

**Document of
The World Bank**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No. 23715

A REVIEW OF INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATION

AND PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTS

SENEGAL

PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1735-SE)

SECOND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 2473-SE)

February 21, 2002

*Sector and Thematic Evaluation Group
Operations Evaluation Department*

<p>This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.</p>
--

Currency Equivalents (annual averages)

Currency Unit = Communauté Financière d'Afrique Francs (CFAF)

CFAF 1.00	=	\$0.0014
\$1.00	=	CFAF 719 (May 2001)

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AfDB	African Development Bank
AGETIP	Public Works and Employment Agency (Agence d'Exécution des Travaux d'Intérêt Public Contre le Sous-Emploi)
CESAG	Higher Education Center for Training in Management (Centre d'Etudes Supérieures en Administration et Gestion)
CFPP	Vocational Training and Upgrading Center
CEAO	West African Economic Community (Communauté Économique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest)
ENSETP	College for Technical and Vocational Education
ENSUT	National University School of Technology
GDP	Gross domestic product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
INEADE	Institut National d'Etudes et d'Action pour le Développement de l'Éducation
MIS	Management Information System
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NCQP	National Center for Vocational Training
OED	Operations Evaluation Department
PPAR	Project Performance Assessment Report*
PCR	Project Completion Report
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
SAR	Staff Appraisal Report
TVET	Technical and vocational education and training
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

* As of July 1, 2001, Project Performance Audits have been renamed Project Performance Assessments

Fiscal Year

January 1—December 31

Director-General, Operations Evaluation	: Mr. Robert Picciotto
Director, Operations Evaluation Department	: Mr. Gregory K. Ingram
Manager, Sector and Thematic Evaluation	: Mr. Alain Barbu
Task Manager	: Ms. Helen Abadzi

February 21, 2002

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

**SUBJECT: Performance Assessment Report on Senegal
Primary Education Development Pr. (Education IV—C1735—SE); and
Second Human Resources Development Pr. (Education V—C2473—SE)**

This is a Performance Assessment Report (PAR) on two education projects in Senegal:

- **Primary Education Development Project** (Education IV—Cr. 1735—SE) for US\$12 million equivalent, which was approved in FY87 and made effective on September 9, 1987. The African Development Bank provided parallel financing of US\$5.33 million equivalent. The credit closed 15 months ahead of schedule, on March 23, 1994 and disbursed fully. Total project cost was US\$19.61 million.
- **Second Human Resources Development Project** (Education V—Cr. 2473—SE) for US\$40 million equivalent, which was approved in FY93 and made effective on January 31, 1994. After extensions totaling six months, the credit disbursed completely and closed on December 31, 1999. Total project cost at completion was US\$39.17 million.

The human resource development strategy that IDA had developed for Senegal was relevant to its economic needs, as perceived in each period, and the objectives of the projects have been relevant to the economic needs of the country. Nevertheless, it would have been helpful if in 1974, when documented concerns arose about primary education, a primary project had been implemented. A school construction program at that time, when the population was about 5.5 million rather than 12 years later, might have resulted in greater progress towards education for all. Overall, efficiency was modest. The project designs of the earlier years were deficient in policy measures, and ultimately were less effective than would have been expected. Also, resources were often used inefficiently. The Bank was reluctant to take measures against alleged mismanagement (e.g. textbook sales of the fifth project) and stop disbursements for activities in which the money has not been used for the intended purpose.

The assessment ratings for each assessed project are shown below. The outcomes of both projects were rated moderately satisfactory because project objectives were only partly achieved. The projects clearly had a significant impact on primary school enrollments in project-supported areas, and the increase clearly benefited the girls and the rural poor. Despite much staff training, however, the projects did not have the expected effect on improving the quality of education. One reason was that in both cases, few students benefited from textbooks.

Borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory because the government showed limited political will to make the changes needed for achieving universal primary education.


This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Primary Education Development Project (Credit 1735—SE)</i>	<i>Second Human Resources Development Project (Credit 2473—SE)</i>
Outcome	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory
Institutional Development Impact	Modest	Modest
Sustainability	Not evaluable	Not evaluable
Bank performance	Satisfactory	Satisfactory
Borrower Performance	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory

Lessons

Experience with the projects confirms a number of OED lessons:

- Sectoral adjustment programs that include policies which governments are reluctant to implement are likely to fail. Mere letters of assurances from governments are often meaningless. To make needed policy changes, project designs should include dialogue, delineation of various special interests, and a process to understand how they are likely to interact.
- While there are usually special interests in favor of higher education, there is less often an organized political front in favor of primary education. Where strong special interests exist in favor of higher education, conditionalities to reduce expenditures in it prove ineffective.
- A broad effort to increase primary school enrollments may result in the deterioration of educational quality. Policies that lead to reduced contact hours are likely to reduce the amount of information children acquire and ultimately detract from the value of school attendance.
- The school inspector function often does not fulfill its quality control role. Pedagogical advisors and school-based management with well-trained principals who are empowered to take action might safeguard school quality more effectively.
- The capacity of communities and small NGOs to build schools is often overestimated. When construction programs rely extensively on community-financed materials or construction, the result may be delays or low-quality work. Communities may contribute to the expansion of education more effectively through quality-oriented tasks, such as managing the construction, monitoring teachers, storing books, coordinating student feeding programs, or secondary building activities.
- It is difficult to establish a book sale system without understanding the market forces and incentives of the vendors. In countries where losses are heavy, it may be better to provide textbooks free of charge to students.



Contents

PRINCIPAL RATINGS	IV
KEY STAFF RESPONSIBLE	IV
PREFACE.....	V
1. REVIEW AND IMPACT OF IDA INVESTMENTS IN EDUCATION	1
EARLIER LENDING PROGRAM (1971–1986): FOCUS ON SPECIFIC TRAINING INSTITUTIONS	2
WHAT WAS THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF THE 1971-1986 LENDING PROGRAM?	5
BANK POLICIES IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR IN VARIOUS PERIODS	6
1971–1986: <i>No Clear Policies Supported through Lending</i>	6
1986–1998: <i>Policy Orientation Toward Primary Education</i>	6
1998–2001: <i>Innovative Projects with Some Difficult Objectives</i>	7
DONOR COORDINATION	8
2. IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES OF THE ASSESSED PROJECTS.....	9
THE PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (EDUCATION IV)	9
THE SECOND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (EDUCATION V).....	10
POLICIES TO INCREASE ACCESS MAY LOWER QUALITY	11
CONTRACT (“VOLUNTEER”) TEACHERS ARE A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE.....	11
INSPECTOR ROLES SHOW LITTLE CHANGE AND LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS	12
CLASSROOM TIME ON TASK MAY BE LIMITED – OBSERVATIONS FROM LITERACY CLASSES ..	13
BETTER METHODOLOGY IS NEEDED FOR COMMUNITY SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION	14
CAPACITY FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH WAS ESTABLISHED.....	14
PROJECT OUTCOMES	14
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACT.....	15
SUSTAINABILITY	15
BANK PERFORMANCE	15
BORROWER PERFORMANCE	16
RELEVANCE AND EFFICIENCY.....	16
3. ISSUES FOR FUTURE CONSIDERATION.....	17
TIME ON TASK IS INSUFFICIENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF BASIC SKILLS	17
FOREIGN-LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION MAY SLOW DOWN THE LEARNING OF INFORMATION IN	
POOR SCHOOLS	18
LITTLE-UNDERSTOOD SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS MAY INFLUENCE EDUCATION DECISIONS....	19
LESSONS	20
ANNEX A. PROJECT ACTIVITIES	21
ANNEX B. BASIC DATA	25

This report was prepared by Helen Abadzi, who audited the project in July 2001. William Hurlbut edited, and Pilar Barquero provided administrative support.

BOXES

BOX 1. CENTER FOR HIGHER STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT (CESAG).....	4
BOX 2. WHY TEACHERS MAY NOT PRACTICE WHAT THEY LEARN IN TRAINING	12
BOX 3. INSPECTOR REPORTS—ONE-WAY STREET TO A MINISTRY STORAGE ROOM.....	13

FIGURES

TABLE 1. IDA-FINANCED EDUCATION PROJECTS IN SENEGAL	2
TABLE 2. TRAINING INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTED BY IDA EDUCATION PROJECTS.....	3
TABLE 3. PCR/ICR RATINGS OF COMPLETED PROJECTS	6
TABLE 4. MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE ASSESSED PROJECTS.....	9

OED Mission: Enhancing development effectiveness through excellence and independence in evaluation.
About this Report

The Operations Evaluation Department assesses the programs and activities of the World Bank for two purposes: first, to ensure the integrity of the Bank's self-evaluation process and to verify that the Bank's work is producing the expected results, and second, to help develop improved directions, policies, and procedures through the dissemination of lessons drawn from experience. As part of this work, OED annually assesses about 25 percent of the Bank's lending operations. Assessments are conducted one to seven years after a project has closed. In selecting operations for assessment, preference is given to those that are innovative, large, or complex; those that are relevant to upcoming country evaluations; those for which Executive Directors or Bank management have requested assessments; and those that are likely to generate important lessons. The projects, topics, and analytical approaches selected for assessment support larger evaluation studies.

A Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) is based on a review of the Implementation Completion Report (a self-evaluation by the responsible Bank department) and field work conducted by OED. To prepare PPARs, OED staff examine project files and other documents, interview operational staff, and in most cases visit the borrowing country for onsite discussions with project staff and beneficiaries. The PPAR thereby seeks to validate and augment the information provided in the ICR, as well as examine issues of special interest to broader OED studies.

Each PPAR is subject to a peer review process and OED management approval. Once cleared internally, the PPAR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and amended as necessary. The completed PPAR is then sent to the borrower for review; the borrowers' comments are incorporated into the document that is sent to the Bank's Board. When an assessment report is released to the Board, it is also widely distributed within the Bank and to concerned authorities in member countries.

