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Report/Evaluation Type:Project Level Evaluations (PPARs)
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Rwanda: Fourth Poverty Reduction Strategy Grant, Fifth Poverty Reduction Support Grant, Sixth Poverty Reduction Support Grant, and Seventh Poverty Reduction Support Financing

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This Project Performance Assessment Report evaluates a programmatic series of four development policy financing (DPF) operations approved for Rwanda over 2008–11. The series consisted of four single-tranche operations: the fourth, fifth, and sixth Poverty Reduction Support Grants (PRSGs), approved in March 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively, and a seventh Poverty Reduction Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report evaluates a programmatic series of four development policy financing (DPF) operations approved for Rwanda over 2008–11. The series consisted of four single-tranche operations: the fourth, fifth, and sixth Poverty Reduction Support Grants (PRSGs), approved in March 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively, and a seventh Poverty Reduction Support Financing operation (PRSF-7, a combination of grant and credit financing) approved in February 2011. The purpose of the PPAR is to examine the extent to which the series achieved its relevant program development objectives and how well the associated outcomes have been sustained since the series’ closure. In addition to its accountability and lesson learning functions, the PPAR provided inputs to the Independent Evaluation Group’s (IEG) fiscal years (FY) 09–17 Country Program Evaluation for Rwanda. Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Key lessons from the experience of PRSF 4-7 include: (i) Programmatic DPF can be an effective form of support for a well-defined, country-owned reform program. (ii) It is difficult to be definitive about the efficacy of a DPF series unless the results framework is tight-knit, the reforms supported have the requisite depth, and there is a strong and direct causal link between these reforms and the outcomes sought. (iii) A commitment to providing regular, predictable financing in the form of (multisector) general budget support operations implies that the World Bank needs to be prepared to accommodate dilution or deferral of reform content relative to what is foreseen at the outset. (iv) The World Bank can face a hard choice between adhering to a CPAF in a multisector budget support series and fulfilling the good-practice prescriptions in its operational policy for DPF. (v) Successful deployment of an integrated financial management information system can be facilitated by high-level commitment and performance monitoring, sustained external support, and system ownership.

Turkey: Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project (PPAR) (Turkish version)

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This version of the PPAR report has been translated to Turkish. Turkey faces high vulnerability to earthquakes, with Istanbul posing the most serious risk due its high seismic risk and its role as the population and economic center of Turkey. A major earthquake near Istanbul in 1999 led to over 17,000 deaths and damage estimated at $US 5-13 billion. The World Bank supported a post-earthquake Show MoreThis version of the PPAR report has been translated to Turkish. Turkey faces high vulnerability to earthquakes, with Istanbul posing the most serious risk due its high seismic risk and its role as the population and economic center of Turkey. A major earthquake near Istanbul in 1999 led to over 17,000 deaths and damage estimated at $US 5-13 billion. The World Bank supported a post-earthquake reconstruction project over 1999-2006, but vulnerability to earthquakes remained high, especially for Istanbul. A major earthquake in Istanbul would be catastrophic, and could derail the country’s development trajectory. The government was committed to undertaking disaster risk mitigation, but needed external assistance and support to do so. The World Bank was a suitable partner based on its financing capacity, technical expertise in disaster risk management and mitigation, and credibility and trust in Turkey based on prior disaster risk management engagements. These considerations motivated the creation of the Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project (ISMEP) as a proactive risk mitigation effort. Ratings for the Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project are as follows: Outcome is highly satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is negligible, Bank performance is satisfactory, and Borrower performance is highly satisfactory. The project offers the following lessons: (i) A sub-national multisector model can be highly effective for reducing disaster risk in a well-functioning major metropolitan area, even in a country where these approaches are unusual. (ii) A semi-autonomous professional project coordination unit can help to ensure effective and efficient project implementation even when dealing with many stakeholders and beneficiary agencies. (iii) Even highly successful project models may not be replicated if they cannot generate strong government ownership and if they rely on exceptional measures. (iv) The World Bank can achieve large scale impact by creating effective project platforms that are able to attract additional financing from other institutions. (v) The World Bank can offer significant value to clients from financing, access to technology, project management experience, and influence - even in megacities in high capacity upper middle-income countries. (vi) Pilot efforts may not support learning if they do not have monitoring and evaluation systems that assess their contribution to program objectives and draw conclusions for the design of future interventions. (vii) Small grants to support municipalities in digitizing their processes can have a significant impact on efficiency and transparency if coupled with highly motivated municipal leadership.

