). Implementation of socioeconomic activities proposed by local communities. And, (v) rehabilitation of four small wharves (river jetties) along the Niger River connecting to the roads.

Component 2. Bamako Urban Transport System Improvement. Appraisal estimate US\$18.20 million. Actual cost US\$21.83 million. This component aimed at improving urban infrastructure in downtown Bamako. Sub-component activities included: (i). Creating a bus-only lane on *People's Boulevard* (about 1.2 km). (ii) Reconstructing a partially dedicated circular road of about 4.8 km ring road for minibuses in downtown Bamako downtown to segregate and facilitate minibus traffic. (iii). Rebuilding pedestrian paths and passages to provide minibus passengers access to city center and constructing two pedestrian overpasses. And, (iv). Providing institutional support, technical assistance and consultant services for developing traffic management capacity for the city of Bamako.

Component 3. Institutional Strengthening. Appraisal estimate US\$6.90 million. Actual cost US\$9.33 million. This component aimed at providing capacity-building and institutional strengthening. Sub-component activities included: (i). Support for implementing financial and institutional mechanisms for financing road maintenance. (ii). Implementing a rural road access index study. (iii). Implementing social and environmental management plans for monitoring mitigation measures. (iv). Monitoring HIV/AIDS prevention campaigns. (v). Capacity building for the implementation agencies. (vi). Financing financial and technical audits. And (vii) Establishing a Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) system and communication activities.

The following changes were made to the scope of component one activities following the approval of AF for the project. (i) Additional funding was provided for rehabilitation of the Bandiagara- Douentza road. Although this activity was included in the original project, the activity could not be funded due to the higher than expected bid prices. (ii) Periodic maintenance activities of an additional 275 km of roads. With this, the total km of roads on which periodic maintenance activities were to be carried out, increased from 1800 km to 2075 km (including 400 km under performance-based contracts), and (iii) Revisions were also made to improve indicators by setting baselines and targets.

d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost. Appraisal estimate US\$106.10 million. AF US\$27.00 million. Revised cost estimate US\$133.10 million. Actual cost at closure US\$107.93 million. The difference between the actual cost and the revised cost estimate was due to large exchange rate variations between the US\$ and West African CFA Franc (FCFA) during the project implementation phase.

Project Financing. The project was financed by an IDA Credit. Appraisal estimate US\$90.00 million. AF US\$23.00 million. Revised IDA credit US\$113.00 million. Amount disbursed at closure US\$91.74 million. Amount disbursed was lower than the revised cost estimate due to the exchange rate variations between the US\$ and FCFA during implementation and at project closure, the entire grant was disbursed. There was parallel financing for complementary rural road sector activities from the Islamic Development Bank.

Borrower contribution. Appraisal estimate US\$16.10 million. AF estimate US\$4.00 million. With this, the revised borrower contribution was estimated at US\$20.10 million. Their actual contribution at closure US\$16.19 million.

Dates. The project closing date was extended twice. (i) By three years from 31 December, 2011 to 31 December, 2014 following the approval of AF for the project on May 5, 2011. The closing date was extended by one more year project through a level 2 restructuring. This extension was provided for completing the ongoing activities, which had been delayed due to the suspension of the Bank's disbursements to Mali until November 2012, following the military coup d'etat of 22 March 2012.



The project, which lasted eight and a half years instead of four and half years as originally planned, closed on December 31, 2015.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

The PDO continues to be highly relevant to the government strategy. Although Mali is a large country in terms of surface area (1.22 million square km- of which 60% is desert), its population of about 14 million is unevenly distributed and concentrated in the southern part of the country in general, and urban areas in particular. Rural communities in the North are not easily accessible by roads, with the river being the only transport mode for these isolated communities. Further, since Mali is landlocked, its external trade depends on its road network – the main transport mode. Road density in Mali one of the lowest in West Africa and insufficient allocation of resources for road maintenance had contributed to substantial maintenance backlogs and this in turn had exacerbated the deterioration of its road network. The government's Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework (GPRSF) for the period 2012-2017 identified transport infrastructure shortcomings as severe constraints for economic growth and poverty reduction and highlighted the need to modernize and extend the road, airport and river transport infrastructure. The PDOs were also consistent with the GPRSF for the 2007-2011 period and with the two strategic objectives - that of accelerating economic growth and improving access to basic socio-economic services - of the governments Transport Policy Program for the 2008-2015 that was under preparation at appraisal.

