



Report Number : ICRR0020636

1. Project Data

Project ID

P100619

Project Name

GH-Urban Transport Project SIL (FY07)

Country

Ghana

Practice Area(Lead)

Transport & ICT

L/C/TF Number(s)

IDA-43340

Closing Date (Original)

31-Dec-2012

Total Project Cost (USD)

173,000,000.00

Bank Approval Date

21-Jun-2007

Closing Date (Actual)

15-Dec-2015

IBRD/IDA (USD)
Grants (USD)

Original Commitment

45,000,000.00

0.00

Revised Commitment

44,836,175.88

0.00

Actual

44,361,373.73

0.00

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Project ID

P092509

Project Name

GH-GEF Urban Transport Project (P092509)

L/C/TF Number(s)

TF-90550

Closing Date (Original)

31-Dec-2012

Total Project Cost (USD)

90,000,000.00



Bank Approval Date	Closing Date (Actual)	
21-Jun-2007	15-Dec-2015	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	0.00	7,000,000.00
Revised Commitment	0.00	6,835,093.67
Actual	0.00	6,835,093.67

2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The project development objective (PDO) in the Financing Agreement (page 5) and in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 8) is: "to support the Recipient in improving mobility in the areas of participating metropolitan, municipal or district assemblies (MMDAs). The PAD adds that the objective would be achieved "through a combination of traffic engineering measures, management improvements, regulation of the public transport industry, and implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system".

□

In the GEF Grant Agreement (page 6), the objective is "promoting a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes and encouraging lower urban transport-related greenhouse gas emissions along the pilot BRT corridor in Accra."

The Global Environment Objective (GEO) is to promote a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes and encourage lower transport-related GHG [green-house gas] emissions along the pilot BRT corridor in Accra (PAD, page 8).

This Review is based on the statement of objectives in the Financing Agreement.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

Note: The actual project cost by components is not provided by the ICR. The cost table in Annex 3 provides figures for IDA and GEF financing but not AFD financing. □

Main Project Components: □



Component 1: Institutional Development (appraisal estimate US\$13.6 million): (i) support strengthening of ministries and agencies concerned with urban transport, transport operators, and MMDAs; and (ii) strengthen the Urban Passenger Transport Units (UPTUs) within each assembly and create an Urban Passenger Transport Coordinating Group (UPTCG) for the Accra and Kumasi MMDAs to plan, regulate, and monitor urban transport operations and services.□

Revised component at the first restructuring (December 7, 2012): The scope of the component was expanded to establish a Greater Accra Passenger Transport Executive (GAPTE) to plan and regulate passenger transport operations in the Metropolitan Area.□

Revised component at the second restructuring (December 3, 2014): Due to management and budget issues, the Center for Urban Transport (CUT) was temporarily closed in 2012 (four years after its establishment). At the time of the second restructuring, a decision was taken to cease support to CUT.□

Component 2: Traffic Engineering, Management, and Safety (appraisal estimate US\$26.9 million): (i) improve traffic management in Accra MMDA and Kumasi areas; and (ii) develop area wide traffic signal control in Accra and Kumasi MMDAs.□

Revised component at the second restructuring: Area wide traffic signal control in the Kumasi Metropolitan Area was dropped, as the Government decided to use other sources of funds to implement this. The unused funds were reallocated to strengthen traffic enforcement along the Quality Bus Service (QBS) route.□

Component 3: Development of a Bus Rapid Transit System (appraisal estimate US\$46.0 million): (i) design and implement the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) infrastructure along the Graphic Road/Winneba Road Corridor in Accra (including segregated bus lanes [9.1km], interchange facilities, terminals, and facilities for pedestrians and non-motorized transport; (ii) engagement with key stakeholders; (iii) establish public relations and media strategy; and (iv) overall management and operationalization of the BRT system.□

Revised component at the second restructuring: Due to significant cost escalation of the first phase of infrastructure development and a design and cost update for the remaining BRT trunk route, the Government opted for provision of the Quality Bus Service (QBS) along the Amasaman and Adenta corridors instead of the BRT route from Mallam to the Central Business District (CBD).□

The BRT consultation, communications, and media strategy was revised to focus on the QBS corridor rather than the BRT trunk road. Also, management and operationalization of the BRT system was revised to include the management and operationalization of the QBS.□

