Project Performance Assessment Report for the Ghana First, Second and Third Natural Resource and Environmental Governance Development Policy Operations
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the First, Second, and Third Ghana Natural Resource and Environmental Governance Development Policy Credits (June 2008 through June 2011). Together they represent a completed Programmatic Development Policy Operation series, and this review... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the First, Second, and Third Ghana Natural Resource and Environmental Governance Development Policy Credits (June 2008 through June 2011). Together they represent a completed Programmatic Development Policy Operation series, and this review assesses the Program as a whole. Government’s Natural Resources and Environmental Governance Program (NREG) represented an innovative effort to bring a new approach to a set of challenging subsectors, and to do so in a harmonized manner with other major development partners. The Program supported efforts to improve environmental and natural resource management under three Policy Areas, (i) Forest and Wildlife; (ii) Mining; and (iii) Environmental Protection. The Program development objectives of the series were to (a) ensure predictable and sustainable financing for the forest and wildlife sectors and effective forest law enforcement; (b) improve mining sector revenue collection, management, and transparency; ( c) address social issues in forest and mining communities, and (d) mainstream environment into economic growth. The Program’s overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory. The experience of NREG offers a number of useful lessons about using development policy operations for sectoral interventions, about donor harmonization, and about natural resource management. These include, (i) earmarking funds to specific agencies can undermine the rationale of a development policy operation by inserting the Bank into the relationship between the finance ministry and the line ministries and their agencies; (ii) there is a risk that in sectoral development policy operations with one-year operational cycles, policy and technical advice to the client can be crowded out by processing requirements; (iii) sectoral development policy operations may need complementary technical assistance and support; and (iv) donor harmonization has tradeoffs: it can help to provide a unified platform for sector reform, but can reduce the flexibility of programs, and differences in rules and expectations across agencies pose significant challenges.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : Ghana
June 30, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the Nigeria Community Based Poverty Reduction Project
This Project Performance Assessment Report reviews the Community Based Poverty Reduction Project (CPRP) in Nigeria (2000 to 2009). Although the Nigerian economy is growing, the proportion of the population living in poverty is increasing every year, and poverty reduction remains a major challenge... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report reviews the Community Based Poverty Reduction Project (CPRP) in Nigeria (2000 to 2009). Although the Nigerian economy is growing, the proportion of the population living in poverty is increasing every year, and poverty reduction remains a major challenge in both urban and—especially—rural areas. The most recent social indicators show signs of progress in some areas—especially the under-five and maternal mortality rates—and delays in others, such as access to safe water and sanitation. The objectives of the CPRP were (i) to improve access of the poor to social and economic infrastructure; and (ii) to increase the availability and management of development resources at the community level. The project was implemented in eight Nigerian States of which two had joined in 2005. The project’s underlying principle was to involve communities in the design and implementation of poverty reduction programs. The bulk of the project, therefore, supported community-based initiatives in building and restructuring basic social and economic infrastructure. The project’s overall outcome is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. Several lessons can be drawn, (i) Community-based initiatives need to be integrated and coordinated with government’s broader poverty reduction strategy in order to effectively tackle poverty reduction. The CPRP was overall successful in increasing access of poor rural communities to water, education, and other social and economic infrastructure. However, to achieve profound and lasting impacts on poverty reduction, key elements include greater collaboration and partnership of communities with local government authorities, as well as active support of by relevant sectoral ministries. (ii) For micro-projects to be sustainable in the long run, the community-based development approach needs to engender and nurture a strong relationship between local communities and government at all levels. The collaboration between communities and local government is crucial also for functional reasons; namely, (a) to guarantee financial sustainability; and (b) to ensure the integration of the community-built infrastructure with the (larger) state and government infrastructure. (iii) Development projects—including community-development projects—need to be coherent and complementary. This complementarity can originate within the project itself through harmonization across different projects, or coordination between the Community-Development-Driven (CDD) approach and the government provision. This latter approach would also produce institutional strengthening as an additional benefit. (iv) The Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework is especially crucial for community-based development projects. The CPRP is an example of a project that was likely more successful than the M&E data can possibly tell. Key indicators were regularly collected and used by state agencies to carry out desk and field