The PDO continues to be highly relevant to the Bank strategy for Mali. The Bank's Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the period 2016-2019, identified transport as a key area for intervention to reach the two critical goals for the country: (i) Improving productive capacity and, (ii) Market integration of farmers and pastoralists and developing and diversifying into value-added activities. The PDOs were also in line with the Bank's corporate twin goals of eliminating extreme poverty and boosting share prosperity and with the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for the 2008-2011 period at appraisal.

Rating

High

b. Relevance of Design

Although the statement of the PDO was somewhat ambiguous and a precise definition of "access to urban communities" and "better transport services" would have provided clarity, the causal links between project activities, their outputs and intended outcomes were logical. Rural access activities such as rehabilitation of earth roads, periodic maintenance activities on rural roads using performance-based methods, maintaining roads using spot improvement method and rehabilitation of wharves could be expected to contribute to improving rural roads and this in turn could be expected to provide access and better transport services to the rural communities. Activities aimed at improving Bamako urban transport system such as reconstructing a partially dedicated circular road, rebuilding pedestrian paths and passages and developing the traffic management capacity for the city of Bamako could be expected to provide access and transport services to the urban communities.

The project was complementing the Bank financed Transport Corridors Improvement Project in the country through its focus on rural areas and the District of Bamako. Its design included activities in different sub-sectors such as rural roads, urban transport, which were dispersed over a large area. This proved to be complex considering the local capacity, in particular in ensuring intended outcomes in Urban transport in Mali's capital.

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)



Objective 1

Objective

Despite a Level 2 restructuring that included revisions to outcome indicators (including targets), IEG has chosen not to undertake a Split rating as the changes did not make a material difference to the achievement of the project against the PDO.

To provide access and better transport services to the rural communities.

Rationale

Outputs

295 km of rural roads were rehabilitated in total as per the revised target and as compared to the original target of 350 km. This included: (i). Rehabilitation of 155 km of rural roads (Badaougous-Bafoulable road) as per the revised target and as compared to the original target of 210 km (55 km of rural roads in this segment was dropped from the project as these roads had already been rehabilitated by the Islamic Development Bank). (ii) 140 km on the Bandiagara-Douentza segment, as originally targeted. Periodic Maintenance was provided on 2,190 km of rural roads. This exceeded both the original and revised targets of 1,800 km and 2,075 km respectively. Of this, 400 km of unpaved roads were maintained using performance-based contracts.

292 small-scale socio-community infrastructure (such as water wells with a manual pump, fences for schools, and dispensaries, new rooms or latrines for schools, solar panels furnishing electricity and lighting and one multifunctional platform. - a source of mechanical and electrical energy meant to replace significant quantities of human labor, especially of women in rural areas) were constructed or rehabilitated as compared to the revised target of 365. There was as no original target for this indicator.

Financing of road maintenance activities through user charges (fuel levy) went up from 25% at the baseline to 72% at project closure. This exceeded the original target of 70% but was short of the revised target of 80%.

Four wharves were built on the Niger river as per the original target.

A rural access index study was completed as targeted.

677 people from the public administration, engineering and construction firms and transport companies were trained at Mali's national institute for training in equipment and transport. The training covered 31 topics such as road design, construction and maintenance.

Outcomes

The share of population with access to an all-season road (core indicator defined as the population living within two km of all season road) increased from 26% at the baseline to 33%. At closure, 631,400 people representing 5% of the country population had access to an all-season road. No targets were set for this indicator.

