



## 1. Project Data

<b>Project ID</b>	<b>Project Name</b>		
P113099	LR-Urban and Rural Infra. Rehab. Project		
<b>Country</b>	<b>Practice Area(Lead)</b>	<b>Additional Financing</b>	
Liberia	Transport & Digital Development	P121770,P144435,P144435	
<b>L/C/TF Number(s)</b>	<b>Closing Date (Original)</b>	<b>Total Project Cost (USD)</b>	
IDA-53510,IDA-H4780,IDA-H6040,TF-16065,TF-94353,TF-98040	30-Jun-2014	129,200,000.00	
<b>Bank Approval Date</b>	<b>Closing Date (Actual)</b>		
21-Apr-2009	30-Jun-2017		
	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>	
Original Commitment	44,000,000.00	45,600,000.00	
Revised Commitment	83,584,695.01	42,842,632.46	
Actual	84,018,927.31	42,842,632.46	
<b>Prepared by</b>	<b>Reviewed by</b>	<b>ICR Review Coordinator</b>	<b>Group</b>
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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as stated in the Financial Agreement (Schedule 1, page 5) was: **"To support the Recipient's efforts to improve road access in the city of Monrovia and targeted rural areas, as well as to improve the institutional capacity for the management of the Recipient's road sector."**

The PDO as stated in the Emergency Project Paper (page 7) was similar.

"To support the government's goal of improving road access in Monrovia and targeted rural areas, as well as



improving institutional structure for technical management of the sector."

**b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?**  
No

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**  
No

**d. Components**

There were two components (PAD, pages 8-9).

**One. Infrastructure Investment.** Appraisal estimate US\$49.65 million. Actual cost US\$108.15 million. Activities in this component aimed at rehabilitating infrastructure assets. Activities included: (i) rehabilitation of Monrovia city streets: (ii) rehabilitation of primary road sections in rural areas (Cotton Tree Bokay Town and Pleebo-Barclayville): (iii) maintenance of rural roads: (iv) rehabilitation of the road intersection of Val Town Bridge and Tucker bridge: and, (v) construction of a new Fuel Unloading Facility in the port of Monrovia. The actual cost of activities in this component was higher than estimated due to a combination of factors including, cost overruns of some project activities and increase in project scope when two Additional financings (AFs) were approved (discussed in 2e).

**Two. Project Management and Institutional Support.** Appraisal estimate US\$3.55 million. Actual cost US\$18.30 million. This component provided project management and institutional support. Activities included: (i) technical assistance for establishing the Infrastructure Implementation Unit: (ii) capacity building to the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) and technical assistance to universities in support of the overall infrastructure sector institutional capacity building: (iii) financing the operating cost of the Project Financial Management Unit: (iv) technical assistance to the MPW for establishing a roads authority: (v) capacity building of the Environmental Protection Agency: and, (vi) financing project audits.

The following changes were made following the AF approved on June 2010. (i) The scope of component one activity (rehabilitation of primary road sections in Cotton Tree Bokay) was expanded by 66 kilometers: and, (ii) outcome indicators were added (discussed in section 9b) and the results framework was modified to reflect the increase in project scope.

These changes were made with the second AF on December 2013: (i) Financing was provided for the contractually obligated inflation linked for the Bokay Two road contracts: (ii) cost overruns associated with the Caldwell bridge and the new Fuel Unloading Facility activity were covered: (iii) The scope of component one activity was expanded to include additional works for Monrovia city streets and the scope of component three activities was expanded to include, preparation of bidding documents for construction of road segments along the Ganta-Fishtown Harper road corridor, feasibility study for developing a dry inland port and technical assistance to the University of Liberia, the Stella Maris Polytechnic and Tubman University for infrastructure sector institutional capacity building: (iv) the target for activities associated with maintenance of rural roads was lowered from 641 km to 132 km: and, (v) meeting partially the costs of social and environmental mitigation measures on account of the delays caused by lack of timely financing from the government.



**e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

**Project cost.** Appraisal estimate US\$53.20 million. Two AFs were approved. Actual cost US\$126.45 million. Actual cost was higher for a combination of factors including increase in project scope and cost overruns associated with some component activities (discussed in the components section).

