



1. Project Data:		Date Posted : 06/04/2004	
PROJ ID: P069633		Appraisal	Actual
Project Name: Dominica Emergency Recovery & Disaster Management Project	Project Costs (US\$M)	6.0	2.74
Country: Dominica	Loan/Credit (US\$M)	5.0	2.62
Sector(s): Board: PSD - Flood protection (68%), Central government administration (27%), Other social services (5%)	Cofinancing (US\$M)	0.5	0
L/C Number: C3150; L4417			
	Board Approval (FY)		99
Partners involved :	Closing Date	01/31/2002	12/31/2002
Prepared by :	Reviewed by :	Group Manager :	Group:
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

There were three overarching **objectives** :

1. To strengthen key economic and social infrastructure and facilities with the aim of minimizing damage caused by future natural disasters, and reducing the disruption of economic activity in the event of disaster emergencies (disaster prevention).
2. To reconstruct and rehabilitate key social and economic infrastructure following disasters to allow quick recovery and minimize disruption of economic activity (post-disaster works).
3. To strengthen the country's institutional capacities to prepare for and respond to disaster emergencies in an efficient and effective manner.

Following Hurricane Georges (September 1998), which struck the St. Kitts and Nevis, the first Adaptable Program Lending operation (APL1) was approved for three countries: St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Dominica. The experience of each country is reported in a separate ICR . APL 1 was the initial phase of a program designed to support immediate reconstruction and rehabilitation, disaster mitigation works, and institutional strengthening . The program aimed to support the physical and institutional efforts of the five member countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) and to strengthen disaster recovery capacity and emergency preparedness management.

b. Components

1. Physical Prevention and Mitigation (appraised cost \$ 4.12 million, actual \$0.88 million): river control/flood damage reduction (involving strengthening/ rehabilitating bridges, culverts, roads); river bank stabilization (mostly slope protection); strengthening of sea defenses (to increase resistance to land slides, sea swells and abnormally high tides); and the construction and strengthening of storm shelters .
2. Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Response (appraised cost \$1.22 million, actual \$1.48 million). Building the capacity of the National Office of Disaster Preparedness by providing it with technical advisors, specialized disaster equipment, and the development of an island -wide emergency communications system . Developing an Effective Early Warning System to alert appropriate government authorities and the public of adverse weather conditions. Creating a public/private partnership for providing training in preparedness, and labor -intensive vulnerability reducing projects . Some of the latter funded by a Vulnerability Reduction Fund (VRF).
3. Institutional Strengthening (US\$0.17 million, actual \$0.0): hazard mapping, safety analysis of public buildings, and the development of a building code that would be enforced through inspections . A subcomponent promoted the reduction of potential fiscal liabilities by the Government from catastrophic losses by insuring buildings and facilities and retrofitting.
4. Project Management: (US\$0.45 million, actual \$0.35).

After the restructuring in January 2002., the Loan/Credit Agreements were amended and some sub -components were abandoned because of a lack of progress .

c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing and Dates

Dominica received an IBRD loan for US\$2.53 million, and an IDA credit for SDR 1.8 million. The Government agreed to find cofinanciers to make up a US\$.0.5 million financial gap, but during implementation was not successful in finding any. Although the project was restructured in January 2002, its objectives were not changed. US\$1.9 million was cancelled from the loan and credit at that time. US\$1.48 was left unspent and had to be cancelled at closing.

3. Achievement of Relevant Objectives:

The project is expected to achieve its major relevant objectives with major shortcomings.

Objective 1 was but partially achieved. Among the key economic and social infrastructure and facilities strengthened with the aim of minimizing damage caused by future natural disasters, and reducing the disruption of economic activity in the event of disaster emergencies were five existing hurricane shelters that were retrofitted to make them more storm-resistant. The refurbished hurricane shelters are in continual use for community purposes not related to disaster, such as community centers, preschools, and post offices, when they are not required for emergencies. These facilities are receiving periodic maintenance from the relevant ministries. Two water containers have been provided to communities to combat water shortages in local health facilities.

Objective 2 was but partially achieved. The VRF was the most satisfactory component of the project. It financed 35 micro projects involving the construction of drains to control storm/flood water and retaining walls to avert the dangers posed by flash floods and landslides. As noted above, five existing hurricane shelters were the key social infrastructure rehabilitated. Among the economic infrastructure reconstructed to minimize disruption of economic activity were sea defenses. Although these works were not financed under the loan/credit, about 2 kms of sea wall costing about US\$ 4 million were placed in service after Hurricane Lenny using Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) funds, thereby reducing to some extent the vulnerability of the west coast to hurricane damage.

Objective 3 was also but partially achieved. The institutional capacity for disaster preparedness and response increased marginally. The country's institutional capacities to prepare for and respond to disaster emergencies in an efficient and effective manner were strengthened through the replacement of meteorological equipment for the National Meteorological Service. Equipment is installed and operational. Equipment has also been procured for a Ham Weather Radio Observation Network. Specialized disaster equipment was procured for the ODM and other agencies, but it is currently being stored at the ODM awaiting distribution until satellite warehouses can be built. Much of the early warning equipment was not procured at all. A consulting firm provided training for ODM and personnel from key agencies involved in disaster management. Because many of the planned mitigation works were not implemented, only limited capacity was built in ODM, however. Since the disaster equipment procured is still in storage no learning took place regarding its use. Some training was conducted through a contract awarded to the Institute of Emergency Management, a local NGO. A total of 248 people participated in workshops on relevant topics such as retrofitting of small buildings, stress management, the role of the media in disasters, the use of GIS coordinates in disaster management, and damage assessment/needs analysis.

4. Significant Outcomes/Impacts:

The Project Coordination Unit established under the project is now responsible for security in ports and airports.

5. Significant Shortcomings (including non-compliance with safeguard policies):

The one new hurricane shelter that was to be built by the project was dropped because the proposed location was found to be inappropriate. Other major works of infrastructure were not implemented because cost estimates exceeded the Government's capacity to pay--the cost of works designed under the program for Dominica was determined to be far out of line with costs paid for similar work in neighboring countries. Although a technical adviser in disaster management was hired to (inter alia): review the operations of the ODM, make recommendations on the National Disaster Plan, and to prepare a National Shelter Policy for the country; his reports were submitted to the Government occasioning little follow-up. The recruitment of a technical advisor to strengthen partnerships with the private sector was first postponed and then cancelled due to slow preparation of the TORs. The design of stabilization works along the Elmshall road was prepared, but the proposed design was considered too risky from an environmental point of view.

6. Ratings:	ICR	OED Review	Reason for Disagreement /Comments
Outcome:	Unsatisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	OED's moderately unsatisfactory rating does not exist under the ICR's 4-point scale.
Institutional Dev.:	Modest	Modest	
Sustainability:	Unlikely	Unlikely	
Bank Performance:	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Borrower Perf.:	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	
Quality of ICR:		Satisfactory	

NOTE: ICR rating values flagged with '*' don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

7. Lessons of Broad Applicability:

1. Prevention measures can have a substantial positive impact on the reduction of social and economic losses .
2. In responding quickly to the immediate concerns of a disaster project, governments should not neglect the opportunity to build capacity for longer-term disaster management capacity .
3. Involvement of the community in the decision of project identification and management assist significantly in ensuring successful implementation .
4. The employment of the local population in labor intensive small-scale prevention works (in VRF-sponsored works was successful in Dominica because it was both a cost effective way to reduce risks and a mechanism to raise community awareness. This modality should be applied in other natural disaster vulnerable countries .
5. Reconstruction components often require careful assessment and a longer-term effort that generally extends the implementation period beyond the normal three years stipulated for Bank-assisted emergency operations (ERLs). Especially in the absence of a disaster-related emergency, standard investment loans are likely to result in more fully developed procurement and institutional arrangements .
6. Project management requires a team of fully committed staff with the relevant qualifications and experience, and enough time to devote to the project . In projects lacking a critical mass of work it is difficult for governments to allocate enough of their scarce qualified manpower to such units . The implementation capacity of post-disaster Project Coordinating Units is slow to develop in most cases . Appropriate training is helpful, more so when given early.
7. TORs for consulting engineers need to specify government budget constraints to avoid over-designed infrastructure that will be unaffordable and therefore impossible to implement .

8. Assessment Recommended? Yes No

Why? The OECS program is of great interest to the ongoing OED Natural Disaster and Emergency Recovery study. PPARs on the component projects would lead to a small island states case study that would inform the broader review of experience .

9. Comments on Quality of ICR:

The ICR is of acceptable quality . It does a nice job of balancing lesson learning with accountability .