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Report/Evaluation Type:Country Focused ValidationsProject Level Evaluations (PPARs)
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Myanmar CLR Review FY15-19

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This review of the World Bank Group’s (WBG) Completion and Learning Review (CLR) covers the period of the Country Partnership Framework (CPF), FY15-FY17, and updated in the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) dated June 2, 2017, which extended the CPF period by two years to FY19. This CPF followed the end-2012 Interim Strategy Note (ISN) that resumed WBG operations after a hiatus of about 25 Show MoreThis review of the World Bank Group’s (WBG) Completion and Learning Review (CLR) covers the period of the Country Partnership Framework (CPF), FY15-FY17, and updated in the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) dated June 2, 2017, which extended the CPF period by two years to FY19. This CPF followed the end-2012 Interim Strategy Note (ISN) that resumed WBG operations after a hiatus of about 25 years. To support the Government’s development efforts, the WBG implemented a major expansion of its activities (a seven-fold increase in the Bank’s portfolio), possibly beyond what the country could absorb. Nevertheless, this support contributed to good progress on farming productivity; on access to electricity, telecommunications, health, education, and finance; and on the business climate. IEG agrees with the lessons drawn by the CLR. These are reformulated and summarized as follows: (i) In an environment of constrained implementation capacity, projects with diverse objectives and multiple implementing agencies may become unwieldy and lead to delays in project implementation. (ii) A results framework that excludes the program’s cross-cutting issues will impede assessment of success in addressing these issues. (iii) Use of country systems, support of key reform champions, and joint analytical work are among the factors that build trust with counterparts and stakeholders. (iv) Access to and coordination of trust fund resources will encourage effective implementation and collaboration across development partners. (v) Good and timely data is critical for evidence-based policy dialogue and timely response to country developments. (vi) A “one WBG” approach is critical to leverage WBG instruments toward specific objectives such as access to electricity. Seventh, more careful attention to indicators, including their sources, baselines, targets and time frames will facilitate program monitoring. (vii) A “disconnect’ between written implementation rules and actual practices in Myanmar, e.g., on procurement, may cause implementation delays. IEG adds the following lesson: Joint Implementation Plans (JIPs5) can improve the effectiveness of the “one WBG” approach noted by the CLR lessons. WBG CPFs normally intend collaboration across the Bank, IFC, and MIGA, but more often than not, CPFs do not spell out how such collaboration is to happen. Myanmar’s CPF JIP to improve access to electricity helped ensure that joint work would materialize. IEG rates the CPF development outcome as Moderately Satisfactory and WBG performance as Good.

Bangladesh: Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Program - Strengthening Auditor General’s Office (PPAR)

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This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank’s project on Bangladesh: Strengthening Auditor General’s Office. The project was selected as part of a pilot initiative by IEG to improve the relevance of the instrument. The PPAR draws lessons from the World Bank’s experience in the context of a challenging public financial Show MoreThis is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank’s project on Bangladesh: Strengthening Auditor General’s Office. The project was selected as part of a pilot initiative by IEG to improve the relevance of the instrument. The PPAR draws lessons from the World Bank’s experience in the context of a challenging public financial management, governance, and political economy environment. The original project development objectives were to (i) strengthen the institutional arrangements of the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General (OCAG), (ii) enhance the quality and scope of audits, and (iii) enhance the institutional capacity of the Financial Management Academy (FIMA). Reflecting government reluctance to enact the underlying legal changes required by the operation, the project development objectives were revised in 2014 to (i) strengthen the quality, scope, and follow-up of audits; and (ii) create a cadre of internationally accredited professionals in OCAG. Ratings for the Strengthening Public Expenditure Management Program - Strengthening Auditor General’s Office project are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately unsatisfactory. Lesson from the project include: (1) Inadequate assessment of political economy risks to key reforms contributed to unrealistically ambitious project design and targets, leading to shortcomings in implementation. (ii) The project sought to implement a politically sensitive policy reform through the use of technical assistance. The objective could have been more effectively pursued through a different instrument, possibly a development policy operation. (iii) The ability for a pilot to effectively demonstrate the potential of a new way of doing business requires commitment to a systematic assessment of the pilot experience and the dissemination of lessons learned.

Senegal CLR Review FY13-17

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Senegal is a lower middle-income country with a Gross National Income per capita of US$1,410 in 2018. It has a population of 16.3 million (2019). Senegal was among the fastest growing economies in Africa over the 2013-2017 period, with real GDP growth averaging 5.8% per year compared with 2.4% annual growth in the 2008-2012 period, with lower growth being primarily the result of the economy Show MoreSenegal is a lower middle-income country with a Gross National Income per capita of US$1,410 in 2018. It has a population of 16.3 million (2019). Senegal was among the fastest growing economies in Africa over the 2013-2017 period, with real GDP growth averaging 5.8% per year compared with 2.4% annual growth in the 2008-2012 period, with lower growth being primarily the result of the economy contracting by 8.1% in 2011 as a result of a severe drought. Services and exports were its main drivers of growth, although all sectors contributed to growth over the CPS timeframe. In spite of the rapid growth, GNI per capita in US dollar terms was lower (US$1280) in 2017 than in 2013 (US$1360), because of a sharp depreciation of the CFA franc. Senegal's human development index stood at 0.505 in 2017 which puts it in the low human development category, standing at 164 out of 189 countries. Its Gini coefficient was 40.3 in 2011.

Mexico CLR Review FY14-19

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This review of Mexico’s Completion and Learning Review (CLR) of the World Bank Group’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) covers the CPS period FY14-FY19 and the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) of January 26, 2017. Mexico is an upper-middle-income country with a gross national income (GNI) per capita (in current US$) of US$9,180 in 2018. During 2014-18, the average annual GDP growth rate Show MoreThis review of Mexico’s Completion and Learning Review (CLR) of the World Bank Group’s Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) covers the CPS period FY14-FY19 and the Performance and Learning Review (PLR) of January 26, 2017. Mexico is an upper-middle-income country with a gross national income (GNI) per capita (in current US$) of US$9,180 in 2018. During 2014-18, the average annual GDP growth rate was 2.2 percent in a show of resilience in the face of a complex external environment. In the first half of 2019, economic growth came to a virtual halt owing to policy uncertainty, tight monetary conditions and budget under-execution as well as slowing global manufacturing activity. Over the longer term, Mexico’s economic growth has been below the level needed to converge toward advanced country economies. The country’s per capita GDP, which is closely related to productivity, stands at 34 percent of U.S. per capita GDP compared with 49 percent in 1980.2 Poverty rates (share of individuals living on less than the 2011 PPP US$1.90 per day poverty line) fell from 3.8 percent of the population in 2016 to 2.2 percent in 2016. There was a small decline in the Gini index from 48.7 percent in 2014 to 48.3 in 2016. IEG’s Country Program Evaluation for Mexico (2018) indicates that Mexico’s multidimensional poverty index for the extremely poor fell from 11.3 percent in 2010 to 7.6 percent in 2016, helping reduce the overall index from 46.1 percent to 43.6 percent. At the same time, income growth of the bottom 40 percent was below the population mean.

Colombia: Programmatic Productive and Sustainable Cities Development Policy Loans (PPAR)

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This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the programmatic Productive and Sustainable Cities Development Policy Loans (DPLs; P130972) intended to support the strengthening of the government of Colombia’s policy framework on productive, sustainable, and inclusive cities. The DPL’s objective was and remains highly relevant to the national policy and sector context, and most of Show MoreThis is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the programmatic Productive and Sustainable Cities Development Policy Loans (DPLs; P130972) intended to support the strengthening of the government of Colombia’s policy framework on productive, sustainable, and inclusive cities. The DPL’s objective was and remains highly relevant to the national policy and sector context, and most of the project’s prior actions were substantially designed to fulfill the aims of the DPL reform areas. However, the alignments of some prior actions show weaknesses, especially in the area of achieving more sustainable cities, and with the definition of outcomes and their measurement. Ratings for this project are as follows: outcome was satisfactory, risk to development outcome was modest, bank performance was satisfactory, and borrower performance was satisfactory. Several lessons emerged from this assessment of the Colombian DPL series: (i) Tacit assumptions that additional fiscal outlays will be forthcoming to support prior actions in development policy operations (DPOs) can create risks to the sustainability of policy reforms. (ii) When designing prior actions that require local-level implementation, it is important to consider municipal capacity and the time required to enact local-level reforms. (iii) In designing multisectoral DPOs with many prior actions across sectors, which include local implementation requirements, municipal capacity building may be required. (iv) In the context of multisector DPOs, it is critical that prior actions be directly linked to results indicators so a clear line of sight and envisioned impact is identified ex ante, thus supporting a strong design at entry.

Mongolia: Governance Assistance Project (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the Governance Assistance Project (GAP) of the International Development Association (IDA) in Mongolia (P170780). The project was approved in March 2006 in the amount of special drawing rights 9.7 million (equivalent to US$14 million), funded by an IDA grant. Following two extensions, it closed on December 31, 2014. This assessment aims Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the Governance Assistance Project (GAP) of the International Development Association (IDA) in Mongolia (P170780). The project was approved in March 2006 in the amount of special drawing rights 9.7 million (equivalent to US$14 million), funded by an IDA grant. Following two extensions, it closed on December 31, 2014. This assessment aims to review whether and how the operation achieved its intended objectives. The PPAR also examines the long-term sustainability of GAP support, such as the extent to which the GAP’s main achievements have been sustained more than four years since the project’s closure. This report provides additional evidence and analysis of relevant data for a more complete picture of the project outcomes and the factors that influenced them. By reviewing developments from 2014 to 2019 (after the project closed), it offers an opportunity for a longer-term perspective on the factors affecting outcomes. Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome as satisfactory, risk to development outcome was modest, bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. This PPAR offers the following lessons: (i) In a low-capacity environment, introduction of basic technical solutions and application of incremental step-by-step reforms can be an effective strategy. (ii) Implementation risks related to project complexity and multiple government implementing agencies can be successfully managed if there is strong leadership from the core government agency (such as the Ministry of Finance) and an experienced and empowered Project Coordination Unit. (iii) Technical assistance projects with multisectoral coverage require significant supervision support. Lack of budget can limit the ability of the World Bank to provide the specialized technical inputs needed to help the client make better design and implementation choices.

Morocco: First and Second Transparency and Accountability Development Policy Loan (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses two International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans (First and Second Transparency and Accountability Development Policy Loans, known as Hakama 1 and 2) made to Morocco during 2013–16 and totaling approximately $407 million. The first operation was approved in October 2013 and the second in October 2015. The European Union and Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses two International Bank for Reconstruction and Development loans (First and Second Transparency and Accountability Development Policy Loans, known as Hakama 1 and 2) made to Morocco during 2013–16 and totaling approximately $407 million. The first operation was approved in October 2013 and the second in October 2015. The European Union and the African Development Bank provided parallel financing in the form of budget support; the European Union and World Bank also provided technical assistance. The development objectives of the loans were to strengthen mechanisms promoting transparency and accountability in the management of public resources, and to support legal reforms fostering open governance in Morocco in line with the new Constitution. Ratings are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lesson from these projects include: (i) Improved knowledge management and better use of knowledge enhance operational quality. (ii) Monitoring and evaluation require attention both at the design stage and during implementation. (iii) Greater transparency and better information management are needed to sustain dialogue as World Bank teams and counterparts change. (iv) It would be helpful to assess a cluster of mutually reinforcing World Bank operations jointly.

Ukraine: First and Second Programmatic Financial Sector Development Policy Loan (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report evaluates a programmatic series of two development policy loans (DPLs) to Ukraine of $500 million each that were provided as part of an urgent international effort to assist the country when Ukraine’s financial sector teetered on the edge of collapse in 2014. A perfect storm had affected the financial system when the geopolitical situation had descended Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report evaluates a programmatic series of two development policy loans (DPLs) to Ukraine of $500 million each that were provided as part of an urgent international effort to assist the country when Ukraine’s financial sector teetered on the edge of collapse in 2014. A perfect storm had affected the financial system when the geopolitical situation had descended into deep crisis arising from the Euromaidan political upheaval, the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea, and the armed separatist movement in the eastern part of the country that initiated open, armed conflict that at times resembled a full-scale war. The exchange rate virtually halved between the end of 2013 (Hrv 8.13 to 1 U.S. dollar) and the end of 2014 (Hrv 15.8 to 1 U.S. dollar), inflation accelerated to 24 percent, the public sector fiscal deficit exceeded 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and public debt—including guarantees—spiked to 70 percent of GDP. Ratings for the First and Second Programmatic Financial Sector Development Policy Loan are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was high, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Lessons from the projects include: (i) Close coordination among donors is critical for DPLs to maximize the effectiveness of a jointly designed reform program. (ii) The design of DPLs needs to focus on all relevant issues, potential weaknesses, and gaps in reform measures. (iii) The presence of task teams in the field can be a critical factor in promoting financial sector reform. (iv) Weak public understanding of financial sector reforms indicates a need to expand outreach efforts to enhance political sustainability. (v) Sustainable reform is difficult to achieve in countries that have corrupt power structures and court systems. Under such circumstances, it is an open question whether World Bank assistance risks providing additional resources for rent seeking rather than support for reforms.

Indonesia: Community-based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project for Central and West Java and Yogyakarta Special Region (PPAR)

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The government of Indonesia committed approximately $600 million to fund the reconstruction and rehabilitation of approximately 255,000 homes in the earthquake-affected areas. Several development partners also contributed funds for a significantly smaller reconstruction initiative. At the government’s request, the World Bank used these additional contributions to create a recipient-executed Java Show MoreThe government of Indonesia committed approximately $600 million to fund the reconstruction and rehabilitation of approximately 255,000 homes in the earthquake-affected areas. Several development partners also contributed funds for a significantly smaller reconstruction initiative. At the government’s request, the World Bank used these additional contributions to create a recipient-executed Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF). The World Bank used the JRF’s resources to create the Community-Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (CSRRP) for Central and West Java and Yogyakarta Special Region. The CSRRP’s objective was to assist in meeting the needs of eligible households for earthquake-resistant housing and community infrastructure in the affected areas. These objectives were to be achieved through a community-based approach in which beneficiaries would have a major role in decision-making about reconstruction of their homes and the construction of their communities’ infrastructure. Ratings for the Community-based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (CSRRP) are as follows: Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development are modest, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Key lessons from the experience of the project include the following: (i) A community-based approach to postdisaster reconstruction can be effective and efficient in a context in which there is prior experience and existing institutions and cultural norms that favor it. (ii) Careful attention is essential in deciding who will be assisted financially in reconstructing homes, the amount of assistance to be provided, and the perceived effects and consequences of these decisions. (iii) The disaster resilience of project-provided housing can be undermined by subsequent expansion or enlargement of the housing. (iv) Community settlement or similar development plans may not meaningfully support disaster risk reduction unless these plans meet several essential conditions. (v) Women’s participation in community-driven development is a challenge to ensure when their interests, experiences, and perspectives are not properly considered in a project’s design, for example, through a gender analysis that identifies potential opportunities and obstacles to their meaningful participation in decision-making.

India: Andhra Pradesh and Telangana State Community-Based Tank Management Project (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the development effectiveness of India’s Andhra Pradesh and Telangana State Community-Based Tank Management Project, which was approved in 2007 and closed in 2016. The development objectives of the project were to (i) improve agricultural productivity with the assistance of selected tank-based producers; and (ii) improve the management of tank Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the development effectiveness of India’s Andhra Pradesh and Telangana State Community-Based Tank Management Project, which was approved in 2007 and closed in 2016. The development objectives of the project were to (i) improve agricultural productivity with the assistance of selected tank-based producers; and (ii) improve the management of tank systems with the assistance of selected water user associations. Ratings for this review are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Lessons from this review include: (i) The potential economic benefits from improved irrigation infrastructure cannot be adequately realized by beneficiaries without the coordinated and ongoing support of multiple government agencies and research extension services in agriculture. (ii) Continued support to WUAs in terms of resources and social intermediation, such as through nongovernmental organizations, is key to enhancing their capacity for improved water management in drought-prone areas. (iii) Benefits from increased water availability can be further increased if cropping decisions by smallholder farmers in drought-prone areas are informed by water budgeting and collective governance principles for sustainable use.