About the OED Rating System

The time-tested evaluation methods used by OED are suited to the broad range of the World Bank's work. The methods offer both rigor and a necessary level of flexibility to adapt to lending instrument, project design, or sectoral approach. OED evaluators all apply the same basic method to arrive at their project ratings. Following is the definition and rating scale used for each evaluation criterion (complete definitions and descriptions of factors considered are available on the OED website: <http://wb1n1023.worldbank.org/oed/oeddclib.nsf/>)

Relevance of Objectives: The extent to which the project's objectives are consistent with the country's current development priorities and with current Bank country and sectoral assistance strategies and corporate goals (expressed in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, Country Assistance Strategies, Sector Strategy Papers, Operational Policies). *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficacy: The extent to which the project's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Efficiency: The extent to which the project achieved, or is expected to achieve, a return higher than the opportunity cost of capital and benefits at least cost compared to alternatives. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Sustainability: The resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. *Possible ratings:* Highly Likely, Likely, Unlikely, Highly Unlikely, Not Evaluable.

Institutional Development Impact: The extent to which a project improves the ability of a country or region to make more efficient, equitable and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources through: (a) better definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements and/or (b) better alignment of the mission and capacity of an organization with its mandate, which derives from these institutional arrangements. Institutional Development Impact includes both intended and unintended effects of a project. *Possible ratings:* High, Substantial, Modest, Negligible.

Outcome: The extent to which the project's major relevant objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Moderately Satisfactory, Moderately Unsatisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Bank Performance: The extent to which services provided by the Bank ensured quality at entry and supported implementation through appropriate supervision (including ensuring adequate transition arrangements for regular operation of the project). *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Borrower Performance: The extent to which the borrower assumed ownership and responsibility to ensure quality of preparation and implementation, and complied with covenants and agreements, towards the achievement of development objectives and sustainability. *Possible ratings:* Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, Highly Unsatisfactory.

Principal Ratings

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Primary Education Development Project (Credit 1735—SE)</i>			<i>Second Human Resources Development Project (Credit 2473 –SE)</i>		
	<i>PCR</i>	<i>ES</i>	<i>PPAR</i>	<i>ICR</i>	<i>ES</i>	<i>PPAR</i>
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory	Moderately satisfactory
Institutional development impact	Partial	Modest	Modest	Partial	Substantial	Modest
Sustainability	Uncertain	Uncertain	Not evaluable	Likely	Likely	Not evaluable
Bank performance	Not rated (described as satisfactory)	Not rated	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	Not rated	Satisfactory
Borrower performance	Not rated (description uncertain)	Not rated	Unsatisfactory	Satisfactory	Not rated	Unsatisfactory

Key Staff Responsible

<i>Project</i>	<i>Task Manager/Leader</i>	<i>Division Chief/ Sector Director</i>	<i>Country Director</i>
<i>Primary Education Development Project (Cr. 1735—SE)</i>			
Appraisal	Tufan Kolan	Alex ter Weele	Hans Fuchs
Completion	Rosemary Bellew	Birger Frederiksen	Katherine Marshall
<i>Second Human Resources Development Project (Cr. 2473 –SE)</i>			
Appraisal	Rosemary Bellew	Birger Frederiksen	Katherine Marshall
Completion	Alassane Diawara	Alexandre Abrantes	John McIntire

Preface

This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) covers the two most recently completed education projects in Senegal:

- ***Primary Education Development Project*** (Education IV, Cr. 1735-SE) for US\$12 million equivalent, which was approved in fiscal 1987 and made effective on September 9, 1987. The African Development Bank provided parallel financing of US\$5.33 million equivalent. The credit disbursed fully and closed 15 months ahead of schedule, on March 23, 1994. Total project cost was US\$19.61 million.
- ***Second Human Resources Development Project*** (Education V, Cr. 2473-SE) for US\$40 million equivalent, which was approved in fiscal 1993 and made effective on January 31, 1994. After extensions totaling six months, the credit disbursed completely and closed on December 31, 1999. Total project cost at completion was US\$39.17 million.

The assessments were conducted to study the effectiveness of IDA strategy in an extremely poor country with complex cultural and economic problems. The report also reviews briefly the outcomes of closed projects in Senegal since 1971. The earlier projects in the sector had a long record of high costs, financial irregularities, and long implementation delays.

The PPAR is based on the following sources: Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs), Staff Appraisal Reports (SARs), Credit Agreements for the projects, and project files, particularly the supervision reports. An OED mission visited Senegal in July 2001 to collect other pertinent information. The author thanks the many government officials who received the mission for their extensive cooperation. Thanks are also given to the country office staff who helped the mission.

Following standard OED procedures, copies of the draft PPAR were sent to the relevant government officials and agencies for their review and comments but none were received.

1. Review and Impact of IDA Investments in Education

1.1 When Leopold Sédar Senghor, celebrated poet and president of the country left office in 1980, the gross enrollment rate in Senegal was 46 percent and the youth illiteracy rate was 69 percent. Twenty years later, the enrollment rate has risen only to 68 percent. This country (per capita income of US\$710), known for its poets, artists, and griots has shown below-average educational achievements compared to other countries of similar income, with indicators similar to those of much poorer countries in Francophone Africa. Educational priorities seem to be in the wrong place. Poor parents of primary school children must buy textbooks at unaffordable prices, while the government finances 95 percent of university expenditures and gives scholarships to most students.

1.2 The government's political will to rationalize costs and reach universal primary education waxes and wanes, sometimes with election cycles. This is surprising for a country that has been rated in the top quintile of the Country Performance and Institutional Assessment¹ and that once aspired to reach universal primary education by 2000. An added problem is that this country with a population of 9.5 million ²grows at a high rate of 3.1 percent per year. Sixty percent of the citizens live in rural areas, and half are under the age of 16. Access to quality education becomes a roller coaster ride, as the government alternatively starts and stops reforms towards universal primary education. In the meantime, 3 percent more children reach school age each year, and the expansion of the system barely covers the needs of the new citizens.

1.3 Since 1971, IDA has financed 10 education projects, of which 6 have been completed (Table 1), totaling US\$210 million equivalent. Though in the past IDA financed only one project at a time (with some overlap), in 2001 it was financing four projects simultaneously, from women's literacy to computer-based distance education. An OED mission visited Senegal in July 2001 to assess the performance of the two most recently completed projects in primary education. To put the problems and solutions of the country in perspective, a review of past IDA lending in education is included as well as the policies and prospects in the current lending program. The review was based on the Staff Appraisal Reports, Project Completion Reports, and audit reports (latter when available) of all completed projects, as well as on staff interviews in Senegal.

1. CPIA. Source www.worldbank.org. Other similarly rated countries are Uganda, Cape Verde, Bhutan, Nepal, India, and Tanzania.

2. World Bank: Edstats, HPNStats, 2001.

Table 1. IDA-Financed Education Projects in Senegal

<i>Project name</i>	<i>Subsector</i>	<i>Credit no.</i>	<i>Approval fiscal year</i>	<i>Final closing date</i>	<i>Credit amount (\$ million)</i>	<i>Audit/</i>
<i>Completed Projects</i>						
Technical and Agricultural Education Project (Education I)	Technical	Cr. 253-SE	1971	12/30/1977	2 fully disbursed	Yes
Education II	Secondary, technical	Cr. 530-SE	1975	1/8/1985	15 0.35 cancelled	Yes
Education III	Primary, technical, higher	Cr. 908-SE	1979	12/31/1986	22 0.7 cancelled	Yes
CESAG project	Higher	Cr. 1638-SE	1986	10/31/1991	12 0.3 cancelled	No
Primary Education Development Project (Education IV)	Primary	Cr. 1735-SE	1987	3/23/1994	40 fully disbursed	Current document
Second Human Resources Development Project (Education V)	Primary	Cr. 2473-SE	1993	12/30/1999	27 fully disbursed	Current document
Total – Completed Projects					118	
<i>Ongoing Projects</i>						
Higher Education I	Higher	Cr. 2872-SE	1996	6/30/2003	27	
Pilot Female Literacy	Nonformal	Cr. 2873-SE	1996	2/28/2002	13	
Distance Learning Center – LIL	Other	Cr. 3398-SE	2000	4/30/2004	2	
Quality Education for All Program	Education Adjustment	Cr. 3330-SE	2000	12/31/2003	50	
Total – Ongoing Projects					92	
Total – IDA Funding					210	

Earlier Lending Program (1971–1986): Focus on Specific Training Institutions

1.4 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Bank expected to stimulate economic development by forecasting manpower needs and building up training institutions to meet those needs. As in other countries (e.g., Bangladesh, Madagascar), the first missions to Senegal analyzed the education sector in terms of training needs for local industry, agriculture, and fishing. To provide the needed manpower, the first and second education projects built or expanded various technical schools (Table 2). In Senegal and elsewhere, preference was given to training trainers and reducing dependence on foreign instructors. For this reason, the institutions developed often trained higher-level cadres rather than prospective workers. Also, higher-level technical institutions prevailed over vocational training. Much technical assistance, local training, and overseas fellowships were provided in an effort to strengthen these institutions and to replace French staff with Senegalese.