assessments of proposals, as well as the selection and funding of micro-projects, and to monitor the realization of the community infrastructure. However, very little was collected on targeting, the participatory process, and impacts on the well-being of the communities. This lack of information, besides preventing a full evaluation of the achievements of the project, also limits a deep understanding of the mechanisms that may enhance or weaken the CDD approach. (v) Community-development projects, when properly designed, have the potential of addressing the needs of community members who are traditionally marginalized or not adequately represented. There is limited evidence that women’s needs were properly represented in the selection of the CPRP micro-projects. A constant effort was made to ensure that women were included in community decision-making and women’s associations were encouraged to present proposals of their own. Moreover, the type of projects allowed for funding by the CPRP was especially pro-poor and generally managed in an inclusive way.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : Nigeria
June 30, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the Bosnia and Herzegovina Business Enabling Environment Structural Adjustment Credit
This Project Performance Assessment Report reviews the Bosnia and Herzegovina Business Enabling Environment Structural Adjustment Credit (BAC), implemented from 2002 to 2007. This assessment will inform the forthcoming evaluation “Investment Climate Reforms—An Independent Evaluation of World Bank... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report reviews the Bosnia and Herzegovina Business Enabling Environment Structural Adjustment Credit (BAC), implemented from 2002 to 2007. This assessment will inform the forthcoming evaluation “Investment Climate Reforms—An Independent Evaluation of World Bank Group Support to Reforms of Business Regulations.” The operation was to support government’s reform program, improve the investment climate, create an enabling environment to promote domestic and foreign investment, and to support private sector growth. The BAC was designed as a two-tranche sector adjustment credit that was accompanied by a series of parallel donor capacity-building technical assistance activities. The tranched design proved difficult to implement in practice because the capacity-building conditions could not be fulfilled within the target dates. In addition, the BAC was initiated prior to the Bank’s operational policy on Development Policy Lending (DPL) that set out a new approach regarding budget support financing. The DPL approach would have specified incorporating a results measurement framework. The BAC was facing the unique challenges of (i) post-conflict recovery and reconstruction after civil war, which ended with the Dayton Accords of 1995 and two governing entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS); (ii) transformation from a centrally planned to a market economy; and (iii) a highly complex governance structure designed primarily to restore peace. Progress had been made on the rehabilitation of infrastructure and basic institutional development, including the establishment of the central bank, state and entity treasuries, and issuance of the national currency. On balance, the BAC’s overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. The legacy of this operation is unique and not easily susceptible to generalized lessons. Bearing this in mind, the key lessons are (i) In high risk environments, an “early win” strategy may be required but should be accompanied by flexibility, structured reviews, and an exit strategy in the event that reforms come off track. (ii) Formulation of laws in adjustment operations needs to be accompanied by careful attention to addressing implementation constraints, particularly in post-crisis or transition environments. (iii) The choice of a quick disbursing instrument was questionable in light of the medium-term requirements of capacity-building. Operations that require intensive on-the-ground capacity assistance are not suitable for pure adjustment-type lending, because the adjustment timetable is usually inconsistent with the capacity-building timetable. Capacity-building projects must be of long duration, especially in a post-conflict situation, to adjust to local conditions and allow sufficient implementation time to build up sustainability. Programmatic lending instruments would be more consistent with these requirements. (iv) In situations with multiple development partners and significant capacity constraints, effective leadership and coordination, both in government and development partners, is essential.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : Bosnia and Herzegovina
June 27, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the Mozambique Public Sector Reform Project
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the Mozambique Public Sector Reform Project (2003 to 2009). A two-phased approach was envisaged for this project that sought to restructure the public service to improve decentralized service delivery, and to improve governance. Initially, a high... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the Mozambique Public Sector Reform Project (2003 to 2009). A two-phased approach was envisaged for this project that sought to restructure the public service to improve decentralized service delivery, and to improve governance. Initially, a high level of commitment for public sector reform existed, evidenced by an ambitious government strategy that also aligned with the Bank’s country strategy and other donors’ programs. However, the design proved to be overambitious in relation to the low capacity environment, particularly when high level commitment for the reforms started to flag. While the project was restructured and its time span extended, the addition of new components, expansion of the monitoring framework, and addition of new implementing partners added to the project’s complexity, which was not appropriate given the severe capacity constraints and the reduced political commitment. The overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. Lesssons from this operation include, (i) Public sector reform operations need to consider sustainability of leadership commitment. Political commitment is multi-dimensional comprising several elements, such as clear enabling policies, time-bound implementation strategies, adequate resourcing, and inclusive citizen participation. (ii) The reform program’s ambition must fit the country’s capacity and technical assistance needs. In the case of Mozambique, part of the program was well designed to focus on quick wins that would visibly generate public support, help sustain commitment, and can help motivate service providers. However, the legal reform element was overly complex and lacked adequate technical assistance to keep it on track. (iii) In contexts where there is joint donor support, the Bank should aim to also provide its support through this fund. Using the same processes for accessing funding from the Bank as for other funding reduces transaction costs for government, and helps ensure that the Bank’s resources are disbursed without delay. (iv) Both leadership commitment and capacity have implications for Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). In situations of low commitment and capacity, the Bank needs to spend extra effort to select and link measurable indicators to objectives, and obtain baseline data at the outset. M&E needs to be owned by project managers to support real-time adjustment to projects through the use of feedback mechanisms, and to ensure that results are broadly understood, and used to widen support for reform.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : Mozambique
June 27, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the Nigeria Second National Fadama Development Project
This is the Project Performance Assessment Report of the Second Fadama Development Project (Fadama II) implemented between 2004 and 2009. The second in a series of three consecutive rural development projects, Fadama II represented a significant shift in the way the World Bank framed its approach... Full Description »
This is the Project Performance Assessment Report of the Second Fadama Development Project (Fadama II) implemented between 2004 and 2009. The second in a series of three consecutive rural development projects, Fadama II represented a significant shift in the way the World Bank framed its approach to service delivery and income generation in rural Nigeria. It was the first project to introduce the concept of community driven development to Nigeria’s agriculture sector. Fadama II had three separate but mutually reinforcing objectives, (i) to sustainably increase the incomes of Fadama users—those who depend directly or indirectly on Fadama resources (farmers, pastoralists, fishers, hunters, gatherers, and service providers); (ii) empower communities to take charge of their own development agenda; and (iii) reduce conflict between Fadama users. The community driven development approach project design was substantially relevant. A demand-driven approach was designed to foster cooperation between resource users to more effectively match rural service delivery with identified core local needs. It was also designed to be socially inclusive. The project design would have been more relevant had it been poverty-targeted. Design also lacked an adequate diagnostic of the income constraints of the more marginalized groups included in the project. Conflict lacked a clear definition and a theory of attribution. The project made substantial progress on achieving its first objective of sustainably increasing the incomes of Fadama users. While data made available from external assessment lacks validity, IEG validated the project assumption that sustained assets could generate additional income that could be saved and reinvested over time. Efforts to empower communities to take charge of their own local development were less successful and are therefore rated Modest. Support made available to Fadama II villages was limited to one project cycle. The project was successful in supporting 95 percent of all community associations formed under the project to implement their local development plans. But the empowerment related indicators used by the project were inadequate to measure the project’s empowerment effects. To better understand the contribution that the project may have had on empowering local communities, IEG administered a survey to 118 randomly selected beneficiaries in the six states selected for the evaluation. The survey revealed that Fadama was perceived to yield additional welfare benefits and to have increased savings, but benefits were enjoyed more by group leaders and active members than non-active members. Fadama increased female participation in local economic development planning but evidence suggests that women and other members of vulnerable and marginalized groups were often not able to afford or obtain their needed assets. Efforts to reduce conflict between Fadama user groups are rated Substantial. While IEG cannot validate the pronounced reduction in conflict due to the different benchmarks, definitions, and data collection methods used throughout the life of the project, IEG found that there was substantial attention to resource related disputes that took place within the confines of the project. The efficiency of the project is rated Modest owing to a lack of methodological rigor in determining the estimated rates of returns at project end, inefficient targeting owing to purposive selection of the states and local governments, and inefficient use of monitoring, data collection and assessment systems to support implementation and the design of subsequent project phases. The outcome of Fadama II is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Lessons learned include, (i) Technical interventions that transform land related assets require a socially and culturally sensitive project design that—to the extent possible—provides inclusive development opportunities to all affected parties. The Fadama program is illustrative of the risks that are attendant in neglecting social analysis in technical work streams. The project’s first phase contributed to conflict between natural resource users groups by financing activities that expanded livelihood benefits to one user group at the expense of others. (ii) Community based approaches to local development require sustained and phased commitment. None of the Fadama villages visited by IEG demonstrated a present day capacity to participate in local development planning in a socially inclusive and accountable manner, despite the project’s efforts. Fadama II villages were only supported by one project cycle. Villagers interviewed for this review expressed a significant level of disappointment about the lack of continued access to facilitated negotiation for the provisions of local goods and services. (iii) The sustainability of community-based initiatives depends crucially on an enabling institutional environment, which requires government commitment, and on accountability of leaders to their community to avoid “supply-driven demand-driven” development. (iv) Programs designed to change behavior need to be grounded in a deep understanding of context; they need to be willing to engage in a study of what motivates people. Programs implemented at scale should include a sensitive design that takes into account the different cultural, linguistic and ethnic characteristics of the targeted population. Programs designed to change behavior also require observational and qualitative indicators that in turn, require capacity building and implementation support to tweak project assumptions and project adjust design in real time.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : Nigeria
June 26, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the Sri Lanka Renewable Energy for Rural Economic Development Project
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the Sri Lanka Renewable Energy for Rural Economic Development (RERED) Project (2002-2011). Examining the performance of this project can add to the understanding of Bank’s role and effectiveness supporting Sri Lanka’s electricity sector over the... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the Sri Lanka Renewable Energy for Rural Economic Development (RERED) Project (2002-2011). Examining the performance of this project can add to the understanding of Bank’s role and effectiveness supporting Sri Lanka’s electricity sector over the past fifteen years, and provide valuable feedback for future engagements of a similar nature. Resulting findings and lessons is expected to inform the forthcoming IEG “Evaluation of the World Bank Group’s Support for Electricity Access.” The project sought to (i) improve the quality of rural life by utilizing off-grid renewable energy technologies to provide energy services to remote communities; and (ii) promote private sector power generation from renewable energy resources for the main grid. The project also sought to reduce atmospheric carbon emission by removing barriers and reducing implementation costs for renewable energy and improving energy efficiency. The overall outcome is rated Satisfactory. Lessons include, (i) Local participation and involvement, suitably incentivized, is crucial to promoting distributed power generation activities. (ii) Involving the private sector effectively in a decentralized developmental effort requires flexibility in implementation arrangements and space for adapting to market conditions. (iii) An appropriate feed-in-tariffs policy and its consistent and transparent application are crucial to spur growth of small scale and non-conventional renewable energy generation. (iv) Investments in off-grid electrification could be underutilized or even abandoned in the event of a faster than expected arrival of the electricity grid.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : Sri Lanka
June 25, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the Albania Health System Modernization Project and the Albania Social Sector Reform Program Development Policy Loan
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the Albania Health System Modernization Project (HSMP), implemented from 2006 to 2012, and the Albania Social Sector Reform Development Policy Loan, a one-tranche DPL that became effective in August 2011 and closed in April 2012. The HSMP... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the Albania Health System Modernization Project (HSMP), implemented from 2006 to 2012, and the Albania Social Sector Reform Development Policy Loan, a one-tranche DPL that became effective in August 2011 and closed in April 2012. The HSMP development objective was (i) to improve physical and financial access to, and use of high-quality primary health care services; (ii) to enhance capacity for formulating and implementing health sector reforms and policies; and (iii) to improve hospital governance and management. The HSMP’s overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. The Social Sector DPL was designed to support legislative reform (i) in support of social safety net effectiveness; and (ii) in support of health spending efficiency and equity. The DPL’s overall outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Both projects were (a) grounded in analytic work and technical assistance; (b) supported far-reaching reforms; (c) sought to exploit synergies across various forms of Bank support and lending instruments; and (d) faced a range of challenges inherent in reform implementation. Highlights of cross-cutting lessons follow. (i) The high quality of the Bank’s analytic work and technical assistance is necessary but not sufficient for effectiveness. Also important are the involvement and buy-in of government and other key stakeholders, as well as the strategic packaging of this support with other products and services. (ii) One-tranche development policy lending can be transformative and support reform momentum, if it (a) builds on solid analytic work; (b) can effectively leverage critical policy change that may not gain sufficient traction through sector dialogue alone; and (c) is supported by continuity in the sector policy dialogue and through lending services once the DPL closes. (iii) The political economy is critical to factor into reform design and risk management. Neglect of some aspects in this regard is likely to have undermined prospects for the full and successful implementation of health reforms under the Health Sector Modernization Project. (iv) The sequencing of reforms under the subsequent Social Assistance DPL and its implementation support is likely to have mitigated potential implementation setbacks associated with political feasibility, capacity, and fiscal constraints. (v) The design and implementation of pilot projects to test and fine-tune reforms, the establishment of well-functioning management information systems and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems are critical to health and social assistance reform, as these can accommodate learning, provide evidence of the feasibility and benefits of such reform, and garner political support.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : Albania
June 24, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the China Second Tianjin Urban Development and Environment Project and the China Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses two urban development projects in China, the Second Tianjin Urban Development and Environment Project (2003 to 2012) and the Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project (2005 to 2012). Notably, findings from this report will inform... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses two urban development projects in China, the Second Tianjin Urban Development and Environment Project (2003 to 2012) and the Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project (2005 to 2012). Notably, findings from this report will inform IEG’s upcoming evaluation of Bank Group performance on poverty reduction, specifically on tackling urban poverty. The unprecedented scale of urbanization in China and the accompanying increasing demands for urban services form the backdrop to this evaluation. Tianjin and Chongqing have the status of provinces, but are administered directly by the central government. Both operations sought to address the key question of how to improve urban services for a rapidly growing population. The Tianjin-II project’s objective set out to assist Tianjin in enhancing the efficiency and equity of wastewater management and transportation system aimed at Tianjin’s sustainable development; however, the concepts of efficiency and equity were undefined. The overall outcome of the project is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. The Chongqing Small Cities Infrastructure Improvement Project objective was to support emerging small cities to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure service delivery, to accommodate rapid urban growth. The overall outcome of the project is rated Moderately Satisfactory. Common lessons from both projects include, (i) Great care is needed in project preparation and appraisal to ensure that all proposed interventions are feasible. In the case of the Tianjin-II project, some originally designed components and activities were cancelled or modified because the feasibility studies showed that these activities were not feasible. The changes led to project restructuring and implementation delays. (ii) A well-phrased and clearly defined project development objective (PDO) statement and a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework is a key step towards a results-focused Bank operation. Both the Tianjin-II and Chongqing Small Cities projects face similar challenges of PDOs that are not clearly defined and non-comprehensive M&E frameworks, making it difficult to monitor and assess the project implementation progress towards achieving the development objectives. IEG’s interaction with task team leaders across the Bank suggests that phrasing an accurate and relevant PDO appears to be a common challenge. (iii) By continuing to tailor its services and instruments to the more localized needs and capacity of the Borrower, the Bank can maintain the effectiveness of its support. The interaction with local officers in Tianjin and Chongqing suggested that there is still strong demand for the Bank’s support in urban development in China. However, in more developed urban areas like Tianjin, demand is mainly for the Bank’s innovation and knowledge rather than the Bank’s financing. For less developed urban areas like the secondary cities in Chongqing, the Bank’s financing and project management experiences with special attention to environment and vulnerable groups, are very much appreciated. (iv) While the Bank’s engagement has supported the development in China, its prolonged internal decision-making processes may decrease its competitiveness in helping address fast-paced changes. In the case of Tianjin-II, the project implementation often could not keep up with local development, resulting in the cancelation of project activities. Such an experience is quite common across the Bank’s projects in China. Inefficiency on the Bank side is often cited by both parties as the main reason. The client suggested that the Bank could become more efficient through simplifying procedures and granting more authority to Bank task team leaders, who could make more timely decisions to accelerate project implementation.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : China
June 23, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the Bangladesh Rural Electricity and Renewable Energy Development (RERED) Project, the Bangladesh Power Sector Development Technical Assistance Project, and the Bangladesh Power Sector Development Policy Credit
This Project Performance Assessment Report evaluates the Bangladesh Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development (RERED) Project (fiscal years 2002 to 2013), the Power Sector Development Technical Assistance Project (fiscal years 2004 to 2013), and the Power Sector Development Policy... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report evaluates the Bangladesh Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Development (RERED) Project (fiscal years 2002 to 2013), the Power Sector Development Technical Assistance Project (fiscal years 2004 to 2013), and the Power Sector Development Policy Credit (fiscal years 2008 to 2009). Despite government’s significant efforts, especially over the last decade, the country lags behind in providing electricity access to its population. The lack of access is particularly high in rural areas, even when compared with other countries in the South Asia Region. By examining the Bank’s role and effectiveness over the past two decades of Bank support to Bangladesh’s power sector over, the resulting findings and lessons will inform the forthcoming IEG “Evaluation of the World Bank Group’s Support for Electricity Access,” as well as provide feedback for future engagement in this sector. Together, the projects addressed priority needs of the country’s energy sector with the overall objective of raising levels of social development and economic growth in the country. The RERED project aimed to increase access to electricity in rural areas. It also worked to reduce atmospheric carbon emissions by overcoming market barriers for the use of renewable energy. Its overall outcome is rated Highly Satisfactory. The Technical Assistance (TA) Project sought to improve the government’s capacity for formulating power sector policies, institutional structures, and a gas supply strategy needed for balanced development of Bangladesh’s power sector. It also sought to prepare at least two power sector investment projects. The project’s overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. The Development Policy Credit focused on enhanced governance and accountability, and on improved financial stability that would lead to better and more sustainable service provision, including improved private investment in generation. Its overall outcome is rated Unsatisfactory. The following lessons can be drawn, (i) Off-grid household electrification can accelerate the benefits of “lighting” in a cost-effective manner, to populations that face uncertain waiting periods for grid-based electricity, or are unlikely to obtain grid-based electricity due to remote or inaccessible locations. (ii) A public-private partnership model can efficiently deliver large-scale and dispersed off-grid electricity services, by deploying public funding through private sector stakeholders. (iii) One-off technical assistance or credit support operations should be highly strategic, selective and practical in supporting policy and institutional issues of a complex nature. (iv) One-off Credit operations cannot be expected to make headway on multiple policy fronts in a sector, especially if these issues have some commonalities with other sectors. The Power Sector Development Policy Credit single-tranche operation covered complex issues of governance and financial sustainability, which were difficult to resolve to any significant extent in a program of short duration. (v) Achieving broader social and economic outcomes from electricity access provision will primarily depend upon the pursuit of a least cost path for grid expansion backed by appropriate sector policies, complemented by off-grid electricity in the interim or permanently as needed.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : Bangladesh
June 20, 2014
Project Performance Assessment Report for the St. Lucia Economic and Social Development Policy Loan and Credit Operation
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the Uganda Second Local Government Development Project (2003 to 2008). The project’s development objective was to improve Local Governments’ institutional performance for sustainable, decentralized service delivery, particularly for the poor. It... Full Description »
This Project Performance Assessment Report assesses the Uganda Second Local Government Development Project (2003 to 2008). The project’s development objective was to improve Local Governments’ institutional performance for sustainable, decentralized service delivery, particularly for the poor. It built on lessons from the previous operation, and sought to support implementation efforts as an important step toward achieving the Millennium Development goals in education, health, and access to water. The project’s overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. Key lessons identified were, (i) Policy reversals can cause serious damage to otherwise significant project outcomes, and are difficult to counter. District proliferation or reduction in un-earmarked funding, or Local Governments’ rights to raise revenues, need to be monitored closely as these could be early signals of policy reversal. (ii) Monitoring should be focused on outcome indicators as well as process indicators; moreover, indicators are best unified across sectors. (iii) Decentralization is not a sector, while it was treated as such in Uganda with a Sector Working Group, a Sector Investment Plan, and specific donor support. Decentralization of service delivery affects all economic sectors and should be supported in a harmonized way across sectors and donor programs. (iv) Many conditional grants to Local Governments are funded through donor programs. A fully decentralized sector allocation, supported through government budgets, however, requires changes to ways of donor fund allocations across sectors, given that such allocations cannot be determined a priori. This is even more important in case Local Governments and communities have authority to do so, while, on the other hand, incompatibilities exist in this regard, such as those related to development cooperation frameworks or to sector-specific earmarking of funds by teams.
Content Type : Reports , Doc Sub Category : Project Performance Assessment Report , Country : St. Lucia
May 30, 2014