Search

You Searched for:Country Program Evaluation or Partnership
Report/Evaluation Type:Project Level Evaluations (PPARs)
Displaying 1 - 10 of 483

Bulgaria: District Heating Project (PPAR)

PDF file
This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluates the development effectiveness and sustainability of results of the World Bank–financed District Heating Project in Bulgaria (2003–08). The project development objectives were to improve the quality of district heating services in the capital city of Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluates the development effectiveness and sustainability of results of the World Bank–financed District Heating Project in Bulgaria (2003–08). The project development objectives were to improve the quality of district heating services in the capital city of Sofia (1.6 million people) and an adjacent town of Pernik (86,200 people), improve financial viability of the Sofia and Pernik district heating companies, and increase environmentally friendly operations in the district heating sector, through energy conservation and pollution reduction mechanisms. The project also extended funds from the World Bank–administered Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) for the purchase of carbon emission reductions resulting from the project activities. Ratings for District Heating Project were as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. IEG’s review of this project’s experience in Bulgaria suggests the following lessons: (i) Postponing an energy efficiency project until the necessary legal measures addressing demand-side management are implemented can lead to better outcomes. (ii) Sustainability of benefits from infrastructure investments can be put at risk if future investment needs are unmet. (iii) Investments in energy efficiency infrastructure alone are not enough to achieve sustained financial viability. (iv) Efforts to encourage private sector participation may fail when there is no strong agreement from key stakeholders in the context of a complex and changing governance structure. (v) Carbon finance operation or results-based financing can have strong demonstration effects.

Vietnam: Forest Sector Development Project (PPAR)

PDF file
The Forest Sector Development Project, which was implemented between 2004 and 2015, contributed to the significant reforestation efforts made by the people of Vietnam. In parallel to this smallholder plantation initiative, the project sought to protect biodiversity in parks and reserves. Bare hillsides underwent reforestation, and by 2017 the level of forest cover reached 48 percent (from 27 Show MoreThe Forest Sector Development Project, which was implemented between 2004 and 2015, contributed to the significant reforestation efforts made by the people of Vietnam. In parallel to this smallholder plantation initiative, the project sought to protect biodiversity in parks and reserves. Bare hillsides underwent reforestation, and by 2017 the level of forest cover reached 48 percent (from 27 percent in 1990). The improved outlook for production forest was matched by an increased government commitment to conserve biodiversity in parks and reserves, which were legally designated as special-use forests. (SUF). The two project objectives were to achieve sustainable management of plantation forests and to conserve biodiversity in special-use forests. Ratings for the Forest Sector Development Project were as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was modest, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) When located appropriately, smallholder forest plantations can boost economic growth in rural areas and help protect the environment—as long as smallholders have continuing access to a full package of technical and financial support. (ii) Smallholders with limited means tend to operate single-species tree plantations on a short rotation; it is too early to say if this trend will continue, or if it poses a long-term risk. (iii) Smallholders with limited means tend to operate single-species tree plantations. (iv) Attempts to engage communities in management of protected areas will only prosper if these areas (and their associated buffer zones) generate substantial revenues that are shared with the participating communities. (v) The design of World Bank projects should have achievable, incremental, and rigorous targets for sustainable forest management (national or international) within given timeframes with iterative steps toward recognized global standards.

Brazil: Integrated Solid Waste Management and Carbon Finance Project (PPAR)

