Report Number : ICRR0020713

1. Project Data

Project ID P099918	**Project Name** HT (APL1) Education For All	
Country Haiti	**Practice Area(Lead)** Education	**Additional Financing** P121193,P121193
L/C/TF Number(s) IDA-H2860,IDA-H5880	**Closing Date (Original)** 31-Jan-2011	**Total Project Cost (USD)** 12,420,000.00
Bank Approval Date 26-Apr-2007	**Closing Date (Actual)** 31-May-2012	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	25,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	37,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	37,845,737.31	0.00

Prepared by	Reviewed by	ICR Review Coordinator	Group
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Financing Agreement (page 5), the project objective was to assist the Recipient in implementing its National Education for All strategy, through

- **Improving access to primary education for poor children age 6 through 12; while**
- **Improving equity, quality, and governance of the education sector.**

According to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 16), and the Project Paper for the Additional

Financing (page 4), the project objectives were as follows:

- **To improve access and equity of primary education;**
- **To operationalize partnerships between public and non-public sectors; and**
- **To build capacity to assess learning outcomes.**

According to the restructuring papers and the ICR, the Financing (legally binding) Agreement was incorrect in applying the Program-wide objective rather than the project-specific objective. IEG concurs with this assessment and relies on the PAD statement as the actual project objective (and hence there has been no revision of the PDOs). However, the targets for the key outcome indicators were revised: for the first two objectives, the targets were revised upward due to the additional financing and are not considered "restructured"; the target for the key outcome indicator for the third objective was revised downward and is considered "restructured," and therefore a split rating is applied only to the third objective.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

Yes

d. Components

1. Improved Access to Primary Education (Appraisal: US$ 22.7 million; AF: US$ 6.3 million; Actual: US$ 26.8 million): This component aimed to increase access to primary education by overcoming financial barriers for poor families, increasing the supply of available teachers, and increasing local accountability through school management committees. Activities included: provision of tuition subsidies to poor out-of-school children that could be used in non-public schools; pre-service teacher training program; and technical assistance to existing or newly-formed school management committees to manage funds and supervise school programs.

2. Improved Quality of Primary Education Services (Appraisal: US$ 8.3 million; AF: US$ 0.3 million; Actual: US$ 7.4 million): This component aimed to develop multi-grade learning approaches in primary education and address health and nutritional deficiencies among students. Activities included: development of strategies and policies regarding multi-grade classes; development of teaching materials; provision of teacher training; distribution of school lunches; and provision of de-worming medicines. There was also to be a pilot program for community-driven school feeding, in an effort to mobilize communities and local structures to participate in school feeding activities.

3. Improve Governance of MENFP (Appraisal: US$ 1.4 million; AF: US$ 0.5 million; Actual: US$ 1.8 million): This component aimed to increase the capacity of the Ministry of Education and Vocational

Training (MENFP) to manage the education sector and to improve transparency and governance. Activities included: technical assistance on fiduciary management of public funds; establishment of a National Education Partnership Office (NEPO) to support policy dialogue and operational collaboration between public and non-public sectors; and accreditation of non-public schools.

4. Project Coordination and Evaluation (Appraisal: US$ 1.5 million; AF: US$ 0.5 million; Actual: US$ 1.7 million): This component was to support project management, including an extensive evaluation program (qualitative and quantitative impact studies of the tuition subsidy and school feeding programs).

At the time of project restructuring, following a January 2010 earthquake, the following revisions were made to the project components:
1. Increase in funding for the tuition subsidy program, to allow provision of subsidies for an additional school year. Pre-service teacher training was shifted to a separate Bank operation.
2. Increase in funding for the school feeding program, to expand coverage. Multi-grade learning activities were scaled down to encompass only policy development.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost

- The appraised project cost was US$ 25.0 million; with Additional Financing of US$ 12.0 million, the total appraised cost was US$ 37.0 million. The actual project cost was US$ 38.2 million; the ICR does not provide a reason for the higher actual cost, compared to the appraised cost.

Financing

- The project was financed entirely by an IDA grant of US$ 25.0 million, at appraisal.
- Additional Financing in the form of a US$ 12.0 million IDA Grant was provided to continue the tuition subsidy program for one more school year and to expand coverage of the school feeding and health program.

Borrower contribution

- There was no planned Borrower contribution.