Table 2. Training Institutions Supported by IDA Education Projects

<i>Institution</i>	<i>Financing</i>	<i>Reported Effects/Results of Financing</i>
Delafosse, Andre Peytavin Technical Lycées (Ed. I and III, World Links program of Ed. V)	Building rehabilitation, some construction, some equipment 25 486 computers through Ed. V, technician training	Modest effect in the functioning of Delafosse, low-quality repairs; no memory in André Peytavin Institute; computers work well and are maintained.
Center for vocational upgrading (CFPP and NCQP – Ed. II, III)	Curriculum development, construction, equipment	Substantial long-term effect. Its training programs are in demand by students and industry.
Technological University Institute (Ed. I)	Construction, equipment	Substantial long-term effect. Building well used, integrated with the university, graduates generally employed.
Higher Training College for Technical Teachers (ENSETP- Ed. III)	Construction, equipment	Modest effect in the functioning of the school. Very low enrollment initially, eventually institution integrated into university.
National University School of Technology (ENSUT – Ed. III)	Construction, equipment	Modest effect in the functioning of the institution. Students effectively absorbed in the labor market; institution integrated in university
Agricultural technician school in Ziguinchor (Ed. I)	Expansion	Initially limited employment for graduates, high unit costs; later effective absorption into labor market.
National Rural Development Institute (Ed. III)	Construction, equipment	Effect uncertain, few university-level graduates, who obtain government posts.
Merchant Marine Training School (Ed. II)	Expansion, dormitory construction, curriculum, equipment, TA to train illiterate seamen	No long-term effect on curricula or quality. Initially student numbers low, limited skills acquisition, program stopped, dorm never used.
Regional Management School - CESAG; (Ed. III and CESAG project)	Construction, equipment, fellowships, TA	Substantial long-term effect on enrollments and instructional quality. Reputable and financially transparent institution that serves the region, partly financed through the Central Bank; World Bank on board of directors.
Lower secondary schools and centers for science teaching (Ed. I, II)	4 schools, 11 centers	Negligible long-term effect on science teaching. They function as secondary schools, urban students benefit exclusively.
Village education centers (Ed. II)	20 planned, 8 built	No long-term effects on village education. Were converted to schools.
Educational Research Institute INEADE (Ed. III, IV)	Construction, equipment, TA	Substantial long-term effect on educational research. Carrying out needed research, but also overstaffed with some less qualified staff.
Teacher training centers (Ed. III and IV)	Construction of 1 (Kolda), expansion of 3 others	Substantial long-term effect on providing trained teachers. Fully functional, training in demand.
Primary schools (Ed. III)	86 classes in Kolda, Tambacounda	Substantial long-term effect on area enrollments.
Primary schools (Ed. IV)	400 new classrooms	Substantial long-term effect on enrollments.
Primary schools (Ed. V)	1076 new classrooms – IDA 2000 new classrooms – other donors	Substantial long-term effect on enrollments.

1.5 A project implementation unit was established around 1975 in the Ministry of Public Works, and much attention was given to architectural designs. Initially it did well, but the projects of the period (Education I-III) had many unrelated components, and the unit had to deal with many ministries and entities. Most construction suffered serious delays. Much less was done than expected, as buildings were unavailable and various operational conditions were not met. Often, only a subset of components was carried out. (In the second project only 51 percent of the work was completed.) Several institutions described in the Staff Appraisal Reports were later dropped entirely (e.g., hotel school, fisheries) or picked up in later projects (e.g., merchant marine training school). Projects received extensions, on two occasions of 4.5 years (Table 1).

1.6 According to tables inserted in project implementation reports, IDA supervised projects frequently. Most disbursed almost completely, and subsequent evaluation reports describe overall outcomes as mainly satisfactory (Table 3). Yet, nearly every project completion and audit report (e.g. the audit report of Education I, no. 10044) states that financial management was weak; though improvements were cited in the completion reports of Education III, accounts continued to be scattered and incomplete. Weak financial management, along with exchange rate fluctuations, may be the main reasons why these projects disbursed almost completely, although some of their components were not implemented. However, a search in the archives did not bring up documents where mismanagement was extensively discussed.

1.7 Many foreign fellowships were awarded (total number in all projects is unknown), but their impact on sectoral development is unknown. On three occasions the mission heard (unverified) concerns that directors and well-connected persons went on workshops or study visits rather than the specialists who were most appropriate. Most fellowships were disbursed, though not in the case of the rural development center. It was not possible to research the extent to which fellowship recipients returned to their campuses and worked and for how long they stayed.

Box 1. Center for Higher Studies of Administration and Management (CESAG)

Through the third project (1979-86), IDA financed the development of a regional center of management studies that would be useful for the area countries as well as for Senegal. As in other countries (e.g., Madagascar, Bangladesh), IDA supported the development of high-level management training capacity in the 1980s through a specific project.

The CESAG project (Cr. 1638-SE) was to transform CESAG into a sub-regional training institution with capacities expanded through additional buildings, equipment, and technical assistance. The International Labor Organization (ILO) was to be the agency through which technical assistance would be contracted. About 40 practicing managers were to serve as part-time instructors. Unfortunately the implementation experience was dismal. The facilities built (partly through government funds) were very good, even luxurious, but cost a lot more than expected. Implementation was very slow, and the persons who were considered management experts proved very weak project managers. The institution was expected to do management consulting but did not. The fellowships, training, and study tours that should have been used to develop technical competency were given to inappropriate people, and IDA eventually stopped disbursements against this component. The management appointed to CESAG was considered unsuitable by IDA, but requests for change were not honored. As with other projects, a lesson for IDA was that management schools are not necessarily competent in managing their own affairs.

Ultimately, CESAG management improved, and the institution may be able to fulfill its goals in the long run. It has been taken under the control of the Central Bank of the West African Economic Community (CEAO), and the World Bank is on the board of its directors. It is training high-level African managers and promoting regional cooperation.

Source: Project Completion Report No. 11470.

What was the Long-Term Impact of the 1971-1986 Lending Program?

1.8 OED visited five previously supported training institutions and obtained indirect information about five others. Meetings were held when possible with groups of employees who were available in the campus at the time of the OED visit. The administrators who could be located in person or by phone were asked what IDA had financed in their institution and what the effects of the financing had been. Long-term employees of institutions recalled what IDA had financed, but others who had arrived recently at the institutions and did not know which donor had financed certain improvements. For example, in Lycée Delafosse, a technical secondary school that was enlarged and equipped by the first two projects, the OED mission heard strong complaints about the low-quality rehabilitation done 15 years earlier. However, some staff were under the impression that it was the French government and not IDA that had financed the building extension and equipment. In the Lycée André Peytavin, a senior staff who could be reached by phone had not heard of any IDA financing and did not know details.

1.9 Clearly, IDA support has been only one of many factors influencing institutional development. Nevertheless, long-term outcomes and progress on the directions of training institutions supported 30 years earlier seem modest. Though medium-sized for the period, the projects did not open large numbers of seats for student learning and did not support training in any single sector strongly enough to make a significant contribution. The training institutions that were established through IDA financing received a legislative framework, staff, and recurrent expenditures. They remain functional to this day. Nearly all had initially lower enrollments than projected, but as demand for education in the country increased, enrollments increased. The higher-level technical institutions that were established did not necessarily increase the supply of technical or vocational teachers; graduates often found jobs elsewhere, but Senegalese trainers eventually became available, and they replaced the French.³ On the other hand, these institutions had high recurrent costs at the outset. Income generation and cost recovery were rarely addressed at the period, although some, such as the Ecole Supérieure Polytechnique, now require tuition and generate significant income.

1.10 Where IDA supported existing training institutions with just physical rehabilitation and technical assistance, the long-term impact was reported to the mission as negligible. New curricula developed through foreign or local consultants often offered improvements, and staff training purportedly improved quality; but without textbooks, the long-term impact of the inputs to students was diminished. Most equipment in the institutions that received it was put to use; though after a few years it became obsolete, cohorts of students were trained through it, and some pieces still work.

1.11 The Bank did the best analytical work it had available at the time, but the extensive manpower studies of the period (e.g., for the National Institute for Rural Development) considered necessary in the mid-1970s to justify the investment in the training institutions turned out to be flawed when the economic crisis of the 1980s came. The crisis dramatically changed the role of the government and the employment prospects in the private sector. During the 1980s and early 1990s the country economic growth, government revenues and capacity to finance public expenditures suffered because of an overvalued exchange rate policy, numerous external shocks, and poor public sector management. Stabilization policy relied on expenditure containment and reduction. The education sector was affected, because there were no recurrent resources to accompany a rapid expansion of the system. Also, local government revenues were non-existent

3. In several countries, such as Bangladesh, the Bank supported sectoral capacity development in vocational-technical sector in the same period, but not in Senegal. The omission may not be important, because outcomes of such projects were often unsatisfactory due to high costs and low enrollments of these institutions.

and small communities and family disposable income declined over much of the period thus constraining family contribution to education financing. The Bank did not have coherent answers to this new reality.

1.12 Also, the Bank did not consult beneficiaries and employers for its sector analyses, and some investments were made on incorrect assumptions. For example, the merchant marine school got a dormitory it could not use for 25 years, and its perspicacious curriculum for illiterate deckhands was eventually scrapped because the graduates could not find suitable work. Similarly, the training of the agricultural school in Ziguinchor was not in demand for several years. Most of the polytechnic institutions have become part of the university, thus turning technical education into higher education. And the vocational educators mistakenly focused on training formally educated trainers, who were unlikely to be artisans and had limited skills to pass on. The Bank did not come up with reasonable policy alternatives for publicly provided and financed skill development and just dropped it from the agenda after 1986. Thus most of the technical-vocational institutions did not receive any further donor help. But in 1998, the World Links program of the World Bank Institute donated refurbished computers for student use to two technical secondary schools supported earlier.

Table 3. PCR/ICR Ratings of Completed Projects

<i>Project</i>	<i>Outcome</i>	<i>Institutional Development Impact</i>	<i>Sustainability</i>	<i>Bank Performance</i>	<i>Borrower Performance</i>
Technical and Agricultural Education	Satisfactory	Not Rated	Not Rated	Not Rated	Not Rated
Education II	Unsatisfactory	Not Rated	Uncertain	Not Rated	Not Rated
Education III	Satisfactory	Modest	Uncertain	Satisfactory	Not Rated
CESAG project	Unsatisfactory	Negligible	Unlikely	Not Rated	Not Rated
Primary Education Development Project	Satisfactory	Modest	Uncertain	Not Rated	Not Rated
Second Human Resources Development Project	Satisfactory	Substantial	Likely	Satisfactory	Satisfactory

Note: Earlier audits and completion reports had limited ratings.