Component 4: Integration of Urban Development and Transport Planning for Better Environmental Management (appraisal estimate US\$2.0 million): Support to the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) and respective MMDAs in updating the integrated urban and transport development plans for the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area.□

Component 5: Project Outcome Monitoring (appraisal estimate US\$1.5 million): Conduct studies to support the monitoring of project outcomes.□

New Component added at third restructuring (August 11, 2015) – Emergency Works and Consulting Services (US\$6.4 million): This component included emergency repairs to drainage systems, buildings, and roads.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Costs: The actual total projects cost calculated on the basis of the sources of financing is



US\$62.8 (the ICR does not provide total cost figures) was considerably lower than the appraisal estimate of US\$90.0 million. This was partly because the Bus Rapid Transport sub-component was dropped and replaced by the cheaper Quality Bus Service. □

Financing: At appraisal, the IDA credit amount was US\$45.0 million and the GEF contribution was US\$7.0 million. The actual IDA credit was US\$44.4 million and the GEF contribution was US\$6.8 million. □

Cofinancing: The project was co-financed by the French Development Agency (AFD). At appraisal, funds from the AFD were estimated at US\$20 million, but Euro 20 million was formally approved which, at the time, was equivalent to US\$27.0 million. The actual financing was US\$9.7 million. This was partially because the Traffic Control Center (area wide) faced delays and the bidding documents for these works were submitted for no objection at the time of the writing of the ICR. □

Borrower Contribution: The actual counterpart financing was US\$18.0 million, same as the appraisal financing commitment amount. □

Dates: The project closed on December 15, 2015, three years after the original closing date. There were three restructurings:

- On December 7, 2012, to extend the closing date by 23.5 months from December 31, 2012 to December 15, 2014. According to the projects paper (page 6), "during this 23.5 months extension period the Recipient will be expected to meet all the outlined steps of the action plan (except formal adoption of legislation creating GAPTE) and implement outstanding works."
- On December 3, 2014, to provide a six-month extension of the closing date to June 15, 2015 to allow additional time to complete ongoing civil works contracts on the Amasaman corridor.
- On December 8, 2015, to extend the closing date by a further six months to December 15, 2015 to utilize the remaining, uncommitted funds for emergency road repairs in Accra following the recent devastating floods.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

At preparation, the urban transport sector in Accra was facing serious issues associated with rapid urbanization and motorization. The existing institutional framework for the management of urban passenger transport in Ghana was fragmented.

The project objective □ was aligned to the first pillar of the World Bank Group's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for Ghana for the period FY08-11 (current at appraisal). However, urban transport was not explicitly discussed under the first pillar "private sector competitiveness," and the CAS stated (page 8) that the Bank "will continue its engagement in the transport sector to support private sector competitiveness". The CAS (page 11) noted that urbanization is expected to increase to 58 percent, and for cities like Accra and Kumasi, infrastructure investments are essential to their growth and progress. The CAS (page 9) □ further noted that "to address urban challenges and improve personal mobility in Ghana cities" an urban transport project □ had been □ prepared.

□

The project objective is aligned with the second pillar of the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) □ for the



period FY13-16 (current at completion): "improving competitiveness and job creation". Improved mobility of goods and passengers is listed as a CPS indicator under the outcome target "improved delivery of infrastructure".

Since the CAS and CPS do not mention urban transport and improved mobility is not featured explicitly, the relevance of objectives is rated **substantial**.

Rating

Substantial

b. Relevance of Design

The design included a clear and focused statement of objective. There was a logical causal link between the project activities, their outputs and the intended outcomes. The project was innovative and aimed to develop the first Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in Sub-Saharan Africa. Experience of BRT in Latin American Countries has shown that buses operating in dedicated bus lanes can reduce travel time by bypassing general traffic. Shifting from informal *tro tro* (*tro tro*'s are minibuses seating 12–14 passengers and working along pre-defined routes) and private cars to larger capacity buses with better emission standards would reduce the number of private cars and public transport vehicles and contribute to a reduction in CO2 emissions. Also, given the fragmented nature of the urban transport sector, the project included a component to strengthen the urban transport sector's institutional structure. The project's results framework included outcome indicators to measure the PDO "improved mobility" (see section 10).