Average travel speed increased on the roads under performance-based contracts from 20 km to 58 km at project closure. This was short of the revised target of 60 km.

Impact surveys carried out by the Government showed that there was increase in traffic on the roads that were once travelled only by pickups, and now used by all sorts of vehicles, including passenger cars, minibuses and coaches. Impact surveys also indicated a decline in the order of 30% to 50% in transport prices for passengers, cattle and freight.

Average travel speed on the rural roads under periodic maintenance increased to 41 km/h at closure but then decreased to 37 km/h, just short of the target.

Roads in good or fair condition as a share of total classified roads increased from 48% at the baseline to 71% at closure as targeted.

2,727,000 people benefited from the project at closure as compared to the target of 2,682,000. These numbers were calculated as the sum of the population of Bamako, the population of the villages located within 2 km of the rural roads targeted by the project and the population of the four villages where the wharves (river jetties) on the Niger River were build. Of this, 49.9% of the project beneficiaries were women.

Rating

Substantial

Objective 2

Objective

To provide access and better transport services to the urban communities.

Rationale



Outputs

8.1 km of urban roads were rehabilitated as compared to the revised target of 6.3 km (there were no original targets for this indicator). This included rehabilitation of 1.3 km of roads on the People's Boulevard to comprise four lanes (including two for high-capacity buses and two for other road users). The works on the People's Boulevard and on the Sotrama ring road were complemented by the construction of pedestrian walkways and two pedestrian overpasses. 500 permanent kiosks were built that replaced mobile street vendors from the People's Boulevard and on the Sotrama ring road. A 4 km closed circular minibuses thoroughfare was constructed as targeted.

Two officers were trained in planning and modeling of urban transport. A study on air pollution in the district of Bamako was completed. A new traffic law that still needs to be approved by parliament was finalized.

The planned parking lots in the original design were not built (7 off-street parking lots with a total capacity of 1,500 vehicles).

Outcomes

Travel time on the People's Boulevard decreased from 35 minutes at the baseline to 9.4 minutes at closure. This exceeded the original target of 16 minutes. The travel time on the ring road reduced from 45 to 19 minutes.

Despite significant reduction in travel time, the dedicated lanes of the Boulevard du Peuple and the Sotrama ring road to public transport are hampered by jay walking, illegal parking and partial occupation of the roadway by mobile vendors. At completion of works in 2011 traffic rules were enforced by the municipality on both roads, however after a coup d'état in 2012, traffic enforcement weakened. The non construction of parking lots as intended had adverse effects since minibuses (operating on the dedicated lanes, as large buses ceased to operate in Bamako) park illegally on the stops that are normally reserved for loading and unloading passengers. In addition, there is damage to some infrastructure due to vandalism after the coup d'état (i.e., concrete barriers to separate lanes from traffic, metal railings) that is in need of repair.

There was no evidence on improvement in traffic safety. The indicator on the number of accidents reduced in the People's Boulevard could not be measured in view of the lack of data of the precise location of accidents in downtown Bamako. The impact survey carried out for the urban component reported that safety did not improve and remained an issue.

Rating
Modest

5. Efficiency

Economic Analysis. An economic analysis was conducted for the four rural roads segments and urban roads components of the project, both at appraisal and at closure. These components accounted for approximately 93% of the cost at appraisal and 91% of the actual cost. The economic benefits of the project were to come from reduction in Vehicle Operating Costs (VOCs) and travel time savings. Costs included capital cost and costs associated with operation and maintenance. The economic analysis for rural roads was conducted using the Roads Economic Decision (RED) model developed under the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) for low-traffic volume road and the economic analysis for the Bamako urban projects was done computing vehicle operating costs based on the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4). The average ex-post Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) at 12% discount rate for the rural roads component was 30% (with the EIRR for the four rural roads segments ranging from 15.9% to 44.3%), as compared to the average ex ante EIRR of 28% (with the EIRR for the four ranging from 18% to 55.3%). The average ex-post EIRR at 12% discount rate for the urban roads was 28%, as compared to the ex ante EIRR of 36.2%. The increase in the investment costs compared to the appraisal estimates was compensated by the observed increase in traffic on the project roads from 2006 to 2015.