Bank Policies in the Education Sector in Various Periods

1971–1986: No Clear Policies Supported through Lending

1.13 The first four projects had no significant sector policy conditionalities. Conditions and agreements mainly refer to appointment of specialists, accountants, staffing, creation of committees, legal establishment of new institutions, budgetary provisions, conclusion of studies, criteria for fellowship awards, or land acquisition. The country strategies of the period focused on responding to immediate needs rather than the long term.

1986–1998: Policy Orientation Toward Primary Education

1.14 In some respects, Senegal received primary education investments sooner than many other countries; concern about the low primary school enrollment started from the second project, in 1974, when gross enrollment rates were only 38 percent, and primary education policy was on

the agenda by 1976. More support was given during the third project (1979), while support for technical education gradually waned. Consistent with the plan of building training capacity before training the population, the second project offered technical assistance to the Ministry of Education in the first of many efforts to get a management information system and school mapping. The third project built 86 classrooms and started the support of the National Institute of Studies and Action for Educational Development (INEADE) to develop capacity in educational research.

1.15 The fourth and fifth projects focused squarely on expanding access to primary education by providing the inputs needed for children's instruction as well as by strengthening the institutions that would make this possible. (See objectives in Table 4.) Thus, they financed construction, technical assistance, and fellowships for the Ministry of Education Department of Planning, Research, and Studies (DPRE) as well as for INEADE. Each project financed large-scale provision of textbooks and teacher training.

1.16 Most important, the projects tried to enforce a set of policies destined to make education accessible for all, including a shift from the bloated higher education budget to primary education. The fourth project included a sector adjustment component, through which it tied school construction to higher education budget reductions. IDA convinced the government (first through a pilot) to introduce multigrade teaching in rural schools, double-shift classes in crowded schools, encourage communities to build schools, and hire briefly trained and teachers on short-term contracts (called "volunteer" teachers) to manage the very high salary budget, given that due to an earlier scarcity of educated people, teacher salaries in Senegal have been 7 to 10 times the per capita gross domestic product (GDP). These were brave and innovative measures, introduced in Senegal often before they were introduced in other countries. The fifth project continued the policy orientation and tried to help the government decrease the rampant expenses of student stipends, dormitories, and food in the university. The assessment outcomes of these two projects are presented in greater detail in Chapter 2.

1998–2001: Innovative Projects with Some Difficult Objectives

1.17 The innovative spirit that characterized the projects of the 1990s has continued in the current lending program, which consists of:

- The Higher Education Project (Cr. 2872-SE; 1996–2003), which was to consolidate the 1994 reforms in the social aspects of higher education and to carry them to the teaching and learning process through library services, upgrading of teaching and research opportunities. However, some university administrators in charge of implementing the reform to lower costs have acted against it, and the benefits of any savings were not applied to improved quality of instruction. Consequently, the government has increased rather than decreased university costs, and weakened the incentives of students and staff to pursue academic goals more intensely. Students became an important voice in ousting the previous government, and are being rewarded through increased scholarships and delayed policies to increase fees. As a result, the outcomes of this project are disappointing.
- The Female Literacy Pilot (Cr. 2873-SE; 1996–2002) is teaching basic literacy to illiterate groups, mainly women. Classes are organizing by creating incentives for NGOs and private operators who receive the instructional materials, deliver instruction, and are evaluated. Despite complexities and doubts regarding what is in fact private provision of adult literacy, about 1,000 classes have been held and about 60,000 illiterate women have attended. It is hoped that the pilot will make 120,000 people literate and then be carried to

a larger scale. IDA attempted adult literacy during the second project, in a misguided plan to provide integrated rural development to young rural populations just at the age they were starting families. Much has been learned since then.

- The Quality Education for All Program (Cr. 3330-SE; 2000–2003) is the first phase of a 10-year program to implement universal primary education, expand access to secondary education, and improve instructional effectiveness, partly by teaching children in national languages. The evolving methodology is school-based management through community involvement and local projects. This well-designed program may attain its objectives if it is implemented as planned.
- The Distance Learning Project (Cr. 3398-SE; 2000–2004) has established a commercial distance learning center and is developing courses and technologies with which to transmit them effectively in Africa. It is one of the 10 pilots established in conjunction with the World Bank's Global Distance Learning Network to disseminate these technologies in Africa and Latin America. It aims to price its products to be competitive and yet accessible. It is not yet evident whether the institution will be financially sustainable through private fees after the IDA project ends.

1.18 Overall, there are three major strands to IDA lending in Senegal over the past 30 years: support for technical/vocational skill development, broad support for primary education development, and policy reform along with targeted support for higher education. The lending program achieved some successes in the first area, considerable progress in the second, but it largely failed in the third. Failure to convince the government of the utility of limiting higher-education expenses has wider implications, because it affects the financing of the education sector. As illustrated below with the two access projects, the Bank has been unable to engage Senegal in a long-term sector-wide policy dialogue. To focus government attention, the Bank tried various methods: non-threatening policy dialogue (Education III), tough conditionalities (Education IV), and up-front action with temporary success (Education V). None of these have been brought about long-term policy changes as yet.

Donor Coordination

1.19 Senegal has received the benefit of much donor financing. France, UNDP, UNESCO, the African Development Bank, Canada, the United States, and the Islamic Development Bank have implemented separate projects or provided parallel financing of IDA projects. Senegal benefits from the presence of the regional UNESCO office in Dakar, which provides a steady flow of workshop opportunities. France and its cultural legacy continues to be respected in Senegal and to some extent shape educational policy, though its aid budget is much smaller than IDA lending. Despite frequent cofinancing of projects, donor coordination is not as close as would be expected. Indeed, different donors sometimes give conflicting advice. For example, France (through the University of Lyons) and Canada (through Université Laval) have given the government conflicting advice regarding curriculum development. Whereas Canada advises the government to develop competency-based instruction, France continues to train Senegalese inspectors to focus, as traditionally, on curricular content. Pluralism can certainly be beneficial, but the debate has shifted emphasis from the very low levels of student performance to the more abstract issue of curricula. Given the limited success of single-donor investments, perhaps the time has come to move to a sector-wide approach and create close donor coordination.

2. Implementation and Outcomes of the Assessed Projects

Table 4. Main Objectives of the Assessed Projects

	<i>Quality</i>	<i>Access-Equity</i>	<i>Finance-Management</i>
Primary Education Development Project (Cr. 1735-SE)	Improve teacher effectiveness Improve relevancy and availability of textbooks	Increase enrollments by about 32% without increasing government share of the budget	Support a phased sectoral adjustment program Strengthen the Ministry of Education
Second Human Resources Development Project (Cr. 2473-SE).	Improve quality and efficiency of primary education for period 1993-98 Improve quality and efficiency of secondary and higher education	Improve access to primary education Raise primary enrollment ratio from 58% in 1992 to 65% by 1988	Strengthening education sector planning and management

Note: The First Human Resources Development project (Cr. 2255-SE) targeted the health sector.

The Primary Education Development Project (Education IV)

2.1 The project was implemented during a period of structural adjustment (1986–92). It focused on Louga, Diurbel, and Fatick, three of the country's 10 regions, where 25 percent of the population lives. Affected by lengthy drought and poverty, the areas had severe teacher shortages, few schools, and very low literacy rates. After years of construction delays by the Ministries of Public Works and Education, AGETIP (a nongovernmental agency) undertook the civil works and carried them out quite efficiently for this and subsequent projects as well. In addition to building and rehabilitating about 400 classrooms, much teacher and inspector training was carried out, and 1,072,000 textbooks were produced, cofinanced by the African Development Bank through its Nigerian trust fund. Civil works were also built for INEADE and for regional inspectorates in an effort to decentralize the system and strengthen local quality control and information. Though only half the expected counterpart funds were given, the project disbursed the IDA funds quickly and was completed 15 months ahead of schedule. (See detailed activities in Annex A, Table 2).

2.2 Community-financed construction was to be an important project innovation, but proved quite difficult to implement. Communities had the will but not always the means to contribute materials. Delays resulted, and the supervision of community construction cost two to three times more than that of regularly built schools (though overall costs may still be lower). The schools visited by the mission that had actually been built by communities were of lower quality and deteriorated more quickly.

2.3 Though various activities were carried out satisfactorily, some policies were not. The government did introduce double-shift and multigrade classes rapidly and in excess of targets. It also started to hire teachers on short-term contracts, a process that was later accelerated despite objections from teacher trade unions. In response, IDA allowed disbursements for school construction. Despite assurances, however, the government failed to reduce the higher education budget, and in fact increased it from 15 percent to 25 percent of the total education budget. Also, the government opened a second university in St. Louis. Eventually IDA realized that the political strength of university special interests could not compete with that of the rural poor and postponed the effort to rationalize the budget for the subsequent project. The policy that appeared promising in the 1980s proved unattainable.

The Second Human Resources Development Project (Education V)

2.4 The fifth project continued the activities and policy initiatives of the fourth. The access to education continued to be insufficient, to the extent that the government called for an emergency education program. The project started a period of reform, which went on in the early 1990s. However, implementation was slowed by internal ministry conflicts and political influence, which assigned classrooms to some areas of low demand and militated against updating the school map. Communities were unable to contribute significantly to school construction. Eventually, plans were revised to rely much more on construction through AGETIP, while community contributions were reduced from 25 percent to 10 percent and limited to items such as enclosures or latrines. Aside from IDA, other donors, such as the European Union, Germany, and the African Development Bank financed the construction of about 2000 classrooms. Overall, many activities were carried out. (See detailed project activities in Annex A, Table 2).