Rating

Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1

Objective

Project Development Objective (PDO): Support the Recipient in improving mobility in the areas of participating MMDAs.

Rationale

Outputs

- Only 10 out of 85 buses that were to be operated on the Amasaman-CBD corridor had been delivered by project closure (December 2015), with the remaining buses arriving after closure (ICR, para 14). The



newly purchased buses meet Euro III emission standards.

- Traffic lights were installed along the QBS corridor. However, traffic control centers in Accra and Kumasi were not established.
- An inter-district body, the Greater Accra Passenger Transport Executive (GAPTE) was established to coordinate, plan, regulate, and monitor bus transit operations and urban transport operations. However, the planned technical support to GAPTE for the initial operation of the QBS did not materialize because the project closed before the QBS became operational. At project closure, GAPTE was facing difficulties in securing operating funds, although it is expected to generate revenue from bus route contracts and lease management fees.
- Both national and subnational urban transport management structures were established through the formation of the Urban Passenger Transport Unit's (UPTU) at the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assembly.
- The Center for Urban Transport (CUT) was established in 2010. However, due to administrative and financial difficulties, CUT was dissolved in 2014 before becoming a fully functional advisory body.
- The Cabinet approved the Urban Development Policy framework, but the integrated urban transport development plan was not updated.
- Policy guidelines, including a national guideline for the Regulation of Urban Passenger Transportation, were developed and disseminated. A framework to guide annual adjustments in transport fare structures for full cost recovery was also developed.
- The land use and spatial planning bill for the Tema Municipality Assembly (TMA), was passed in July, 2016. It defines inclusion of public transport routing in the structural plans.
- The project also developed the non-motorized transport (NMT) master plan for TMA, which provides the framework for an improved pedestrian and cyclist environment with improved road safety. The ICR notes (para 18) that this master plan can be used by other MMDAs.
- Registration of public transport was carried out and about 90 percent of public transport operators have type 'A' licenses in Accra.

Outcomes

The PDO of improving mobility in the areas of participating MMDAs was not achieved. The BRT component was dropped and the QBS was not operational at project closure. The QBS officially started operation on December 1, 2016. Data collected by the Greater Accra Passenger Transport Executive (GAPTE) during the first month of QBS operation (December 1, 2016-January 14, 2017) shows that 21 buses per day were deployed (84 percent of the target of 24). However, little concrete evidence of the impact of the QBS on travel time, speed, and emission levels on the QBS corridor was available to the ICR team. Ridership was low at 1,580 passengers per day, 7 percent of the target number of 22,500 passengers per day. Average travel time and speed in the first two weeks in January 2017 were 62.8 minutes and 21 km/hour, amounting to 27 percent and 10 percent of the respective targets.

The project contributed, to some degree, to the establishment of a basic regulatory and institutional framework for urban transport among the MMDAs.

Rating



Negligible

Objective 2

Objective

Global Environment Objective (GEO): Promote a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes and encouraging lower urban transport-related greenhouse gas emissions along the pilot BRT corridor in Accra.

Rationale

Outputs

Same as above.

Outcome

The GEO of promoting a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes and encouraging lower urban transport-related greenhouse gas emissions along the pilot BRT corridor in Accra was not achieved. The project's impact on modal shift was negligible because the BRT was dropped and the QBS had only been in operation for a month at the time of the writing of the ICR.

The new buses, which are compliant with the Euro III emission standard and are planned to be fully deployed on the QBS routes are expected to reduce air pollution along the corridor. However, no data were collected.

GEO is not rated.

The Global Environment Objective is not rated.

Rating

Not Rated/Not Applicable

5. Efficiency

Economic Efficiency:



At appraisal, an economic analysis of the BRT corridor was conducted, which accounted for 51 percent of the project cost. Costs included capital costs plus maintenance of the busway and associated terminal and modal interchanges. Fares on BRT corridor was assumed to be at the same level as existing *tro-tro* fares. For simplicity, a two-tier fare structure was assumed in which both users of the feeder services and trunk route users would pay 2,000 cedis. Therefore, users of both the feeder and trunk services would pay 4,000 cedis. Based upon the estimated annual usage of 69,400,000 passengers, annual revenue was expected to be 208,200 million cedis, or US\$23.13 million. Road user savings were quantified for the following: (i) vehicle operating costs; and (ii) travel time. The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) was estimated at 21 percent.