**Project financing.** The project was financed by an IDA grant and co financing from the multi-donor funded Liberia Reconstruction and Development Trust Fund (LRTF) of US\$53.20 million (including US\$44.00 from IDA and US\$9.20 million from LRDT). (The financing included a Project Preparation Advance of US\$3.50 million to fund the advance payment for the contract associated with rehabilitating city streets in Monrovia) (PAD, page 14). AF of US\$47.00 million was approved on June 2010 (including an IDA grant of US\$20.00 million and LRTF of US\$27.00 million). With this, the total estimate was US\$100.20 million. AF of US\$29.00 million was approved on December 2010 (including an IDA grant of US\$19.60 million and LRTF US\$9.40 million). With this, the revised estimate of the grant for the project was US\$129.20 million). Amount disbursed US\$126.45 million.

**Borrower Contribution.** None was planned. There was no borrower contribution during project execution.

**Dates.** With second AF on December 2013, the closing date was extended by 18 months from June 30, 2014 to December 31 for extending the scope of project activities.

Through a Level 2 restructuring on November 2015, the closing date was extended by 18 months from December 31, 2015 to June 30, 2017 for completing ongoing activities which had been delayed on account of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak. The project closed on June 30, 2017.

### 3. Relevance of Objectives

#### Rationale

Prior to appraisal, mobility within the country was constrained due to the deterioration of the road and bridge network, following years of neglect and lack of maintenance during and after the civil war. Alongside this, road sector management was hampered due to a combination of factors, including poor governance and low implementation capacity in the Ministry of Public Works. The PDO was well-aligned with the government strategy at appraisal (PAD, page 4). The first Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) of 2008 identified the rehabilitation of the road networks that had been extensively damaged during the civil war as a priority. The government's National Transport Policy and Strategy of 2008 estimated investment needs of rehabilitating the country's basic roads and bridges network at US\$1 billion. The strategies outlined in the government's *National Vision Rising of 2030* and in the *Agenda for Transformation for 2013-2017*, identified improving accessibility as a top priority.

The project was consistent with the Bank strategy at appraisal. The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for the 2009-2011 period, prepared jointly by the Bank/ the International Finance Corporation and the African Development Bank, endorsed the government's emphasis on infrastructure and sector management. The PDO was consistent with two of the three strategic themes of the CAS: (i) rebuilding core state functions and institutions: and, (ii) rehabilitating infrastructure to Jump-start economic growth. The Bank's most recent Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for 2013-2017 highlighted the importance of improving the transportation infrastructure for addressing the spatial isolation of the hinterland.



## Rating

High

### 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

#### Objective 1

##### Objective

To support the government's goal of improving road access in Monrovia and targeted rural areas

##### Rationale

**Outputs.** (ICR, pages 11-13 and 28-34).

The following outputs were completed.

- 24 km of city roads in Monrovia, which were nearly impassable in all seasons, were rehabilitated.
- The new Caldwell Bridge and its approaches linking the suburb of Caldwell to Bushrod Island and downtown Monrovia was constructed.
- The road intersection of the Vai Town Bridge was constructed with proper channeling of the different movements for improving capacity.
- 148.50 km of rural roads (Pleebo- Barclayville-Cotton Tree - Buchanan) were rehabilitated.
- 45.5 km of the previously repaired rural roads were provided road maintenance. This was short of the revised and original targets of 131.6 km and 641 km respectively. The shortfall was due to the cancellation of two mis procured lots of rural road maintenance works.
- The new Fuel Unloading Facility (FUF) at the Port of Monrovia was built. It was not yet operational at closure as works were still ongoing to connect it to the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company's (LPRC) tank farm and LPRC was in the process of procuring generators to power the facility. The ICR (page 32) notes that the FUF was expected to be commissioned by the end of 2017. According to the information provided by the team, the testing of FUF is still ongoing and the facility is expected to be operational by the end of April, 2018. The team also clarified that the unloading platform is however operational for the mooring of incoming ships to date.