2.5 However, important components intended to increase the quality of education foundered. In a move to introduce school-based, community-assisted management, schools in high-risk areas were to receive school improvement grants, for which proposals were to be elaborated by the communities. The procedures proved too time-consuming, and ultimately only 196 were awarded. About 2.7 million textbooks were financed that were to be free or sold cheaply through private vendors, but about 30 percent of the books were stolen, partly through organized efforts to break into storage areas; prices were hiked by two or three times, above what many poor parents could pay, and eventually only 20 percent of students received books. After this experience, the government decided to give the books to students charging only a very small fee to help with their maintenance.

2.6 The government's desire to improve primary education brought about considerable policy action at the higher education level for a limited period. In 1994, the government evicted "professional" students from the dormitories where they had been staying for years with their families, privatized the cafeteria, and assigned the savings to the recruitment of contract teachers. In turn, the higher education project rehabilitated the dormitories and the cafeteria. Though the political will waned again as the next elections approached, university dormitories have remained accessible to regular students.

2.7 Both projects suffered from financial management irregularities, as had the earlier projects. The project implementation unit (PIU) of the fourth project was staffed with 50 percent more people than necessary. Irregularities included incorrect recording of expenditures, mistakes in withdrawals from special accounts, inadequate internal controls, and late or incomplete submission of audit reports. The fifth project encountered the large problem of the mismanaged textbook fund. Government audits showed that funds disappeared, but the PIU did not move to correct the problem. However, the Bank did not stop disbursements.

2.8 The mission visited about 27 school sites, inspectorates, and literacy classes in Dakar, Louga, Diurbel, Rufisque, Nianing, and Jamnyadio. The sites corresponded to the areas of greatest involvement for the fourth and fifth education projects. Though schools were closed in July 2001, the mission visited the buildings and interviewed inspectors, teachers, parents, and teacher trainees. Frequently, inspectors accompanied the mission to nearby school sites for visits and discussions with users. Salient issues encountered are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

Policies to Increase Access May Lower Quality

2.9 Running double-shifts reduces class time. According to inspectors and educational researchers who interacted with the mission, the policies aimed at increasing access to education reduced the amount of time children spent in class and in learning tasks. The double shift was a means to accommodate large numbers of students in crowded schools without increasing the number of teachers. It was to extend the class day and allow the teacher to teach two classes in the same space and in the span of about eight hours. It was expected that students of one section would do extracurricular activities while the other section was in class, but this does not happen. It was also foreseen that remediation would take place on Saturdays, but this also does not happen. About 37 percent of students (mainly in urban areas) are on this schedule. INEADE has estimated that students get 180 fewer contact hours per year as a result of the policy. One reason is that teachers, who are overwhelmed by two shifts of classes of 60 students, teach fewer hours than expected. In Nianing, nearly illiterate parents mentioned to the mission that their children attended school for very few hours, particularly since teacher strikes are frequent. For this reason, parents who can afford the tuition of about \$8 per month (e.g., the salary of a guide in a tourist resort), send their children to a private school.

2.10 According to inspectors, multigrade teaching, where used, also has problems with time on task. It should work well if the teachers practiced what they learned in training sessions and if students had materials. But with few textbooks available, it has not been easy to give school work to different groups of students. Thus, all classes may study together or students of one class may go outside and play.

2.11 Mother-tongue education is not practiced, despite a successful experiment in the late 1970s during the third project. In reality, the teachers have to teach in the language of the students if they want to communicate any information, but this mode of instruction is not officially sanctioned, and there are no mother-tongue instructional materials. Because French has complex spelling rules, many students find it hard to learn simultaneously a new language as well as basic reading in it.

Contract (“Volunteer”) Teachers Are a Viable Alternative

2.12 After lengthy country dialogue, piloting, and consensus building, the fourth and fifth projects have promoted the use of lower-paid contract teachers. These can be recruited at the province level and receive 50,000 CFAF (about US\$77) per month. They usually have a baccalaureate, though people with a ninth grade diploma may also be appointed if they pass the examinations. The policy has proved sustainable, despite the objections of the teachers’ union. The positions are in much demand, since the candidates hope that they will eventually be regularized and receive pensions.

2.13 The inspectors interviewed stated that the contract teachers usually perform well, but they are not a long-term solution, since they leave the class as soon as they find a better position. However, others are willing to take their place, and the system is sustainable for the time being. There are about 7,000 contract teachers, 44 percent of a total of about 16,000.

2.14 The mission visited the Louga teacher training college, interviewed groups of teacher trainees totaling about 25 persons, and observed training. The visit coincided with a hunger strike, because a number of trainees demanded regular civil service positions. Trainees stated that the job pays very little, but that this is the only avenue open to most, given that they have followed an academic track.

Box 2. Why Teachers May Not Practice What They Learn in Training

Inspectors are often concerned because teachers do not practice in class what they are taught in in-service training. One reason may be that the material is not imparted in a way that enables learners to make meaningful connections between theory and its practical application. One example was training of contract teachers in the development of school projects in classes observed by the mission.

During class, panels of trainees read aloud and wrote on the board material they had read on developing school projects: meaning of a project, defining objectives, assessing needs, surveying the community, asking authorities for help. However, the students could not easily present examples of suitable projects for the poor areas they would be working in, given their own experiences. They mentioned a school garden and a library, and stated that when appointed as teachers, they would conduct a needs assessment and would write to the local authorities for materials. But when pressed to think of a project for their own training college, they stated that the deficiencies were glaring without a needs assessment, and it was unrealistic to expect their remedy from writing to local authorities.

A professor explained that students should first learn the theory and that next week they would develop concrete school projects. However, cognitive research indicates that students are much more likely to remember material for which they have established a use.⁴ The theory on needs assessment was not giving them the tools they needed for a functional school project.

2.15 According to the Implementation Completion Report on the fifth project, the government succeeded in redeploying to classrooms teachers who were in administrative posts. However, some inspectors reported that success did not last long because those teachers often have political connections. So, about 10 percent of the teachers may still be in non-teaching positions.

Inspector Roles Show Little Change and Limited Effectiveness

2.16 To decentralize the system and overhaul the antiquated role and training of the inspectors, the fourth project financed 20 staff months of advisory services, 1,720 days of seminars, 6 national seminars on innovation and system management, and vehicles to visit schools. Regional and local councils were established, which have assumed functions such as distributing chalk and rescheduling school to accommodate market days. An inspection academy was created, inspectors became better able to train teachers and keep track of enrollments, but their role did not change. Inspectors may be useful as teacher trainers, but as they are currently used, they cost a lot and provide little value added to the system. The IDA projects did not succeed in bringing about the substantial reform that had been envisaged.

4. Perffetto, G. Bransford, D. and Franks. J. Constraints on access in a problem solving context. *Memory and Cognition* 1983, 11, 24-31.

Box 3. Inspector Reports—One-Way Street to a Ministry Storage Room

There is one inspector for about 400 teachers in Senegal, and each one is expected to carry out 30 inspections per year, 25 of teachers and 5 of principals. The inspector must visit a school every two years, but in fact inspection often takes place once every three years. The official spends a day in the school and observes the classes then fills out a report on each teacher, which is now in the form of a questionnaire. The questionnaire requests ratings on items such as the existence of a register log book, and blackboard, if students recite, use of time, objectives, instructional cards, written work, compositions, drawings, practical activities, group work, as well as propriety, order, class decoration, teacher regularity, appearance, diligence, and training needs. The report is confidential. Teacher promotions are determined on that basis.

The inspector writes the report and gives it to the head inspector, who sends summaries of the reports to the Ministry of Education. Usually the ministry receives the summaries one or two years later and stores them. There is no meaningful discussion of results or analysis of the data collected. The process is a one-way information flow to a storage room of an entity that does not respond.

Inspectors themselves find their functions antiquated and would prefer to be pedagogical advisors with rapid decision-making power, but there is no legislation for a different role. For example, they cannot take actions against absent teachers. If a teacher is not at work, the inspector must send a separate report to the prefect, ask for explanation, and wait for three days before starting disciplinary proceedings. Despite the rampant and lengthy absenteeism (teachers often start work two months after the school year starts), teachers are not disciplined. This happens partly because inspectors rarely return to a school.

Inspectors are usually men aged 45–50, selected through grade and seniority, and enjoy status and respect. They drive and maintain the vehicles provided by the IDA projects. Status makes it hard for them to ride bicycles or motorbikes to schools, which IDA has provided in other countries. At the same time, they complain that the vehicles they have received are expensive to maintain and that often a head inspector, who has limited field functions, takes a vehicle for exclusive personal use.

The inspection function was developed in Europe in the 19th century and may be appropriate for situations where the school principal is not allowed to or cannot effectively supervise teachers or decide their promotion. The school-based management model that Senegal would like to implement makes this function superfluous. A strong principal would be responsible for school-level outcomes and supervise teachers. A less expensive cohort of staff could become pedagogical advisors, supporting rather than controlling teachers. However, there is often tension between support and control functions, and Senegal has not yet developed effective school-based management.

Source: Interviews totaling nine inspectors, including a group of six. They were the staff available during mission visits to the offices of Luga, Diurbel, Rufisque, and Dakar.

Classroom Time on Task May be Limited – Observations from Literacy Classes

2.17 Though primary schools were closed during the OED mission, many adult literacy classes were operating, and three were visited. Students had received textbooks and writing materials. However, they were not kept busy all the time, as they should be. One student read or worked on the blackboard, while the rest were unoccupied and inattentive. They could be reading in small groups, but they were not.

2.18 The interactions in literacy classes were reminiscent of primary classes, where the same teachers often teach. In primary and secondary schools of many countries, teachers limit student participation. They may be standing by the blackboard asking questions to the general class, accepting volunteer group answers from a few students in the front rows. Unresponsive students, who often sit at the back, tend to fail. It is very likely that primary school interaction methods reflect the model seen in literacy classes. And since teachers in Senegal are known to have inordinately large classes in double shifts, they may pay very little attention to the response patterns of individual students. Possible neglect may promote dropout and repetition.