The ICR conducted an economic analysis of the Odaw Bridge expansion and the construction of the flyover over the railway along the original BRT corridor (33 percent of the project investment costs). The flyover and bridge were originally designed to provide extra lanes for the BRT corridor. Although the BRT was canceled, the improvements have nonetheless expanded traffic capacity in locations where the railway and river crossings had formerly caused a bottleneck. The evaluation followed the same approach as the ex-ante economic analysis in assessing road user benefits and the cost of the investments. The main benefits stemming from the flyover and bus priority corridor investments are reduced vehicle operating costs and travel time for passengers and freight. The ERR is estimated at 17.6 percent.

Administrative Efficiency:

The project experienced implementation delays, and the closing date was extended twice by a total of 2.5 years (29.5 months, or 45 percent of the originally planned duration). The ICR reports that there were considerable cost overruns. Actual total cost, estimated on the basis of the sources of financing (since the ICR does not provide actual cost figures), was US\$62.8 million. This compares to an appraisal estimate of US\$44 million after deducting the expected cost of the BRT, which was not implemented.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	21.00	51.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	17.60	33.00 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome



The relevance of objectives and design is rated substantial. However, there were major shortcomings in implementation leading to an unsatisfactory outcome assessment. The efficacy of the PDO of improving the mobility in the areas of participating MMDAs is rated negligible, while the GEO of promoting a shift to more environmentally sustainable urban transport modes and lowering greenhouse gas emissions was not achieved. Efficiency is assessed as modest.

a. Outcome Rating
Unsatisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Ridership risk: With the commencement of QBS on the Amasaman route, about 10 percent travel time reduction during the peak period was observed. The first month of QBS operation indicates some challenges, such as attracting passengers, issuance of integrated circuit (IC) cards, and so on. Once all 85 new buses are in operation, service quality is expected to improve and ridership might increase. Therefore, this risk is assessed as modest.

Environmental Risk: The new buses are compliant with the Euro III emission standard and are planned to be fully deployed on the QBS routes. The reduction in air pollution along the corridor is expected overtime. However, it is not clear if the required modal shift will occur, which is expected to reduce GHG emissions further. The environmental risk is therefore assessed as modest.

Institutional Risk: An inter-MMDA regulatory body, the Greater Accra Passenger Transport Executive (GAPTE) was established and by November 2014, three route contracts were awarded. The ICR reports (para 17) that GAPTE needs more time to support the QBS operation due to delays in civil works, delivery of buses, training bus drivers, development of a communication strategy, and agreements with public transport operators. Also, the project was never able to solve the fundamental problem of the fragmented institutional framework for urban transport in Ghana. The institutional risk is assessed as substantial.

Financial risk: The ICR reports (para 37 and page 17) that GAPTE is relying on revenue generated from fare collections and was facing challenges in securing sufficient financial resources. The financial risk is assessed as high.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating
Substantial

8. Assessment of Bank Performance



a. Quality-at-Entry

The project design was based on a World Bank policy paper on urban transport, including sector reform and the BRT system development. The project was developed under the framework defined by the Letter of National Transport Policy prepared by the Ghanaian Government in 2007. The project aimed to develop the first Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system in Sub-Saharan Africa, and lessons from the Bank's BRT projects in other countries (e.g. Brazil, Colombia, and Chile) were incorporated in project design. These included (a) the need for legislative, institutional, and management changes at the national, state, and municipal level; (b) reorganization of the urban transport service planning and delivery with integrated and inclusive decision making; (c) development of a full package of BRT designs (bus lanes, stops and junctions, network, Intelligent Transportation System, fare system) and operational arrangements; and (e) have a good monitoring system.

□

Many of the potential risks were identified and mitigation measures were prepared, and the overall project risk rating was substantial. However, the ICR reports (para 26) that the risks related to inadequate institutional sustainability, inability to provide counterpart funds, and ineffective M&E mechanisms were not identified.

Safeguards identification was satisfactory.

□

Significant shortcomings of quality at entry were: (a) the proposed BRT system in Accra was designed without up-to-date land use data and an urban transport plan for Greater Accra; and Accra's master plan was already outdated by preparation (para 25); (b) the design of the BRT system was not fully developed at appraisal - this contributed to significant delays, design changes, and cost overruns for the BRT, which was eventually dropped from the project; and (c) the PAD addressed the complementary pillars of the planned BRT: regulatory framework and institutions, structures for the passenger transport industry and for compliance with regulations, and infrastructure; but did not specify who would be responsible for overall management and operationalization of the BRT system.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

The midterm review (January 2012) found that project implementation was significantly behind schedule, specifically due to delays in civil works designs, inadequate government funding, and delayed establishment of the CUT and other operational entities. The Bank was flexible in restructuring the project and reallocating funds to the most promising activities. However, the project objective was not aligned with the replacement of the BRT by Quality Bus Service. The latter was never likely to meet the original project objective "improve mobility in areas of participating metropolitan, municipal, or district assemblies (MMDAs) through a combination of traffic engineering measures, management improvements, regulation of the public transport industry, and implementation of a Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system" According to the Government's comments on the ICR (ICR page 26), the Bank did not explore the option of Additional Financing to finance the BRT as originally conceived. □



The Bank team could have been more proactive in addressing concerns about M&E implementation, especially the lack of baseline and monitoring data (see Section 10 below).

□

Due to the revision of the GEO indicator in 2014, the causal linkage between the GEO and the indicator was lost and baseline data and the target for the revised GEO indicator were missing (see Section 10 below). Contrary to the project design, gaseous pollutant emissions were not monitored in the sites along either the BRT or QBS corridors.

□

According to the Government's comments on the ICR (ICR page 26), given the complexity of the project, sustained presence of the Washington-based task team leader (TTL) in the country might have helped to resolve the implementation challenges and delays. Furthermore, the transition from one TTL to the other was short.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

The ICR reports (page 30) that the project was implemented under three different administrations and suffered from implementation delays during the transition periods. Slow disbursements for about six months in 2008/2009 due to leadership changes caused delays in the approval and clearance of contracts by the Tender Board. The Government had originally committed US\$18 million to the project, of which US\$12.3 million was for the BRT infrastructure. However, the Government was unable to provide its counterpart funds, and this—together with the cost overruns—made it difficult to proceed with the BRT scheme.

However, the Government showed commitment towards some institutional reforms: (i) both national and subnational urban transport management structures were established through the formation of the Urban Passenger Transport Unit's (UPTU) at the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assembly; and (ii) the cabinet approved the Urban Development Policy framework. However, the integrated urban transport development plan was not updated.

Government Performance Rating

Moderately Unsatisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

- The fragmented organizational structures to deal with urban passenger transport in Ghana adversely affected project implementation. The original implementing agency was the Department of Urban Roads



(DUR), under the former Ministry of Roads & Transport (MoRT). In 2009, the transport sector was rearranged under two separate ministries: The Ministry of Roads & Highways (MoRH) and the Ministry of Transport (MoT). The DUR remained under the MoRH and was responsible for urban roads and the infrastructure of the BRT, but not the management of the BRT.

- The Ministry of Local Government & Rural Development (MLGRD) was added as the second implementing agency as the regulation of urban passenger transport was a devolved responsibility under the Local Government Act of 1993. However, the role of MLGRD in the overall planning and regulatory framework for urban transport was not defined.
- There was limited leadership and coordination among the various implementing agencies.
- The Project Advisory Office (PAO) monitored some of the project indicators but did not keep or submit formal written reports to the Bank (the location of this Office is not mentioned in the ICR).
- There were delays in completion of civil works, development of communications strategy, and agreements with public transport operators.
- There were procurement delays and procurement and related reports were frequently submitted behind schedule.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating

Unsatisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating

Unsatisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The project's results framework included outcome indicators to measure the PDO "improved mobility." These were: (a) reduction in average travel time for bus passenger, and (b) increase in average travel speed. Other than reduction in CO2 emissions, however, there was no indicator, such as modal shift, to measure the degree of attainment of the GEO. Also, there were no output indicators to enable assessment of the project's institutional activities such as building capacity to plan, regulate, coordinate, and monitor urban public transport services.

Although the PAD identified agencies responsible for M&E data collection, the data sources and methods were not defined.



b. M&E Implementation

The ICR reports (para 43) that though the Project Advisory Office (PAO) monitored some of the project indicators, no M&E reports were prepared. When CUT was established in 2010, it took on the overall M&E responsibility, but CUT was later dissolved in 2014. Data such as travel speed, travel time, and GHG emission before and at the restructuring were not collected.

□

Due to the revision of the GEO indicator in 2014, the causal linkage between the GEO and the indicator was lost. Although the GEO remained unchanged in its reference to the pilot BRT corridor, the GEO target indicator was changed in 2014 from the pilot BRT corridor to the QBS corridor. Even so, baseline data and for the revised GEO indicator were not collected and the target was not specified. Gaseous pollutants were not monitored in the sites along both the planned BRT and QBS corridors under the project. The Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) installed the air quality monitoring sites along the BRT corridor, but these were only measuring particulates, not GHG emissions. This issue was already identified during the 2008 supervision mission, but nothing was done about it.

Some efforts were made to mainstream M&E within sector organizations and project implementation entities, including conducting M&E workshops and project management training, recruitment of M&E consultants, and supporting a unit for M&E in CUT. Nonetheless, these efforts were unable to make a significant contribution to establishing a culture of M&E in the urban transport sector (ICR, para 45).

c. M&E Utilization

M&E Quality Rating

Negligible

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

At appraisal, the project was assigned Environmental Category “A” and three safeguards policies were triggered: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP/GP 4.0 1); Cultural Property (OP 4.11); and Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12).

According to the PAD, an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared and disclosed, prior to appraisal. No adverse environmental impacts were identified by the ESMF. The PAD (page 28) stated that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), with accompanying environmental management plans (EMP), would be prepared after the detailed design of the BRT were done and prior to the road upgrading civil works along the BRT corridor. Appropriate mitigation measures and management



arrangements would be designed to ensure compliance and appropriate implementation of the Environmental Management Plan (EMP).

Despite this being a category “A” project, the ICR contains no supporting information on compliance with OP 4.01. It simply states (para 39) that the overall safeguard compliance was satisfactory, which does not provide the reader with sufficient confidence that Bank policy was fully complied with. No land acquisition was required as BRT component was dropped. There is no discussion of OP 4.11.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Procurement: The ICR reports (para 39) procurement and related reports were frequently not submitted on schedule. Also, delays in procure negatively impacted project implementation. There were no reported cases of misprocurement.

Financial Management: The ICR contains no discussion of financial management compliance except to state in para. 40 that “The ICR team did not observe any significant issue to be noted.” Even given the pilot status of the report, clear statements of compliance would have been useful with regards to the formal validation of project adherence to Bank policy.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

None reported.

d. Other

None reported.

12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	---
Risk to Development Outcome		Substantial	---
Bank Performance		Moderately Unsatisfactory	---
Borrower Performance		Unsatisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---



Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.

The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

Lessons included in the ICR are considered below as they have broader applicability::

- Counterpart financing is critical for the success of the project. However, if counterpart funding becomes unavailable, the project – both the objectives and components - may need to be restructured to ensure that the revised project development objectives can be achieved.
- Urban transport sector reform and the development of an urban transport system need to be implemented sequentially. Furthermore, a new transport system is best achieved by establishing institutional arrangements with a clear mandate and involving various local government units before designing the new system.
- Strong stakeholder commitments (especially from bus operators) is crucial while introducing BRT or bus schemes which require relocation of bus routes and rationalization of urban transport system. Implementation of a BRT system is complex. Communications with the public to explain the BRT system's benefits are very important. The potential benefits to users are: affordable, fast, reliable, and comfortable transport systems."

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

This is an "agile pilot ICR" and largely captures the project implementation experience. The recommendations are noteworthy. However, there are some shortcomings:

- The table "(a) Project Cost by Components" in Annex 3 should include financing of components by all sources i.e. IDA, GEF and AFD. As presented it excludes financing by AFD.
- The ICR does not provide the total actual project cost.
- Despite this being a Category "A" project, the discussion of safeguards is very sparse, as is that of fiduciary compliance.



a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial