



1. Project Data

Project ID

P091979

Project Name

E- Adaptation Climate Change (KACCAL)

Country

Kenya

Practice Area(Lead)

Agriculture

L/C/TF Number(s)

TF-96908

Closing Date (Original)

31-Dec-2014

Total Project Cost (USD)

6,390,000.00

Bank Approval Date

10-Jun-2010

Closing Date (Actual)

30-Jun-2017

IBRD/IDA (USD)
Grants (USD)

Original Commitment

5,500,000.00

5,500,000.00

Revised Commitment

5,500,000.00

5,185,288.85

Actual

5,499,999.15

5,185,288.00

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) Special Climate Change Fund Grant Agreement of August 21, 2012 (p. 5) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) (p. 6) the objective of the project was “to improve the ability of participating districts and communities in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands to plan and implement climate change adaptation measures. This objective will be achieved through: (i) strengthening climate risk management and the natural resource base related knowledge; (ii) building institutional and technical capacity for improved planning and coordination to manage current and future climate risks at the district and national levels; and (iii) investing in communities’ priorities in sustainable land and water management and in alternative livelihoods that helps them adapt to climate risk.”



b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

The project included three components:

Component 1: Climate information products, policy and advocacy (appraisal estimate US\$1.46 million, actual US\$2.25 million): This component was to finance the strengthening of capacity and institutional coordination among national agencies to manage disasters and to better assess and respond to climate risk through developing climate-related knowledge products to inform climate risk management strategies in the (Arid and Semi-Arid Lands) ASALs and integrating climate action into the ASAL development strategies and programs. Activities included the development of county management plans, county climate risk profiles, community action plans, and a tool kit for screening agricultural investment programs for climate risk.

Component 2: Climate risk management at district level (appraisal estimate US\$1.37 million, actual US\$2.00 million): This component was to finance the integration of climate risk management into county planning processes and programs through building capacity and supporting “climate-smart” public and private investments to implement selected public and private sector interventions identified in county plans. Activities included the construction of 14 mega intercommunity investments (ICIs) (13 water pans and one camel milk value addition processing plant).

Component 3: Community-driven initiatives for climate-resilience (appraisal estimate US\$2.67 million, actual US\$1.25 million): This component was to finance the supporting of beneficiary communities to adopt climate change adaptation strategies and investments to reduce climate related vulnerabilities and strengthen their resilience to climate risk. Activities included the financing of micro-projects to distribute adaptation information through trainings and demonstration of both, traditional and new approaches, to climate change adaptation.

During the first and second restructuring and the Mid-Term Review adaptations were made to the components to improve project performance and speed up the progress towards the achievement of the PDO.

Under Component 1 the number of county CRPs was increased from 4 to 15. In addition, knowledge products were revised to avoid duplication of products developed by other programs. The improvement of the Early Warning System was moved to another project, the Kenya Climate Smart Project. The development of a methodology and a tool for screening agricultural investment programs for climate risk were added.

Under Component 2 the number of inter-community investments (ICIs) was reduced, the geographical coverage was increased, and it was agreed to construct a total of 14 ICIs

Under Component 3 the initial scale of the community adaptation micro-projects was reduced and resulted in a change in the overall component cost. The project had anticipated funding larger scale (i.e. size & costs) but same number of community adaptation micro-projects, therefore the original target of 80 was



never revised.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: The project was estimated to cost US\$6.32 million. Actual cost was US\$5.50 million.

Financing: The project was financed by a US\$5.50 million Global Environmental Facility Grant which was completely disbursed.

Borrower Contribution: The Borrower was to make a budget allocation of US\$0.69 million. The actual budget allocation was US\$0.13 million and covered, as agreed, all costs that were originally planned such as salaries and operating costs.

Dates: The project was approved on June 10th, 2010 and effective only two and a half years (29 months) later, on November 21st, 2012. The original closing date was December 31st, 2014 and the actual closing date was June 30th, 2017, i.e. a total of two and a half years' (30 months') extension.