Better Methodology is Needed for Community School Construction

2.19 Communities were to provide materials for schools. Though members developed committees and agreed in principle, it became very hard to provide the materials and labor in practice. Construction by communities needed intensive supervision, and the results were not always satisfactory. The need to have all materials ready to build in remote areas meant long delays when communities did not have the means provide them. Ultimately, community contribution was reduced from 25 percent to 10 percent and limited to structures like enclosures or latrines. However, it is not possible to build all schools by contractors who are much more expensive.

2.20 Given the government's limited means and magnitude of need for more schools, community participation needs to become more effective. The on-going project may pilot community management of school construction (as has been done in Mauritania) based on government advances to the community and Government supervision of works.

Capacity for Educational Research Was Established

2.21 Since the third project, in 1981, IDA has supported the development of educational research capacity, and the fourth project built a building for INEADE. The organization has developed the textbooks that were printed in the two projects and is responsible for ensuring the upcoming free distribution of textbooks to students.

2.22 INEADE has proved its capacity to carry out educational research, and has exported its expertise to neighboring countries, such as Mali. Researchers documented the loss of instructional time in double-shift classes and the dismally low level of performance. Assisted by foreign specialists, INEADE produced standardized achievement tests and tested samples of students over four years in basic competencies. To their astonishment, they found only two public-school children in grade 4 who had mastered all basic competencies, while only 30 percent of the students had mastered 50 percent of the objectives. INEADE also carried out a UNICEF-financed experiment to teach basic competencies in 100 schools. But the achievement level of all students was so low that it was not possible to show differences between experimental and control classes. (The report is still in the process of being written.)

2.23 INEADE is respected in Senegal, but its researchers are concerned that the government makes policy decisions without considering their findings or consulting them. One problem is that INEADE's functions overlap to some extent with those of the Department of Planning and Educational Research of the Ministry of Education. The two organizations have been in some conflict for several years. Another problem is that of the 40 staff members in INEADE only a few are competent researchers. Several employees are reportedly political appointees, who are not qualified to do the sophisticated technical work required in this institution. Thus, capacity to deliver targeted work is rather limited.

Project Outcomes

2.24 The projects clearly had a significant impact on primary school enrollments in project-supported areas. For example, in the areas supported by the fourth project, enrollments increased by 35 percent above targets. The increase clearly benefited the rural poor. Girls' enrollments also increased, from 41 percent in 1992 to 47 percent in 1998. UNICEF supported campaigns to send girls to school, and it is possible that the campaigns contributed to the increase. Despite these

efforts, Senegal continues to lag in enrollments behind countries that have a lower per capita income.

2.25 Despite much staff training, however, the inspectors interviewed by the mission reported that the projects did not have the expected effect on improving quality of education. One reason was that in both cases, few students benefited from textbooks. One problem was that the various documents give very little emphasis to instructional issues and information processing in class.

2.26 The financial policies supported by the projects were only partially implemented. Because university expenses increased rather than decreased, and the share of the budget devoted to primary education remained almost stationary. Both projects demanded large budget decreases and university discipline to increase efficiency of spending without providing politically acceptable avenues on how to bring that about or considering the special interests that ultimately prevailed. As a result of these problems, outcomes for both projects are rated *moderately satisfactory*.

Institutional Development Impact

2.27 The assessed projects included many activities intended to build institutions, such as INEADE and the rationalization of educational management. However, the efforts had partial results. The function of the inspectors has not changed, and their impact on the quality of classroom instruction has been modest. Overall, institutional development impact for both projects is rated *modest*.

Sustainability

2.28 The outcomes appeared to be sustainable in terms of resilience to risk of net benefits over time, to the extent that beneficiaries acquired permanent skills. However, sustainability of educational outcomes has been limited in Senegal. Activities are carried out when donor financing flows, but they stop when projects end. An example is a unit set up to train teachers that does very little work after the end of the 5th project (although the government is still paying for salaries and the project built buildings that use electricity). When equipment breaks down it is not replaced, and school buildings are not maintained. A number of inspectors stated that the project-financed vehicles had been inoperative for months as a result of insufficient repair budget.

2.29 Another concern has been policy sustainability. The policy to hire contract teachers has thus far been maintained. However, the political will of the government toward higher education reform lasted only for two or three years, and then the education reform was suspended in the face of upcoming elections. Overall the sustainability of the fourth and fifth projects is rated *not evaluable*.

Bank Performance

2.30 Overall, Bank performance for the two assessed projects is rated *satisfactory*. Project designs were innovative, supported dialogue, and gave some incentives to the government to carry out difficult reforms. In many respects, the Bank did the best it could in Senegal with respect to implementation design, assessment of risks, and supervision. However, it could have given more emphasis to instructional issues and explored more clearly the unresolved problems of teaching in national languages and revising the roles of inspectors. One criticism is that the Bank should have planned in greater detail on how to deal with obstacles (and thus ensure sustainability) and not just rely on written assurances by the government that certain policies

would be carried out. One example was the textbooks of the fifth project, whose distribution was quite insufficiently planned, and where the Bank disregarded equity concerns. A number of officials stated that they had been against the sale of textbooks to parents and had advised the Bank to give them for free.

2.31 The Bank has been reluctant to take measures against potential corruption and mismanagement and to stop disbursements for projects or components where the money has not been used for the intended purposes. This reluctance may have given a message that there is no clear strategy on how to deal with tolerating sloppy records and questionable financial management, which are mentioned in almost all the earlier project completion reports. Thus, the institution may still be giving mixed messages regarding what it realistically plans to do. The Bank often finds itself in a difficult situation. Managers do not want to stop disbursements that will benefit the poor, even though a portion may be siphoned elsewhere. And the Bank hesitates to demand immediate reimbursement of the loan in case of massive misuse. Perhaps the Bank should be more explicit about what it can accept and when it can no longer support the sector.

2.32 The Minister of Education, a former university rector, felt that the Bank sometimes gives contradictory messages. On one hand, university faculties were told to open new specialties, on the other the university was told not to hire more teachers. The Bank was interested in building libraries, but classrooms are also needed. The Minister also disagrees with the donor policy to promote primary education and feels that all subsectors should be promoted equally. Specifically he expressed the view that the Bank does not do enough toward poverty alleviation, because it does not sufficiently support university students, most of whom come from families of limited means.

Borrower Performance

2.33 For both projects, borrower performance is rated *unsatisfactory*. Civil works were carried out satisfactorily, but many training activities ended when financing ended. A coalition of university-led special interests seems to be driving the real primary education policy. University students and professors have much greater bargaining power than primary school students, who have no special interest group except, perhaps, for the teachers' union. (In Senegal there are no large NGOs that could put political pressure on the government to invest more in primary education.)

2.34 The government may not be sufficiently informed about the research that shows the benefits of primary education in health and income generation. Perhaps there should be a multidonor effort to inform the government about these benefits versus the costs of political expediency. Greater access to attention by the media may also help citizens understand the importance of primary education for the poor.

2.35 If the same policy preference continues to be given to higher education, the 10-year program is at risk.

Relevance and Efficiency

2.36 The human resource development strategy that IDA had developed for Senegal was relevant to its economic needs, as perceived in each period, and the objectives of the projects have been relevant to the economic needs of the country. Nevertheless, it would have been very helpful if in 1974, when concerns first arose about primary education, a primary project had been

implemented. At that time the country had a substantially lower population, and its literacy rate might be higher today.

2.37 Overall, efficiency was at best modest. The project designs of the earlier years were deficient in policy measures and ultimately were less effective than would have been expected. Also, resources were often used rather inefficiently, partly as a result of long-standing financial mismanagement. With respect to allocative efficiency – whether the project financed the most cost-effective types of interventions, the record is mixed. Some of the activities, such as civil works, were cost effective. Others, such as textbooks, were not.


2.38 Although the goals of the projects were relevant to the needs of the country, the limited efficiency meant that considerable loans were obtained for investments that may not have had the expected human-capital returns. By 2001, IDA had committed or spent US\$210 million for a population of 8 million (compared to Bangladesh, where IDA has committed US\$500 million for 120 million people). These IDA credits contributed to making Senegal a highly indebted country in need of debt relief. Though decisions on how to spend the funds were ultimately made by the country, the Bank's earlier efforts to promote projects in countries with limited absorptive capacity may have increased the indebtedness.

3. Issues for Future Consideration

3.1 Below are the salient issues arising in the audited projects—one general set and one for the audited projects

Time on Task Is Insufficient for the Acquisition of Basic Skills

3.2 Several factors conspire to reduce systematically the time on task available in class for actual acquisition and processing of useful information. Discussions with various government officials, including inspectors, suggest that students have much less available time to learn basic information than formal school schedules suggest. An estimate is as follows:



3.3 The INEADE test results, indicating a 0.2 percent mastery of basic skills, prove that very little usable information is transmitted to the children. Much emphasis has been placed on increasing access and enrollments, but to some extent quality is being sacrificed. Unless the Senegalese students retain and recall significant amounts of useful information, attendance becomes an expensive social gathering.

3.4 Increasing time on task should become an issue of highest priority, which requires interventions at various levels. If inspectors are to actually inspect schools, they need the legal

framework to discipline the absent teachers. Students must receive free textbooks, and take them home to study. Even as a recurrent expenditure, the textbook budget is small compared to the cost of repetition and dropout.

3.5 The country has made good use of the contract teacher system and can probably do more. However, the teachers still usually come from another town (which may be nearby) and may still be absent for a long time. Since in Senegal students without the Baccalaureate are eligible to take the teacher training examinations, persons with about nine years of education could be chosen in the more remote villages for teacher training and appointed as assistant teachers. Being resident, they would be less likely to be absent from the school and would be more accountable to their communities for educating children. Similar systems are used in India, Nepal, and Bangladesh.

Foreign-Language Instruction May Slow Down the Learning of Information in Poor Schools

3.6 Available evidence from various countries suggests that students may be better off studying in their own language if they are to progress in school.⁵ Poor rural children have few means of outside help and study in schools of lower means. If the disadvantaged children of Senegal face the same problems as those of Guatemala, then they have difficulty learning basic skills and reading in an official language that they must first master. For this reason, the third project financed technical assistance and experimentation with 600 students who studied in Wolof. However, for logistical and political reasons, the pilot was not extended, and Senegal still only teaches students formally in French. The government is teaching adult and nonformal adolescent literacy (*écoles communautaires de base*) in the six official national languages, but a separate Ministry of Literacy and National Languages is in charge of these programs.

3.7 The 10-year plan elaborated by the government and partly financed by donors includes a plan to introduce national languages in primary schools, but the information obtained by the assessment mission suggests that no preparation is being done nor are close linkages to the Literacy Ministry being established. The mission heard concerns from the inspectors who were interviewed that it would be too complex to teach in 6-8 languages, and that teachers would need special training. There is also a concern that the vocabulary of some languages would be inadequate and an uncertainty on the language to use with a multilingual class of students, as is frequently the case in Dakar. Finally, there is some concern that languages might fuel nationalism, although Senegal does not have serious tribal problems.

3.8 Another problem posed by inspectors who were interviewed by the mission is that the poor population may not understand why their children should study in their national language.

5. e.g., H. Patrinos and E. Velez. 1996. Costs and Benefits of Bilingual Education in Guatemala, Human Capital Development Working Papers 74, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

Dutcher, N. & Tucker, R. (1997) *The Use of First and Second Languages in Education: A Review of International Experience. The Pacific Islands Discussion Paper Series* (World Bank Report Number 18803). Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

Findings from a 1998 study may be applicable to the problems faced in countries such as Francophone Africa. (Wayne P. Thomas and Virginia Collier. 1997. *School Effectiveness for Language Minority Students* (<http://www.ncbe.gwu.edu>). Through a US government grant, the authors studied the longitudinal performance of minority-language students in various types of bilingual programs, including the performance of students studying exclusively in English because of parental choice. They found a distinct advantage to mother-tongue instruction in earlier years and teaching courses in both languages in later years.

Some workers expressed to the mission that since a child already speaks Wolof, there is no advantage in learning more Wolof in school. Parents are not yet informed of the advantages.

3.9 Logistics are complicated, because efforts should be made to appoint teachers in areas whose language they speak.⁶ However, teachers already teach informally in the national languages; two instructors interviewed at the Louga teacher training college stated that it is not possible for children to learn otherwise. But teachers lack national-language materials to reinforce reading and math.

3.10 To increase the time available to students for learning, the government might enable the teaching of basic skills in 6-8 national languages while French is taught from the first year as a foreign language. In addition to getting oral explanations from teachers, students need to receive textbooks in their languages and study basic literacy and numeracy through those. One solution may be to strengthen the current informal system and provide national language textbooks as supplementary materials. These would be inexpensive and exact translations of the French textbooks. To provide support at this level, the government would not have to declare a national languages policy if that is politically inconvenient.

Little-Understood Sociological Factors May Influence Education Decisions

3.11 Donors finance the expansion of primary education with the expectation that graduates will be able to get information to make better decisions about their lives and be more productive. Discussions with parents and students, however, suggest a widespread belief that education instead leads to a different way of life and to occupations different from those of the local population. Even some government officials expressed the view that primary education is of no use unless one continues on to secondary and higher education.

3.12 Once one takes the education road, going back to common occupations may be seen as a loss of face. This may be one reason why the government has had so much demand for the contract teacher positions which pay very poorly. These Baccalaureate holders who were attending the Louga teacher college explained that they could not find anything else to do with their level of education but be in academic fields. They could not easily become, for example, merchants. Certainly, education improves social standing worldwide, but the intensity of this view may be unusually strong in Senegal and possibly in other Sahel countries. This tendency may explain the reason for the large graduate unemployment encountered in various countries, and the phenomenon of young people preferring unemployment to mundane jobs.

3.13 This hypothesis may explain to some extent why student subsidies continue. They may have broad support because the local society considers them natural rewards for going down the education road. One would think that once enough people get educated and see that there is no different way of life for most, that the view would change. But with 67 percent gross enrollment, a good academic level is still scarce enough to justify the view that education leads to a different road from which there should be no return.

3.14 Some inspectors who interacted with the OED mission mentioned the need for more application-oriented curricula to give more basic skills to students who go on to higher schooling levels. Though experience from other countries in this respect has been disappointing, the instruction of some specific skills might be considered. At this time, what is taught in public schools is very limited.

6. Several countries, such as Mali, Nepal, and Papua-New Guinea, have successfully developed textbooks and mother-tongue instruction in multiple languages.

Lessons

3.15 Experience with these projects confirms a number of OED lessons:

- Sectoral adjustment programs that include policies which governments are reluctant to implement are likely to fail. Mere letters of assurances from governments are often meaningless. To make needed policy changes, project designs should include dialogue, delineation of various special interests, and a process to understand how they are likely to interact.
- While there are usually special interests in favor of higher education, there is less often an organized political front in favor of primary education. Where strong special interests exist in favor of higher education, conditionalities to reduce expenditures in it prove ineffective.
- A broad effort to increase primary school enrollments may result in the deterioration of educational quality. Policies that lead to reduced contact hours are likely to reduce the amount of information children acquire and ultimately detract from the value of school attendance.
- The school inspector function often does not fulfill its quality control role. Pedagogical advisors and school-based management with well-trained principals who are empowered to take action might safeguard school quality more effectively.
- The capacity of communities and small NGOs to build schools is often overestimated. When construction programs rely extensively on community-financed materials or construction, the result may be delays or low-quality work. Communities may contribute to the expansion of education more effectively through quality-oriented tasks, such as managing the construction, monitoring teachers, storing books, coordinating student feeding programs, or secondary building activities.
- It is difficult to establish a book sale system without understanding the market forces and incentives of the vendors. In countries where losses are heavy, it may be better to provide textbooks free of charge to students.

Annex A. Project Activities

Table 1. Primary Education Development Project (Education IV - Cr. 1735-SE)

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>
Sector Adjustment	Reduction of teacher and administrative staff costs per primary school student	Reduce administration budgets by 7.7% primary, 11.4% secondary, 7.7% tertiary by 1994/95		Ultimately unit costs were not reduced
	Reduction of higher education subsidies, unit costs	Reduce overseas fellowship amounts by 26% by 1994/95 Reduce indirect subsidies by 51%	Not met; fellowships and subsidies increased from 40% to 58%; violent protests	Issue was to be dealt with in the higher education project, no progress
	Expenditure ceilings at the post-primary level		Not met; higher education budget increased from 15% to 25% of education budget	Higher education costs continue to increase
Sector Adjustment Policies	Enrollment increases	Increase by 32%, from 549000 in 1985/86 to 726,000 in by the 1994/95 school year	Target exceeded by 120,000 students, but increase only slightly above population rate	Enrollments continued to increase
	Assistant teachers	Recruit initially 20% of teachers, raise to 53%	Recruited 20%, not 53%	High demand, functional, but trade union is against it
	Reallocate savings to primary education		Primary education budget remained the same 46-48%	Later reduced
	Redeploy teachers working in administration	400 by 1991 do not refill administrative posts	1260 redeployed	Some redeployed, others taken off service
	Introduce double shift and multigrade teaching		Introduced	Problems with teachers remain
	Increase student-teacher ratio in training colleges	From 8:1 to 15:1	Rose to 13:1	Colleges in considerable use
	Consolidate civil service training schools	Increase student-teacher ratio	Study was done, results not implemented	None
	Increase primary education budget	no increase in government share of education budget from its 1985/86 level	Not met	Budget share is essentially stationary
Institutional Development	Strengthen directorate of Studies, Human Resources, Planning to collect enrollment data, plan schools	Fellowships 59 staff months	Staff trained, 50%+ left jobs; low salaries and motivation	Unit did not perform as expected
		Technical assistance 59 staff months Furniture, equipment	Experts' knowledge not transferred	
Classroom Construction	Rehabilitating and construction of 400 classrooms with community input	Policy measures a condition of disbursement (30% increase in classroom numbers)	Cost 80% more than expected Only 75 built with community help Conditionality waived	Community construction is inefficient

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>
	Rehabilitate, maintain schools in 3 of the 10 regions	Rehabilitate 100 classrooms Create preventive maintenance guide	Guide written, but no maintenance	Schools deteriorate
Quality Improvement	Strengthen the National Pedagogical Institute (INEADE)	Construct, furnish building. 3 vehicles	Experiments conducted	Results very informative
	Research on double shift and multigrade teaching	116 staff months technical assistance 166 staff months fellowships 100 staff months inservice training	Research conducted	INEADE found lower quality among double shift students, 180 contact hours fewer
	Train, strengthen inspectors	Fellowships 20 motorbikes for assistants	Inspectors are more knowledgeable	Inspector role has not changed
	Teacher training-upgrading Curriculum development		Many training sessions organized Continuing discussions about change	Teacher behaviors in class do not change Deliberations often in process
Textbook production	Establish textbook publishing unit	Provide 1m textbooks in 25 titles 1 per 2 students textbook loans	1.5 m printed, but they could not be effectively distributed	Ultimately few students received them
8 studies to improve internal and external efficiency of education	Primary education expansion, school location		Completed	Impact limited
	Cost-efficiency measures in secondary and higher education		Used for appraising follow-on project	Impact unknown
Policies	Efficiency measures in primary education			Increased access, may have lowered quality
	Containing subsidies in higher education			Only temporarily contained
	Resource transfer from higher to primary			The opposite seems to have happened

Table 2. Second Human Resources Development Project (Cr. 2473-SE)

