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Project Performance Assessment Report - Senegal: Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project and Sustainable Management of Fish Resources Project

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This Project Performance Assessment Report reviews World Bank support for the sustainable management of fisheries in Senegal over the period of 2004 to 2012, provided by two investment projects: Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Project (2004-2012) and Sustainable Management of Fish Resources Project (2008-2012). Designed in response to a crisis in the fisheries Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report reviews World Bank support for the sustainable management of fisheries in Senegal over the period of 2004 to 2012, provided by two investment projects: Integrated Marine and Coastal Resources Project (2004-2012) and Sustainable Management of Fish Resources Project (2008-2012). Designed in response to a crisis in the fisheries sector, both projects aimed to enhance the sustainable management of the artisanal fisheries sector. The overall outcome rating of the GIRMAC project is unsatisfactory. The overall outcome of the GDRH project is rated highly unsatisfactory. The experience of the two projects yields the following lessons: (1) Reforming the fisheries sector is a politically sensitive and long-term pursuit, best suited to a phased programmatic approach in which sustained support is ensured over a series of operations. (2) Operationalizing co-management requires actions at both local and national level, lack of synchronization between the two can disrupt implementation and the motivation of key actors. (3) Supporting Alternative Revenue Generating Activities can potentially reduce the poverty-conservation tradeoff by making up for lost income or subsistence opportunities that stem from reduced resource access caused by project activities.

Staying on track with the Sustainable Development Goals- What evaluation can teach us

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Staying on track with the Sustainable Development Goals – What evaluation can teach us
What IEG has learned about the Sustainable Development Goals through evaluating the World Bank Group’s work.What IEG has learned about the Sustainable Development Goals through evaluating the World Bank Group’s work.

World Bank Group Engagement in Small States

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country program evaluation, world bank group engagement in small states
The Cases of the OECS, Pacific Island Countries, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Cabo Verde, and Djibouti - Clustered Country Program EvaluationThe Cases of the OECS, Pacific Island Countries, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Cabo Verde, and Djibouti - Clustered Country Program Evaluation

Cluster Country Program Evaluation on Small States: Pacific Island Countries Program Evaluation (FY05–15 - Volume 1)

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This evaluation assesses the Bank Group’s relevance and effectiveness in the PICs as satisfactory. The World Bank made effective use of budgetary, IDA, and trust fund resources to support significant transformational changes in the region, and had a key role in persuading Australia and New Zealand to adopt temporary migration programs that yielded major benefits to participating countries. In Show MoreThis evaluation assesses the Bank Group’s relevance and effectiveness in the PICs as satisfactory. The World Bank made effective use of budgetary, IDA, and trust fund resources to support significant transformational changes in the region, and had a key role in persuading Australia and New Zealand to adopt temporary migration programs that yielded major benefits to participating countries. In addition, the World Bank persuaded a number of PICs governments to scale back their departments for infrastructure maintenance and to outsource this maintenance to the private sector. It also increased awareness of the need to build climate resilience into infrastructure design and enabled major improvements in communications through enhanced connectivity. Looking forward, the evaluation emphasizes collaboration between the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation to more effectively support private sector development; increasing the focus on education’s role in providing the skills needed for developing tourism, agriculture, and fisheries; and providing better preparation for temporary and permanent migrants.

Cluster Country Program Evaluation on Small States: Pacific Island Countries Program Evaluation (FY05–15 - Volume 2)

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This is the appendix to the evaluation that assesses the Bank Group’s relevance and effectiveness in the PICs as satisfactory. The World Bank made effective use of budgetary, IDA, and trust fund resources to support significant transformational changes in the region, and had a key role in persuading Australia and New Zealand to adopt temporary migration programs that yielded major benefits to Show MoreThis is the appendix to the evaluation that assesses the Bank Group’s relevance and effectiveness in the PICs as satisfactory. The World Bank made effective use of budgetary, IDA, and trust fund resources to support significant transformational changes in the region, and had a key role in persuading Australia and New Zealand to adopt temporary migration programs that yielded major benefits to participating countries. In addition, the World Bank persuaded a number of PICs governments to scale back their departments for infrastructure maintenance and to outsource this maintenance to the private sector. It also increased awareness of the need to build climate resilience into infrastructure design and enabled major improvements in communications through enhanced connectivity. Looking forward, the evaluation emphasizes collaboration between the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation to more effectively support private sector development; increasing the focus on education’s role in providing the skills needed for developing tourism, agriculture, and fisheries; and providing better preparation for temporary and permanent migrants.