The project was restructured four times:

- On June 29, 2012 the project was restructured to: i) link the project to a new IDA parent project, the Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agri-Business project (KAPAP); ii) modify activities under the different components to avoid duplication of activities that had been implemented outside the project and modify the Results Framework accordingly; iii) transfer the project from the Ministry of State for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Fisheries (MoALF); iv) reassign the coordination and implementation management to the Kenya Agricultural Productivity Program Secretariat; v) adapt the financial management and procurement arrangements of the KAPAP; vi) extend the closing date from December 31, 2014 to October 31, 2016 due to the delays in project effectiveness.
- On March 4, 2016 the project was restructured to: i) make further changes in the results framework; ii) reallocate funds and make further adjustments to the financial and procurement arrangements; iii) link the project to another IDA-funded project, the Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Project.
- On October 14, 2016 the project was restructured to extend the closing date from October 31, 2016 to April 28, 2017 to allow time to complete implementation of critical on-going activities that will inform the preparation of the proposed Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Project (KCSAP) and thus make up for the fourth month delay in the flow of funds to MoALF.
- On April 18, 2017, the project was restructured to extend the closing date from April 28, 2017 to June 30, 2017 to allow for the completion of the water pan in West Pokot since its completion was delayed due to a drought.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives



According to the 2006 Nicholas Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change and the findings of the Fourth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Kenya was among the countries most at risk of climate change related weather events such as droughts and flooding. These extreme weather events had become more frequent and intense and had a strong negative impact on the country's agricultural production.

Especially, the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) is disproportionately vulnerable to these extreme weather events. The PAD stated (p. 1) that the ASALs cover more than 80 percent of the country's land mass and produces 75% of Kenya's livestock production and contributed almost 30% to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at the time of project appraisal.

The objective of the project supported the government's Vision 2030 which envisages a sustained, inclusive growth to end extreme poverty and improve opportunities for all. Furthermore, the project also supported the country's National Policy for Sustainable Development of ASALs which aimed to facilitate and fast-track sustainable development in Northern Kenya and other arid lands by increasing investment in the region and ensuring that the use of those resources is fully reconciled with the realities of people's lives.

The objective was also well aligned with the objectives of the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (2010-2013) which were to reduce inequality and social inclusion, managing resources constraints, and unleashing Kenya's growth potential. The project's objective also supported the Kenya Joint Assistance Strategy 2007-2012 which addressed the need for Kenya to invest in adaptation to climate change and the Africa Action Plan, which included support for decentralized institutional capacity and various investments that reduce the risk from extreme climate events. The Bank's most recent Country Partnership Strategy (FY14-18) also focuses in one of its three main areas on promoting protection and potential to ensure all groups share in advancing prosperity and helping the vulnerable to develop their potential.

Rating

High

b. Relevance of Design

The underlying assumption of how certain activities were to contribute to the achievement of the PDO was clear and properly laid out. The project was designed to be a pilot, accompanying the Arid Lands Resource Management Project II (ALRMP II) and targeting three beneficiary groups: the ASAL communities, county and national government institutions, and private sector stakeholders. Furthermore, the project design included a community driven development approach to promote the adoption of adaptation measures.

Activities to improve the ability of participating districts and communities in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands to plan and implement climate change adaptation measures included the developing of knowledge products and building capacity within national agencies to manage disasters and to better assess and respond to climate risk. Knowledge products included the development of Climate Risk Profiles for project areas and counties outside project areas as well as a methodology and tool for screening agricultural investment programs for climate risk and Community Action Plans. In addition, capacity was built by training public and private advisory agents in community climate risk management. Furthermore, activities aimed to improve climate risk management at district level through supporting "climate-smart" public and private investments such as financing mega intercommunity investments. Finally, activities included investments into micro-projects to distribute information to climate change adaptation.



A shortcoming of the project design was that it did not take negative externalities into account, such as the government's fiscal constraints, and the cancellation of the ALRMP II. Furthermore, while the project's objective was clearly specified, and the theory of change was sound and reflected in the Results Framework, most indicators focused on outputs rather than outcomes.