##### Outcomes.

- 94% of the rural population had access to an all-season road at closure as compared to the revised target of 90%. There were no original targets for this indicator. Since the rehabilitated primary roads were on the Cotton Tree - Buchanan corridor (linking Monrovia to the Port of Buchanan) that cut across densely populated rural areas, the roads provided access to the primary network to an estimated 215,000 rural dwellers. According to a recent estimate provided in *Liberia Spatial Analysis of Connectivity and Growth Potential*, Liberia's Rural Accessibility Index (defined as population living within two km of an all season



road) improved from 40% to 48%.

- 35% of city streets in Monrovia, where about one third of Liberia's population lives, were reported to be in good or fair condition at project closure as targeted and as compared to 5% at the baseline.
- Travel time between Cotton Tree and Buchanan decreased from 163 minutes on average at the baseline to 55 minutes at closure. This exceeded the revised target of 71 minutes. Average travel time between Pleebo and Barclayville decreased from 160 minutes on average at the baseline to 45 minutes at closure. This exceeded the revised target of 73 minutes. No original targets were set for these indicators.
- About 1,194,729 people benefitted from the project activities - including 314,070 rural beneficiaries (215,309 on the Cotton Tree Buchanan road and 98,761 on the Pleebo -Barclayville Road) and 90,000 urban beneficiaries (from city street improvements, rehabilitation of Caldwell Bridge and Vai Town Intersection). This exceeded the revised target of 744,980. Of these 49% were women as per the revised target. The team provided the methodology followed in estimating the number of beneficiaries. The estimates of rural beneficiaries in the direct area of influence of the roads (10 kilometers buffer) was based on a Geographic Information System (GIS) methodology, with the population estimate for 2017 based on the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo Information Services (LISGIS) population survey data of 2008, inflated by annual growth rate of 3.6%. The population of Monrovia (about 90,000) was used for the estimates of urban beneficiaries, based on the assumption that the entire population of Monrovia benefited from the urban interventions.

**Rating**  
Substantial

## **Objective 2**

### **Objective**

To improve the institutional structure for technical management of the sector.

### **Rationale**

### **Outputs.**

- Technical assistance was provided for for establishing the semi-autonomous Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) in the Ministry of Public Works (MPW) to replace the former Special Implementation Unit (SIU).
- An Action Implementation Plan for sustainable financing of the road sector was completed as targeted.
- An action plan was completed for establishing a second-generation Road Management Fund (RMF). The ICR (page 12) notes that the Road Fund Act for funding road maintenance activities was established by a law in 2016.
- Feasibility study for a dry port was completed.



- Training was provided to the local university professors in the University of Liberia, the Stella Maris Polytechnic and Tubman University. 37 engineering students were trained in road infrastructure construction and management. Geological laboratory equipment was provided to the civil engineering society of Liberia.
- Technical assistance was provided for preparing future investments such as for the Ganta-Zwedru corridor.

### **Outcomes.**

- The IIU was established although with some delay. The MPW devolved all road sector operational responsibilities to the IIU. Compared to the previous SIU, the IIU had a clear mandate to conduct network planning, procurement and contract management. According to the information provided by the team, although the IIU is not a formal Road Agency, it is now currently performing most of the functions of a road agency and has taken over the responsibility for road construction (construction and maintenance financed by donors and the government) from the MPW and that it is effectively acting as a proxy for a road agency, until the legislation is enacted for establishing a fully-fledged road authority.
- The Road Fund Act was enacted in 2016. The Road Maintenance Fund (RMF) was not fully operational at project closure, according to the ICR (page 12).
- The legal and administrative framework for establishing the road authority and the draft legislation for establishing an autonomous road agency for funding road maintenance activities was completed. According to the information provided by the team, the government imposed and started collecting \$0.50 levy per gallon through the Liberia Petroleum Refining Company (LPRC), ahead of passing of the legislation. The money so collected was transferred to a consolidated account of the government, as the 2016-2017 budget did not specifically have line item for Road Fund. The team also clarified that the fuel levy was challenged by two fuel importers on procedural issues and that the matter is now under consideration at the Supreme Court with a decision expected by end of April 2018.

The full benefits of institutional strengthening activities will take longer than the project cycle to materialize. Given that most of the outputs were completed and the institutional framework for road sector management has been set up, it is reasonable to conclude that the project made a significant contribution to improving the institutional structure for road sector management.