Review of the 2005-2012 Sao Tome and Principe Country Partnership Strategy Completion Report (CPSCR) and the Interim Strategy Note (ISN)

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This review examines the implementation of the FY2006-FY2009 Sao Tome and Principe Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) of FY2005, and the FY2011-FY2012 Interim Strategy Note of FY2011. While the CPS was an IDA-only strategy, the ISN was jointly implemented by IDA and IFC. This review covers the joint program of the two institutions. The overall objective of the CPS was to support implementation of Show MoreThis review examines the implementation of the FY2006-FY2009 Sao Tome and Principe Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) of FY2005, and the FY2011-FY2012 Interim Strategy Note of FY2011. While the CPS was an IDA-only strategy, the ISN was jointly implemented by IDA and IFC. This review covers the joint program of the two institutions. The overall objective of the CPS was to support implementation of the country's Poverty Reduction Support Program (PRSP). The ISN built on the CPS, continuing the support to government's emphasis on eliminating constraints to growth but taking into account the uncertainties of the potential inflow of oil revenues. World Bank Group (WBG) support under the ISN was organized under two pillars, (i) accelerating sustainable and broad-based economic growth; and (ii) strengthening governance, public institutions, and human capital. IEG rates the overall outcome as Moderately Satisfactory. Under Pillar I, the Bank achieved its objective of increasing competition in the telecommunications sector. There was substantial progress in strengthening the fiscal regulatory framework. Progress was mixed both in terms of improving the business climate and of aid coordination. Results in the energy sector were not achieved, and financial intermediation and access to credit did not improve. Under Pillar II, results were achieved in the area of budgetary operations where transparency and accountability were improved as well as the effectiveness of budget execution. Objectives in the education sector were mostly achieved as access and efficiency improved but no evidence was provided to support improvements in quality. Development of a second PRSP was mostly achieved. Results were partially achieved given that the country remained to be Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)-compliant, and no further progress on strengthening the National Petroleum Agency was reported. Objectives in the health sector were partially achieved as access improved but there was no evidence of improvements in quality and efficiency. The objective of increasing capacity of coastal fisheries to address climate variation was not achieved. The CPSCR outlined nine lessons for the next CPS. IEG agrees with these lessons and underscores two additional points. First, faulty design of results frameworks has a negative impact on the ability to take stock of the impact of the WBG on development outcomes and diminishes their usefulness as a monitoring and management tool. Second, proposed WBG interventions should be capable of achieving the CPS / ISN objectives and contribute in a significant way to the country development goals (i.e., the results chain linking WBG interventions to the country development goals must be strong and clear).

Review of the 2007-2012 Mauritania Country Assistance Strategy Completion Report (CASCR)

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This review examines the implementation of the FY2008-FY2011 Mauritania Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of FY2007, and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). The CAS was implemented by IDA. The overarching objective of the CAS (as expressed in the results matrix) was to contribute to poverty reduction through the different channels of its interventions in Mauritania. The CAS objectives Show MoreThis review examines the implementation of the FY2008-FY2011 Mauritania Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of FY2007, and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). The CAS was implemented by IDA. The overarching objective of the CAS (as expressed in the results matrix) was to contribute to poverty reduction through the different channels of its interventions in Mauritania. The CAS objectives were organized under the same five pillars as the poverty reduction support program 2 (PRSP 2): (i) accelerate growth and maintain macroeconomic stability by strengthening the macro-economic framework, private/financial sector and competitiveness, growth potential in key sectors, and infrastructure; (ii) anchor growth in the economic environment of the poor through the development of rural and urban sectors, micro-finance and MSE, and targeted poverty alleviation programs; (iii) develop human resources and generalize access to basic social services via improved access to education and vocational, technical training, to health and nutrition, to water and sanitation, to basic services and increased rights awareness; (iv) improve good governance and capacity building through modernization of public administration, efficient management of public property and decentralization; and (v) reinforce pilot programs, monitoring, evaluation and coordination. IEG rates the overall outcome of Bank assistance as unsatisfactory, below the CASCR rating of moderately unsatisfactory. IEG's rating reflects the fact that a majority of the intended outcomes set out in the CAS were only partially achieved or not achieved--this much is acknowledged in the CASCR. Bank support contributed to strengthening the legal framework and institutional capacity for managing oil revenues and other natural resources, to addressing the issue of locust invasions, and to improving the quality of basic education. Good progress was made in improving the living conditions of rural communities through implementation of CDD programs and in facilitating access to basic services in urban areas. However, only limited progress was achieved in a large number of areas, including the capacity for macroeconomic analysis, the institutional framework for financial and transport sectors, sustainable irrigation schemes, access to basic services, employment opportunities and micro-credits, quality and relevance of higher education, civil service management, public resource management and decentralization. The Bank played an insignificant role and/or achieved little progress in the areas of a modern business environment, tools for managing the fishery sector, rural electrification, land tenure reforms, maternal health services and HIV/AIDS treatment, and gender equality. Finally, no information is provided in terms of helping the country strengthen monitoring, evaluation and coordination capacities. The CASCR draws several sound lessons based on the difficult experience with CAS design and implementation. IEG concurs with all these lessons, and wishes to underscore two additional points. First, there needs to be greater adherence to the practice rather than the rhetoric of selectivity. The Mauritania CAS, for all its overwhelming scope, was designed "with the aim of selecting specific strategies to maximum impact." This failure at being strategically selective even when strategic selectivity was an explicit goal and specific tools (i.e., strategic positioning tool) were developed to promote its application, calls for a careful reflection on the meaning and implications of selectivity. Second, IEG stresses the urgency of the need to rebuild statistical and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capabilities in the context of developing local capacities, and the need to sharpen the results focus of the next CAS in order to better capture development outcomes and better learn from failure.

Review of the 2004-2013 Guinea Country Assistance Strategy Completion Report (CASCR) and of the Interim Strategy Note Completion Report (ISNCR)

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This review examines the implementation of the FY2004-FY2006 Guinea Country Assistance (CAS) of FY2003 and the FY2011-FY2012 Interim Strategy Note (ISN) of FY2011, and assesses the CAS and ISN Completion Report (CASCR). The CAS was prepared for IDA only, whereas the ISN was for IDA, IFC and MIGA. This review covers, where possible, the activities of the three institutions, although the CASCR does Show MoreThis review examines the implementation of the FY2004-FY2006 Guinea Country Assistance (CAS) of FY2003 and the FY2011-FY2012 Interim Strategy Note (ISN) of FY2011, and assesses the CAS and ISN Completion Report (CASCR). The CAS was prepared for IDA only, whereas the ISN was for IDA, IFC and MIGA. This review covers, where possible, the activities of the three institutions, although the CASCR does not discuss IFC or MIGA programs. The objectives set out in the CAS and the ISN covered many of the same areas. The overall objective of the CAS was to support the implementation of the three pillars of the 2002 Poverty Reduction Support Program (PRSP). This would be achieved through (i) fostering macroeconomic stability, establishing minimum infrastructure services for improving the investment climate, supporting policy reforms in fisheries, agriculture, mining and trade, and improving rural services under Pillar I; (ii) empowering urban and rural people, local governments, and their organizations, and strengthening service delivery in health, education, fight against HIV/AIDS, and water resource management under Pillar II; and (iii) supporting institutional transformation, strengthening downward accountability, and supporting monitoring and evaluation (M&E) under Pillar III. The ISN had as its overall goal to deliver timely and adequate support to the then newly elected government in its effort to bring about a tangible improvement of the living conditions of the population. To this end, the ISN proposed to help the Guinean government promote good governance, basic services and job creation. Social accountability and regional integration were identified as the cross-cutting themes. The CASCR rates the overall outcome of World Bank Group (WBG) assistance as moderately unsatisfactory. Applying IEG standard desk-based review methodology in situations where partial information is presented, as it is the case here, would typically lead to a downgrade from the CASCR rating. However, the circumstances under which the CAS and the ISN were developed and implemented mean that IEG is unable to rate with any confidence. Available evidence suggests that some progress has been achieved in select areas, especially during the ISN period, but it is impossible to determine how far these achievements have met the CAS and/or ISN expectations. A field-based evaluation would be necessary to gather the information required for a reliable assessment. For the same reasons as above, the standard IEG CASCR review methodology would call for a downgrade from the CASCR rating of moderately unsatisfactory for WBG performance. The overall CAS and ISN objectives were relevant to the country context and aligned with the PRSP priorities. The CAS engagement areas seemed overly wide, while the lack of clear articulation of the expected outcomes makes it difficult to assess whether the proposed interventions were appropriate for achieving the expected results. The ISN improved the focus of the assistance program. There was good consistency between the planned AAA and financing, and sufficient consideration of other development partners' programs. Key implementation risks were properly identified, although few mitigation measures were proposed. Indeed, the WBG did not appear to have a real strategy for dealing with fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS). There is no information on how the WBG responded when the risks materialized. The results frameworks in the strategy documents, especially the CAS, were weak, partial, and not utilized. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to assess the quality of the WBG's implementation support. There is no information on the quality and impact of the knowledge services, or on the WBG's efforts for improving coordination with other development partners. Adequate attention was paid to fiduciary issues in the strategies, but safeguard concerns were not mentioned. Synergy between the Bank, IFC and MIGA was envisioned in both the CAS and the ISN, but there is no information on how it worked in practice as the CASCR neglects to discuss IFC or MIGA activities. IEG generally agrees with the lessons drawn in the CASCR, and underscores three additional points. First, for both accountability and learning purposes, it is important that country strategies and completion reports adhere to the WBG norms for setting and reporting on monitorable objectives. Second, given the gap between IEG ratings on completed projects and the much higher ISR ratings on projects under implementation, the Bank would need to pay careful attention to these projects in order to recognize the downside risks and provide necessary implementation support. Third, the experience with this country program highlights the importance of having a real strategy, underpinned by sound analyses of the political economy, in an FCS context.

Fisheries in the Maldives and Yemen

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Cambodia: Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project, Northeast Village Development Project, Forest Concession Management And Control Project, and Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Project (PPAR)

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The rural sector of Cambodia — which accounts for the majority of population, production and employment in the Cambodian economy as well as the great majority of poor people — continues to struggle under the consequences of war-torn infrastructure and displaced communities. The four projects reviewed in this report represent an important effort by the Bank to assist the Government to address Show MoreThe rural sector of Cambodia — which accounts for the majority of population, production and employment in the Cambodian economy as well as the great majority of poor people — continues to struggle under the consequences of war-torn infrastructure and displaced communities. The four projects reviewed in this report represent an important effort by the Bank to assist the Government to address these critical infrastructure and capacity building needs directly related to the well being of people in the rural sector. The Agriculture Productivity Improvement Project, approved in 1997, was intended to enhance the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to implement a coordinated national program to help improve the quantity and quality of the technical, human and physical resources required to promote sustainable agricultural development improvements in Cambodia. The overall outcome is rated moderately unsatisfactory. The Northeast Village Development Project, approved in 1999, was intended to introduce decentralized, participatory, and poverty-focused approaches to rural development in some of the poorest areas of Cambodia. The overall outcome is rated satisfactory. The Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project, also a LIL and approved in 2000, was intended to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive set of operational guidelines and control procedures for sustainable forest management in concession areas, and to establish an effective forest crime monitoring and prevention capability. The overall outcome is rated unsatisfactory. The Flood Emergency Rehabilitation Project, approved in 2001, was intended to rehabilitate the economic and social infrastructure damaged by the 2000 floods and to assist the Government in formulating a long-term strategy aimed at reducing the country's vulnerability to flooding. The overall outcome is rated satisfactory. These projects provide five lessons: (1) Use of the Learning Instrument Loan: While it is understood that Learning Instrument Loan or other simplified instruments should not require the same amount of analysis as standard investments loans, the risk review analysis carried out at the concept review stage should identify any particular fiduciary or safeguards that would require regular preparation and appraisal; (2) The Importance of Continuous Contact for Effective Implementation: The fragile institutional framework in post-conflict Cambodia and the limited counterpart pool undermined the effectiveness of periodic Bank supervision and credibility; (3) Sector and Country Strategies as a Management Tool for Operations: Sector or country strategies are often seen as the leading edge for policy dialogue and the identification of investment opportunities, but their usefulness during project implementation may not be as widely recognized; (4) A Gradual Approach to Change: Institutions generally respond more favorably to moderate or gradual change than to radical innovation, particularly when power or stature is being threatened; and (5) Dealing with Informal Transaction Costs as a Development Issue: To an outsider, informal transactions costs may be seen as corruption, but to a participant they may be an expected form of sharing or a means of reaffirming one's role in a group.