Rating
Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

To improve the ability of participating districts and communities in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands to plan and implement climate change adaptation measures:

Rationale

Outputs:

- 15 Climate Risk Profiles (CRPs) were developed (four for the targeted project areas and eleven for counties outside the project areas). However, the CRPs were not developed in time to inform the preparation of the county climate risk planning and management process for KACALL as was originally planned due to procurement delays. The ICR (p. 34) stated that they are being used under ongoing Bank projects (the Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Project (KCSAP) and the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project (RPLR)).
- Four Count Management Plans were developed and provided budgeted climate risk management programs and were subsequently incorporated into County Integrated Development Plans. The ICR does not state whether this implied that the planned target was achieved.
- Methodology and tool for screening agricultural investment programs for climate risk was developed, achieving the target. However, the development was completed only a few months before project closing due to procurement delays related to the lack of technical expertise in firms competing for the contract. The tool will be used under the ongoing KCSAP and RPLR.
- 497 public and private advisory agents were trained in community climate risk management, surpassing the target of 80 agents.
- All of the 156 KAPAP sub-projects were screened for improving response to climate risk, achieving the target.
- 82 Community Action Plans (CAPs), which identified concrete climate risk management activities reflected in the County Integrated Development Plan, were developed, surpassing the target of 80 CAPs.
- 156 community adaption micro-projects were developed and implemented, surpassing the target of 80



projects.

- The project benefited 37,977 beneficiaries, surpassing the target of 10,000.
- 69% of beneficiaries were female, surpassing the target of 50%.

Intermediate Outcomes:

- Targeted training on safeguards and M&E improved the ability of county officials to integrate environmental and social safeguards into community planning, and the ability of the community to monitor and evaluate community adaptation activities. The training had a positive impact on the quality of the demonstration activities, which received a satisfaction rate of 96% by participating farmers.
- 81% of public and private sector investments were rated satisfactory or better by beneficiary, just surpassing the target of 80%.

Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

The PAD did not include an Economic analysis and stated (p. 19) that the quantification of economic benefits for the project as a whole was not deemed to be meaningful or to add significant value to the project's design.

Instead, the PAD conducted a preliminary economic analysis for some CDC micro-projects, and the economic impacts of climate change were discussed based on a literature review. The Internal Rates of Return (IRRs) for these micro-projects (small scale irrigation, woodlots, beekeeping, and sustainable land management) were estimated to be between 13 and 30 percent, assuming a discount rate of 10 percent. At project closing, an ex-post financial analysis was conducted, assessing the financial viability of demand-driven CDC activities under component 3 (for nine most popular enterprises for which data was available - agriculture, dairy, local poultry, mango, and tomatoes) using the same methodology as the one included in the PAD and also a discount rate of 10 percent. According to the Bank team "popular" was defined as enterprises with the highest uptake rates which was determined by the technology type, physical and economic accessibility, good market access, commercial value, significant potential to bring in higher incomes and overall anticipated economic impacts.

The results were largely positive except for one dairy and one agriculture enterprise which had a negative Net Present Value (NPV) and /or a benefit-cost ratio below 1. For all other enterprises the NPVs ranged from US\$667 to US\$10,871 and the IRRs ranged between 18 and 262 percent.

Operational Efficiency:

The project experienced several significant implementation delays due to procurement and financial management issues such as slow flow of funds, bottlenecks within the Ministerial Tender Committee, and frequent institutional changes. Due to these issues the project's closing date had to be extended three times



from originally closing in December 2014 to June 2017. All this might be indicative of an inefficient use of project resources.

Overall, the project's efficiency is rated Modest.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of objective is High given ASALs high vulnerability to climate change related extreme weather events such as droughts and flooding. Relevance of design is rated Substantial as is the achievement of the PDO. Efficiency is rated Modest. Taking everything together this results in an outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

The government continues to be committed to the climate change agenda as demonstrated through implementing several climate change related policies and strategies. The project has also supported the government's agenda by strengthening some of the country's institutional mechanisms. The ASALs will continue to be vulnerable to extreme weather events such as droughts and flooding. Therefore, it will be critical that adaptation activities will be scaled up. However, the ICR (p. 28) stated that even though the counties plan to use the Community Action Plans and the County Integrated Development Plans as intended, they experience a lack of actual budget allocations for climate change adaptation. Furthermore, at the national level the mainstreaming of climate change issues in the agriculture sector was to be led by the Climate Change Unit. However, following several institutional changes, staffing and funding challenges, the unit essentially became



ineffective, presenting an institutional risk to the outcomes achieved. While there is currently a National Climate Change Response Strategy and National Climate Change Action Plan in place, there is also need for a centralized institutional mechanism for climate change mainstreaming and coordination at the sector level. Resurrecting the unit within the Ministry would be critical. The Bank has ongoing operations (The National Agricultural Rural Inclusive Growth and Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Project) and is planning to have future operations to support climate change adaptation efforts. Also, insecurity and conflict about water resources are likely to continue. Therefore, it will be critical for the government to institutionalize and scale up conflict management measures at the county level throughout the ASALs to prepare for potential larger scale conflicts.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Modest