**Rating**  
Substantial

### **Rationale**

Given that the targets for most of the activities had been realized, there is sufficient evidence that the project made a significant contribution to realizing the PDOs.



## Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

### 5. Efficiency

**Economic analysis.** An economic analysis was not conducted at appraisal due to the lack of basic data and security considerations were still an issue at appraisal (PAD, page 75). An ex post economic analysis of Monrovia city street works and the Cotton Tree-Bokay Town - Buchanan road (component one activities) was conducted at completion, using the Highway Development and Management -4 model (HDM-4). These activities accounted for 86% of the total project cost at closure. The economic project benefits were assumed to come from savings in vehicle operating costs. The other benefits of the project which were identified but not factored in the quantitative analysis were the benefits to beneficiaries on account of the year-round accessibility of roads. The analysis indicated that the Net Present Value (NPV) at 12% discount rate of US\$19.8 million and an Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) of 18%.

**Operational and administrative issues.** There were cost overruns due to the incorporation of additional works that were not in the original emergency package but added during implementation (such as, activities aimed at drainage and sidewalk improvements) and contract-obligated price adjustments. The activity pertaining to the Fuel Unloading Facility was subject to substantial delays of more than two years due to factors such as, the perceived high risk of operating in Liberia, the limited size of the market and the lack of specialized international contractors. Although the cost of this activity was about 50% higher than estimated, the final contract price was still lower than the second lowest bidder at the time of allotment. At closure, most activities had been completed, albeit with delays and despite adverse economic shocks such as the repercussions of the global financial crisis of 2009 on foreign investments in Liberia, decline in global commodity prices and the demobilization of contractors in the wake of the outbreak of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD).

### Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	18.00	86.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.





## 6. Outcome

Relevance of the PDO for the government and the Bank strategy is rated as High. Outcome indicators had either been realized or exceeded. The project activities, which included investment activities and technical assistance activities aimed at changing behavior can be expected to contribute to the long term development objective of restoring essential transport infrastructure services and supporting the gradual rebuilding of institutions and human capacities for professional management of the road sector. Overall efficacy is Substantial. Efficiency is rated as Substantial.

### a. Outcome Rating

Satisfactory

## 7. Risk to Development Outcome

**Financial Risk.** Liberia Public Expenditure Review (2013) estimates that about 42% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) would be required for rehabilitating Liberia's deteriorated road network. Given the limited fiscal space, it is unclear if there would be adequate budget allocation for road rehabilitation, without some other kind of arrangements such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The routine maintenance needs of the Cotton Tree to Buchanan road, assured for the the next five years through a maintenance contract financed by the European Union (EU), is at best, a short-term solution. It is not clear if there would be adequate funding for sustained road maintenance activities in the medium term.

**Technical Risk.** Although the Fuel Unloading Facility (FUF) constructed under the aegis of this project has a guaranteed design life of 50 years with basic routine maintenance, there is significant risk pertaining to security and safety issues on account of the following factors: (i) risk to facility operations on account of fisherman operating with explosives: (ii) safety risk to the new FUF on account of fuel theft on the old oil jetty: and, (iii) failure to dismantle the old oil jetty could obstruct operations at the new FUF (ICR, page 26)..

**Social Risk.** Road investments could be undermined by the deteriorating road safety outcomes. The ICR (page 26) notes that as per police records, there has been a phenomenal surge in fatal crashes in Liberia in less than a decade (from 80 fatalities in 2009 to 1,448 in 2013). The benefits of investments in road infrastructure could be undermined without a conscious strategy aimed at addressing issues pertaining to road safety.

## 8. Assessment of Bank Performance

### a. Quality-at-Entry

The project design was based on international best practices adapted for country-specific conditions (such as the limited time during a year where civil works could be executed in Liberia because of intensive rains). As indicated in section 2e, the design included a Project Preparation Advance to expedite project implementation. Given the Fragile Conflict and Violence (FCV) environment and the weak implementation capacity, the design appropriately focused on providing the basic building blocks of reform and did not aim at achieving complex reforms (such as commercialization of road management). Several risks were





