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Topic:Social, Urban, Rural & Resilience
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Boosting Market Confidence to Support Key Development Efforts: Three Lessons from Indonesia

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Boosting Market Confidence to Support Key Development Efforts
This brief captures the lessons from evaluating the World Bank’s Public Expenditure Support Facility (DPL-DDO) in Indonesia. This brief captures the lessons from evaluating the World Bank’s Public Expenditure Support Facility (DPL-DDO) in Indonesia.

Turkey: Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project (PPAR) (Turkish version)

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This version of the PPAR report has been translated to Turkish. Turkey faces high vulnerability to earthquakes, with Istanbul posing the most serious risk due its high seismic risk and its role as the population and economic center of Turkey. A major earthquake near Istanbul in 1999 led to over 17,000 deaths and damage estimated at $US 5-13 billion. The World Bank supported a post-earthquake Show MoreThis version of the PPAR report has been translated to Turkish. Turkey faces high vulnerability to earthquakes, with Istanbul posing the most serious risk due its high seismic risk and its role as the population and economic center of Turkey. A major earthquake near Istanbul in 1999 led to over 17,000 deaths and damage estimated at $US 5-13 billion. The World Bank supported a post-earthquake reconstruction project over 1999-2006, but vulnerability to earthquakes remained high, especially for Istanbul. A major earthquake in Istanbul would be catastrophic, and could derail the country’s development trajectory. The government was committed to undertaking disaster risk mitigation, but needed external assistance and support to do so. The World Bank was a suitable partner based on its financing capacity, technical expertise in disaster risk management and mitigation, and credibility and trust in Turkey based on prior disaster risk management engagements. These considerations motivated the creation of the Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project (ISMEP) as a proactive risk mitigation effort. Ratings for the Istanbul Seismic Risk Mitigation and Emergency Preparedness Project are as follows: Outcome is highly satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is negligible, Bank performance is satisfactory, and Borrower performance is highly satisfactory. The project offers the following lessons: (i) A sub-national multisector model can be highly effective for reducing disaster risk in a well-functioning major metropolitan area, even in a country where these approaches are unusual. (ii) A semi-autonomous professional project coordination unit can help to ensure effective and efficient project implementation even when dealing with many stakeholders and beneficiary agencies. (iii) Even highly successful project models may not be replicated if they cannot generate strong government ownership and if they rely on exceptional measures. (iv) The World Bank can achieve large scale impact by creating effective project platforms that are able to attract additional financing from other institutions. (v) The World Bank can offer significant value to clients from financing, access to technology, project management experience, and influence - even in megacities in high capacity upper middle-income countries. (vi) Pilot efforts may not support learning if they do not have monitoring and evaluation systems that assess their contribution to program objectives and draw conclusions for the design of future interventions. (vii) Small grants to support municipalities in digitizing their processes can have a significant impact on efficiency and transparency if coupled with highly motivated municipal leadership.

Can Ethiopia Create 2 Million Jobs Every Year?

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Can Ethiopia Create 2 Million Jobs Every Year
Insights from a recent High-level Forum on job creation in the rural non-farm economy, held in Addis Ababa.Insights from a recent High-level Forum on job creation in the rural non-farm economy, held in Addis Ababa.

Seychelles CLR Review FY12-16

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The World Bank Group's (WBG) Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Seychelles covers the period, FY12-FY15. The CPS was extended by one year to FY16 at the Country Partnership Strategy Progress Report (CPSPR) in FY15. This Review covers both the CPS and CPSPR period, FY12-16.WBG's support for Seychelles was in line with the country's draft Seychelles Medium-Term National Development Strategy Show MoreThe World Bank Group's (WBG) Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for Seychelles covers the period, FY12-FY15. The CPS was extended by one year to FY16 at the Country Partnership Strategy Progress Report (CPSPR) in FY15. This Review covers both the CPS and CPSPR period, FY12-16.WBG's support for Seychelles was in line with the country's draft Seychelles Medium-Term National Development Strategy 2013–17 (MTNDS), later approved in 2015, which presented the vision and goals for the country. The core aim of the MTNDS was to reduce Seychelles' vulnerability and to provide the basis for long term sustainable development. Specifically, the objective of the MTNDS was to reduce vulnerability, increase resilience, and provide the basis fora sustainable development. The WBG supported the government in reducing vulnerability and building long-term sustainability with a program centered on two pillars: (i) increasing competitiveness and employment and (ii) reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience, and one cross-cutting foundation, governance and public-sector capacity. The CPS built on the previous Interim Strategy and aimed to deepen and broaden structural reforms via programmatic support using Development Policy Lending (DPL) operations, complemented with Analytical and Advisory Services (ASA), including technical assistance and reimbursable advisory services (RAS).The IEG concurs with key lessons in the CLR: (i) development policy operations can be mobilized quickly and achieve strong results when complemented by sound analysis and technical assistance but it requires commitment and ownership, (ii) deeper understanding and assessment of political economy would help explain the successes and failures of specific reform efforts and identify factors that might otherwise be missed, and (iii) well-designed and updated results framework prove useful for Bank and Government monitoring of program implementation and results.

Azerbaijan: Internally Displaced Persons Economic Development Project (PPAR)

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The well-being of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arose as a significant political and policy concern in the wake of the military conflict between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. The conflict lasted from 1988 to 1994 when a cease-fire was declared (which continues to this day). The conflict resulted in the occupation of about 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. Some 612,000 people, or Show MoreThe well-being of internally displaced persons (IDPs) arose as a significant political and policy concern in the wake of the military conflict between Azerbaijan and neighboring Armenia. The conflict lasted from 1988 to 1994 when a cease-fire was declared (which continues to this day). The conflict resulted in the occupation of about 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory. Some 612,000 people, or 15 percent of the Azerbaijani population, became internally displaced, making them one of the highest concentrations of IDPs per capita in the world. In addition, some 200,000 ethnic Azerbaijani returned to Azerbaijan from historically Azerbaijan-populated territories in Armenia. IDPs live in scattered communities throughout Azerbaijan; and although some have been able to integrate into mainstream Azerbaijani society, many still live in collective centers (public buildings, dormitories) and temporary shelters where conditions are harsh and amenities, such as access to clean water, adequate sanitation, and electricity are scarcer than among the non-IDP population. IDPs have few income-generating options and are highly dependent on state transfers and subsidies as their main source of income. This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) evaluates the performance of the Azerbaijan Internally Displaced Persons Economic Development Support Project, a community development fund project, and an additional financing that was added to the IDP-EDS to respond to additional demand for micro-projects. Ratings for the Internally Displaced Persons Economic Development Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is low, Bank performance is moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory. The main lessons to draw from the project assessment are the following: (i) Community micro-projects may not require high levels of community mobilization to be successful. (ii) Well-targeted micro-projects are likely to successfully improve basic living conditions in a community but may not be sufficient to make a difference in terms of creating economic opportunity and reducing poverty. (iii) Pursuing social integration can be a legitimate project objective, but it may require participatory processes that can generate positive spillover effects in the broader community. (iv) When World Bank and government objectives don’t coincide, project outcomes may not be easily achieved and investments can be at risk. (v) Women may be formally present in community committees but may not have a voice.

Strengthening Local Government Capacity to Deliver Services: Four Lessons from Rural Kyrgyz Republic

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Strengthening Local Government Capacity to Deliver Services
This brief captures the lessons from evaluating two World Bank projects implemented in the Kyrgyz Republic, the Village Investment Project and Second Village Investment Project.This brief captures the lessons from evaluating two World Bank projects implemented in the Kyrgyz Republic, the Village Investment Project and Second Village Investment Project.

Brazil: Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Development Project - Viver Melhor II (PPAR)

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This is a project performance review of the Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Development Project financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and implemented between 2005 and 2013 in two cities in the state of Bahia: Salvador and Feira de Santana. The project sought to reduce urban poverty sustainably in the poorest and most vulnerable sections of Salvador by Show MoreThis is a project performance review of the Bahia Poor Urban Areas Integrated Development Project financed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and implemented between 2005 and 2013 in two cities in the state of Bahia: Salvador and Feira de Santana. The project sought to reduce urban poverty sustainably in the poorest and most vulnerable sections of Salvador by providing access to basic services and improved housing and social support services. It was designed when Bahia had the highest quantitative housing deficit in absolute numbers and the highest number of people living in slums in the country. The project follows a series of previous World Bank–financed urban development operations in Bahia that focused on integrating physical infrastructure and social services delivery in low-income communities. This project represents the World Bank’s first large-scale investment supporting urban upgrading at a state level. Outcome is moderately unsatisfactory, Risk to development outcome is significant, Bank performance is moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance is moderately unsatisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Adaptability to local needs, retaining beneficiaries in the territory, and integration between different types of interventions are key features in slum upgrading and social housing. (ii) Weakness in social service delivery can jeopardize expected outcomes and sustainability. Flexible designs and adequate sequencing of activities might help ensure results. (iii) It is crucial in slum upgrading projects to guarantee delivery of all outputs in the social activities cycle because even small failures can jeopardize the expected outcomes. (iv) Adoption of multiphase projects or a programmatic long-term approach in slum-upgrading projects might be appropriate when social capital strengthening is considered necessary to achieve long-term results. (v) Appropriate timing in the preparation of slum-upgrading projects is crucial. Studies and diagnostics require sufficient time (though not too long) to avoid frustrating local expectations or hampering integration. (vi) Continuity in project management is a success factor in complex institutional development and social capital–strengthening projects, allowing familiarity with the local context and building mutual trust with the affected communities. (vii) It is important for World Bank project management to ensure that slum-upgrading projects in urban areas are consistent with existing city plans and are integrated seamlessly into World Bank Group sectoral and thematic operations.

Nicaragua: Offgrid Rural Electrification (PERZA) Project (PPAR)

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The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group prepared this Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) on the Nicaragua Offgrid Rural Electrification Project. PERZA’s development objectives were to support Nicaragua in increasing the sustainable provision of electricity services and associated social and economic benefits in selected rural sites in its territory; and Show MoreThe Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group prepared this Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) on the Nicaragua Offgrid Rural Electrification Project. PERZA’s development objectives were to support Nicaragua in increasing the sustainable provision of electricity services and associated social and economic benefits in selected rural sites in its territory; and strengthening its institutional capacity to implement its national rural electrification strategy. The World Bank’s financing for the project was $13.47 million of the actual project cost of $26.26 million. The Global Environment Facility financed $3.94 million. The project was appraised on April 23, 2003, approved by the World Bank’s Board on May 15, 2003, and declared effective on November 28, 2003. The project was designed for execution in five years, and the original closing date was December 31, 2008. The project closed on December 31, 2011 after two project closing date extensions of 18 months each and an implementation period of eight years. Ratings for the Offgrid Rural Electrification (PERZA) Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is substantial, Bank performance is moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Complementary infrastructure development, especially road connectivity to local markets, can further increase the welfare impacts of electrification in rural communities. (ii) Solar home systems can be a successful solution for the provision of basic electricity services to poor rural communities outside the reach of the grid if the initial investment cost is subsidized appropriately to make it affordable to the beneficiaries while promoting ownership. (iii) A pilot project consisting of numerous but well-integrated learning-by-doing project activities can improve a client institution’s capacity to implement larger projects in the future successfully.

Bulgaria: Social Inclusion Project (PPAR)

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Bulgaria is a middle-income country that joined the European Union (EU) in 2007. After setbacks in social well-being and economic growth precipitated by the 2008 global economic crisis, Bulgaria has recently made progress in improving economic performance and reducing poverty. However, it faces the formidable challenge of addressing persistent pockets of poverty and social exclusion. Poverty in Show MoreBulgaria is a middle-income country that joined the European Union (EU) in 2007. After setbacks in social well-being and economic growth precipitated by the 2008 global economic crisis, Bulgaria has recently made progress in improving economic performance and reducing poverty. However, it faces the formidable challenge of addressing persistent pockets of poverty and social exclusion. Poverty in Bulgaria is linked with low levels of education, high unemployment, rural residence, belonging to an ethnic minority, female gender, and old age. Social exclusion is both a cause of poverty and a consequence. Fighting poverty and social exclusion is a priority of Bulgaria, and education a key component of its national policies. The objective of the Social Inclusion Project (SIP) is “to promote social inclusion through increasing the school readiness of children below the age of seven, targeting low income and marginalized families, including children with a disability and other special needs” (World Bank 2008a). The objective did not change during the life of the project. Ratings for the Social Inclusion Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately satisfactory, risk to development outcome is moderate, Bank and Borrower performance are both moderately satisfactory. The following lessons, offered to this end, are relevant to both the World Bank and the government: (i) Official databases are important, but may need to be complemented with mapping of target communities and households and their needs, priorities, motivations, and dynamics, undertaken by those with intimate knowledge of the community and with community development expertise. (ii) Mobile services and mediators face challenges in reaching target populations, especially when mediators are few relative to their target populations and have heavy workloads, and they do not always share the language, culture, and living conditions of those populations. (iii) Low appreciation of evidence for learning, program refinement, and policymaking can undermine the effectiveness of programs and policies, especially where piloting is intended. The development of M&E capacities could provide MLSP with a critical management tool for ensuring continuous learning and accountability for ECD results and increase its potential for resource mobilization and future replication. (iii) Experience under the SIP reveals the scope and opportunity to clarify roles and responsibilities to optimize comparative advantages and synergies of the many actors involved both horizontally (across partners at each level of the system) and vertically (up and down the various levels of decentralized government). (iv) Investments in ECD and social inclusion activities targeted to low-income and marginalized children ages 0–7 years and their parents are necessary, but they are insufficient to ensure the children’s success and inclusion in primary school and beyond.

Colombia: Peace and Development Project (PPAR)

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Colombia has experienced internal armed conflict for the last 50 years. The conflict has been waged primarily in rural areas and over control of territory, particularly in regions characterized by weak institutions and, in many cases, corruption and cronyism, impunity, expansion of illicit crop cultivation, and weak civil society links to state institutions owing to lack of opportunities for Show MoreColombia has experienced internal armed conflict for the last 50 years. The conflict has been waged primarily in rural areas and over control of territory, particularly in regions characterized by weak institutions and, in many cases, corruption and cronyism, impunity, expansion of illicit crop cultivation, and weak civil society links to state institutions owing to lack of opportunities for participation (World Bank 2013:1). Over time, the conflict has spawned a complex array of non-state actors who have waged terror as a weapon of war. Specifically, their modus operandi has included systematic large-scale human rights violations, such as public executions, disappearances, massacres, town take-overs, extortions, assassinations, kidnappings, and forced recruitment of children. Against this backdrop of conflict and violence, the World Bank provided support through the Peace and Development Project (PDP) to assist vulnerable, low-income and displaced populations in rural and urban communities in the conflict-affected regions to reduce the risk of their exposure to conflict and mitigate the negative impact of possible derived effects. Ratings for Colombia Peace and Development Project are as follows: Outcome is moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome is significant, Bank performance is satisfactory, and Borrower performance is moderately satisfactory. The findings from the performance assessment of the PDP suggest the following lessons: (i) Identifying and supporting activities that create lasting shared interest among community members is a critical building block for generating a community response to conflict. (ii) Having separate but similar activities for IDPs and host communities is not advisable in a CDD project since such separation deters social cohesion via competition for resources. (iii) The support of a respected and neutral third party organization can be key for the successful implementation of a CDD project in a conflict-affected area. (iv) Projects that seek to deter displacement may not necessarily reduce exposure to conflict since displacement can sometimes be the only option for citizens whose lives or livelihoods are severely threatened. (v) Socioeconomic stabilization and a strengthened social fabric can deter preventive displacement but both are insufficient to deter reactive displacement which is driven by direct threats. (vi) Projects with participatory approaches implemented in conflict-affected situations that elevate the role of community members can put them in harm’s way and, for this reason, must include protocols to mitigate the risk of leaders suffering victimization acts.