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project design built on previous Bank projects such as the Arid Lands Resource Management Project I and II and the Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agri-business Project (KAPAP). The ICR (p. 29) stated that lessons learned and best practices from projects in Africa and other regions were taken into account. The ICR (p. 12) also stated that the project's objective was realistic and achievable. The Bank used the already established community driven development approach

The Bank identified relevant risk factors. The risk of alternative sustainable Livelihood strategies to pastoralism not to be taken up in the arid lands was rated as High. The Bank rated the country's overall financial management risk and the internal control risk as Substantial. However, the Bank underestimated the impact of the fiduciary risk and did not identify the risk of frequent institutional changes such as the elimination of the ministry originally responsible for the project, the transfer of the project to a new ministry, reassignment of the project to a different implementation agency and Kenya's devolution process, resulting in implementation challenges. Also, the risk of continued and growing conflict, especially in arid districts was underestimated. During the 2016/2017 drought clashes between project and non-project community members took place.

The ICR (p. 12) stated that the project used the already existing implementation infrastructure of the AMRMP II project in order to avoid any duplication and reduce operational costs. However, the unexpected suspension and closure of the ALRMP II and the need to link the KACCAL to the KAPAP resulted in several challenges. The KAPAP did not have the technical staff to manage a climate change project and had to hire new staff resulting in significant implementation delays since the recruitment took almost two years. Another shortcoming was that the project areas were expansive and distant from each other, making coordination more challenging. Also, due to the long delays during project preparation, the original four years implementation period decreased to two and a half years. Furthermore, the Results Framework had several shortcomings (see section 10a for more details).



Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank team consisted of staff with relevant technical and operational expertise from headquarters and from the country office. The Bank team conducted supervision missions on a regular basis. During the critical implementation phase between 2012 and 2016, missions were conducted twice a year as required, for a total of 10 missions during that timeframe. Bank team missions included a mix of agriculture specialists, economists, fiduciary and safeguards specialists. The Bank team successfully restructured the project four times to adapt the project to changing circumstances and improve project performance. According to the ICR (p. 29) the Mid-Term Review was critical for improving implementation progress and performance. The Bank team identified shortcomings in financial management and provided support to strengthen the project's internal controls. The ICR (p. 29) stated that challenges related to M&E such as delays in data collection were followed up closely. Also, the Bank team provided timely advice and support in regard to the Bank's safeguard policies and monitored the grievance redress mechanism regularly. According to the ICR (p. 29) all complaints were recorded to have been addressed satisfactorily. The ICR also stated that overall supervision ratings were candid and while the project was rated Unsatisfactory at the beginning of implementation, it was rated Moderately Satisfactory when it closed. Even though the project had five different Task Team Leaders throughout its implementation, not allowing continuity, the ICR (p. 29) stated that since three of the Task Team Leaders were based in the country a closer interaction with the government was possible, and making up for the lack of continuity. The Bank team was unable to solve the issue of slow funds which caused significant implementation delays even though this problem was consistently mentioned to the government. The ICR (p. 29) stated that this was a common profile throughout the Bank's project in the country.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The government showed its commitment to addressing climate change by putting in place its policy agenda. However, given the challenging political turmoil after the 2007 election, frequent institutional changes and constitutional reform process had a negative impact on project implementation. Also, the project was negatively affected by the delays in project effectiveness, consistently slow flow of funds from the Treasury, the delayed opening of a designated project account, long procurement processes and the long recruitment process for hiring climate change experts at the national and county level.



Government Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

The KAPAP Secretariat was responsible for the implementation of the project. According to the ICR (p. 30) the secretariat worked with the Bank to coordinate mission field visits, regular internal national and county level meetings, monitored safeguards and evaluated the performances of the service providers. The Secretariat ensured fiduciary compliance. However, the secretariat lacked the necessary technical capacity to support the project and it took a significant time until the capacity was available. Also, the ICR (p. 16) stated that M&E data was not used to inform decision making or to modify actions to improve project implementation.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The project used the M&E system of the Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agri-business Project (KAPAP).

The ICR (p. 16) stated that data was collected from the national, county and community level. Data collection at community level consisted of a combination of beneficiary participation to record and collect data on activities. At county level the data was consolidated by the county M&E officers and at national level a final overall data consolidation was conducted by the M&E officer of the KAPAP secretariat.

The project's objective was clearly specified, and the theory of change was sound and reflected in the Results Framework. Most of the intermediate results indicators were adequate to capture the contribution of the project's outputs toward achieving the PDO. However, several of the intermediate outcome indicators in the original Results Framework were not sufficiently specific such as the intermediate outcome indicator which measured "climate scenarios developed and adjusted to regional and provincial levels". Also, most of the indicators focused on outputs rather than outcomes.

b. M&E Implementation

The original Results Framework was modified during the June 2012 and March 2016 restructuring. One PDO and three intermediate outcome indicators and three targets were modified to reflect changes in project scope and institutional arrangements. The ICR (p. 16) stated that by the end of project implementation, data for all indicators was collected and recorded in the Results Framework.

According to the additional information provided by the Bank team via email on May 13, 2018 the M&E data was deemed reliable and of good quality. Data at project level was collected by participating community



members. County level data was consolidated by the county M&E officers and then sent to the Secretariat at national level. According to the Bank team, M&E staffing was deemed adequate.

The key M&E challenges were related to delays in collecting and moving data from the counties to the Secretariat as a result of poor infrastructure and network connectivity challenges in some of the counties. This oftentimes delayed data consolidation and reporting at national level.

The Bank team stated in an email on May 13, 2018 that the likelihood of sustaining the M&E functions and capacity after project closure is deemed high. At national level M&E specialists from the Ministry were used. At county level, KACCAL used existing county M&E functions. These functions have remained even after KACCAL's closure and are proving valuable for other projects such the KCSAP. County Climate Change Experts whose role also included an oversight dimension for M&E were integrated into the county government structures after the project closed. In addition, as part of the KACCAL exit strategy, the National Government signed MoUs with the Counties committing them to support activities/functions supported under the project.

c. M&E Utilization

The ICR (p. 16) stated that M&E data was not used to inform decision making or to modify actions to improve project implementation.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as category B and triggered the Bank's safeguard policies OP/BP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP/BP 4.04 (Natural Habits), OP/BP 4.09 (Pest Management) and OP/BP 4.10 (Indigenous People). When the project was relinked to KPAP, OP/BP 4.04 was no longer triggered since activities were only implemented on existing farmland and the project did not finance activities in protected areas.

The project developed, disclosed and applied an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), an Integrated Pest management Framework (IPFM), and an Indigenous People's Planning Framework (IPFF). Furthermore, all of the 156 micro-projects were screened according to the ESMF and an Environmental Impact Assessment Studies were conducted for all 14 ICIs. The project trained stakeholders and beneficiaries in environmental and social safeguards before the sub-projects were implemented. Also, the project conducted a social assessment to identify vulnerable marginalized groups/indigenous people and ensure their inclusion in project activities.

The project also established a grievance redress mechanism (GRM) which used county level implementation committees to channel conflict resolution and amicable settlement of disagreements. The complaints were documented by the M&E officer in a complaint register at the CSU level. According to the



ICR (p. 17) the project complied with all environmental and social safeguard requirements.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial Management:

During project preparation the financial management risk was rated Substantial. A Country Policy and Institutional Assessment identified weaknesses in governance and judiciary, corruption and the 2008 post-election crisis. Since the Arid Lands Resource Management Project II faced several financial management issues, the KACCAL project identified and implemented additional measures to strengthen its internal controls. The ICR stated (p. 18) that the project fully complied with the Bank's financial reporting requirements. The Kenya National Audit Office prepared quarterly interim financial reports and annual audit reports in a timely manner. The project experienced implementation delays due to the government's slow internal bureaucracy with the project's internal flow of funds despite relatively simple flow of funds procedures. The ICR (p.29) stated that FM reporting indicated that there were no identified incidences of fraud. According to the email sent by the Bank team on May 13, 2018, the external auditor's opinion was not qualified.

Procurement:

The Bank team stated via Email on May 13, 2018 that the project followed the Bank's procurement guidelines. Also, overall procurement capacity was adequate. At the national level there was a fulltime Procurement Officer and a Procurement Assistant solely dedicated to the project. At the county and community level the project relied on the County Procurement Officers to assist in procurement matters.

According to the ICR (p. 18) the project experienced significant procurement related delays. At the national level delays resulted from bottlenecks within the Ministerial Tender Committee (MTF). The ICR (p. 14) stated that these delays resulted in the non-alignment between fund receipt, annual workplans and budget and led to the disruption of implementation sequencing of critical project activities such as planting materials for demonstrations on tree planting, tree seedlings and grasses were distributed late in and out of season and therefore not achieving the impact as planned. The Bank team stated via email on May 13, 2018 that the main procurement bottlenecks in the MTF included: (i) difficulty in getting the committee members to constitute a quorum on a timely basis which significantly delayed reviews; and (ii) the members were not professional procurement officers and therefore could not give professional opinions on procurement matters. The Bank consistently pushed the Government to speed up procurement processes during support missions but was limited in what it could realistically achieve since KACCAL had to follow the country procurement systems. The MTC has now been abolished by the Government because of numerous complaints from different ministries. Overall, according to the Bank team, the project's finance and procurement management issues were handled in compliance with the existing GoK procedures and Bank guidelines. Kenya's Public Finance Management Act and guidelines were the key documents which guided project FM issues. Procurement was in accordance with Kenya's Procurement Act and World Bank approved procurement plans. The Secretariat flagged fiduciary issues to the Ministry on time as well as sought the guidance from the Bank team on how to resolve them.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

NA



d. Other

12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Modest	Modest	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Since the Quality of Entry was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory and Supervision was rated Moderately Satisfactory, the ICRR guidelines state that the rating for the overall Bank Performance will be determined by the overall Outcome Rating. The overall Outcome rating was Moderately Satisfactory and thus tips Bank Performance above the satisfactory line.
Borrower Performance	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Modest	---

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

The ICR (p. 31) provides useful lessons learned, adapted by IEG below:

- **It is critical for projects that include the CDD approach to allow for sufficient time for consultations, community mobilization and sensitization before project activities are being implemented.** This project, due to critical implementation delays, did not allow for sufficient time for consultations and



sensitization initiatives. The Bank team stated in an Email sent on May 13, 2018 that according to beneficiaries consulted during preparation of the end of project impact evaluation study, a longer implementation timeframe would have allowed for the following: (i) longer technology demonstration and training period, and therefore more time to absorb and internalize the information; (ii) a higher number of beneficiaries to be reached; (iii) and a higher uptake rate of adaptation technologies and practices for improved resilience. For those adopted technologies that had particularly strong potential for higher earnings, more beneficiaries would have had an opportunity to reap the benefits of improved economic impacts.

- **For agricultural project it is important that budgetary planning and the flow of funds are aligned with climatic patterns/seasonality instead of the government's budgetary cycle.** In this project the delay in flow of funds from the treasury to the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries had a negative impact on the implementation of project activities such as the delivery of seeds during drought season.

- **Taking socio-economic factors into account is critical for ensuring the uptake of climate adaptive technologies by local communities.** In this project, in some cases, such as in apiculture, the uptake of modern/improved bee hives, while being considered highly effective, proved to be cost prohibitive for many beneficiaries in some of the counties due to the high cost of the technology.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR provides a good overview of project preparation and implementation and estimated the NPV and IRR for a few sub-projects. The ICR is concise and internally consistent. However, the ICR does not provide sufficient information on critical areas such as financial management, procurement, M&E, and how the project was affected by various political crises. Also, the ICR mentions the government's Vision 30 and National Policy for Sustainable Development of ASALs but does not provide any details. Furthermore, even though the ICR provides interesting lessons learned, it does not explain what the impact of project shortcomings such as shortened implementation time for CDD activities was. Finally, the ICR is not outcome driven and does not provide sufficient analysis to show how the outputs produced under the project led to the outcomes.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Modest