<i>Components/ subcomponents</i>	<i>Activities</i>	<i>Targets to be achieved</i>	<i>Outputs</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>
School construction, equipment, maintenance	Classroom construction in 5 low-enrollment regions, rural areas	1310 - SAR According to ICR, 875 construction, 1080 refurbishment	1076 were built 892 refurbished other donors built 2000 additional classrooms	Periurban areas did not get many schools Builder errors, some schools poorly built Some classrooms went to areas of low demand, did not add latrines, outdated school map
	School maintenance	Film commissioned to an NGO	Maintenance not done by communities	Effects unknown
	Community construction	447 schools	Constructed	Not good, as in previous project
Increasing enrollments	Period 1993-1998	Raise the primary enrollment ratio from 58% in 1992 to 65% by 1998	Met	With 3% annual population increase, rate cannot be surpassed
Boosting girls' participation	Broad interventions in schools and communities		A public awareness campaign Ratio increased from 41% to 47%	Ratio increased, campaign effects unknown
Establishing a sustainable textbook system		Produce 1.18m textbooks, 14 new titles gr. 3-6 Recover costs	Textbooks produced 30% lost	Few students received them
Supporting school-initiated quality improvements	School-improvement grants of CFAF 1m	200 schools	196 received funding delayed successful	Mistrust, formalities required, delays; communities needed practical items, e.g. chalk, books
Strengthening teacher preservice and inservice training,	Inservice Training	Colleges reduced from 6 to 4	About 4500 primary and 8167 secondary teachers participated in inservice training	Instructional delivery improvement has not been documented
	Refurbish colleges enrich libraries Reduce colleges from 6 to 4 Reduce to 1 year programs Reduce staff numbers Employ 'volunteer' assistant teachers		computers provided, refurbishment 1200 employed	results discouraging Ultimately there are about 9000; highly successful
Establishing a student assessment system	Assess grades 2, 4, 6 in French, math, science			Teacher training and student assessment activities were carried out as planned
	Preparation for assessment -INEADE	26 months fellowships 26 months TA 480 months training	Now technical assistance to other countries provided to Mali	Successful research, revealing results
Improving the quality and efficiency of secondary education	Prepare policy study	9 months consultant services	Books in 15 secondary school libraries 7800 schools received learning kits	Has not been effectively used

Components/ subcomponents	Activities	Targets to be achieved	Outputs	Outcomes
	Rehabilitate 6 colleges		Regional directorates became responsible for administering secondary, decentralized	Effects of decentralization uncertain
Improving the quality and efficiency of higher education	Finance a consultative process, study Carry out urgent repairs to the university Check Anta Diop		Central library stocked books and professional journals Emergency electrical systems repaired	Quality and efficiency could not be sufficiently improved through these measures
Strengthening education sector planning and management	Furnish and equip central and regional offices of planning and studies department		Not exactly strengthened	Impact unclear
A volunteer (minimally paid) teachers' program		32,000 applied, 1200 recruited, few women inspectors could recruit directly	filled 20% of primary classrooms by 1998, while accounting for 9% of the salary bill	Earlier project had higher expectations Enrollments increased by 7% and 11% where these teachers were recruited
Internet centers in schools,			Computers and training in 12 schools	Students able to learn computer operation
School principals training			secondary school principals trained, selection criteria reset	Cooperation Francaise did training, results unknown
Policy measures				
(a) in primary education to contain costs, diversify sources of financing, and reduce inequities between urban and rural areas, and between boys and girls;	Continued double-shift teaching in 30% of urban classrooms Recruitment of 80% assistant teachers Textbook cost recovery			Policies increased attendance, but not textbook availability
(b) in secondary education to improve internal efficiency;				Results unclear
(c) decentralize education planning, administration and supervision to the regional and departmental levels				Regional councils became in charge of various educational aspects.

Annex B. Basic Data

SENEGAL—PRIMARY EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (C1735—SE)

Key Project Data

	<i>Appraisal Estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs (US\$M)	19.61	19.61	100
Original Principal (US\$M)		12.00	
Total Cancellation (US\$M)		0.35	

Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements (US\$ million)

	<i>FY87</i>	<i>FY88</i>	<i>FY89</i>	<i>FY90</i>	<i>FY91</i>	<i>FY92</i>	<i>FY93</i>	<i>FY94</i>	<i>FY95</i>
Appraisal estimate	0.5	0.9	1.7	2.7	4.0	5.6	9.2	11.5	12.0
Actual	0.0	1.2	3.4	6.71	8.17	9.47	12.67	13.35	--
Actual as % of estimate	0	133	200	248	204	169	138	116	--

Project Dates

<i>Steps in project cycle</i>	<i>Date planned</i>	<i>Date actual</i>
Identification (Initial Project Brief)	-	September 22, 1983
Preparation	March 1983	October 1983-September 1985
Appraisal	March 1985	October 1985
Negotiations	October 1985	July 1986
Letter of development policy	NIA	NIA
Board presentation	January 1986	October 14, 1986
Signing	July 1986	July 1, 1987
Effectiveness	November 1986	September 9, 1987
First tranche release	At effectiveness	September 9, 1987
Second tranche release	June 1988	December 2, 1998
Third tranche release	June 1990	January 25, 1991
Project completion	December 31, 1994	December 31, 1993
Loan closing	June 30 1995	March 23 1994

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

<i>Total</i>	<i>1985</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1987</i>	<i>1988</i>	<i>1989</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>	<i>1993</i>	<i>1994</i>	<i>Total</i>
Through	57.5	22.3									79.8
Appraisal											
Appraisal-Board			46.6								46.6
Board-		0.2	5.0								5.2
Effectiveness											
Supervision			7.8	13.9	6.3	11.4	6.1	15.7	10.0	4.2	75.4
Completion										4.0	4.0
Total	57.5	69.1	12.8	13.9	6.3	11.4	6.1	15.7	10.0	8.2	211

Mission Data

Stage of project cycle	Date (month/year)	No. of staff in field	Duration of mission (# of days)	Specializations represented ^a	Performance ratings		Types of problems
					Implement. Status ^b	Develop. Objectives ^b	
Through Appraisal	10/85	5	23	E, A, EC			
Supervision 1	11/87	2	9	EP, A	2	1	Budgetary: reallocation of savings between budget categories not carried out
Supervision 2	06/88	2	11	EP, A	2	2	Contracts: delays in launching studies and implementing cost recovery measures
Supervision 3	02/89	2	17	EP, A	3	2	Policy: delays in launching sector adjustment program (SAP)
Supervision 4	12/89	2	5	EP, A	2	2	Policy: Government not living up to its obligations for policy and budget measures as agreed under SAP
Supervision 5	03/90	2	6	E, O	2	2	As above
Supervision 6	11/90	2		E, O	2	2	Pedagogical: untrained primary teachers placed in the classrooms
Supervision 7	12/91	4	16	E, EP, T, O	2	2	Management: excessive delays in school construction, late submission of audit reports, delays in provision of counterpart funds
Supervision 8	03/92	5	5	E, EP, T, O, A	2	2	Policy: adjustment measures in higher education not implemented
Supervision 9	10/92	2	4	EP, A	2	2	Management: delays in school construction
Supervision 10	07/93	3	11	EP, E, A	2	2	Management: Abrupt firing of project director and delays in recruiting a replacement. Financial: liked audits

a. A=Architect/Implementation Specialist; T=Textbook Specialist; O=Operations Officer; E=Educator; EC=Economist; EP=Education Planner

Related Bank Credits

Credit title	Credit	Purpose	Year of approval	Status
Preceding operations				
Second Education Project	530-SE	Science, vocational, and rural youth training	1975	Completed 1984
Third Education Project	908-SE	Improve primary education and training	1979	Completed 1987
Management School	1638-SE	Establish a regional management training center	1985	Completed 1993
Following operations				
First Human Resources Development Project	2255-SE	Integrated Health Services	1991	Under implementation
Second Human Resources Development Project	2473-SE	Expansions and quality improvements in education	1993	Under implementation

SENEGAL—SECOND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PR. (C2473—SE)

Key Project Data

	<i>Appraisal estimate</i>	<i>Actual or current estimate</i>	<i>Actual as % of appraisal estimate</i>
Total project costs (US\$M)	72.80	39.17	53.80
Original Principal (US\$M)		40.00	
Cancellation (US\$M)		3.22	

Project Dates

<i>Steps in project cycle</i>	<i>Original</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Appraisal	06/28/1992	
Approval	03/18/1993	
Effectiveness	07/29/1993	01/31/1994
Midterm review	04/01/1995	03/18/1996
Loan closing	06/30/1999	12/31/1999

Staff Inputs (staff weeks)

<i>Stage of project cycle</i>	<i>Actual</i>	
	<i>Weeks</i>	<i>US\$</i>
Identification/Preparation	87.9	201.4
Appraisal/ Negotiations	49.8	138.4
Supervision	182.4	482.4
ICR	8.7	14.9
Total	328.8	837.1

Mission Data

Stage of Project Cycle	Date (month/year)	No. of staff in field	Specializations represented	Performance ratings	
				Implement. Status	Dev. <i>Objectives</i>
Identification/Preparation	2/92	3	1 Architect, 1 Education Planner, 1 Textbook Specialist		
Appraisal/Negotiation	6/92	4	1 Architect, 1 Education Planner, 1 Textbook Specialist, 1 Education Specialist		
Supervision	7/93	3	2 Education Specialists 1 Implementation Specialist	S	S
	7/94	4	1 Implementation Specialist, 1 Textbook Specialist, 2 Education Specialists	S	S
	3/95	5	1 Economist, 2 Education Specialists, 1 Operations Analyst, 1 Financial Analyst	U	U
	11/95			U	U
	3/96	4	1 Implementation Spec., 2 Education Spec., 1 Operations Analyst	U	U
	11/96	2	1 Education Specialist, 1 Operations Analyst	S	S
	4/97	1	Education Specialist	S	S
	7/97	1	Education Specialist	S	S
	11/97	1	Education Specialist	S	S
	7/98	1	Education Specialist	S	S
	5/99	1	Education Specialist	S	S
	12/99	1	Sr. Operations Analyst	S	S
ICR	02/00	2	Education Specialists	S	S