Papua New Guinea: Smallholder Agriculture Development Project (PPAR)

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Papua and New Guinea (Papua New Guinea) has faced considerable development challenges since its independence in 1975. Through the Smallholder Agriculture Development Project, the World Bank sought to improve community participation in rural areas by supporting the already-established local palm oil production industry. The objective of SADP in the financing agreement (July 2008) was to increase, Show MorePapua and New Guinea (Papua New Guinea) has faced considerable development challenges since its independence in 1975. Through the Smallholder Agriculture Development Project, the World Bank sought to improve community participation in rural areas by supporting the already-established local palm oil production industry. The objective of SADP in the financing agreement (July 2008) was to increase, in a sustainable manner, the level of involvement of targeted communities in their local development through measures aimed at increasing oil palm revenue and local participation. Ratings for the Smallholder Agriculture Development Project are as follows: Outcome was unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome was high, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was unsatisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Projects that seek to improve crop productivity and income on smallholder farms, in addition to CDD, work better when they integrate the two disparate objectives because of the very different implementation modalities involved. (ii) Complex, multidimensional projects require additional oversight and support in environments with weak government implementation capacity. (iii) Creative operational approaches or sufficient institutional support is required in weak-capacity environments to ensure that project disbursements are distributed effectively. (iv) Understanding cultural impacts and how they influence agricultural cash crops in smaller, geographically isolated states is necessary to ensure that political constraints do not reduce the impact of World Bank projects. (v) Agricultural sector road infrastructure investments need to be coordinated sufficiently with domestic private-sector interests and provincial government priorities to ensure sustainability and future operational maintenance.

Rwanda: Quality of Decentralized Service Delivery Support Development Policy Operation (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the Rwanda Quality of Decentralized Service Delivery Support Development Policy Operation, in the amount of $50 million, which was approved by the Board of Executive Directors on May 14, 2013 and closed as scheduled on June 30, 2014. The purpose of the PPAR is to examine the extent to which this development policy operation achieved its Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the Rwanda Quality of Decentralized Service Delivery Support Development Policy Operation, in the amount of $50 million, which was approved by the Board of Executive Directors on May 14, 2013 and closed as scheduled on June 30, 2014. The purpose of the PPAR is to examine the extent to which this development policy operation achieved its relevant objectives and the sustainability of outcomes after project closure. In addition to its accountability and lesson-learning functions, the PPAR provided input for IEG’s Country Program Evaluation for Rwanda for fiscal years 2009–17. It will also serve the purpose of providing input to an upcoming IEG thematic evaluation on strengthening subnational governments. Ratings for this project are as follows: World Bank’s financial contribution was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Government performance was satisfactory. The following lessons are drawn from the design and implementation of the program: (i) Strong government ownership and leadership of the reform agenda are important drivers of successful development policy financing. (ii) Rollout of an IFMIS at the local government level can serve as a useful catalyst and vehicle for enhancing local capacity. (iii) Flexibility, agility, and strategic acumen on the World Bank’s part can play a valuable role in resolving a financing impasse that threatens to jeopardize development gains. (iv) In designing a DPO, there may be a trade-off between speed of response and value-added in terms of leveraging reforms.

Burkina Faso: Growth and Competitiveness Credits 1-4 (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the Growth and Competitiveness Credit Development Policy Financing series (I–IV) implemented in Burkina Faso between 2012 and 2015. The total cost of the four operations was $359 million equivalent. The first operation was approved by the Board of the International Development Association (IDA) on June 26, 2012, and the Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the Growth and Competitiveness Credit Development Policy Financing series (I–IV) implemented in Burkina Faso between 2012 and 2015. The total cost of the four operations was $359 million equivalent. The first operation was approved by the Board of the International Development Association (IDA) on June 26, 2012, and the last on April 2, 2015. The series closed on December 31, 2015. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) prepared the report based on interviews, a review of World Bank files, and documents and data collected during a field visit to Burkina Faso in November 2017. The mission met with World Bank staff, government officials, beneficiaries of the reforms, donors, academia, and civil society groups. The evaluation also draws from interviews with the task team leaders and country manager of Burkina Faso. The series followed 11 budget support operations of the Poverty Reduction Support Credits and Grants 1–11 in Burkina Faso and was the only type of development policy operation financed by IDA resources during the period.

Azerbaijan: Internally Displaced Persons Economic Development Project (PPAR)

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The well-being of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arose as a significant political and policy concern in the wake of the military conflict between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. The conflict lasted from 1988 to 1994 when a cease-fire was declared (which continues to this day). The conflict resulted in the occupation of about 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. Some 612,000 people, or Show MoreThe well-being of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arose as a significant political and policy concern in the wake of the military conflict between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. The conflict lasted from 1988 to 1994 when a cease-fire was declared (which continues to this day). The conflict resulted in the occupation of about 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. Some 612,000 people, or 15 percent of the Azerbaijani population, became internally displaced, making them one of the highest concentrations of IDPs per capita in the world. In addition, some 200,000 ethnic Azerbaijani returned to Azerbaijan from historically Azerbaijan-populated territories in Armenia. IDPs live in scattered communities throughout Azerbaijan; and although some have been able to integrate into mainstream Azerbaijani society, many still live in collective centers (public buildings, dormitories) and temporary shelters where conditions are harsh and amenities, such as access to clean water, adequate sanitation, and electricity are scarcer than among the non-IDP population. IDPs have few income-generating options and are highly dependent on state transfers and subsidies as their main source of income. This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the performance of the Azerbaijan Internally Displaced Persons Economic Development Support Project, a community development fund project, and an additional financing that was added to the IDP-EDS to respond to additional demand for micro-projects. Ratings for the Internally Displaced Persons Economic Development Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is low, Bank performance is moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory. The main lessons to draw from the project assessment are the following: (i) Community micro-projects may not require high levels of community mobilization to be successful. (ii) Well-targeted micro-projects are likely to successfully improve basic living conditions in a community but may not be sufficient to make a difference in terms of creating economic opportunity and reducing poverty. (iii) Pursuing social integration can be a legitimate project objective, but it may require participatory processes that can generate positive spillover effects in the broader community. (iv) When World Bank and government objectives don’t coincide, project outcomes may not be easily achieved and investments can be at risk. (v) Women may be formally present in community committees but may not have a voice.

China: NanGuang Railway Project (PPAR)

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The purpose of this Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the World Bank’s NanGuang Railway Project in China is to offer closer and deeper insights on the project’s outcome, based on updated evidence, including an assessment of the project’s contribution to sector reform and institutional improvement. The PPAR is the first of three PPARs, each for a World Bank–financed large railway Show MoreThe purpose of this Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the World Bank’s NanGuang Railway Project in China is to offer closer and deeper insights on the project’s outcome, based on updated evidence, including an assessment of the project’s contribution to sector reform and institutional improvement. The PPAR is the first of three PPARs, each for a World Bank–financed large railway investment project in China that was completed over the past five years. Although the World Bank’s financing ranged from US$200 million to US$300 million and accounted for a small percentage of the total cost for each project, all three projects provided a platform for railway sector policy engagements between the World Bank and the Government. The goal of the NanGuang Railway Project was to enhance transport services in a congested corridor connecting a large and populous less-developed western region in Southwest China and the more-developed Pearl River delta region, with the aim of contributing to regional economic development. The project was also intended to serve as a platform for the World Bank to continue its policy engagement with the Government of China in the railway sector. Ratings for the NanGuang Railway Project are as follows: Outcome is satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is negligible, Bank performance is satisfactory, and Borrower performance is satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Sound technical design, project preparation, and implementation management, combined with a strong financial capacity, are a recipe for success for a high-speed railway project. (ii) Agglomeration effects are an important benefit of high-speed rail development and should be incorporated in the benefit-cost analysis of such projects. (iii) Successful reforms in large and complex infrastructure sectors such as railways in China require sustained policy dialogue and engagements. (iv) Good connections of high-speed railway lines with other transport modes and between the rail stations and urban centers are critical to achieving the full benefits of high speed trains.

Bangladesh and Nepal: Strengthening Regional Cooperation for Wildlife Protection in Asia (PPAR)

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South Asia is home to 13–15 percent of the earth’s floral and faunal biodiversity, including some of its most iconic and endangered wildlife species. In recent decades, the region has experienced a rapid loss of critical natural habitats for those species, increasing poaching of wildlife and an expanding illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products driven largely by consumer demand in East Show MoreSouth Asia is home to 13–15 percent of the earth’s floral and faunal biodiversity, including some of its most iconic and endangered wildlife species. In recent decades, the region has experienced a rapid loss of critical natural habitats for those species, increasing poaching of wildlife and an expanding illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products driven largely by consumer demand in East Asia. The World Bank project, Strengthening Regional Cooperation for Wildlife Protection in Asia (SRCWP), intended to contribute to the long-term goal for the South Asia Region of stabilizing and increasing the populations and habitats of critically endangered animals (e.g. tigers, snow leopards, rhinos, and elephants). Collaboration in a regional approach to building institutional capacity for curbing the illegal wildlife trade and strengthening management of critical wildlife habitats in national protected areas was the way to achieve that long-term goal. The SRCWP was designed as the first phase of a horizontal (multi-country) adaptable program loan (APL) that, in its second phase, included a similar project in Bhutan. A separate PPAR will be prepared for the project in Bhutan. Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome is satisfactory, Risk to outcome is moderate, World Bank performance is moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory. IEG’s review of the SRCWP’s experience suggests the following lessons: (i) Given their design and implementation challenges, regional projects focusing on global public goods require adequate preparation time to conduct a thorough analysis of participant capacities and commitments. (ii) Regional projects aiming to pilot new approaches to collaboration on transboundary wildlife management and illegal wildlife trade require a carefully designed results framework. (iii) Regional projects designed to build institutions and capacity for collaboration on transboundary wildlife management and illegal wildlife trade require a long-term investment to ensure success in achieving results.

Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Sao Tome, Principe: Internet and Mobile Connectivity (Central African Backbone Program APL 1A and APL 2) (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Central Africa Backbone Project Adaptable Program Loan (APL) 1A implemented in three countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad; and the Central Africa Backbone Project APL 2 implemented in Sao Tome and Principe. The objectives of the projects were to help Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Central Africa Backbone Project Adaptable Program Loan (APL) 1A implemented in three countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic and Chad; and the Central Africa Backbone Project APL 2 implemented in Sao Tome and Principe. The objectives of the projects were to help to increase the geographical reach and usage of regional broadband network services and reduce their prices to end-users. Ratings for these projects are as follows: Outcome is unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome is substantial, Bank and Borrow performance are both moderately unsatisfactory. For APL 2, the ratings are: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is substantial, Bank performance is satisfactory, and Borrow performance is moderately satisfactory. Lessons from the projects include: (i) A thorough political economy assessment and high-level national and regional commitment are key ingredients for complex regional ICT projects. (ii) The experience from the Central Africa Backbone APL 1 and 2 project shows that public private partnership arrangements are difficult to implement in multiple countries, particularly when countries have asymmetrical needs and incentives with respect to increasing competition for the provision of international and national capacity. (iii) Technical assistance for the preparation of legislation and sector strategies is only the first step to creating an enabling environment for the ICT sector. (iv) Assessing and funding the capacity needs of Regional Economic Communities is important for project coordination and implementation, so that they can carry out their functions effectively. (v) In weak capacity environments, it is beneficial that the projects build the needed institutional capacity for the Borrower to further / implement the crucial reforms and to ensure sustainability of the investments in the country.

Bolivia: Reducing Maternal and Infant Mortality: A multi-project evaluation of 16 years of World Bank support to the health sector (PPAR)

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Bolivia’s poor maternal and child health outcomes were of great concern in the 1990s. Infant and child mortality rates were 67 and 92 per 1,000 live births in 1998, and maternal mortality was 390 per 100,000 live births, risking Bolivia’s achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The capacities of the Bolivian health system were insufficient to respond to the need for health care Show MoreBolivia’s poor maternal and child health outcomes were of great concern in the 1990s. Infant and child mortality rates were 67 and 92 per 1,000 live births in 1998, and maternal mortality was 390 per 100,000 live births, risking Bolivia’s achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The capacities of the Bolivian health system were insufficient to respond to the need for health care access, availability, affordability, quality, and equity. Health facilities lacked essential drugs and equipment needed to provide good care. In addition to scarce and inefficiently distributed health workers, heath staff were often poorly trained, compromising the quality of treatment. The Expanded Immunization program had too little funding, poor communication strategies, and unreliable data, which led to declining immunization rates starting in 1996. Cultural and economic barriers limited demand for both preventive and curative care. The World Bank supported the government’s health sector reforms through a series of Adaptable Program Loans (APLs) over 16 years, including the 1999 Health Sector Reform Project, 2001 Second Phase of the Health Sector Reform Program, and 2008 Expanding Access to Reduce Health Inequities. The reforms supported by these projects are the subject of this Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR). This report spans three projects. Ratings for the first project, Health Sector Reform (APL 1) is as follows: Outcome is satisfactory, risk to development outcome is moderate, Bank and Borrower performance is both moderately satisfactory. Ratings for the second project, Sector Phase of the Health Sector Reform Program (APL II) is as follows: Outcome is moderately satisfactory, risk to development outcome is moderate, Bank and Borrower performance is both moderately satisfactory. Ratings for the third project, Expanding Access to Reduce Health Inequities (APL III) is as follows: Outcome is moderately satisfactory, risk to development outcome is moderate, Bank and Borrower performance is both moderately satisfactory. Lessons from these projects include: (i) The definition of a common results framework is useful to align the efforts of different government levels. (ii) A robust results-based approach needs to define a clear mechanism of rewards/sanctions to function well. Otherwise it risks turning into a mere monitoring tool that could lead to perverse incentives. (iii) Project design coordinating efforts with parallel programs that have similar goals has a great potential for efficiency, but it raises methodological concerns about the attribution of outcomes. (iv) While continued focus on quality objectives is certainly commendable, it needs to be accompanied by more robust outcome measures to prove quality enhancements. (v) Programmatic approaches are suitable where sector knowledge is strong, program objectives are long-term and clear, and country ownership is established. (vi) Ambitious projects partially relying on a government promise to pass a reform law are likely to need a restructuring. Reallocation of project funds in response to ad hoc government requests may lessen the logic of the results chain and risk the M&E framework from providing sufficient evidence of project achievements.