PDF file
This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Integrated Solid Waste & Carbon Finance Project in Brazil. The project was approved on November 2, 2010, for a cost of US$160 million, with World Bank support of US$50 million. The project cost at completion was US$122.7 million, with only US$16.7 million of the World Bank’s loan being utilized. Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Integrated Solid Waste & Carbon Finance Project in Brazil. The project was approved on November 2, 2010, for a cost of US$160 million, with World Bank support of US$50 million. The project cost at completion was US$122.7 million, with only US$16.7 million of the World Bank’s loan being utilized. The project was closed on December 31, 2015 as planned. The objective of the project was to improve the treatment and disposal of municipal solid waste in Brazil. This was to be achieved through closing of open dumps and constructing modern and environmentally safe landfills, improving municipal solid waste management (SWM) practices, reducing poverty among waste pickers, increasing private sector participation in SWM service provision, and strengthening the borrower and implementing agency CAIXA Econômica Federale’s capacity to manage carbon finance projects. Ratings for Integrated Solid Waste Management and Carbon Finance Project were as follows: Outcome was unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was unsatisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) A project with sector-wide objectives must provide for engagement with the government at the policy level to lay a strong basis for achieving development outcomes. (ii) For an operation involving a financial intermediary, a minimum number of sub-projects must be committed at project effectiveness, to demonstrate quick successes and to develop further momentum during implementation. (iii) In an upper middle-income country with broad-based financial and institutional resources, the World Bank’s interventions in a sector should focus on functional areas with a clear need and demand for external support and expertise. (iv) In seeking to attract private sector investment and expertise to public service provision, the major barriers to entry must be clearly recognized and addressed. Incentives at the margin are unlikely to generate wide or sustained interest.

Kyrgyz Republic: Village Investment Project and Second Village Investment Project (PPAR)

PDF file
This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) of the Village Investment Project (VIP 1) and the Second Village Investment Project (VIP 2), implemented from 2003 to 2014. Both VIP projects were designed against a backdrop of persistent rural poverty, a vacuum in the supply of local infrastructure services, a lack of economic opportunities, and a nascent decentralization agenda. Project Show MoreThis is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) of the Village Investment Project (VIP 1) and the Second Village Investment Project (VIP 2), implemented from 2003 to 2014. Both VIP projects were designed against a backdrop of persistent rural poverty, a vacuum in the supply of local infrastructure services, a lack of economic opportunities, and a nascent decentralization agenda. Project design incorporated lessons from implementing a community-based pilot financed by the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) and information from extensive consultations conducted as part of the thorough project preparation. High capacity and excellent support from the implementing agency created by the project were crucial factors in their successful and rapid implementation of the projects. Ratings for the Village Investment Project were as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, World Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Ratings for the Second Village Investment Project were: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, World Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Multiple tranches of village-level financing in CDD projects can reinforce and strengthen participatory planning over time. This approach can also lower the risk of elite capture. (ii) CDD programs implemented nationally can enhance political legitimacy, especially in countries with ethnic or regional tensions. Although a move to consolidate project activities can magnify local economic gains, these consolidations carry the risk of perceptions of favoritism of one group over another. (iii) In rapidly scaled out CDD programs there is a need to pay simultaneous attention to social outreach and infrastructure quality. Poor infrastructure can undermine program legitimacy and create a public safety risk. (iv) Investments in small-scale enterprises require an upstream diagnosis of capacity and constraints and the interventions should be targeted to address known binding constraints.

Mali: Project to Support Grassroots Initiatives to Fight Hunger and Poverty (PPAR)

PDF file
This is a project performance review of the Grassroots Hunger and Poverty Initiative Project (PAIB) financed by the International Development Association (IDA) and implemented between 1998 and 2004 across two regions of Mali (Mopti and Tombouctou). Original financing was anticipated to be $23 million, including a $21.5 million IDA credit and $1.5 million borrower contribution. Actual costs were $ Show MoreThis is a project performance review of the Grassroots Hunger and Poverty Initiative Project (PAIB) financed by the International Development Association (IDA) and implemented between 1998 and 2004 across two regions of Mali (Mopti and Tombouctou). Original financing was anticipated to be $23 million, including a $21.5 million IDA credit and $1.5 million borrower contribution. Actual costs were $23.2 million. The project sought to improve the living conditions of disadvantaged targeted rural communities, responding to their priority needs by strengthening the capacity of communities in identifying and ranking their priority needs and in planning, implementing, and supervising actions to respond to those needs in partnership with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities. In parallel, it also sought to strengthen institutional and policy-making capacity at the local and national levels in the fight against hunger and poverty.

Mali - Rural Community Development Project

PDF file
This is a project performance review of the Rural Community Development Project (PACR) financed by the International Development Association (IDA) and implemented between 2005 and 2014 across four regions of Mali. Original financing was anticipated to be US$64 million including a US$60 million IDA credit and US$4 million borrower contribution. Actual costs were US$71.2 million because of two Show MoreThis is a project performance review of the Rural Community Development Project (PACR) financed by the International Development Association (IDA) and implemented between 2005 and 2014 across four regions of Mali. Original financing was anticipated to be US$64 million including a US$60 million IDA credit and US$4 million borrower contribution. Actual costs were US$71.2 million because of two additional financings. The project sought to improve the living conditions of rural communities by providing access to basic socioeconomic services and a sustainable increase in income, while promoting improved natural resource management practices. Designed at a time when Mali had just begun to operationalize its decentralization policy, by putting national and local structures in place, the project represents the World Bank’s first large-scale investment in support of this aim. This assessment was based on a review of World Bank project documentation, supplemented by several sources of primary and secondary data collected during a field mission to Mali conducted between May 8 and May 30, 2017. Secondary data collected included the original Management Information System, 2009 census data, and fiscal transfers between the National Agency for Communal and Territorial Investments (ANICT) and all project (and nonproject communes). The data for the period 2001 to 2010 was obtained from Grinnell College, and for the period 2011, 2012–17, from ANICT (there were no transfers in 2012 because of the coup d’état that occurred that year). Primary data collection gathered the perceptions of the affected commune councils and mayors, service users and service providers, and the cooperatives that received grants for private productive assets. Specifically, the assessment conducted 12 commune council group interviews and 36 cooperative group interviews. In addition, the assessment collected data on distance and population to test the project’s service delivery metrics and targets. The project assessment will provide inputs into the Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG’s) Fiscal Decentralization and Subnational Finance and Citizen Engagement Macroevaluations.

PPAR Improving Basic Health : The World Bank’s Experience in the Philippines

PDF file
This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses two World Bank health projects in the Philippines: the National Sector Support for Health Reform Project and the Second Women’s Health and Safe Motherhood Project. The National Sector Support Project was approved in June 2006 and closed in March 2012, nine months after the original date of June 2011. The Second Women’s Health Project was Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses two World Bank health projects in the Philippines: the National Sector Support for Health Reform Project and the Second Women’s Health and Safe Motherhood Project. The National Sector Support Project was approved in June 2006 and closed in March 2012, nine months after the original date of June 2011. The Second Women’s Health Project was approved in April 2005 and closed in June 2013, 12 months after the original date of June 2012. For both projects, the extensions were to permit the projects additional time to finish their activities. These projects were selected for a field-based assessment for several reasons. First, both projects represented major efforts to reform the health sector in the Philippines. Second, the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) had previously recommended both projects for further evaluation during the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) review process to validate ratings. Third, the PPAR will contribute to IEG’s ongoing evaluation on the World Bank’s Support for Basic Health Services. The Philippines is classified as a lower middle-income country, with a gross national income of $3,550 per capita and an estimated population of 101.6 million in 2015. In recent years, economic growth has increased substantially between 2012 and 2016, the longest period of sustained economic growth in recent history. However, poverty and inequality remain high and persistent. At the time of both projects’ appraisal, the Philippines had seen low increases of health outcomes that were among the slowest in the region. The Philippines has a double burden of disease—both from traditional public health issues and emerging noncommunicable diseases. Health equity was a major challenge, in terms of access and health outcomes, and the high cost of healthcare contributed to impoverishment. The Philippines has long pursued health reform, built around improving equity with demand-based finance through a combination of public and private health services.

eGhana Project (PPAR)

PDF file
This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) reviews the World Bank’s eGhana Project, which was approved on August 1, 2006 at an original cost of XDR 26.90 million (US$40.0 million) from International Development Association (IDA) resources. The eGhana project responded to the Government’s request for support in implementing its agenda for Information and Communication Technology (ICT)-led Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) reviews the World Bank’s eGhana Project, which was approved on August 1, 2006 at an original cost of XDR 26.90 million (US$40.0 million) from International Development Association (IDA) resources. The eGhana project responded to the Government’s request for support in implementing its agenda for Information and Communication Technology (ICT)-led growth. This project was based on sound analytical work and the Bank’s experience in Ghana and elsewhere (including the ICT development project in Sri Lanka). The project development objective was to assist the Government of Ghana to generate growth and employment by leveraging ICT and public-private partnerships to: i) develop the IT Enabled Services (ITES) industry, and ii) contribute to improved efficiency and transparency of selected government functions through e-government applications.

Peru: Rural Electrification Project (PPAR)

PDF file
Peru has been one of the Latin America and the Caribbean Region’s fastest-growing economies. It grew an average 6.2 percent between 2004 and 2013. Moderate poverty was more than halved from 58 percent to 22 percent of the population between 2004 and 2015. Extreme poverty, which is mainly rural, also fell from 16 percent to 4 percent during that period. Although urban inequality declined Show MorePeru has been one of the Latin America and the Caribbean Region’s fastest-growing economies. It grew an average 6.2 percent between 2004 and 2013. Moderate poverty was more than halved from 58 percent to 22 percent of the population between 2004 and 2015. Extreme poverty, which is mainly rural, also fell from 16 percent to 4 percent during that period. Although urban inequality declined substantially, rural inequality was reduced only modestly. To avoid a reversal of its achievements, the government needs to raise the quality of basic services, expand access to markets for the poor and vulnerable, and close infrastructure gaps to facilitate access to markets and services—all of which underscores the high priority of addressing rural electricity needs. The reform of Peru’s electricity sector in 1992 separated the generation, transmission, distribution, and regulatory functions. Based on an efficient enterprise model, the reforms introduced cost-recovery tariffs, and generation and transmission were privatized. A new regulatory body was created, and private companies are now in charge of electricity distribution in Lima and other urban centers. In rural areas, about 20 public electricity distribution companies (EDCs) provide electricity service. Most of the EDCs have performed well operationally and financially, with losses of less than 12 percent and payment rates above 95 percent. In 2005, when the first Rural Electrification Project (REP I) was appraised, Peru had a rural electrification rate of 30 percent—one of the lowest in the Region. According to the Ministry of Energy and Mines, more than 300,000 isolated households in rural areas could be reached only through renewable energy technologies, specifically individual solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. Prior to REP I, service providers allocated negligible funding to meet this off-grid demand through renewable energy. The scarcity of rural electricity—coupled with the broader lack of access to infrastructure—have perpetuated the cycle of low quality of life, poor education and medical care, and limited opportunities for economic development in Peru’s rural areas. Ratings for this project were as follows: outcome was satisfactory, risk to development outcome was negligible, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from this project included: i) The promotion of productive uses of electricity needs consistent and adequate levels of technical assistance and investment support, without which their sustainability is put at risk. (ii) Achieving the financial sustainability of solar photovoltaic systems remains a challenge that the government and electricity distribution companies need to address. (iii) To reach “the last mile” of rural electrification while ensuring sustainability, the government and the EDCs need to take specific actions.

China Renewable Energy Scale-Up Program: Phase I (PPAR)

PDF file
The China Renewable Energy Scale-up Program (CRESP) was designed to enable a long-term policy dialogue and engagement with the government to develop renewables on a national scale. The backbone of the CRESP partnership was a three-phase program to develop a legal and policy framework and to support technology improvements, standards and Show MoreThe China Renewable Energy Scale-up Program (CRESP) was designed to enable a long-term policy dialogue and engagement with the government to develop renewables on a national scale. The backbone of the CRESP partnership was a three-phase program to develop a legal and policy framework and to support technology improvements, standards and certification, preparation, and implementation of innovative renewable energy projects across the country. Ratings for the project are as follows: Outcome was highly satisfactory, Risk to development was low, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. The main lessons that emerge from the experience of this complex project are: (i) Combining institutional development and investments in one package can help overcome difficult challenges. (ii) Adequate time and resources for preparation and consultations should be planned and allowed. (iii) Cost-shared grants can enhance selectivity and efficiently leverage knowledge transfer, technology improvement, and counterpart funding. (iv) A long-term, predictable price signal can provide an effective stimulus for continuing investments in renewable energies.