Administrative and Operational issues. There were cost-overruns, with the actual cost of rural roads component being 47% higher than the appraisal estimate. This component represented about a third (30%) of total project cost. The cost overruns were due to a combination of factors, including unrealistic unit prices based on engineering plans that had not been updated since 2004, significant delays and increase in prices of petroleum-based products and construction costs in 2007-2008 in Sub-Saharan Africa. This necessitated AF for this component. The contractor for the Badougou-Bafoulabe road works which represented about 20% of the total project cost abandoned the construction site in 2013 and its contractor had to be terminated. This necessitated re-bid for these road works.

The second extension to the project closing date was mainly due to factors beyond the control of this project such as the military coup d'état in March 2012 which caused subsequent suspension of the Bank's disbursements to Mali under 2012. Although implementation was hampered by a series of adverse issues, such as the armed conflict in the north of the country which directly impacted on a few project locations, the outbreak of the Ebola crisis and the terrorist attacks in Bamako, all the road works contracts funded under the project were completed within the revised budget and extended project closing date.



Efficiency Rating
Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	32.00	93.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	29.00	91.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of objective for the Government and Bank strategy for Mali was rated as High. Relevance of design was rated as Substantial. Efficacy of the first objective - to provide access and better transport services to the rural communities' was rated as Substantial and relevance of the second objective - to provide access and better transport services to the urban communities - was rated as Modest. Efficiency was rated as Modest.

a. Outcome Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Financial Risk. Although the budget of the Roads Agency has increased substantially from West Africa CFA Franc (FCFA) 7.3 billion in 2008 to FCFA 26 billion in 2015 (due to the fuel levy and subsequent increases by the government), this budget still represents 74% of the maintenance needs, estimated at FCFA 35 million in 2015. Further, given that most of the available funding goes to maintaining paved roads, it is not clear how much of if the 2,500 km of unpaved rural roads financed by the project will be included in the maintenance plan of the government. Likewise, the district of Bamako's commitment to maintaining the urban roads financed by the project is not clear.

Institutional risk. There is high risk that ongoing benefits from this project in the district of Bamako could be compromised due to the lack of enforcement of traffic rules. This is particularly so given that some of the small infrastructure installed along the Boulevard du Peuple that had suffered from vandalism in the aftermath of the coup d'état of March 2012 had not yet been repaired at project closure. Regarding the wharves financed by the project on the Niger River, it remains unclear who is responsible for the operation and maintenance of the wharves.

Political and Security risk. There is high risk to ongoing benefits from this project given that the security situation still remains fragile.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating
High

8. Assessment of Bank Performance



a. Quality-at-Entry

The preparation of this project was based on Mali's transport study of 2004 and experience from other Bank financed transport sector projects in Mali: First Transport Sector Project (1994-2004), The Transport Corridors Improvement Project (2004-2009), and the National Rural Infrastructure Project (2004-2009). A feature incorporated in the design was spot improvement - as compared to the more expensive general treatment method on low traffic-volume rural roads - for budgetary reasons. Appropriate measures were taken for safeguards and fiduciary compliance (discussed in section 11).

As discussed in Section Five, costs were underestimated, with the actual cost of rural roads activities being 47% higher than the appraisal estimate, due among other things, to the poor quality of studies that were outdated and unrealistic unit prices. This necessitated the AF and extension of project closing date for completing this activity.

At preparation, there was lack of due diligence on selecting rural roads for the project. A segment of the road (about 55km) that was selected for intervention under this project, had already been rehabilitated by the Islamic Development Bank. Further, it is not clear if there was an assessment of the road condition in the project area. The project activities envisioned "rehabilitation" of roads, implying that the roads had been in good condition at some time in the past. However, roads were in a much worse condition than assumed and needed to be "reconstructed".