identified at appraisal including high risks associated with the country context (security situation remained fragile), lack of qualified staff in the respective ministries, governance and risks associated with systemic corruption. Several mitigation measures were incorporated at design including, support to making the transition to the professionally-managed Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU), intensive supervision, annual disclosure on details and progress of implementation (PAD, pages 25-27). Implementation arrangements for the project, which aimed at gradual transfer of responsibilities to the IIU in place of the existing Special Investment Unit (SIU) was appropriate, given that SIU at appraisal was already implementing three infrastructure projects and that SIU was an emergency project implementation unit for Bank-funded projects, with very limited capacity and no road network management mandate. Appropriate arrangements were made at appraisal for safeguards and fiduciary compliance (discussed in section 10). There were minor shortcomings in the M&E design (discussed in section 10 a). Given that this was a roads sector project, the project at design could have incorporated road safety features, given the increasing road fatalities (discussed in section 7). The team clarified that road safety was embedded in the infrastructure design and that crashes are due to the unsafe interface among the three components of the transport system: road infrastructure, road users and vehicles. Rehabilitation of the road infrastructure and increased motorization has brought in its wake road safety issues in Liberia that the existing transport management system is not equipped to deal with effectively. The team also clarified that given the emergency situation in the country at appraisal necessitated quick intervention and so earlier projects in Liberia (such as this project) focused on rehabilitating road infrastructure and policy and institutional dimension of road sector management (including road safety dimension), are being addressed through ongoing projects. (An ongoing project (Liberia Road Assessment Management project has substantial investments and community awareness programs aimed at addressing road safety issues).

### **Quality-at-Entry Rating**

Satisfactory

#### **b. Quality of supervision**

Supervision missions were held regularly and 15 Implementation Status Reports were filed over a nine year period. Missions included visits to project sites to monitor project execution and regular audio conferences were held even during the Ebola Virus Outbreak (EVD) crisis aided in resolving contract issues. The supervision team included in addition to the Task Team Leader, procurement, environmental and social safeguards specialists. The supervision team was proactive in mobilizing AFs and this aided in scaling up impacts of the project. The supervision team introduced innovative approaches in the face of the weak implementation capacity. such as internally-focused capacity building strategy (through providing training to the universities and professional institutes). Training provided to the staff during supervision of the newly recruited Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) unit aided in environmental and social safeguards and fiduciary compliance, although there were procurement issues during implementation, which were eventually resolved (discussed in Section 10b).

### **Quality of Supervision Rating**

Highly Satisfactory



## **Overall Bank Performance Rating**

Satisfactory

## **9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

### **a. M&E Design**

The key original outcome indicators were appropriate for monitoring performance. The indicators pertaining to the kilometer (Km) of roads that were reported to be in good and fair condition and the average travel times on the project intervened areas were appropriate for monitoring performance with respect to the PDO of improving road access in Monrovia and targeted rural areas. The indicators associated with the legal and administrative framework for the establishment of road authority were appropriate to the PDO of improving the technical management of the road sector. However, there were no baseline or specific targets for some indicators, and the methodology of assuming all the urban population in Monrovia are the beneficiaries of the project intervention is also questionable.

### **b. M&E Implementation**

Core sector indicators - share of rural accessibility (that is, share of rural population with access to all season roads) and the number of direct project beneficiaries including women - were added during implementation. Data on performance indicators was collected by the Infrastructure Implementation Unit (IIU) on a regular basis and disseminated through quarterly progress reports to the Bank. A pilot Information and Communication Technology Program (ICT) platform called the *Taarifa* program, was developed by the Infrastructure implementation Unit (IIU) for monitoring road sector activities. This platform was a smartphone based application aimed at enhancing the M&E capacity of the IIU and the government and eventually aimed at encouraging citizens' participation in the monitoring of completed assets. This platform was tested by the IIU staff for monitoring construction of the Fuel Unloading Facility (FUF) and the Caldwell Bridge. The ICR (page 22) notes that this tool was being developed and that its rollout was expected by the end of 2018.

### **c. M&E Utilization**

The M&E was used for monitoring project performance. The ICR (page 22) notes that there was no mechanism for continuous monitoring of project outcomes beyond the completion of project activities.

## **M&E Quality Rating**

Substantial



## 10. Other Issues

### a. Safeguards

The project was classified as a Category B project. Other than environmental assessment (OP/BP 4.01) one social safeguards was triggered: Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12).

The PAD (page 17) notes that adverse environmental impacts of investments were expected to local in nature and not complex. An Environmental Mitigation Plan (EMP) was prepared for addressing the environmental impacts of activities associated with the resurfacing of city streets and road segments and publicly-disclosed (PAD, page 17). A Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) prepared for a prior solid waste management project and to be used as a template for this project, was publicly disclosed (PAD, page 72). No new safeguard policies were triggered by the activities following the AFs for this project.

The ICR (page 22) provides little details but notes that there was safeguards compliance. Insufficient funding from the Government for providing compensations to Project Affected Persons (PAPs) during implementation and late payment to PAPs contributed to delays for activities associated Caldwell bridge construction. This was eventually rectified by the Bank's decision to allocate US\$8.00 million under the second AF for the project to cover payments for the PAPs affected by this activity (ICR, page 23).

### b. Fiduciary Compliance

**Financial management.** An assessment was conducted at appraisal to judge the Project Management Financial Unit's (PMFUs) capacity to address financial management issues (PAD, page 15). The PMFU had implemented Bank-financed projects before and the agency's financial arrangements were deemed to be satisfactory. The ICR (page 23) notes that five compensation checks totaling US\$11,348 were stolen from the PMFU and illegally cashed during implementation. This was eventually refunded by the government. The ICR (page 23) notes that the financial management was satisfactory. The monitoring reports were compliant with the agreed format and the reports were submitted in a timely fashion. According to the information provided by the team, the audits were unqualified.

**Procurement.** As assessment was conducted at appraisal to judge the implementing agency's ability to address procurement issues (PAD, page 57) and a procurement plan which provided the basis for procurement methods was prepared at appraisal (PAD, page 59). The ICR (page 23) notes that inadequate procurement capacity contributed to initial delays in the execution of works and that there was a significant case of mis procurement - when two contracts were awarded without the Bank's prior approval. The government eventually reimbursed US\$3.00 million through the project's special account.

### c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

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### d. Other



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## 11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	---
Bank Performance	Highly Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Minor shortcomings with M&E.
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

## 12. Lessons

The ICR draws the following lessons from the experience of implementing this project, with some adaptation of language.

**(1) Sector reforms can be implemented in a Fragile, Conflict and Violence (FCV) context, through a programmatic gradual approach, that spreads the expected reforms over several operations, while individual project adopts a realistic reform objective.** Benefiting from the previous Bank engagement in the transport sector in Liberia, this project demonstrated that more sustainable sector gains can be achieved within a relatively short time (of ten years), provided conditions such as a long term programmatic commitment to building institutional capacity are met.

**(2) In a low capacity context, it may be beneficial and sustainable in the long term, to build the capacity of existing staff as well as young university graduates to take on key sector and industry roles.** Under the auspices of this project, at least 20 well-trained professional were trained in road asset management. This capacity can be expected to remain in-country, given the demand for qualified human resources for reconstruction needs.

**(3) In a fragile context, simplified implementation arrangements through involving a minimum number of entities for delivery of infrastructure services can be helpful.** Given multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests, full responsibility and decision making for infrastructure delivery could rest with one main entity, while keeping the other stakeholders informed. In this project ownership of the Fuel Unloading Facility (FUF) was lacking due to the multitude of low-capacity stakeholders entrusted with the responsibility of making decisions regarding the FUF.

**(4) In a post-conflict environment, it is necessary to assess the impact of capacity building activities as the feedback would help in targeting of future interventions.** If options such as Impact Assessments (IAs) are not feasible due to lack of data, other options need to be considered such as simpler participative methodologies such as focus group discussions and key informant interviews.

## 13. Assessment Recommended?

No



## **14. Comments on Quality of ICR**

The ICR is concise and well-written. The quality of evidence and analysis is adequate. The ICR candidly discusses the problems that were encountered during implementation (such as inadequacy of resources for meeting the requirements of the Resettlement Action Plan). The ICR draws valid lessons based on evidence and is internally consistent.

However, the information provided in the ICR on safeguards compliance and financial management is brief. The ICR provides little information on the quality of financial audits (This information was later supplied by the team).

### **a. Quality of ICR Rating** Substantial