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Report/Evaluation Type:Project Level Evaluations (PPARs)
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Cambodia: Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness (PPAR)

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The FY05 Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness Project (P089196) was a US$10 million IDA grant to Cambodia. The objective of the project was to support the government’s strategy to promote economic growth by helping (i) reduce transaction costs related to trade and investment; (ii) introduce transparency in investment processes; and (iii) facilitate access of enterprises to export markets. The Show MoreThe FY05 Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness Project (P089196) was a US$10 million IDA grant to Cambodia. The objective of the project was to support the government’s strategy to promote economic growth by helping (i) reduce transaction costs related to trade and investment; (ii) introduce transparency in investment processes; and (iii) facilitate access of enterprises to export markets. The purpose of this PPAR is to assess the outcome of the Cambodia Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness project and to provide an input to IEG’s forthcoming macro evaluation on Facilitating Trade. Ratings for the project are: outcome is moderately satisfactory, risk to development outcome is negligible to low, Bank performance is moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory. Lessons of the project include: (i) Early involvement with government. (ii) Expert assistance. (iii) Implementation readiness. (iv) Trade-off between good governance and timely project implementation.

Philippines: Support for Basic Education Reform, 2006-12

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The Philippines is a lower-middle-income country with a gross national income of $3,550 per capita and an estimated population of 101.6 million in 2015. Economic growth has increased substantially in recent years. The longest period of sustained economic growth in recent history was between 2012 and 2016. Despite this growth, poverty and inequality remain high and persistent. Show MoreThe Philippines is a lower-middle-income country with a gross national income of $3,550 per capita and an estimated population of 101.6 million in 2015. Economic growth has increased substantially in recent years. The longest period of sustained economic growth in recent history was between 2012 and 2016. Despite this growth, poverty and inequality remain high and persistent. Priority for reform of the education sector has shifted through the years from access to quality. This assessment examines two such education quality projects in the mid-2000s, assessing both projects together because they were designed jointly to support the government’s education strategy. The National Program Support for Basic Education’s (NPSBE) objective was “to improve quality and equity in learning outcomes for all Filipinos in basic education.” The Support for Basic Education Sector Reform Project’s (SPHERE) objective was “to support the implementation of the Philippine government’s Basic Education Sector Reform Agenda (BESRA) which in turn aims to contribute to the achievement of the Philippines’ basic education goal of improving quality and equity in learning outcomes.” Relevance of the objectives is rated substantial for both projects. The projects’ objectives aligned well with government and World Bank strategy at appraisal and closing. However, project documents also reference intended efficiency outcomes that were not specified as part of the formal objectives. Relevance of design is rated modest for both projects. Both projects’ stated development objectives supported improvements in quality and equity of learning outcomes, yet the equity objective was not well defined, and the components and activities were oriented toward access and quality with an unclear theory of change that would have related project interventions to equity outcomes.

Lao People's Democratic Republic: Sustainable Forestry for Rural Development Project (PPAR)

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Ratings for the Sustainable Forestry for Rural Development Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome is high, Bank performance is moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrow performance is moderately unsatisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) A pattern of weak government commitment to increasing citizen’s natural resource rights exists in Lao Show MoreRatings for the Sustainable Forestry for Rural Development Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome is high, Bank performance is moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrow performance is moderately unsatisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) A pattern of weak government commitment to increasing citizen’s natural resource rights exists in Lao PDR. (ii) Villagers who are denied secure community tenure and rights to forest resources are unlikely to commit to sustainable forest management. (iii) The zoning of natural forest may fail to reflect variations in the richness of the resource, so the area earmarked for sustainable management may be unrealistically large, stretching administrative resources too thin. (iv) Zoning and the preparation of management plans for specific forest tracts are important first steps but they are not, in themselves, sufficient evidence that sustainable forest management is being implemented.

Lao People's Democratic Republic: Sustainable Forestry for Rural Development Project (PPAR)

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Ratings for the Sustainable Forestry for Rural Development Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome is high, Bank performance is moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrow performance is moderately unsatisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) A pattern of weak government commitment to increasing citizen’s natural resource rights exists in Lao Show MoreRatings for the Sustainable Forestry for Rural Development Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome is high, Bank performance is moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrow performance is moderately unsatisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) A pattern of weak government commitment to increasing citizen’s natural resource rights exists in Lao PDR. (ii) Villagers who are denied secure community tenure and rights to forest resources are unlikely to commit to sustainable forest management. (iii) The zoning of natural forest may fail to reflect variations in the richness of the resource, so the area earmarked for sustainable management may be unrealistically large, stretching administrative resources too thin. (iv) Zoning and the preparation of management plans for specific forest tracts are important first steps but they are not, in themselves, sufficient evidence that sustainable forest management is being implemented.

Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali: West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project implemented in three countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali. The project was approved on June 19, 2008, for a cost of US$197.2 million, with an International Development Association (IDA) credit of US$190 million. The project Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project implemented in three countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali. The project was approved on June 19, 2008, for a cost of US$197.2 million, with an International Development Association (IDA) credit of US$190 million. The project cost at completion was US$180.87 million, with US$173.5 million of the IDA credit being utilized. The project was closed on June 30, 2015, with a delay of fifteen months due to delays in release of counterpart funding from the Government of Ghana and suspension of works in Mali (for about 11 months) in the aftermath of the political crisis in March 2012. Landlocked economies are disadvantaged by costly and unreliable transport and transit processes. For example, transport and transit costs for countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are up to 50 percent higher than for countries with direct sea access. Historically, the Abidjan-Ouagadougou-Bamako Corridor was the main sea access corridor for both Burkina Faso and Mali. However, because of the deteriorating security situation in Côte d'Ivoire, there was an urgent need to seek alternative access to ports for the landlocked countries of Burkina Faso and Mali. Ratings for the West Africa Transport and Transit Facilitation Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is substantial, Bank performance is moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory. Lesson from the project include: (i) A regional approach to implement road rehabilitation works along strategic corridors can enhance the benefits particularly for the landlocked countries by linking them to gateway ports. (ii) It is important to have strong upstream analytical work and technical assistance for regional trade facilitation reforms so that countries can agree early on the technical details of institutional reforms. (iii) When the projects involve Regional Economic Communities (REC), it is important to assess and cover RECs’ funding needs for project coordination and implementation so that they can carry out this function effectively. (iv) The World Bank’s current single-country business model makes it challenging to implement regional projects.

Bulgaria: District Heating Project (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluates the development effectiveness and sustainability of results of the World Bank–financed District Heating Project in Bulgaria (2003–08). The project development objectives were to improve the quality of district heating services in the capital city of Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) prepared by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluates the development effectiveness and sustainability of results of the World Bank–financed District Heating Project in Bulgaria (2003–08). The project development objectives were to improve the quality of district heating services in the capital city of Sofia (1.6 million people) and an adjacent town of Pernik (86,200 people), improve financial viability of the Sofia and Pernik district heating companies, and increase environmentally friendly operations in the district heating sector, through energy conservation and pollution reduction mechanisms. The project also extended funds from the World Bank–administered Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) for the purchase of carbon emission reductions resulting from the project activities. Ratings for District Heating Project were as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. IEG’s review of this project’s experience in Bulgaria suggests the following lessons: (i) Postponing an energy efficiency project until the necessary legal measures addressing demand-side management are implemented can lead to better outcomes. (ii) Sustainability of benefits from infrastructure investments can be put at risk if future investment needs are unmet. (iii) Investments in energy efficiency infrastructure alone are not enough to achieve sustained financial viability. (iv) Efforts to encourage private sector participation may fail when there is no strong agreement from key stakeholders in the context of a complex and changing governance structure. (v) Carbon finance operation or results-based financing can have strong demonstration effects.

Vietnam: Forest Sector Development Project (PPAR)

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The Forest Sector Development Project, which was implemented between 2004 and 2015, contributed to the significant reforestation efforts made by the people of Vietnam. In parallel to this smallholder plantation initiative, the project sought to protect biodiversity in parks and reserves. Bare hillsides underwent reforestation, and by 2017 the level of forest cover reached 48 percent (from 27 Show MoreThe Forest Sector Development Project, which was implemented between 2004 and 2015, contributed to the significant reforestation efforts made by the people of Vietnam. In parallel to this smallholder plantation initiative, the project sought to protect biodiversity in parks and reserves. Bare hillsides underwent reforestation, and by 2017 the level of forest cover reached 48 percent (from 27 percent in 1990). The improved outlook for production forest was matched by an increased government commitment to conserve biodiversity in parks and reserves, which were legally designated as special-use forests. (SUF). The two project objectives were to achieve sustainable management of plantation forests and to conserve biodiversity in special-use forests. Ratings for the Forest Sector Development Project were as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was modest, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) When located appropriately, smallholder forest plantations can boost economic growth in rural areas and help protect the environment—as long as smallholders have continuing access to a full package of technical and financial support. (ii) Smallholders with limited means tend to operate single-species tree plantations on a short rotation; it is too early to say if this trend will continue, or if it poses a long-term risk. (iii) Smallholders with limited means tend to operate single-species tree plantations. (iv) Attempts to engage communities in management of protected areas will only prosper if these areas (and their associated buffer zones) generate substantial revenues that are shared with the participating communities. (v) The design of World Bank projects should have achievable, incremental, and rigorous targets for sustainable forest management (national or international) within given timeframes with iterative steps toward recognized global standards.

Brazil: Integrated Solid Waste Management and Carbon Finance Project (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Integrated Solid Waste & Carbon Finance Project in Brazil. The project was approved on November 2, 2010, for a cost of US$160 million, with World Bank support of US$50 million. The project cost at completion was US$122.7 million, with only US$16.7 million of the World Bank’s loan being utilized. Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Integrated Solid Waste & Carbon Finance Project in Brazil. The project was approved on November 2, 2010, for a cost of US$160 million, with World Bank support of US$50 million. The project cost at completion was US$122.7 million, with only US$16.7 million of the World Bank’s loan being utilized. The project was closed on December 31, 2015 as planned. The objective of the project was to improve the treatment and disposal of municipal solid waste in Brazil. This was to be achieved through closing of open dumps and constructing modern and environmentally safe landfills, improving municipal solid waste management (SWM) practices, reducing poverty among waste pickers, increasing private sector participation in SWM service provision, and strengthening the borrower and implementing agency CAIXA Econômica Federale’s capacity to manage carbon finance projects. Ratings for Integrated Solid Waste Management and Carbon Finance Project were as follows: Outcome was unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was unsatisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) A project with sector-wide objectives must provide for engagement with the government at the policy level to lay a strong basis for achieving development outcomes. (ii) For an operation involving a financial intermediary, a minimum number of sub-projects must be committed at project effectiveness, to demonstrate quick successes and to develop further momentum during implementation. (iii) In an upper middle-income country with broad-based financial and institutional resources, the World Bank’s interventions in a sector should focus on functional areas with a clear need and demand for external support and expertise. (iv) In seeking to attract private sector investment and expertise to public service provision, the major barriers to entry must be clearly recognized and addressed. Incentives at the margin are unlikely to generate wide or sustained interest.

Kyrgyz Republic: Village Investment Project and Second Village Investment Project (PPAR)

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This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) of the Village Investment Project (VIP 1) and the Second Village Investment Project (VIP 2), implemented from 2003 to 2014. Both VIP projects were designed against a backdrop of persistent rural poverty, a vacuum in the supply of local infrastructure services, a lack of economic opportunities, and a nascent decentralization agenda. Project Show MoreThis is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) of the Village Investment Project (VIP 1) and the Second Village Investment Project (VIP 2), implemented from 2003 to 2014. Both VIP projects were designed against a backdrop of persistent rural poverty, a vacuum in the supply of local infrastructure services, a lack of economic opportunities, and a nascent decentralization agenda. Project design incorporated lessons from implementing a community-based pilot financed by the Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) and information from extensive consultations conducted as part of the thorough project preparation. High capacity and excellent support from the implementing agency created by the project were crucial factors in their successful and rapid implementation of the projects. Ratings for the Village Investment Project were as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, World Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Ratings for the Second Village Investment Project were: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, World Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Multiple tranches of village-level financing in CDD projects can reinforce and strengthen participatory planning over time. This approach can also lower the risk of elite capture. (ii) CDD programs implemented nationally can enhance political legitimacy, especially in countries with ethnic or regional tensions. Although a move to consolidate project activities can magnify local economic gains, these consolidations carry the risk of perceptions of favoritism of one group over another. (iii) In rapidly scaled out CDD programs there is a need to pay simultaneous attention to social outreach and infrastructure quality. Poor infrastructure can undermine program legitimacy and create a public safety risk. (iv) Investments in small-scale enterprises require an upstream diagnosis of capacity and constraints and the interventions should be targeted to address known binding constraints.

Mali: Project to Support Grassroots Initiatives to Fight Hunger and Poverty (PPAR)

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This is a project performance review of the Grassroots Hunger and Poverty Initiative Project (PAIB) financed by the International Development Association (IDA) and implemented between 1998 and 2004 across two regions of Mali (Mopti and Tombouctou). Original financing was anticipated to be $23 million, including a $21.5 million IDA credit and $1.5 million borrower contribution. Actual costs were $ Show MoreThis is a project performance review of the Grassroots Hunger and Poverty Initiative Project (PAIB) financed by the International Development Association (IDA) and implemented between 1998 and 2004 across two regions of Mali (Mopti and Tombouctou). Original financing was anticipated to be $23 million, including a $21.5 million IDA credit and $1.5 million borrower contribution. Actual costs were $23.2 million. The project sought to improve the living conditions of disadvantaged targeted rural communities, responding to their priority needs by strengthening the capacity of communities in identifying and ranking their priority needs and in planning, implementing, and supervising actions to respond to those needs in partnership with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local authorities. In parallel, it also sought to strengthen institutional and policy-making capacity at the local and national levels in the fight against hunger and poverty.