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Kenya: Agricultural Productivity Program (KAPP I and II)

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This is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) covers the Kenya Agricultural Productivity Program (KAPP) and Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Program (KAPAP). This report was commissioned to assess the development results and outcomes of the projects, and to document the experiences and lessons from the innovative institutional and policy reforms carried out to accelerate Show MoreThis is a Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) covers the Kenya Agricultural Productivity Program (KAPP) and Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Program (KAPAP). This report was commissioned to assess the development results and outcomes of the projects, and to document the experiences and lessons from the innovative institutional and policy reforms carried out to accelerate agricultural productivity growth and commercialization of smallholder agriculture in Kenya. The sequential implementation of two projects offered an opportunity to assess the extent to which certain institutional and policy reforms—to bring pluralism in the agricultural extension system and increase the performance of the agricultural research system—have contributed to crop-livestock productivity growth. It also allows evaluation of whether the changes introduced are likely to be sustained. This report covers two projects and ratings for each are as follows: Kenya Agricultural Productivity Project - Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was high, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory and Borrower performance was moderately satisfactory. Kenya Agricultural Productivity and Agribusiness Project – Outcome was moderately satisfactory, Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory, and Borrower performance was moderately unsatisfactory. The following lessons are drawn from the experience of the KAPP program: (i) Sustained government ownership and commitment are key to achieve complex and sectorwide institutional reforms. (ii) Effectiveness of institutional reforms and project outcomes requires sustained effort through continuous realignment with the changing context. (iii) Participatory and client-driven approaches with strong priority setting and regular evaluation are critical to stimulate and transform the agricultural research system. (iv) Provision of agricultural extension services to poor small-scale farmers as a public good requires a sustainable financing mechanism. (v) Public sector funding for extension services can be decoupled from public provision to strengthen complementarities and create space for private sector participation and improved service delivery. (vi) Scaling up the contracted service delivery model using the privatized extension system requires development of new public regulatory and quality control systems.

Paraguay CLR Review FY15-18

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Paraguay - Completion and Learning Review for the Period FY15-FY18 : IEG Review (English) Paraguay is an upper middle-income country with a population of 6.8 million (2017) and a GNI per capita (Atlas method) of USD 3,920 in 2017.The population is very young (60 percent under thirty years old) and the country is going through a rapid urbanization process from a low base. The country has over Show MoreParaguay - Completion and Learning Review for the Period FY15-FY18 : IEG Review (English) Paraguay is an upper middle-income country with a population of 6.8 million (2017) and a GNI per capita (Atlas method) of USD 3,920 in 2017.The population is very young (60 percent under thirty years old) and the country is going through a rapid urbanization process from a low base. The country has over the last 15 years achieved solid economic growth (average GDP growth of 4.7 percent per annum) and improved shared prosperity, spurred by abundant natural resources. The CPS for the World Bank Group (WBG) had three pillars (or focus areas): (i) resilience to risks and volatility; (ii) pro-poor delivery of public goods and services; and (iii) agricultural productivity and market integration. The Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) focus areas and objectives were broadly aligned with the government's National Development Plan (NDP) 2014-2030 and supported the NDP's higher level objective to reduce extreme poverty and foster income growth of the bottom 40 percent. The WBG's program components were well aligned with the NDP and addressed important development issues. The program was selective with three focus areas and eight objectives (some of which, however, contained multiple sub-objectives). The Bank demonstrated flexibility by shifting to knowledge services when the demand for IBRD lending dropped in the run-up to the election. However, the results framework had significant shortcomings which were not fully addressed at the PLR stage. The Completion and Learning Review (CLR) highlighted six lessons with which IEG concurs: (i) simplicity in project design helps speed up project implementation; (ii) investment projects may help to build governance and capacity; (iii) a realistic results framework is needed for timely achievement of objectives; (iv) a strong ASA program requires selectivity and government ownership; (v) RASs may help prioritize ASA demand and advance reforms during Paraguay's long project preparation cycles; and (vi) the flexibility afforded by programmatic ASA helps respond to changes in client needs.

North Macedonia: Regional and Local Roads Program Support Project (PPAR)

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This PPAR assesses the development effectiveness of the Regional and Local Roads Program Support project in North Macedonia, which was approved in 2008. The original development objective of the project, “to reduce cost of access to markets and services for communities served by regional and local roads,” was revised through a level I restructuring in 2013 “to reduce the cost of safe access to Show MoreThis PPAR assesses the development effectiveness of the Regional and Local Roads Program Support project in North Macedonia, which was approved in 2008. The original development objective of the project, “to reduce cost of access to markets and services for communities served by regional and local roads,” was revised through a level I restructuring in 2013 “to reduce the cost of safe access to markets and services for communities served by regional and local roads in North Macedonia’s territory, and to improve institutional capacity for investment planning and road safety.” The revised objective thus introduced the element of road safety to access, as well as institutional capacity for investment planning and road safety. Ratings for the Regional and Local Roads Program Support Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was substantial, Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Objective criteria developed and applied in a participatory manner can support a transparent framework to allocate investments and maintenance funds in the roads sector. (ii) The decentralization of responsibilities to local governments needs to be accompanied by the availability of commensurate resources and capacity building. (iii) Road safety and road design elements need to be jointly integrated into the project design and monitoring framework to mitigate risks to the effectiveness of road projects. (iv) Road project appraisal requires sufficient time and technical due diligence to ensure effective and timely project implementation.

Ethiopia: Urban Local Government Development Project (PPAR)

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This is the Project Performance Assessment Report for the Urban Local Government Development Project (ULGDP) in Ethiopia, which was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors on May 29, 2008, and closed on December 31, 2014. The project’s development objective was to support improved performance in the planning, delivery, and sustained provision of priority municipal services and Show MoreThis is the Project Performance Assessment Report for the Urban Local Government Development Project (ULGDP) in Ethiopia, which was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors on May 29, 2008, and closed on December 31, 2014. The project’s development objective was to support improved performance in the planning, delivery, and sustained provision of priority municipal services and infrastructure by urban local governments across the country. Ratings for Urban Local Government Development Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was negligible to low, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) There is a trade‐off between scope and development outcomes in municipal operations that use performance‐based grants. It is critical to ensure that funding is sufficient to both incentivize behavior at the city level and offer a meaningful level of technical assistance. (ii) A one‐size‐fits‐all approach is ineffective in urban development projects that target multiple cities at various stages of development. (iii) Performance‐based grants should be considered as a preferred method of intermediating intergovernmental fiscal resources to urban local governments in the context of emerging urban systems. (iv) Promoting autonomous decision making at the city level although ensuring that operational rules and supervision are in place is a necessary condition to ensuring the intended use of funds in municipal finance projects. (v) Urban development projects need to balance targeting core city administrative functions as well as improving city management and planning competencies.

World Bank Group Support for the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, 2007-2018: An IEG Evaluation (Approach Paper)

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State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) play a critical role in many developing and emerging economies. Governments use SOEs to pursue economic, social and political objectives. These can include such objectives as promoting growth in promising sectors or lagging regions, delivering services to the urban or rural poor or general population, addressing market failures such as natural monopoly, filling Show MoreState-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) play a critical role in many developing and emerging economies. Governments use SOEs to pursue economic, social and political objectives. These can include such objectives as promoting growth in promising sectors or lagging regions, delivering services to the urban or rural poor or general population, addressing market failures such as natural monopoly, filling perceived market gaps, financing investments whose size or risk make private investment unlikely, or addressing issues of heightened national priority or security. The evaluation will review the experience of the WBG supporting SOE reforms over the ten-year period 2008-2018. It will: (i) assess the ways in which WBG support to SOE reform achieved its stated objectives (including the extent to which those objectives were aligned with the strategies of the Bank Group, country, and relevant sectors); (ii) identify what worked (success factors and examples of good practice); and (iii) draw lessons from factors associated with successful and unsuccessful interventions and country engagements to inform the Bank Group’s future response to needs for SOE support.

Bolivia: Rural Alliances Project (PPAR)

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Around the turn of the millennium, based on lessons learned from projects in Bolivia and elsewhere, the World Bank began tinkering with the model of decentralized, community-driven development, trying to make it a more effective vehicle for boosting incomes generated by private sector productive activities in poor rural areas. The conviction was growing that past efforts to raise production Show MoreAround the turn of the millennium, based on lessons learned from projects in Bolivia and elsewhere, the World Bank began tinkering with the model of decentralized, community-driven development, trying to make it a more effective vehicle for boosting incomes generated by private sector productive activities in poor rural areas. The conviction was growing that past efforts to raise production incomes had underperformed because they had not, at the project design phase, paid enough attention to the potential of existing—and, more importantly, new—markets, nor had they developed ways to better link small-scale producers to those markets. The rural alliances model has now been applied to 18 operations in 10 countries throughout the Latin America and Caribbean Region. It seeks to promote links between buyers and organized groups of poor rural producers. The objective of the project, as stated in the development credit agreement, was to test a model to improve accessibility to markets for poor rural producers in pilot areas. Ratings for the project as follows: Outcomes was highly satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was negligible to low, Bank performance was highly satisfactory, and Borrower performance was highly satisfactory. IEG draws six lessons from the assessment: (i) In a country such as Bolivia, where the productivity of small-scale producers is low and there is substantial scope for increasing sales to the domestic market, the first step for a productive alliance is to boost the quantity and quality of the marketed surplus. (ii) Once producer groups are well organized, alliances can help producers obtain sustainable, postproject finance, enhancing the sustainability of the alliance arrangement. (iii) Project management can be greatly enhanced when strict quality controls are applied by independent parties, without political interference. (iv) Technical assistance works best when it is based on a flexible menu that accommodates the varied capacity building needs of different subprojects. (v) Agile disbursement of project funds enhances beneficiary commitment and increases the efficiency of subproject implementation. (vi) Having a knowledgeable national coordinator who helps design the project and provides long-term leadership greatly enhances the achievement of project objectives.

The Philippines Country Program Evaluation (Approach Paper)

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This Country Program Evaluation (CPE) aims to assess the development effectiveness of the World Bank Group (WBG) program in the Philippines between FY10‐18. It will assess the WBG’s contributions to the country’s development in each of the WBG group priority areas of engagement as defined in the 2010‐2012 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the 2014‐2019 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). At Show MoreThis Country Program Evaluation (CPE) aims to assess the development effectiveness of the World Bank Group (WBG) program in the Philippines between FY10‐18. It will assess the WBG’s contributions to the country’s development in each of the WBG group priority areas of engagement as defined in the 2010‐2012 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the 2014‐2019 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS). At the same time, it will look into the extent to which the WBG took advantage of potential synergies between the financial, knowledge and convening services that the WBG institutions offered across its various engagement areas, as well as the factors that could have limited or constrained the scale of the WBG engagement in the country.

Rwanda: Urban Infrastructure and City Management Project (UICMP) (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report reviews the Rwanda Urban Infrastructure and City Management Project (UICMP). The project was approved on November 10, 2005 and became effective on June 2, 2006. The project’s original closing date of March 31, 2009, was extended by nine months to December 31, 2009. The project was financed by an International Development Association (IDA) grant ($20 Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report reviews the Rwanda Urban Infrastructure and City Management Project (UICMP). The project was approved on November 10, 2005 and became effective on June 2, 2006. The project’s original closing date of March 31, 2009, was extended by nine months to December 31, 2009. The project was financed by an International Development Association (IDA) grant ($20 million) and a Professional Human Resource Development grant ($0.46 million), and contributions from the government of Rwanda ($2.6 million). The Nordic Development Fund provided parallel financing ($6.4 million). The project development objective (PDO) was to increase access to urban infrastructure and services in the primary city of Kigali and the two secondary cities of Butare and Ruhengeri through physical investment and upgrading and improved management tools. Ratings for this project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Main lessons from this operation are as follows: (i) The World Bank’s absence in a sector creates knowledge and implementation gaps for both World Bank and client, requiring significant catch-up transaction costs. (ii) Using a delegated management agency to address the weak implementation capacity of local governments requires a focus on building such capacity and a clear exit strategy to ensure long-term sustainability. (iii) To maximize learning from pilot project components, their lessons should be documented and disseminated to inform the future work of the World Bank and government.

Albania: Secondary and Local Roads Project (PPAR)

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This Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Secondary and Local Roads Project in Albania approved in 2008. The project development objective was to improve access to essential services and economic markets via the provision of all-weather roads for the resident population in the rural areas of Albania. This would be achieved through Show MoreThis Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) assesses the development effectiveness of the Secondary and Local Roads Project in Albania approved in 2008. The project development objective was to improve access to essential services and economic markets via the provision of all-weather roads for the resident population in the rural areas of Albania. This would be achieved through reconstructing selected secondary and local roads; building the competencies of the implementation agency Albanian Development Fund (ADF); building an asset management system for the secondary and local road networks; and improving capacity in the local community for maintenance. Ratings for the Secondary and Local Roads Project are as follows: Outcome was satisfactory, Risk to development outcome as moderate, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was satisfactory. Lessons from the project include: (i) Implementing a successful multidonor programmatic approach to sector development requires the combination of government commitment with credible planning and common rules of engagement. (ii) Concentrating competencies within one agency may frustrate future decentralization of responsibilities. (iii) In the absence of need-based and credible linkages to resource allocation, a road asset management system may not get sufficient traction.

Peru: Sierra Rural Development Project (PPAR)

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This is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the Peru Sierra Rural Development Project (P079165). The assessment will contribute to learning from projects that seek to increase the integration of small-scale producers with market value chains. The loan agreement stated that the project development objective was to assist the Borrower in improving the assets and economic conditions Show MoreThis is the Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for the Peru Sierra Rural Development Project (P079165). The assessment will contribute to learning from projects that seek to increase the integration of small-scale producers with market value chains. The loan agreement stated that the project development objective was to assist the Borrower in improving the assets and economic conditions of rural families in selected areas of the Borrower’s Apurímac, Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Junín, Huánuco, and Pasco regions, and strengthen government capacity to implement an integrated Sierra development strategy. Ratings for the Sierra Rural Development Project are as follows: Outcomes was satisfactory, Bank performance was satisfactory, and Quality of monitoring and evaluation was substantial. Four lessons from the experience of this assessment include: (i) Subproject investments by producer groups are more likely to be viable when the selection of subprojects is competitive and demand-driven, and it entails a substantial producer contribution to subproject cost. (ii) Building partnerships between actors in the market value chain is difficult and, in some circumstances, may not be feasible in the short term. (iii) Subproject investments by producer groups give a one-off boost to poor producer households without necessarily ensuring that they will continue to grow, or that the groups to which they belong will become stronger. (iv) Ensuring complementarity between subproject investments by producer groups and government-financed infrastructure and services, although hard to achieve, is important for maximizing impact.