The design did not include activities aimed at providing technical assistance to the implementing agencies on the spot improvement method - an innovative approach in the context of Mali. This resulted in the deficient quality of road works, due to the lack of understanding on the method by the implementing agencies at the onset of the project. This aspect was rectified during implementation.

There were shortcomings with M&E design with several indicators lacking either baseline or targets (discussed in section 10).

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The project was supervised by a team both at the headquarters and in Mali. 18 supervision missions were conducted regularly over a nine year period. The supervision team was proactive during supervision, especially with regarding to mobilizing the extra resources (AF) to achieve the PDO and working in an environment of political and security instability. Following AF, the supervision team made revisions with regard to improving some of the key PDO and intermediate indicators. The team also ensured a close follow-up when required, for example at the time of disputes related to the resettlement of street vendors and termination of a road works contract for the Badaougous-Bafoulable road. The Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) were submitted in a timely fashion and in 2014, by extending the project closing date by a year, it correctly estimated the extra time needed to complete the project. The Bank support, however, was not sufficient to address issues that affected the urban component of the project during the last three years of project implementation.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The Government showed strong commitment to the project given that the transport sector development was its priority. The government developed a Transport Sector Policy for the 2007-2011 period, which was a condition for the presentation of the project to the Bank Board. The government provided adequate resources to the implementing agencies to carry out the project and this aided in completion of all planned activities, albeit with some delays that were often outside the control of the government. The government also increased the fuel levy and this contributed to achieving important progress in financing road maintenance activities.

The government, however, did not exercise due diligence in the selection of roads to be rehabilitation as demonstrated by including a road segment that had already been rehabilitated. The approval of deficient engineering studies contributed to the poor cost estimation. The government also delayed effectiveness of the AF, which took six months, twice the duration initially set in the Financing agreement. In addition, weak traffic enforcement on the project-supported urban roads since 2012 affected the intended outcomes.



Government Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

There were two implementing agencies: The Executing Agency for road maintenance (The French acronym- AGEROUTE) and the Executing agency for works on rural infrastructure development (The French acronym- AGETIER). The National Coordination Unit (NCU) established within the Ministry of Equipment and Transport was in charge of coordination and implementation of the project. At appraisal, the NCU was already implementing an ongoing Bank financed project (The Transport Corridor Improvement Project). The two implementing agencies coped well with the crisis following the coup of March 2012 and completed all the major activities.

There were however shortcomings, as follows: (i) The engineering studies were deficient (in particular, poor cost estimation) and this contributed to the cost overruns. (ii) There were delays in implementing the resettlement plan (construction of the kiosques) for the urban component in Bamako, and (iii) There were weaknesses in M&E associated with difficulties to measure the rural access index and there was no ex-post evaluation of the performance-based maintenance contract in the road sector.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The key outcome indicators – percentage of rural population with access to all-season road, time spent to reach specific rural services from home and average time per km traveled in rural and urban areas were appropriate. The intermediate indicator associated with the institution strengthening component of the project – user charges are at least 40% of the road maintenance financing needs by 2008 was appropriate.

There were no indicators to measure "access to urban services" and several indicators lacked baseline figures or targets. It is not clear how the base and target for reduction in the number of accidents in the People's Boulevard were set given that there was no data on the precise location of accidents in downtown Bamako, according to the feasibility study of the urban sector component of the project.

b. M&E Implementation

The National Coordination Unit (NCU) was responsible for collecting the data from individual consultants or public entities. Revisions were made to improve the indicators (particularly the share of rural population with access to an all-season road) by setting baselines and targets. At the time of AF, the results framework was revised to reflect the implementation progress made to date and to include the new activities funded by the AF. Core sector indicators were added and some intermediate indicators were revised. A study to design a computer-based tool for the monitoring and evaluation of the project by the NCU was completed in 2010, but the tool was never set up.

c. M&E Utilization

The M&E framework was used to inform decision-making and resource allocation.

M&E Quality Rating
Modest



11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as a Category B project. Four safeguard policies were triggered; Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.01); Cultural Property (OP 4.11); Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12); Forests (OP/BP4.36).

An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) was conducted for rural and urban roads at appraisal and an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared and publicly disclosed, at appraisal (PAD, page 91). For the urban transport component, a Social Study and Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was prepared by the government and submitted to the Bank. The RAP involved about 450 people and provided details on the compensation packages and reinstallation strategies of displaced vendors and kiosks. A Physical Cultural Resources Management Plan was also prepared as required at preparation. Subsequently site-specific ESMP for each rural roads subproject and ESMP for wharves was also prepared.

The ICR (page 9) notes that there was compliance with Forests and Cultural Resources safeguards was deemed to be consistently satisfactory. There was compliance with Environmental Assessment and Involuntary Resettlement, albeit with some delays. These delays were due to a combination of factors including: (i) the difficulty to find appropriate locations in the very densely urbanized center of Bamako to build the kiosques. (ii) A legal dispute between the District of Bamako and an affluent individual opposing the construction of some kiosques near his property. (iii) Slow procurement of a contractor and slow construction of the kiosques, and (iv). The coup d'état of March 2012, which stopped the construction of the kiosques.

The ICR (page 9) reports that at closure 515 kiosques were constructed to resettle the mobile street vendors on People's Boulevard for the urban roads component of the project.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management. A Financial Management Assessment conducted at appraisal concluded that the National Coordination Unit- which was implementing an ongoing project- had the required ability for financial management arrangements. There was compliance with financial management issues during implementation (ICR, page page 10). The ICR (page 10) reports that external financial audits with unqualified opinions were submitted in a timely fashion. The financial covenants were complied with. Interim unaudited financial reports, submitted in a timely fashion, was deemed to be satisfactory to the Bank and there was no pending audit recommendation at closure.

Procurement. At appraisal, procurement risk was rated as High, based on a procurement capacity assessment carried out by the Country Office Procurement staff and an action plan was prepared to address the risks identified during the assessment. During implementation, in the initial years there was failure to implement the plan and this led to delays. The contractor for the Badougou-Bafoulabe road works which represented about 20% of the total project cost abandoned the construction site in 2013 and its contractor had to be terminated. This necessitated re-bid for these road works. These were however rectified and this led improvements in the quality of the documents send to the Bank for no objection (ICR, page 10). The ICR reports no case of mis-procurement.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

d. Other

12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	While the first objective on providing access and better transport services in rural communities was achieved to a



			substantial extent, there were shortcomings in the achievement of the objectives related to urban transport in Bamako, which were rated modest. Efficiency is assessed as modest due to a number of administrative and operational inefficiencies.
Risk to Development Outcome	High	High	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

The ICR draws the following main lessons from implementing this project:

- (1) In a low-capacity country, it would be useful to keep the design, with focus on one type of intervention (rural or urban). Further the results framework should contain only a few key indicators, with baselines and targets set before (not after) the beginning of implementation.
- (2) Poor quality of studies and cost estimation for civil works can lead to cost overruns and delays in achieving project objectives.
- (3) In urban transport projects or components, inadequate sensitization and enforcement of traffic rules can reduce affect outcomes and reduce the expected benefits.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provides a detailed overview of the project. It is concise and analytical. It is candid, particularly in discussing the issues faced at design and M&E. The quality of evidence and analysis is aligned to the messages outlined in the ICR, though there were some shortcoming in the completeness of information. For instance, it would have helped in discussing the methodology followed in administering the survey. The ICR's lessons are clear, useful and based on evidence provided in the ICR. On a minor note, it would have been useful to have an English translation of the Borrower's ICR in Annex 7.

- a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial

