Report Number : ICRR0020884

1. Project Data

Project ID	Project Name
P117382	DRC: Capacity for Core Public Management
Country	**Practice Area(Lead)**
Congo, Democratic Republic of	Governance

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD)
IDA-H7210	15-Sep-2016	29,900,000.00
Bank Approval Date	**Closing Date (Actual)**	
28-Jun-2011	15-Jan-2017	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	29,900,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	29,900,000.00	0.00
Actual	26,476,758.68	0.00

Prepared by	Reviewed by	ICR Review Coordinator	Group
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

According to the Financing Agreement (p. 5), the project's objective was "to strengthen core public administration functions of selected central and provincial institutions in the Recipient's territory." The Project Appraisal Document (PAD, p. 7) specified that the program's initial focus would be on the Ministries of Finance, Budget, Planning, Decentralization, Public Service, Infrastructure and Telecommunications, Health, Regional and International Cooperation, and Primary and Secondary Education. The PAD (p. 7) further specified the core functions specifically targeted as: leadership, basic results-based management, procurement, and financial management. Other core competencies were to be addressed by other development partners.

At a January 2015 restructuring, one key outcome target was revised, but as it was revised upward and met, a split rating will not be performed.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

Yes

Date of Board Approval

22-Jan-2015

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

The project initially contained four components:

1. Strengthening Government's Capacity in Results-Based Management (appraisal, US$ 4 million; restructuring, US$ 5.2 million; actual, US$ 5.1 million) contained two subcomponents. The first subcomponent was to focus on leveraging implementation capacity in the administration to deliver short-term targeted results in priority areas. Focusing on nine specific ministries, it was to provide support across the hierarchy in the government, from high-level leadership to core administration who could sustain a results culture even in case of political turnover. Reform processes were to span high-level leadership commitment, application of Rapid Results Methodology (RRM) and Results-Based Management (RBM) tools, and policy-level engagement to institutionalize change. Support was to be provided by a network of national and provincial training institutions, including local facilitators and coaches. The second subcomponent was to build human and institutional capacity to leverage change and sustain capacity development in leadership for results, aimed at developing a pool of national coaches affiliated with training centers. These coaches were to be developed using a curriculum customized to the needs of different levels of the administration, articulated around prioritized thematic areas. Each of the ministries supported by a coach was to form a team of change agents who would facilitate the implementation of RBM at their respective institutions. At a January 2015 restructuring, additional funds were allocated to support the development of review of performance contracts as well as a more robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system at the level of the training centers. A third subcomponent was added to support a Rapid Results Approach (RRA) and RBM training for implementation of an Economic Governance Matrix Action Plan in some provinces.

2. Strengthening Core Functions of Public Administration (appraisal, US$ 7 million; restructuring, US$ 6 million; actual, US$ 2.5 million) contained two subcomponents. The first subcomponent, on public financial management, was to design and deliver priority training programs to a critical mass of officials. These activities were to be implemented by and in the Ministry of Finance, while also strengthening the

Studies and Planning Department, Administrative and Financial Department, and General Services units in line ministries. Key elements to be covered included strengthening of macro and revenue forecasts to prepare credible multi-year planning; strengthening internal controls and financial oversight; improving budget execution, budget reporting, and analysis; and strengthening public sector accounting capacity. The second subcomponent, on procurement, was to be implemented by the ARMP (Procurement Regulatory Body) to support implementation of a new Procurement Code adopted in 2010. Activities were to include support to new procurement institutions, training program design and implementation, capacity building for the whole procurement system, a first independent audit of the system, and support to independent training institutions for creating and implementing procurement training programs. At the January 2015 restructuring, training modules were added in public financial management (PFM) and procurement for client agencies that were implementing performance contracts.

3. Support to Local Training (appraisal, US$ 12.4 million; restructuring, US$ 12.2 million; actual, US$ 10.5 million) contained two subcomponents. The first subcomponent was to support facilities and capacity development for selected national and provincial training centers to become programs of excellence, and to build a cross-country network of training centers. Six centers were pre-selected for support during project preparation, based on their demonstrated capacity to provide training and manage contract implementation; these centers were expected to then support other institutions in their respective regions. The National Secretariat for Capacity Building (SENAREC) was to manage these activities through sub-grant agreements with the training centers. The second subcomponent was to bring in high-level international expertise to provide consultant support and assistance to the training centers, and to conduct related studies and assessments, based on a list of international experts prepared by SENAREC. At the January 2015 restructuring, a subcomponent was added to support sub-grants to strengthen and internalize a results-based culture by rewarding training centers participating in grant competitions.

4. Strengthening SENAREC and Building a Quality Control System (appraisal, US$ 5 million; restructuring, USE 6.5 million; actual, US$ 7.3 million) contained two subcomponents. The first subcomponent was to strengthen SENAREC as a "clearing house" for capacity building, supporting its mandate to coordinate and monitor implementation of the government's overall National Capacity Building Program (PRONAREC) and to manage donor support. It was to focus on attracting and financing critical central unit staff, financing a South-South twinning arrangement to provide coaching on program management and accreditation, and upgrading office facilities. The second subcomponent was to create and sustain a quality control and accreditation system, to be used to assess the capabilities of training centers throughout the country to deliver training modules in RBM, PFM, program management, and human resources management. The accreditation mechanism was to be administered by SENAREC and overseen by an independent board of experts, with its operating costs financed under the project. At the January 2015 restructuring, additional funds were added to support full functioning of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU).

Overall, the 2015 restructuring reduced the number of Project Implementation Units from three (SENAREC, the Public Sector Reform Orientation Committee under the Ministry of Finance, and ARMP) to one (a strengthened SENAREC). The restructuring also enhanced the results orientation of activities, detached activities from PRONAREC (which the government had abandoned), and sharpened focus on activities that were proving successful and producing results attributable to project inputs (performance contracts, the rapid results approach, and training centers). Dropped activities related to financial management were picked up by another Bank-financed project (Strengthening Public Financial Management and Accountability, P145747, US$ 5 million, 2014-2021).

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project Cost: Estimated total project cost was US$ 29.9 million, including US$ 1.5 million in price contingencies. Actual spending was US$ 25.1 million, or 84% of the original estimate.

Financing: The project was to be financed by a Technical Assistance Grant in the amount of US$ 29.9 million. Actual disbursements were US$ 25.1 million. The ICR does not state whether the difference was due to exchange rate fluctuations or other factors.

Borrower Contribution: No Recipient contribution was planned or made.

Dates: The project was approved on June 28, 2011 and became effective on October 25, 2011. It was restructured on January 22, 2015 to simplify activities, revise some targets, and reallocate funds between components; the aim was to detach activities from outdated government programs (such as PRONAREC) that had not been fully implemented, and instead to focus on activities that were achieving results attributable to project inputs. On September 12, 2016, the closing date was extended from September 15, 2016 to January 15, 2017 to allow for completion of activities.

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design

a. Relevance of Objectives

The objective was strongly aligned with country conditions at the time of appraisal. Addressing governance concerns and building capacity to create sustainable institutions was clearly a prerequisite for the country's considerable resource endowment to be translated into long-term and sustainable growth after more than a decade of conflict. Government strategy, based in the PRONAREC, focused on building public sector capacity at the national and sub-national level. The project's objective was also highly relevant to Bank strategy at appraisal, as the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS, FY 2008-2011) contained objectives on good governance and improved access to social services, and to the CAS at closing (FY 2013-2016), with its first strategic objective to increase state effectiveness and improve good governance. The CAS at closing (p. 23) observes that "reforming civil service and restructuring the public sector are critical to re-establish the credibility and effectiveness of the state." (The next Country Partnership Framework is scheduled to cover FY 2018-2023.) Despite the government's shift away from PRONAREC, the project remained highly relevant to the National Strategic Plan for Development 2050, which highlights the governance reforms supported by the project as part of its top eight priorities. The wording of the objective was deliberately broad to provide flexibility for adjustments during implementation.

Rating	Revised Rating
High	Not Rated/Not Applicable

b. **Relevance of Design**

Design was sequenced in two phases. The short-term track was to meet priority challenges articulated in a Priority Action Plan covering the first three years of PRONAREC implementation: fine-tuning the Plan itself, putting results-based work programs in place with concrete goals for seven key ministries, and strengthening SENAREC capacity. This initial set of activities is well detailed in the PAD (pp. 56-74), including the specification of training centers to be involved. Capacity building was to begin with the definition of performance targets for selected government institutions, starting with 100-day targets and evolving toward annual targets over the first two years, as well as more "classical" technical assistance to address some critical needs in PFM and procurement reform (PAD, p. 7). In the longer term, the project was to support the broader implementation of PRONAREC. This incremental and sequential approach was to allow lessons from the shorter-term experience to guide implementation of the longer-term program. The specific activities designated for the short term -- institutional and individual capacity building pertaining to strengthening leadership; introduction of results-based management tools; enhancing of human resource management, PFM, and procurement; development of national and provincial training centers; and quality control of training and coaching programs -- were logically and plausibly tied to achievement of the project's development objective. This initial phase was well designed to lead to the longer-term plan for a more programmatic modality based on annual plans and results-linked disbursements.

However, despite careful planning, the initial design turned out to be too complex, given existing implementation capacity. The multiple implementing agencies had differences in focus, responsibility, and lines of hierarchy, making prioritization of, and responsibility for, specific activities difficult to determine. In line with the government's move away from PRONAREC, the 2015 restructuring aligned activities under all four components to contribute to two related, consolidated streams: introduction of a results-based culture through performance contracts at the central and provincial levels, and building a sustainable public sector training infrastructure to institutionalize training and help implement the performance contracts. This streamlining produced a substantially relevant design, with complexity and ambition appropriately aligned with capacity.

Rating	Revised Rating
Substantial	Not Rated/Not Applicable

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

Objective 1
Objective
Strengthen core public administration functions of selected central and provincial institutions in the Recipient's territory

Rationale

Financing for the government reform program was provided by several related Bank projects as well as other donors: the African Development Bank, French Development Cooperation, and United Nations Development Programme. The ICR does not provide information on the specific activities or amounts financed by these other sources. The project team later explained that the work of other donors was complementary to the project: the African Development Bank provided equipment and rehabilitation for one of the eight project-supported training centers; France provided technical assistance through an advisor permanently placed in the civil service ministry; and the UK Department for International Development was involved in the implementing and monitoring mechanism for performance contracts.

<u>Outputs:</u>

The project served 8,238 direct beneficiaries, exceeding the target of 5,000. Of these, 23% were women, not meeting the original target of 35%, and not quite reaching the revised target of 25%. The actual share of female civil servants in the workforce was estimated at 21.9%.

32 key central and provincial units prepared and implemented plans to strengthen staff professional performance, exceeding the target of 18. 2,668 staff said that they have used training they received on the job, more than tripling the target of 800. The number of training centers with detailed work plans for development of accredited programs increased from 4 in 2011 to 8 in 2016, achieving the target of 8. These training centers concluded conventions with provincial governments and with SENAREC to align training offerings with needs. 22 permanent accredited programs on Managing for Results, PFM, and procurement were offered by training centers, almost tripling the target of 8. 18 centers were assessed annually for accreditation, exceeding the target of 15. Six competitive allocations of grant funding to training centers were held, meeting the target of 6. The centers are now equipped with videoconferencing capability and sufficient bandwidth to operate as a network.

<u>Outcomes:</u>

Performance contracts have become established practice at the central government level, including at the highest levels: the Prime Minister concludes them annually with all ministers. These contracts cover strategic objectives, expected results, indicators to measure those results, a timeline, and provisions for ongoing monitoring. 51 targeted units had approved performance plans by the end of the project, exceeding the target of 50. 90% of targeted ministries and provincial authorities issued executive orders aiming to facilitate the implementation of these plans, far exceeding the target of 50%. 27 targeted units had approved performance plans formally reviewed, with results verified, at least annually. This exceeded the original target of 6 and the revised target of 11. The percent of institutional improvement plan targets achieved within their stated time frame increased from 20% in 2011 to 96.7% in 2016, exceeding the 90% target.

13 certified level 1 RRM coaches were available to accompany RRM teams, exceeding the target of 10, and 95% of RRI teams were satisfied with their coaching support, exceeding the target of 70%. 163 RRIs were coached by teams led by DRC-national coaches, almost doubling the target of 85. 62.6% of rapid results initiatives achieved at least 90% of the goals set in their performance contracts by the end of the project,

exceeding the target of 60%. The ICR (p. 15) provides brief descriptions of several instances in which RRIs produced improved public service delivery, stating that government at all levels "fully adopted the deployment of RRIs as a management tool to unblock reform bottlenecks."

The percentage of key central and provincial units that had the required equipment and resources to perform key procurement functions increased from 10% in 2011 to 66.6% in 2016, exceeding the target of 60%. 100% of public contracts above an agreed threshold were awarded through open and competitive processes in participating ministries at the central level, exceeding the target of 70% (the ICR does not state the exact level of this threshold; the project team confirmed that it was US$ 0.5 million). No data are available for the provincial level.

The ICR (p. 33) reports improvements in public financial management, including a reduction to zero gaps between revenues and expenditures and therefore production of a more credible and realistic public budget, but it is not made clear how these results are attributable to project interventions.

Overall, the project's training and capacity building activities strengthened core functions around unit planning and performance management. However, the project did not meet targets for gender inclusion, and only anecdotal evidence is provided on the extent to which improved staff and unit performance translated into more effective or efficient service delivery. Given that the specific objective was to strengthen core functions, these are considered to be minor shortcomings, resulting in a Substantial rating for achievement of that objective.

Rating
Substantial

5. Efficiency

The PAD did not conduct a formal economic analysis, instead asserting qualitatively (p. 23) that the project would improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector, through economic growth and poverty reduction due to more efficient, transparent, and accountable fiscal and budget management. The ICR's analysis (pp. 32-41) includes non-quantifiable benefits, including the evolution of a results-based culture centered on realistic performance planning. Its formal analysis finds a negative economic rate of return. The origin of many of its assumptions, however, is unclear. For example, it uses an estimated value of US$ 196.03 per beneficiary with no information on how that figure was derived. It also includes benefits from merit-based grants to the six "best-performing" training centers, but it provides no information on how the value of the grants was determined, or how the "best-performing" training centers were identified.

Disbursements were low during the first several years of implementation, and there was "a sense that the project was overly ambitious and not sufficiently focused" (ICR, p. 10). High ambition combined with inadequate prioritization led to loss of vision and coherence, reducing efficiency. Lack of procurement capacity negatively impacted the implementation schedule, and overall implementation was fragmented across the three responsible agencies. After the 2015 restructuring, administrative efficiency improved considerably.

Overall, however, the project's scope was significantly decreased at restructuring, with fewer overall activities implemented under the initially planned resource envelope. The ICR (p. 17) judges that the project was only modestly efficient when considering the extent to which costs were reasonable in comparison with benefits and recognized norms. Efficiency is rated Modest.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 ☐Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 ☐Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

The project's objective was highly relevant to country conditions, government strategy, and Bank strategy. Relevance of design was substantial, as the project's activities were logically and plausibly aligned with anticipated outcomes, and the restructuring produced streamlined implementation arrangements that were coherent with capacity. Efficacy is rated substantial, based on achievement of targets for training and training centers that led to successful implementation of results-based unit planning and performance management. Efficiency, however, is rated modest, based on a negative rate of return, as well as the project's reduction in scope at restructuring while remaining within the initially planned financing envelope. These ratings are indicative of moderate shortcomings in the project's preparation and implementation, producing an Outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating

The Bank approved an additional financing in May 2017 for the Public Sector Reform and Rejuvenation Project (P12229, US$ 122 million, 2014-2019), whose objective is to strengthen and reform the civil service. This project is expected to leverage the achievements of the project under review, particularly SENAREC and the network of rapid results coaches and training center infrastructure. However, the ICR (p. 18) cautions that most of the training centers are anchored at universities, leading to a lack of government ownership that calls their sustainability into question. It is not clear that resources will be adequately allocated to the costly videoconferencing technology, bandwidth provision, and basic maintenance the centers will require. Human resource challenges arise from the possibility that officials trained under the project will pursue more attractive opportunities in the private sector. More broadly, the possibility of increased fragility and new conflict poses significant risk.

a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating

Substantial

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

This project was designed to accompany a phased investment operation supporting administrative modernization; it was thought that a shorter-term facility was essential to build critical capacity, especially in PFM and procurement reform. Project design built on extensive analytic work conducted with Bank financing, including a series of Policy Notes on decentralization and public sector wage reform, analytic notes underpinning the PFM Action Plan (2009), a review of accounting and auditing, a policy note on public service retirement, Economic Sector Work (ESW) on reform of the country's administrative and territorial architecture, and ESW on relationships between the provinces and territorial decentralized entities. A Project Preparation Facility enabled fine-tuning of action plans, the development of results-based work programs for seven ministries, and strengthening of SENAREC in preparation for project coordination. Implementation arrangements were specified in detail (PAD, pp. 16-18). Important lessons were learned from previous experience in the country (PAD, pp. 14-15): the need to take country context into account; the importance of government ownership and flexibility to take changing government priorities into account; the key role of sequencing that underpins reforms with appropriate capacity; the potential ineffectiveness of overreliance on external consultants, with preference for more sustainable building of capacity of national and provincial training centers; and the key roles of both adequate implementation arrangements and a strategic approach. Several areas were identified as substantial or high risk -- corruption, security, the 2011 presidential election, stalled public service reform, SENAREC reform and capacity, implementation delays (given the technically complex and politically sensitive nature of proposed reforms), and financial management -- with mitigation measures clearly specified (PAD, pp. 20-21).

However, implementation arrangements were cumbersome and complex, with insufficient cohesion among project elements. Although a broad range of government stakeholders were consulted during preparation, the ICR (p. 9) reports little evidence of consultations with civil society. The ICR (p. 19) also states that some components were not ready for implementation during the project's start-up phase; the project team later explained that the fourth component, supporting SENAREC, and elements of the third component supporting training centers exhibited shortcomings until restructuring.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

Effective policy dialogue convinced the government of the need for project restructuring (the government was reluctant to drop two implementing agencies as part of project simplification). There were four task team leaders (TTLs) over the project's first two years of implementation, weakening the effectiveness of the Bank's support over this period (ICR, p. 11). After 2013, however, there was increasing focus on implementation support and achievement of development impact, facilitated by a locally-based TTL. The mid-term review in March 2014 identified implementation shortcomings and facilitated restructuring.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. Assessment of Borrower Performance

a. Government Performance

Government commitment was initially strong, if uneven. However, the complex initial implementation arrangements produced a situation where there was no single government entity responsible and accountable for driving the project as a whole. Commitment to the initially ambitious PRONAREC waned, leading to its cancellation. The government initially resisted the restructuring that streamlined implementation, though it eventually took measures to establish a new team at SENAREC and increase its capacity through a competitive, merit-based recruitment process. The central government effectively supported the PIUs, and key staff were appointed in a timely manner.

Government Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Implementing Agency Performance

Initial implementation arrangements, spread across three responsible entities, were inefficient and unworkable. Other project implementation structures -- such as the Economic and Reconstruction Commission that was in charge of providing strategic guidance to the project, and the Interministerial Technical Committee that was to clear annual work plans and budgets at the national level -- were abolished during the project's initial years. The Project Steering Committee that was to meet quarterly instead had only met twice by the time of the mid-term review in March 2014. At the restructuring, a renewed and strengthened SENAREC was established as the sole implementing agency. From this point forward, SENAREC accelerated implementation, addressed earlier shortcomings in procurement and FM, and shifted toward management for results based on the project's M&E framework.

Implementing Agency Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Borrower Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

SENAREC was responsible for data monitoring at both central and provincial levels, with the entire process based on monitoring plans established by each targeted ministry. The project was to finance recruitment of an M&E specialist and assistant, computer equipment, and management-for-results training, as SENAREC had little capacity in this area. Six outcome and 13 output indicators that reasonably measured achievement of the objectives were specified, with baselines and targets (PAD, pp. 44-50). However, the overall initial M&E framework was overly complex, given capacity constraints.

b. M&E Implementation

While SENAREC had a dedicated M&E expert from the beginning of the project period, initial implementation was "suboptimal" (ICR, p, 12). Data for some indicators was not available at all, and for others it was collected late. At the 2015 restructuring, some indicators that did not measure results of the remaining core activities were dropped, and improved capacity in SENAREC brought significant improvements to M&E implementation. Data was collected and reported on a regular basis.

c. M&E Utilization

The ICR (p. 12) reports that, after restructuring, the project focused on communication of project results. Project management used M&E data and targets to set priorities and manage progress toward targets.

M&E Quality Rating
Substantial

11. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was rated Environmental Assessment category C. No safeguard policies were triggered.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

According to the ICR (p. 12), both financial management and procurement arrangements were rated Moderately Satisfactory across most of the project's lifetime. However, "things never went entirely without issues." Shortcomings were appropriately identified during implementation support missions and were addressed adequately, but often with delay. These shortcomings, according to the ICR (p. 13), included initially inadequate procurement capacity and some violation of financial management rules related to salaries (some SENAREC staff were paid simultaneously by the government budget and the project for the same work, a practice that SENAREC management defended). These issues resolved after the consolidation of implementation into SENAREC at restructuring. The ICR does not report on external auditing of project accounts.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

None reported.

d. Other

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12. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	Efficiency is rated Modest, with fewer overall activities implemented under the initially planned resource envelope and a negative economic rate of return.

Risk to Development Outcome	Substantial	Substantial	---
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Borrower Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	---
Quality of ICR		Substantial	---

Note

When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column could cross-reference other sections of the ICR Review, as appropriate.

13. Lessons

The ICR (pp. 22-24) offers several insightful lessons, including:

Government ownership and commitment increase when implementation occurs through a permanent structure established by the government. In this case, SENAREC, as a permanent institution under the Ministry of Planning, enjoys full support of the central government, contributing to efficacy and sustainability of outcomes.

Locating responsibility and authority under a single agency helps to define and increase accountability for performance. In this case, the initial arrangement under three implementing agencies led to blame-shifting when shortcomings emerged. Putting one agency, SENAREC, in charge facilitated the identification of lines of responsibility and authority.

Achieving gender targets requires deliberate action. In this case, gender data on training participants was not even collected initially because of a lack of prioritization, awareness, and willingness. Once these elements were put in place after the mid-term review, specific actions were implemented to attempt achievement of gender targets.

IEG offers the following additional lesson:

Anchoring training centers at independent entities such as universities involves trade-offs between capacity and sustainability. In this case, the use of government training centers -- to the extent that such centers exist -- would likely have low absorptive capacity and involve political risk. On the other hand, their location at universities calls into question the potential for their operation as a cohesive network, given the need for acquisition and maintenance of costly technology and the uncertainty of full cost recovery.

14. Assessment Recommended?

No

15. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is clear, concise, and candid about the project's initial implementation challenges. Its executive summary is useful in understanding the project's storyline. It provides a straightforward account of the factors leading to restructuring, as well as the changes in implementation speed and effectiveness that followed restructuring. The lessons are extensive, well grounded in project experience, and potentially highly valuable for future projects. The ICR's economic analysis is thorough, but some of its assumptions are not adequately explained. A more structured and detailed discussion of fiduciary issues would have been useful, especially in the country context.

a. **Quality of ICR Rating**
Substantial