



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 09/25/2003	
PROJ ID: P001755		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Agricultural Trading And Process Promotion Pilot Project	Project Costs (US\$M)	6.90	5.14
Country: Mali	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	6.0	5.08
Sector(s): Board: RDV - Agricultural marketing and trade (94%), Central government administration (4%), General finance sector (2%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	0.10	0.49
L/C Number: C2737; CP921			
	Board Approval (FY)		95
Partners involved : Canadian NGO (CECI), CIDA (Canada), Japanese Government	Closing Date	03/31/2001	12/31/2002

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The project was a five-year pilot that was to address key sectoral constraints to private investment in agricultural processing and marketing, focus on capacity building and transfer of know-how to the private sector through information networks, training, specialized technical assistance and study tours .

The project's development objectives were to :

- a) enhance the technical and managerial skills of private entrepreneurs in the agricultural trading and processing sub-sectors;
- b) demonstrate the feasibility of alternative export channels and expand the use of low-cost processing and storage technologies;
- c) help entrepreneurs identify and access new markets for their products;
- d) facilitate the development of business relations between private agricultural trading /processing enterprises and formal and informal financial institutions;
- e) help the Chambers of Agriculture and professional association increase their capacity to deliver demand-driven support services to private entrepreneurs .

The project objectives were not revised during implementation .

b. Components

The project had four components :

- a) Decentralized support in Sikasso, Segou and Mopti Regions (base cost US \$ 2,500,000, 48 percent of actual costs) ;
- b) Support packages to sub-sectoral professional associations (base cost US \$ 1,438,000, 27 percent of actual costs);
- c) Agency management and agricultural processing and marketing information exchange network; (base cost US \$ 1,084,000, 21 percent of actual costs); and
- d) Access to credit (base cost US \$ 93,000 1.8 percent of actual costs).

The project components also did not change during implementation .

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates

The project was appraised in November 1994, approved in June 1995 and became effective in April 1996. Mid term review (MTR) took place in September 1998 and the project closed in December 2002, 20 months behind schedule . Total project costs at appraisal were US\$ 6.9 million of which the IDA share was to be US \$ 6 million, the Canadian NGO CECI was to contribute US \$ 0.1 million and the government and beneficiaries, US \$ 0.80 million. Actual project costs were US \$ 5.14 million of which the IDA share was US \$ 5.08 million, Government and beneficiaries

contributed US \$ 0.06 million, the Canadian NGO CECI contributed US \$ 0.09 million. In addition CIDA (Canada) and the Japanese government provided US \$ 0.3 million and US \$ 0.1 million respectively. CIDA and the Japanese contributions were not originally included in project costs .

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The project was an ambitious pilot operation . It is reported to have achieved most of its objectives though it is difficult for the Evaluation Summary (ES) to actually assess how far each of the specific development and long term objectives were achieved because of the inadequate M&E .

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

- The project provided significant promotional and technical assistance to producers, traders and exporters by organizing marketing campaigns and agricultural fairs . It also helped establish quality standards and market databases;
- It helped create favorable conditions for the strengthening of a significant number of professional associations;
- Outputs of potatoes, onions and tomatoes are reported to have increased;
- It demonstrated the feasibility of alternative export methods, particularly for mangoes and assisted merchants in identifying new markets;
- It successfully catalyzed new partnerships between private entrepreneurs and financial institutions;
- It strengthened the Chambers of Agriculture providing them with the capacity to launch commercial activities in the three regions;

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

- Project monitoring and evaluation became operational only two months before project ended;
- The accumulated information, studies and comprehensive documentation were not made available to the beneficiaries for various reasons like unoperational websites, lack of distribution of studies etc .;
- Though the agribusiness entrepreneurs' associations were created they are not fully operational as they lack business plans and financial resources;
- The project failed to finance construction and rehabilitation of wholesale market facilities, a critical need in all the three regions;
- There was lack of coordination between project and other related activities going on in the field supported by other projects and agencies;

6. Ratings :	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome :	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	[the ICR's 4-point scale does not allow for a "moderately sat." rating]. OED rates a project as moderately satisfactory when it is expected to achieve most of its relevant objectives but with significant shortcomings. The shortcomings noted under section 5 are significant.
Institutional Dev .:	Modest	Modest	
Sustainability :	Likely	Likely	
Bank Performance :	Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	The ICR itself rates the Bank's overall performance as marginally satisfactory . The ES downgrades it to unsatisfactory for several reasons: (i) the project had several design weaknesses as noted by the ICR para 3.5; (ii) the project faced several risks and strong monitoring was to play a critical role in the management of these risks. The Bank should have taken adequate steps to ensure that monitoring and evaluation became operational particularly since this was a pilot operation; (iii) the Bank should have given more attention to clarifying the institutional interface between the Government and the APCAM (Assembly of the Chambers of Agriculture) which was entrusted with the task of project execution; (iv) the Bank should have been more vigilant and ensured adequate financial management of the project;
Borrower Perf .:	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	

Quality of ICR :	Satisfactory
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NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

The ICR has two important lesson on monitoring and adequate beneficiary participation which are repeated here : First, close monitoring of a project through an independent body is vital to its execution . Second, beneficiaries need to be involved in the planning and execution of project activities .

The ES adds the following lessons: (i) In projects with a clear poverty alleviation objective, development objectives should be framed at least partly in terms of poverty alleviation . This should be done in a way that is monitorable and should be backed up in design by a monitoring and evaluation system capable of measuring poverty impact . (ii) Building the partnerships between the private sector and financial institutions is just the first step . More time and resources are needed to strengthen and consolidate gains so that their sustainability over the long run is assured .

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

Why? (i) To verify the outcome, sustainability and institutional development impact; (ii) to provide input for the upcoming CAE on Mali.

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is rated satisfactory but has three significant shortcomings : (i) It is not clear to the reader how the ICR Annex 1 table 3.1 on key performance indicators is related to Table 5 in the appraisal report. The indicators do not match; (ii) It is not clear why the aide memoire for the MTR has been attached to the ICR . The aide memoire for the ICR mission would have been more relevant . Moreover it would have been helpful if the Aide memoire and the borrower's contribution to the ICR were available in English; and, (iii) the ICR does not explain why CIDA and Japanese government funds were included when they were not originally included in project costs;