Dates

- *January 2010*: An earthquake occurred and caused significant destruction to physical infrastructure and human resources, including in the Ministry of Education and in project schools/communities. Project implementation came to a halt for the first half of 2010, and subsequent project decisions and implementation performance were substantially affected by this event.
- *May 2010*: Additional Financing was approved and the project underwent minor restructuring. The results framework was refined, including a correction in the project objective statement. The target for one key outcome indicator was revised downward. The project closing date was extended from January 2011 to May 2012.
- *May 2012*: There was a reallocation of funds among expenditure categories to account for higher than anticipated spending on Components 1 and 2, and lower spending on Components 3 and 4.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

Haiti is one of the most disadvantaged countries in the world, as reflected by its low ranking on the UN Human Development Index (ranked 153 out of 177 countries in 2005) and 78% poverty rate (2001 living conditions survey data), compounded by near non-existence of quality public social services. The primary education net enrollment rate was 71% in 2006, with an unprecedented 80% of students attending non-public schools, and approximately 500,000 children aged 6-11 who did not attend school of any kind. 43% of parents stated that the reason for non-enrollment was inability to pay for school tuition and associated fees. There was also a dearth of trained teachers (10,000 new teachers needed to achieve globally-set education goals, while only 450 are newly certified each year) as well as limited involvement of parents and local communities in school management, hence lack of accountability. Lastly, there are inequities in access according to gender and also in public financing for education.

The project objectives are substantially relevant and directly responsive to the government's country conditions as well as its National Strategy for Education For All, which sets policies and goals for access to primary education. The Bank's Country Assistance Strategy at the time of project closing (FY 2009-2012) includes investing in human capital as one of three key pillars. Following the massive destruction caused by the earthquake in 2010 and shifting government priorities, the relevance of increased access to education remained strongly relevant, although the other objectives related to public-private partnerships and assessment of learning outcomes were somewhat diminished in relevance.

Rating	**Revised Rating**
Substantial	Substantial

b. Relevance of Design

The project aimed to address both supply and demand side aspects of school enrollment. Project interventions to increase demand for school enrollment - tuition subsidies and school lunch/health activities - were likely to achieve the objective of increased access to education. Project interventions to increase supply of school opportunities - teacher training and curriculum support - were also likely to achieve this objective. The former was designed to target poor students (offered in poor communities and at sufficiently low levels to discourage interest from higher income families) in order to support the equity objective. The project design also addressed low capacity of the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training by developing institutional mechanisms to partner with the private sector and to assess educational outcomes. However, there were some project activities that were not directly relevant to the results chain; for example, activities to improve quality (multi grade learning policy, training, and learning materials; provision of Creole language textbooks).

Rating	Revised Rating
Substantial	Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

To improve access and equity of primary education

Rationale

Outputs

- Provision of subsidies to 1,212 non-public schools to cover costs for poor out-of-school children. These subsidies were originally intended to cover tuition and school fees but were subsequently also used to cover teacher salaries and learning materials for schools, as well as some capital improvements (due to earthquake damage).
- Provision of school lunches and de-worming medicine through integrated school health and nutrition programs. However, the pilot community-driven school feeding program was not implemented due to capacity constraints.

Outcomes

Access

- Tuition subsidies were provided to cover 285,000 person-years (original cohort of children from year one, followed by second and third cohorts in years two and three; all cohorts continued to receive subsidies each year of the project period). This surpassed the original target of 135,000 children, which translates into 250,000 person-years. However, this fell short of the revised target of 390,000. According to the ICR (Data Sheet), the remaining 140,000 person-years were covered through funding from other donors, which had been catalyzed by the Bank project. The ICR (page 13) also suggests that the beneficiary students might otherwise not have attended school and that these schools did not have other sources of funding.

- School lunches and de-worming medicines were provided to cover 150,000 person-years. This surpassed the original target of 25,000 children, which translates into 75,000 person-years, but fell short of the revised target of 210,000 person-years. According to the ICR (Data Sheet), the remaining 60,000 person-years were covered through funding from other donors.

However,

- There were no data available on actual increases in enrollment rates of previously out-of-school children. The key outcome indicator on Grade 1 intake capacity (47% at baseline) was dropped. Planned impact studies were not carried out due to capacity issues and complications arising from the earthquake, although technical audits were completed to confirm use of funds.

Equity

- The ICR (page 13) suggests that while the subsidy program was self-targeting (students volunteered to apply for the program), the amount of subsidy (US$ 90) was set at the lowest end of the range of primary school tuition costs, and therefore it was likely that only poorer students would self-select into the program. The poverty rate in the entire country is 78%, further suggesting that poor students comprised a significant proportion of the general school population, and therefore it is likely that poor students benefitted.
- Participating schools in the school health and nutrition program were selected according to poverty maps, suggesting that poor students comprised a significant portion of the beneficiaries. The ICR (page 14) reports anecdotal evidence that many students in these schools had been listless and had poor school attendance because of lack of nutrition at home, and that the nutrition program was a powerful incentive to attend school.

However,

- There were no data available specifically disaggregated by income or gender to confirm actual improvements in equity of access.

Rating
Substantial

Objective 2

Objective

To operationalize partnerships between public and non-public sectors

Rationale

Outputs

- Development of mechanisms to increase partnerships between non-public schools and government agencies, including the program for tuition subsidies (which identified objective criteria, financing mechanisms and reporting processes) and accreditation processes.
- Development of school canteen program through participation of four NGOs.

However,

- The National Education Partnership Office (NEPO) was not made operational as planned, although the law authorizing the establishment of NEPO was approved by Parliament. This was a key project output that was not completed, although partnerships were still made operational through the Ministry of Education.
- Also, school management committees (SMCs), which were to be a key institutional means for managing tuition subsidies, were established and supported by the project, but there is limited information on the capabilities of the SMCs. For example, SMCs were originally intended to have responsibility for the use of funds reports; however, the ICR notes they did not fulfill this function due to "capacity constraints" (ICR, Data Sheet).

Outcomes

- Participation in subsidy program by 1,212 non-public schools, which needed to undergo accreditation process prior to receiving funds. This surpassed the original target of 500 and the revised target of 1,100.
- 76% of participating schools submitted "use of funds" reports. This fell slightly short of the original target of 80% (no revisions in target).

Rating

Substantial

Objective 3

Objective

To build capacity to assess learning outcomes

Rationale
Outputs

- Design and administration of a Grade 2 literacy competency test, the first assessment of its kind in the country.

Outcomes

- The Grade 2 literacy competency test was applied to 84 schools, falling far short of the original target of 200 schools. The shortfall was due in part to higher than anticipated costs of carrying out this activity. The ICR also notes that the shortfall was due to "capacity constraints in schools" (ICR, page 3).
- The ICR (page 9) notes that physical investments in the MENFP were largely destroyed in the earthquake and that there was much turnover in staff leaving the Ministry to work outside of the government. Therefore, the capacity development may not be fully sustained.

Rating
Modest

Objective 3 Revision 1

Revised Objective
Objective is not revised, but target was revised downward.

Revised Rationale
Outcomes

- The Grade 2 literacy competency test was applied to 84 schools, nearly achieving the revised target of 86. This test provided baseline data to subsequently measure improvements in learning outcomes.

Revised Rating
Substantial

5. Efficiency

The economic analysis in the PAD (Annex 9) provides an assessment of costs and benefits. Costs are calculated as project costs for the tuition subsidy, school feeding, and multi-grade learning activities. Benefits are estimated according to additional completed years of schooling and the incremental increase in lifetime income. The internal rate of return is calculated as 17.0%.

The economic analysis in the ICR (Annex 3) updates this assessment, although costs are calculated from the tuition subsidy and school feeding activities only. Benefits are similarly estimated according to additional completed years of schooling and the incremental increase in lifetime income. The updated internal rate of return is calculated as 13.0%, which is lower than expected at appraisal despite full disbursement of funds.

The restructuring papers and the ICR both report the significant impact of delayed tranche disbursements for tuition subsidies. Late payments to schools resulted in schools being forced to operate without sufficient income for over a year, some resorting to debt, wage arrears, or collection of tuition fees. The impact of the earthquake was also such that 100 schools were destroyed and there were numerous delays in project implementation.

Efficiency Rating
Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	17.00	75.00 ☐Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	13.00	70.00 ☐Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Project under original targets - Moderately Satisfactory
Relevance of the project objectives and design are Substantial. Achievement of the objective to improve access and equity to primary education is rated Substantial due to effective implementation of activities that addressed barriers to school access, although there were no data on actual improvements in enrollment rate. Achievement of the objective to operationalize public and non-public partnerships is rated Substantial due to effective implementation of coordination mechanisms. Achievement of the objective to build capacity to assess learning outcomes is rated Modest due to significant shortfall in the target number of schools participating in the literacy assessment. Efficiency is rated Modest across the entire project period due to significant implementation challenges (such as late tranche disbursements of tuition subsidies and the earthquake) that likely affected schools' ability to function optimally.

Project under revised targets - Moderately Satisfactory
Ratings are the same, except that achievement of the objective to build capacity to assess learning outcomes is

rated Substantial due to meeting of the revised target.

<u>Overall outcome</u> - Moderately Satisfactory
According to harmonized IEG/OPCS guidelines, the overall outcome of a restructured project is calculated by weighting the proportion of the grant that disbursed before and after the restructuring. As the ratings for this project are the same for before and after restructuring, the overall outcome is also Moderately Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

A Medium-Term Expenditure Framework for education was not completed as planned, putting at risk the sustainability of government support to primary education goals. Therefore, the main project activities that supported increased access to education - tuition subsidies and school feeding - remain entirely dependent on donor funding. Capacity development efforts were also less effective than planned, both at the central level and for school management committees; therefore, insufficient capacity to sustain programs remains a substantial risk.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Substantial

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project design incorporated lessons specific to the country context, such as the need to partner with the non-public sector given its prominent role in the education sector, and the need to address demand-side issues. The project was assessed as a high-risk operation given the fragile political and security environment, limited transparency in government functioning, and weak institutional capacity, both within the sector and in managing donor funds. Two key mitigation measures were setting aside project preparation funds for a comprehensive and rapid fiduciary capacity building program and assigning management of the tuition subsidy program to the Ministry of Education in the absence of the National Education Partnership Office. In addition, project implementation arrangements were detailed, with mechanisms to promote transparency in decision-making and processing of transactions. However, institutional capacity (both within the Ministry and especially in school management committees) was still overestimated given the ambitious project objectives and complex design. The M&E design reflected a realistic approach of tracking mostly outputs, while planning for impact evaluations to assess actual outcomes.

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The Bank team responded to implementation challenges that were greatly exacerbated by the earthquake in 2010. The Additional Financing and restructuring was used to scale up interventions that were having impact, while also dropping activities that were less relevant and thereby sharpening focus on achieving project objectives. Implementation arrangements were also adjusted, including the mechanism for disbursing tuition payments to schools; instead of requiring use of funds reports from school management committees, independent firms were hired to conduct technical audits to verify the number of students in schools eligible for the subsidy. In the absence of a well-functioning public sector, the project implementation arrangements also served as a conduit for additional donor support, which was used to scale up activities and increase impact. However, the project restructuring was a missed opportunity to further revise the results framework, as it was clear at that point that the impact evaluations would not be carried out. There were no fiduciary problems reported.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The government was overall committed to the project objectives and strongly supported the key project interventions of the tuition subsidies and school feeding. However, there was less commitment to carrying out institutional changes, including the lack of political will to operationalize the National Education Partnership Office (NEPO). The ICR notes that this shortcoming was in part due to in-fighting over which office would have the power to select schools for subsidies. There were also political obstacles to appointing the Director General and managing staff of NEPO.

Government Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

Following the earthquake and the negative impact on human resource capacity at the Ministry of Education (MENFP), the project coordinating unit (PCU) took on more responsibilities and operated in a more autonomous capacity. This facilitated project implementation to some extent, but also contributed to less ownership and capacity building within the broader MENFP. The PCU continued to experience implementation constraints, for example in processing use of funds reports from schools and signing agreements with NGOs for the school feeding program. These led to significantly delayed disbursements and operational hardships for schools. There were no fiduciary problems reported.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

Given the overall lack of data for the education sector, the project M&E framework focused on output indicators (i.e. number of subsidies provided) rather than on outcome indicators (i.e. net enrollment rates). The M&E design also included several impact evaluations as part of efforts to address the data shortcomings. There were some weaknesses in the selection of indicators; for example, the number of tuition subsidies provided and the number of school lunches provided were not clearly linked to increased enrollment. The upward revised targets at the time of Additional Financing reflected sector wide targets (Bank + donor funding) rather than those that could be more clearly attributed to Bank support. This was likely due to the fact that the project was implemented in partnership with the Education For All - Fast Track Initiative, involving all major donors, such that a single set of monitoring indicators and reporting framework were utilized for the sector.

b. M&E Implementation

Project monitoring was carried out mostly as planned, although a significant shortcoming was the failure to carry out impact evaluations (due to the earthquake and capacity constraints).

c. M&E Utilization

There is limited information on the use of M&E, aside from informing the targets and parameters of the Additional Financing.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as a Category "C" project and no safeguard policies were triggered.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management: Fiduciary capacity of the Ministry of Education was characterized by limited experience and insufficient capacity, and therefore extensive capacity building was planned through a project preparation facility allocation. Financial reports were submitted regularly, and annual audit reports were often delayed but had no major qualifications or breaches reported.

Procurement: There were limited procurement needs for the project, aside from contracting NGOs for the school feeding program. The latter experienced delays, but there were no other significant problems reported on procurement.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

None reported.

d. Other

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12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome	Substantial	Substantial	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

Note
When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

Lessons drawn from the ICR:

- A project's implementation arrangements and mechanisms can help to sustain the provision of basic services in the context of a fragile environment. In this case, the earthquake had severely damaged physical and institutional infrastructure, while the PCU was able to maintain functions and even serve as a mechanism for channeling additional donor funds to the basic education sector.
- The use of non-public sector institutions can help to ensure service provision in a fragile state. In this case, the use of private schools (to deliver primary education) and NGOs (to deliver school feeding programs) was effective in delivering services especially to poor populations.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR quality is overall satisfactory and results-oriented, although the robustness of the evidence is constrained by a general lack of data in the country. The discussion of Efficiency is insufficient; although the ICR is candid about the severe impact of the earthquake and implementation capacity constraints, the analysis does not take into account the impact on efficiency in the use of project resources. Lessons are informative for project operations in fragile states. Annex 1, Table (b), reports an "Actual/Latest Estimate" of US$ 97.93 million which appears incorrect.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial