Review of the 2006-2008 Timor-Leste Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), the 2010 Timor-Leste Interim Strategy Note, and the CAS Completion Report
This review examines the implementation of the Fiscal Years (FY) 2006-2008 Timor-Leste Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the FY 2010 Timor-Leste Interim Strategy Note (ISN), and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). This review covers the joint program of the tWorld Bank and the... Full Description »
This review examines the implementation of the Fiscal Years (FY) 2006-2008 Timor-Leste Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) and the FY 2010 Timor-Leste Interim Strategy Note (ISN), and assesses the CAS Completion Report (CASCR). This review covers the joint program of the tWorld Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
The broad objective of the CAS was to support Timor-Leste in consolidating its early progress and creating the conditions for growth outside the petroleum sector and poverty reduction. The objectives were organized under three pillars: (i) delivering sustainable services; (ii) creating productive employment; and (iii) strengthening governance. Youth and gender would be mainstreamed across these pillars.
IEG rates the overall outcome of the World Bank Group support as moderately unsatisfactory, concurring with the CASCR rating. It is only ten years since Timor-Leste celebrated independence. Although the country is making rapid progress in developing the key political and social structures, IEG concurs with the CASCR that the environment in which the WBG program was delivered was fragile, rapidly changing and in some ways uniquely challenging.
IEG concurs with the lessons identified in the CASCR, and underscores three additional points. First,the importance to devote at least as much attention to building a strong results chain for the cross-cutting themes as to any other pillars, and include them in the results framework for proper progress monitoring. Second, the risks tn the successful implementation of WBG program may differ in important ways from the risks facing the country that the WBG program is designed to address. Confusing the two often leads to inadequate mitigation measures to leal with the implementation risks. Third, the results frameworks should be consistent with the institutional capacity for data collection and streamlined to include a manageable number of key outcomes to guide program implementation and help signal any needed adjustments.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : CAS Completion Report Reviews , Country : Timor-Leste
March 5, 2013
Timor-Leste Country Program Evaluation, 2000-2010
The World Bank Group (WBG) strategy in Timor-Leste during 2000-10 was articulated in a series of documents; The Joint Assessment Mission Report (Dec 1999) which formed the basis of the Bank's initial interventions; a Transitional Support Strategy (Nov. 2000), which covered the period until Timor-... Full Description »
The World Bank Group (WBG) strategy in Timor-Leste during 2000-10 was articulated in a series of documents; The Joint Assessment Mission Report (Dec 1999) which formed the basis of the Bank's initial interventions; a Transitional Support Strategy (Nov. 2000), which covered the period until Timor-Leste became eligible to apply for membership of IBRD/IDA (May 2002); a Country Assistance Strategy (June 2005) outlining the strategy for the period FY06-08; and a Interim Strategy Note (Aug. 2009) defined the strategy of the WBG for the period FY10-11.
Throughout these strategy documents, the WBG planned to support Timor-Leste in three broad areas: (a) poverty alleviation and the provision of basic social services, including health and education; (b) development of state institutions, including creating good governance and building the capacity of state institutions; and (c) promoting sustainable nonpetroleum growth, especially through the development of agriculture and the private sector.
The relevance of the WBG strategy waned through the evaluation period, despite being broadly congruent with the country's own aspirations. During the first three years, the WBG strategy was relevant, focusing on immediate reconstruction needs, the restoration of key social services and alleviation of basic deprivation. At that time the Bank was the trustee and co-manager of the Trust Fund for East Timor, which brought together resources from different donors and funded investments through grants. As years went by, this immediate focus dissipated. The strategy became more diffuse and all-inclusive, covering a very broad front to the detriment of the most critical areas such as agriculture and capacity-building of state institutions.
WBG support increasingly took the form of development policy operations and extensive analytical and advisory services. The WBG failed to respond to critical social challenges arising from youth unemployment and rising poverty, as the initial emphasis on delivering early tangible benefits to the population lost momentum. The efficacy of the program varied over time and by sector. The Bank performed relatively well in the early reconstruction period, when conditions were most challenging.
As a result, access to basic health and education services improved and dire human deprivation was mitigated. Thereafter, measured against the objectives set by the WBG for itself, the results of its interventions with respect to long-term development challenges became much more uneven. Overall, moderately satisfactory outcomes in health and veterans' issues and highly satisfactory outcomes in the petroleum sector were offset by weak outcomes in other areas covered by the WBG program.
Despite the priority accorded throughout the succession of WBG strategy documents to agriculture, private sector development and employment generation, very little was achieved after the initial period of reconstruction and stabilization. Progress in improving governance and building state institutions, another priority area for the WBG, was good in some respects, but in others opportunities for greater impact were missed. Overall, the outcome of the WBG's program was Moderately Unsatisfactory when rated against the goals that it set for itself.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Country Program Evaluations , Country : Timor-Leste
April 29, 2011